

Mm. Professor  
**Kuppuswami Sastri**  
Birth Centenary  
Commemoration Volume

Ed. by Dr. S. S. Janaki

THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MADRAS

1981















Mm. Professor  
**KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY  
COMMEMORATION VOLUME**

PART I

(Collection of Sastri's Writings and a Kavya on him)



BIRTH-CENTENARY PUBLICATION

*Editor:*

**DR. S. S. JANAKI**

**THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
MADRAS**

1981



Copyright, K. S. R. Institute

Price Rs.

185/-

Published by  
The Kuppuswami Sastri  
Research Institute,  
84, Royapettah High Road,  
Madras 600 004.

Printed by T. V. Ramani  
at Ramani Brothers, (Printers)  
4, C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer Street  
Madras-600 018





His Holiness Jagadguru

**SRI CHANDRASEKHARENDRASARASWATHI**

Sri Sankaracharya Swamigal of Kanchi Kamakoti Peetam









His Holiness Jagadguru  
**SRI JAYENDRA SARASWATHI**  
Sri Sankaracharya Swamigal of Kanchi Kamakoti Peetam









## ॥ श्रीचन्द्रमौलीश्वरः ॥

स्वस्ति - श्रीमदखिल - भूमण्डलालंकारत्रयत्रिंशत्कोटिदेवतासेवितश्रीकामाक्षीदेवीसनाथ - श्रीमदेकाम्रनाथ-  
श्रीमहादेवीसनाथ-श्रीहस्तिगिरिनाथसाक्षात्कार-परमाधिष्ठानसत्यव्रतनामांकित-काञ्चीदिव्यक्षेत्रे शारदामठसुस्थितानाम्  
अतुलितसुधारसमाधुर्य - कमलासनकामिनीधम्मिल्लसम्पुल्लमल्लिकामालिकानिप्यन्द-मकरन्दझरीसौवस्तिक-वाङ्मनगुम्भ-  
विजृम्भणानन्दतुन्दिलितमनीषिमण्डलानाम् अनवरताद्वैतविद्याविनोदरसिकानाम् निरन्तरालंकृतीकृतशान्तिदान्तिभूषणम्  
सकलभुवनचक्रप्रतिष्ठापक - श्रीचक्रप्रतिष्ठाविख्यातयशोऽलंकृतानाम् निखिलपाषण्डषण्डकण्टकोत्पाटनेन विशदी-  
कृतवेदवेदान्तमार्ग - षण्मतप्रतिष्ठापकाचार्याणां श्रीमत्परमहंसपरित्राजकाचार्यवर्य - श्रीजगद्गुरु-श्रीमच्छंकरभगवत्पादा-  
चार्याणाम् अधिष्ठाने सिंहासनाभिषिक्त-श्रीमन्महादेवेन्द्रसरस्वतीसंयमीन्द्राणाम् अन्तेवासिवर्यश्रीमच्चन्द्रशेखरेन्द्र-  
सरस्वतीश्रीपादादेशानुसारेण श्रीमज्जयेन्द्रसरस्वतीश्रीपादैः क्रियते नारायणस्मृतिः ।

श्रीगणपत्यग्रहाराभिजनस्य मीमांसादिशास्त्रनिपुणत्वेन प्रकाशितवतः दर्शनकलानिधेः राजकीयादि-  
क्षेत्रेषु शास्त्रपरीक्षाप्रणालीप्रबन्धकर्तुः, मयूरपुरीसंस्कृतकलाशालाभूतपूर्वाध्यक्षस्य कुण्डपुरस्वामिशास्त्रिणः स्मारकत्वेन  
एतच्छास्त्रिणः शिष्यैः सुदृढिश्च एतत्कलाशालाप्राङ्गणे स्थापितायाः, अनेकशास्त्रग्रन्थधटितं पुस्तकालयं  
निर्वहन्त्याः, पत्रिकाद्वारा, साक्षाच्च पूर्वमुद्रितशास्त्रग्रन्थान् सविमर्शनं प्रकाशयन्त्याः कुण्डपुरस्वामिशास्त्रिविमर्शक-  
समितेः निर्वाहकाः आगामिनि ज्येष्ठमासे एतच्छास्त्रिजन्मशताब्दोत्सवं सविशेषं प्रवर्तयिष्यन्तीति विदित्वा मोदामहे ।

एतत्समितेः शास्त्रसेवा आस्तिकानां सहयोगेन उपर्युपर्यभिवृद्धिमियादित्याशास्महे ।

यात्रास्थानम्

सतारा (महाराष्ट्रप्रदेशः)

दुर्मति चैत्रशुद्धद्वादशी

नारायणस्मृतिः







## FOREWORD

Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri was a giant among Sanskritists of the present century, who gave a new life to Sanskrit Studies, moulded, nurtured and directed them for over thirty-five years. He was himself a great scholar of massive intellect and a worker of uncompromising integrity. With a solid foundation in Vyakarana, he mastered the two Mimamsas, Nyaya and Sahitya. Side by side with his education on traditional lines, he studied the present-day subjects, including Western Philosophy through the medium of English. The result was that he was steeped in Indian scholarly traditions and had also absorbed the best features of the modern, critical, comparative and historical methods. Besides all this, the uniqueness of Prof. Sastriar is that he performed everything most conscientiously and with utmost dedication.

Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, in his tribute said: "R. G. Bhandarkar on our side, Ganganath Jha in the North and Kuppuswami Sastri in the South were the three pillars of Oriental Scholarship known to the older generation of today whose examples must be placed permanently before the younger generation of workers through some standing memorial Institutions that could continue their work for incoming ages in the same spirit of devotion and self-less-ness".

Fortunately, we have the Bhandarkar Institute in Pune, Ganganatha Jha Research (now G. Jha Kendriya Vidyapitha) in Allahabad and our own modest Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute in Madras.

I am now delighted that it has been possible for the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute to bring out the valuable writings of Sastriar collected in a single volume, along with a kavya on him by a devoted disciple of his. The collection, I am sure, will be of great value to Sanskrit students and researchers. It is indeed a fitting homage to that great savant.



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

This volume is but the first part issued by the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute in connection with the Birth-Centenary of Sastriar on the 19th, 20th and 21st of June. The second part will follow in due course, as indicated by Dr. Janaki in her fine Preface.

I congratulate Dr. Janaki for compiling all the relevant material with singular devotion.

Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri was a Kulapathi in the literal sense. He has brought into existence directly and indirectly a large number of scholars who bear his mark and have been and are working all over India. May they increase and flourish and carry the torch of learning lit by their Master !

I hope and trust that these celebrations and these volumes will give a great fillip to the cause for which the great savant, held in Rishi-like veneration, worked so arduously all his lifetime.

*J. V. Viswanatha Aiyar*

Madras,  
9th June 1981



## PREFACE

It is my pleasant duty and a privilege to bring out, on behalf of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, this valuable collection of the writings of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri, along with a Kāvya on him, on the occasion of his Birth-Centenary Celebrations.

The spectrum of 27 articles, presented now, each one a precious gem in itself, appears afresh and charming like a newly strung Nakshatra-garland—सूत्रे मणिगणा इव. They represent the varied writings of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri, covering nearly two decades (1919-40)—lectures, critical exposition, Presidential address, Foreword, and Introduction. The subjects are diverse—terse Śāstraic matter, keen appreciation of the classics, known and little known, critical introduction of texts, Library Science and Sanskrit Studies. Their treatment by Sastriar is unique and unsurpassed. He deals with abstruse topics in his characteristic clear manner, and makes them impressionable even to the beginner on the subject by apt analogies. His literary estimate of a Kāvya reveals not only his keen poetic sensibilities but also its appreciation in the proper perspective. Those who were privileged to hear Prof. Sastriar's speeches, especially those in Sanskrit, still feel thrilled about his ringing words, rhythmic assonance, his choice expression and clear delivery. It is no wonder that the silver-tongued orator, the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, was one of the great admirers of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri. Whatever Prof. Sastri wrote or spoke was the cream of his thought, a model of excellence, authoritative and thought-provoking. सारं वा लिख्यते किञ्चित् न वा किञ्चन लिख्यते, seems to have been the motto of his writings. Although they were written nearly fifty years ago, his writings and speeches still exude fresh odour and are useful for the students in diverse fields of Sanskrit studies and research.

Many may not be aware of the valuable contributions of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri to Tamil Studies. He was the first Principal of the Raja's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Tiruvayyaru during 1910-14. It was he who first introduced the Vidwan Course in Tamil in that College. He took great interest in ancient Tamil manuscripts which he collected in large numbers for the Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, as its Curator. As a member of the Tamil Lexicon Committee he greatly helped in its publication. He has himself made a deep study of the Tamil classics, especially the *Manimekhalai*. We learn from his article on Aravanavaṭikal, included in this collection, that he had even planned to bring out his annotated critical edition of some chapters of *Manimekhalai* with English translation, bringing out the correspondence between the Tamil classic and early Buddhist logic.

I started collecting the scattered writings on the basis of Prof. Raghavan's bibliographical account about his guru, Prof. Sastri. I am glad now that by the grace of the Almighty, it has been possible for me to get all of them after a long search and even two more gems, not listed therein, namely his foreword to *Vishnusahasranāma* and *Mūkapañcaśatī*. The *Mūkapañcaśatī* was one of the stotras that Sastriar dearly loved and appreciated, having learnt it from his



maternal grandfather Vengu Sastrigal. The latter, who attained Siddhi at the fourth year of the Professor, is known to have woken up his grandson at midnight, before himself taking to Sannyasa, and to have given fresh milk sanctified with his *Abhimantraṇa*.

धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे  
न चापलमयामहे भवभयान्न दूयामहे ।

which Prof Sastriar was often repeating, he was repeating from his third year.

In this collection I have corrected a few obvious printing mistakes in the earlier publications and also added some notes wherever necessary, to bring the matter upto date. I have indicated the sources for all the writings and it is now my pleasant duty to thank the various authorities, especially the following, who spontaneously gave permission to me for publishing these articles in this collection :

The Govt., Oriental Mss. Library, Madras ; The Madras Library Association ; R. S. Vadhyar & Sons, Kalpati, Palghat ; M. L. J. Press, Madras ; The Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, U. P. ; The Indian Philosophical Congress, Waltair ; Triveni, Machilipatnam ; and All-India Oriental Conference, Poona.

I am thankful to the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare for the financial assistance in bringing out this Volume. My thanks are also due to Sri V. T. Rajan and Ramani Brothers Printers for their neat execution, and for publishing this whole work in about 45 days.

I intend to bring out the follow-up issue of the Birth-Centenary Commemoration Volume, containing the Proceedings of the Birth-Centenary Celebrations, tributes, and articles in Sanskrit and English, by Scholars in India and abroad, to be released at the Valedictory function of the Birth-Centenary Celebrations that is planned to take place in the first week of November 1981.

Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri stood for high ideas and ideals in life and academic pursuits. May the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, founded in memory of the great master and pioneer in Sanskrit research studies in South India, grow from strength to strength, and enrich the cultural life of the Indological world, in India and outside !

Madras,  
9th June 1981

S. S. JANAKI



## CONTENTS

		Pages
NARAYANA SMRTI	... H. H. Sri Jayendra Sarasvati Swamigal of Kanchi Kamakoti Pitha	i
FOREWORD	... Sri T. V. Viswanatha Aiyar.	v
PREFACE	...	vii
CONTENTS	...	ix
NARAYANA SMRTI	... H. H. Sri Chandrasekharaendra Sarasvati Swamigal of Kanchi Kamakoti Pitha. (From Kuppuswami Sastri Memorial Volume).	i
MM. PROF. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI	... Dr. V. Raghavan	iii

## COLLECTED WRITINGS OF PROF. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIAR :

Problems of Identity in the Cultural History of Ancient India	. 1
The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad	. 9
Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi	. 23
Maṇḍana's Vibhramaviveka	. 66
Compromises in the History of Advaitic Thought	. 74
Pūrṇaism in Indian Philosophy	. 89
Abrahmajijñāsā (Skt.)	. 94
The Prābhākara School of Karma Mīmāṃsā (I-II)	. 95
Nyāya Vaiśeṣhika—Origin and Development	. 104
Rāvana-Bhāshya	. 119
Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit	. 122
Vālmiki Rāmayaṇa	. 152
Padyacūḍāmaṇi of Buddhaghosha	. 154
Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi of Śaktibhadra	. 158
Naishadhiyacarita of Śrī Harsha	. 169
Nilakaṇṭhaviṇaya Campū of Nilakāṇṭha Dīkṣita	. 171
Kośavān Ācāryaḥ	. 176
Library Movement as viewed by a classicist	. 178
Authorial Polyonymy and Homonymy in Sanskrit Literature	. 186



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

	Pages
Linguistic Notes—Bhadanta	. 190
Madras University Convocation Address	. 191
Sri Ramakrishna and the Message of Hinduism	. 203
Sri Viṣṇusahasranāma	. 206
Mūkapañcaśatī	. 208
Presidential Address at Pandita Parishad A.I.O.C. (Synthesis of Learning and Research) (Skt.)	. 210
Presidential Address at All-India Sanskrit Conference (Skt.)	. 212
Problems of Identity in the Cultural History of Ancient India— Aravaṇavaṭīkal of Sangam Age	. 217

## SUPPLEMENT:

GURUCARITAM: (Kāvya on Mm. Kuppuswami Sastri) by Prof. N. Ramakrishna Bhat	. i-xlvi
---	----------



**Published with the Financial Assistance of the Ministry  
of Education and Social Welfare, Government of India.**



Published with the sanction of the Ministry  
of Education and Social Welfare, Government of India



SRIMUKHA FROM H. H. SRI JAGADGURU  
CANDRASEKHARENDRA SARASVATI SVAMIGAL  
SANKARACARYA OF  
KNCI KAMAKOTI PITHA

श्री चन्द्रमौलीश्वर

स्वस्ति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरित्राजकाचार्यवर्य श्रीकाञ्चीकामकोटिपीठाधीश्वरजगद्गुरु-श्रीमच्छङ्कर-  
भगवत्पादाचार्याणामधिष्ठाने सिंहासनाभिषिक्तश्रीमन्महादेवेन्द्रसरस्वतीसंयमीन्द्राणामन्तेवासिवर्य -  
श्रीमच्चन्द्रशेखरेन्द्रसरस्वतीश्रीपादैः क्रियते नारायणस्मृतिः ॥

दर्शनकलानिधि - महामहोपाध्यायादिविरुद्व्याख्यातचतुस्तन्त्रवैशारद्यानां परिशीलनसंवर्धनसेवादिभिः  
संस्कृतविद्यैकतानस्वान्तानाम् औदार्यक्षमामुदितादिगुणविभूषितानां स्थूलसूक्ष्मकारणातिरेकिणा अनपायिना यशःका-  
येन चकासतां ब्रह्मश्रीकुपुस्वामिशस्त्रिणां संस्मरणलक्षणोऽयं ग्रन्थः तच्छात्रैः अन्यैश्च तेष्वकलितभाववन्धैः  
सहृदयैः विरचितप्रबन्धनिचयात्मा प्रकाशमुपनीयत इति भृशं प्रमुदितान्तरङ्गा स्मः ॥

शास्त्रिणः किलैते कौमारादेव संस्कृतविद्याभ्यसनप्रवणाः कुलक्रमानुगतेन, पौर्वदेहिनेन च केनापि  
बुद्धिसंयोगेन न्यायमीमांसादिशास्त्रेषु नितरां परिश्रम्यन्ति स्मेति श्रूयते । यदा च संस्कृत एम्. ए. परीक्षामुदतरन्  
तदा श्री वि. कृष्णस्वाम्यार्यमहोदयाः शास्त्रेषु आङ्गलविद्यायां च तादृशमेषां महोद्यममालक्ष्य अतिमात्रमेनानभिन्त्य-  
विशन्त ; अभ्यारोहयंश्च नवप्रतिष्ठापितायां स्वीयसंस्कृतविद्याशालायामध्यक्षपदवीम् ॥

तत्र च बिन्दुटीका-भाट्टचिन्तामणि-कुतूहलवृत्त्यादीन् विरलप्रचारान् ग्रन्थान् सकुतूहलम् अध्यापयन्तः  
सम्यग्विवर्धयन् प्राचीननवीनशास्त्रग्रन्थानां कामपि पाठनरीतिमवतारयन्तश्च स्वीयपाण्डित्याभिवृद्ध्या साकं  
शास्त्राभिवृद्धिं कलयन्तः तेषु च शास्त्रेषु ये ग्रन्थविशेषाः अनितरमेधास्तानविश्रान्तपरिश्रमेण समीक्ष्य निपुणमतीन्  
स्वानन्तेवासिनो ग्राहयन्तश्च व्यराजिषत ॥

अपरं च, पञ्चनदसंस्कृतविद्याशालाप्रधानाध्यक्ष्यावलम्बनेन तत्र यथादर्शितया दिशा साहित्यव्याकरणादि-  
सामान्यशास्त्राध्यापनशैलीपरिष्करणेन, ततो मद्रपुरीराजकीयाङ्गलकलाशालासंस्कृतप्रधानाध्यापकस्थानपरिग्रहेण  
साङ्गलसविमर्शसंस्कृताध्यापनेन च शास्त्रिवर्या अनितरसाधारणीं प्रथामवापुः । इत्थमिमे सप्तत्रिंशता वत्सरैः  
उपेयभूतानां वेदान्तादीनां, उपायभूतानां साहित्यादीनां शास्त्राणां सविमर्शमध्यनोपकल्पनेन, हन्त ! शास्त्रिवर्याः



अन्वर्थमहामहोपाध्यायविरुदाः, दर्शनकलानिघयश्च संवृत्ताः । यथा चेमे उदारोदाराणां महाशायानां वि. कृष्ण-  
स्वाम्यार्याणां शिवस्वाम्यार्याणां च परिग्रहणेन महतीं समुच्छादशामध्यरोहन्ति स्म तथा पण्डितवर्याणामेतेषामा-  
श्रयेण विराजमानास्वद्यतनासु संस्कृतकलाशालासु मदपुरीयसंस्कृतकलाशाला अनुत्तमां समुन्नतिमवाप्य विराजमाना  
दरीदृश्यते ॥

नात्र किञ्चिच्चित्रमिव यदिदानीमपि कराळे कलौ काले संस्कृतविद्या उज्जीवनीति, यदेभिः एतावन्तं  
कालं विश्वविद्यालयासु राजकीयासु च विचार-निर्णय-उपदेशसमितिषु अभ्यन्तरीभूय संस्कृतानुबन्धिकर्तव्याकर्त-  
व्यविषयेषु बहुशः तत्तन्व्यायोल्लिङ्गनपूर्वकं युक्तरूपा विशिष्टतराश्च उपदेशाः कृताः । न चेदमपि परीक्षकाणां  
विस्मयावहं यदेषां संस्कृतसेवायामेव कृत्स्नमायुरुपक्षपयतां तानि तानि उपदेशवचनानि श्रुतिवचनानीव विश्वविद्याल-  
यीयैः, राजकीयैश्च निरपेक्षं प्रमाणानि उररीक्रियन्ते स्मेति यत इमे शास्त्रिवर्याः विद्याशीलपरोपकारप्रख्याति-  
सुखवित्तानां पारदौर्बल्यं श्रुतिलिङ्गादीनामिव अभिमन्यमानाः दोषविदूराः अभिरूपायाः शोभनायाश्च लोकयात्रायाः  
निर्वहणेन इत्थं विद्या अभ्यसनीया इत्थं लोकव्यवहारो वर्तनीय इति चास्मिन् विषये निदर्शनमासन् । सर्वमिद-  
मनुचिन्त्यमानं सहृदयपरीक्षकाणाम् अनल्पाय हृदयसंवादोपस्कृताय च नियतं चमत्काराय कल्पेत । श्रीमच्छास्त्रिवर्यैः  
समक्तिप्रकर्षं निरन्तरसमाराधितस्य उमासहायस्य परमेश्वरस्य अनुग्रहविशेष एवायं यदेतावती एतेषाम् अनन्य-  
सुलभा समुच्छादप्राप्तिः । सततशिवपूजापरतया “परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः । कविताबुधयोयोगे नमामि  
शिवयोर्यथा ॥” इति चैवमादि-पद्यविरचनेन कियती शास्त्रीणां पारमेश्वरी भक्तिरिति सुतरामभिव्यज्यत एव ।  
तन्मन्यामहे पण्डितप्रवराणामीदृशानां संस्मरणप्रबन्धो नाम महदुपकुर्याल्लोकस्य । यदि चोक्तशास्त्रिवर्य-  
संस्मरणप्रबन्धप्रकाशनोद्युक्ता एते चान्ये च संस्कृतप्रणयिनः इतोऽप्यधिकतरं व्यवस्येयुः तत्तादृशस्य शास्त्रिवर्यादृतस्य  
संस्कृतविद्याभिवृद्धिप्रकारस्य संस्कृतलोकोपकारस्य च अनुरूपं किमप्यन्यत् अभिज्ञानं सम्पादितं भवेदिति ॥

आशास्महे च स एव भगवान् कुतूहलवृत्तिं ब्रह्मसिद्ध्यादिप्रबन्धात्मना यशःकायेन इह शाश्वतीं प्रतिष्ठां  
शास्त्रिवर्याणामनुगृहीयात् ; आविर्भावयेच्च स्वं परतरं ज्योतिस्स्वरूपमिति, एवं शास्त्रिवर्यविषये कृतज्ञताविष्करण-  
कुतूहलिनां तत्संस्मरणप्रबन्धप्रकाशनरूपलोकोपकारबद्धादराणां गीर्वाणभाषाभिमानिनाम् ऐहिकामुष्मिकश्रेयांस्यनु-  
गृह्णात्विति च ॥

मकाम् कुम्भघोणम्  
श्री. शा० शके १८६५  
सुभासुसं० मार्गशीर्षक १०

नारायणस्मृतिः









**Mm. Professor KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI**



# Mahamahopadhyaya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri

By

DR. V. RAGHAVAN

शरतलपे शयानस्तु शाम्यन्निव द्रुताशनः<sup>1</sup> ।

So did that Bhishma of learning appear when in the first half of 1943, I ran to Gaṇapati Agraharam on hearing about our beloved Professor's illness, and saw that mighty personality reclining in his sickbed. The body was ill, but that spirit, that will, that white-hot intellect was all in tact. As I neared him and he held my hand, tears welled up in his eyes, and he said that the scene was similar to that painted by Bāṇa, Harṣavardhana rushing to Prabhākara-vardhana's bedside and added, looking at me and his son who was also nearby, 'Do not push the comparison further. I am going to live for twenty-five years more.' Some months later, he was again in a serious condition but he was continuously affirming his long life; not because this Vedantin valued life as such, but because, as he reiterated in many public utterances of his, he yet wanted to teach more and help to knowledge still many more that might seek him. The Kulapati passed away on 5th September, 1943, but the long life that he was affirming will be that of his fame, of the *Yasāḥkāya* of one to whom more than to anybody else, Sanskrit learning in South India, on both the traditional and the modern styles, owes so much.

आस्त एव निरातङ्गं कान्तं 'कीर्ति'-मयं वपुः<sup>2</sup> ।

The late Professor was born on 15th December, 1880 in the village of Gaṇapati Agraharam on the banks of the Kāverī in the Tanjore District, the banks along which Paramahamsas like Sadāśiva Brahmendra roamed.

The Professor's family was well-known in the place as Malayāla-sthas, indicating their migration, and a maternal great grand-father of his was a courtier of the Tanjore Court and held an annual reception to King Serfoji at Gaṇapati Agraharam. Kuppuswami by the popular name and Veṅkaṭarāma by his Samskāra-name, he was the fourth son of Seturāma Ayyar, and his maternal grandfather Veṅgu Śāstrigal was a *Catuśśāstra-pāraṅgata* who later became a Sannyāsin. Veṅgu Śāstrigal who attained *Siddhi* at the fourth year of the Professor woke up his grandson at midnight, before himself taking to Sannyāsa, and gave him fresh milk sanctified with his *Abhimantraṇa*. Even before this the grandfather had taught the child the entire Devī hymn of 500 stanzas, the Mūkapañcaśatī.

\* From the obituary by the writer in the *New Indian Antiquary*, April, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> *Mahābhārata Śānti* 45. II.

<sup>2</sup> *Kāvya-lāṅkāra* (Bhāmaha) I, 6.



धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे  
न चापलमयामहे भवभयान्न दूयामहे ।

which the Professor was often repeating, he was repeating from his third year. His uncle Muttappa Śāstrigal and elder brother Śeṣādrinātha Śāstrigal taught him Kāvya and Alankāra. He was also put to the English School at the nearby Tiruvayyāru but before he reached his 3rd Form there, he had become a master of Sanskrit. It was decided to teach him the Śāstras in Sanskrit primarily and to give English education secondarily. The chief Guru of our Professor in the Śāstras was the Sannyāsin, Śrī Brahmendra Sarasvatī, familiarly known as Paḷamānēri Svāmigal, who was a pupil of Rāma Śāstrigal and Sundara Śāstrigal, the pupils of the famous Mm. Tyāgarāja alias Rāju Śāstrigal of Mannārguḍi, author of Nyāyenduśekhara and other works. Professor studied Vedānta, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā under this Paḷamānēri Svāmigal. Pūrvamīmāṃsā, for the special proficiency in which he became well-known in Pandit circles, the Professor mastered early in his life. Later he studied Vyākaraṇa under Nilakaṇṭha Śāstrigal of Tiruvayyāru, and some more Nyāya under Candrasekhara Śāstrigal. A remarkable feature of the Professor even when he was a student at the feet of Śrī Paḷamānēri Svāmigal was the great trouble he took to note down all references to other texts, secure those works and pursue to the full all the issues raised in the cross-references; and this thoroughness stood out prominently in his work later of guiding Research scholars.

In 1896 he passed the Martication examination and graduated from the S. P. G. College at Tanjore in 1900, with Philosophy as his special subject. He then entered the Revenue Board as a clerk on Rs. 25 but after six months resigned this, the only subordinate job in his life, as he was not granted leave to rush to the side of his ailing mother. The mother survived him and passed away six months after the Professor passed away, but the resignation was a significant episode in his life; seeking an independent life, he studied Law at Madras and Trivandrum, all the time continuing his Śāstraic studies, but without qualifying as a lawyer, he became a Master of Arts in 1905.

At Mylapore, Madras he was giving some religious discourses, and the easy mastery with which this young man was handling advanced Advaitic polemical texts brought him into contact with the late V. Krishnaswami Ayyar, the founder of the Madras Sanskrit College. It did not take long for the young man to demonstrate his reputation and convince Sri V. Krishnaswami Ayyar, who by appointing him as almost the first Principal of his Sanskrit College, discovered Sri S. Kuppuswami Sastrigal to the world of Sanskrit. It was in the years 1906-1910 when he was Principal of the Sanskrit College at Mylapore that some eminent Paṇḍitas of the present times who became Mahāmahopādhyāyas were his students.

He was next to take charge of the Principalship of the Tiruvayyāru Sanskrit College soon after the Government raised its status to that of a college. Here again, in the years 1910-14 his teaching gave to the world of Sanskrit scholarship a set of distinguished Paṇḍitas.



## DR. V. RAGHAVAN—ON SASTRIAR

v

In 1912 he was called upon to act in the leave vacancy of the late Prof. M. Rangacharya, Professor of Sanskrit in the Presidency College, Madras. When Prof. Rangacharya retired subsequently, Sri Kuppusami Sastri became the permanent Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the Presidency College, and Curator of the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library, a position which he relinquished only in 1935 when his official retirement happened. Then after a brief period of Honorary Professorship at the Annamalai University, the Professor retired to his village where he passed away in September 1943 at the age of 64.

During his life as Professor of Sanskrit, he was a member of the Senate and the Academic Council and the President of the Boards of Studies and Examiners in the Madras University. He was a Member of the Court of the Benaras Hindu University, and was connected as Examiner with most of the other Indian Universities. His legal training and Mīmāṃsā scholarship stood in good stead in the deliberations of the Madras University bodies, where his amendments, constructive criticisms and corrections to the wordings of Resolutions contributed to the building up of the Regulations and Statutes of the University. He fashioned the Sanskrit Honours Syllabus, the *Śiromaṇi*<sup>4</sup> course of study on the traditional lines, and the Oriental Titles in the Madras University. He organised the three years Honours Course in Sanskrit with provision for the study of all the Śāstras by rotation, together with a special course in Comparative Philology of the Indo-Germanic languages with special reference to Sanskrit. He developed an intense love in Linguistics, a subject in which he equipped himself in emulation with his colleague, the English Professor in the Presidency College, Mark Hunter.<sup>5</sup> This Honours Department produced many noteworthy scholars who later occupied important places in the educational, intellectual, cultural, and administrative spheres in and outside Madras.

Through the B.O.L. and M.O.L. Degrees, he provided opportunities for those with traditional training and Diplomas to come in line with modern Degree-holders.

Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri brought into being through the Sanskrit Colleges and Honours Department of the Presidency College and the Madras University a School of South Indian Research, and through this school brought into teaching vogue higher and more ancient classics in the different Śāstras like the Dhvanyāloka, the Kusumāñjali and the Nyāyabhāṣya; his Curatorship of the Government Mss. Library resulted in collection of numerous rare works, some of which he himself helped his students to publish or work upon, as for instance the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana which he himself edited, works of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā and the *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* of Bhoja. He assisted actively in the establishment of the Oriental Research Institute of the Madras University. For the publication of the research turned out

---

<sup>4</sup> The Professor's admiration for the brilliant Navadvīpa logician Raghunātha Śiromaṇi was responsible for the Professor calling this title-course 'Śiromaṇi'.

<sup>5</sup> Among Philologists, Jespersen exercised a great fascination over the Professor. When the Professor was on his death-bed, news of Jespersen's death in the papers was conveyed to him by me; and the Professor said that an under-current of deep philosophy flowed in the sentences of Jespersen.



through all these agencies, he founded and edited the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, and started the *Madras Oriental Series*.

With his minute and accurate grip of erudite Śāstraic texts, the Professor combined a remarkable and keen love and enthusiasm for poetry and drama, and for the preservation of popular interest in Sanskrit, he along with friends and colleagues started and conducted the Madras Samskrta Academy. He actively encouraged the Sanskrit students of the Presidency College to stage Sanskrit dramas and would attend rehearsals and offer suggestions.

The Professor was a real great teacher, who loved teaching, more than taking leisure for himself to write books; he loved his pupils and gave of his best to them; he spent hours reconstructing broken manuscript-lines for his students' editions of texts, not to mention the time he gave to the works being produced by other scholars and submitted to him for suggestions and corrections. As a class teacher he followed the method of spending additional time to broadbase and lay well the foundation, and equip the student to self-tuition in the later stages. He never felt tired of repeating again and again for a backward student. His heart was generous, and never exclusive; even to scholars, who were not his students, he did not stint to render assistance. Satisfied with some good aspect of work, he had the depth of personality to forgive or forget the failures in those that came to him; though one who held fast to standards of intellectual honesty and high academic quality, he did not refuse his help as a scholar even to those who did not care much for such ideals.

When the Government called for Certificates for appointing him to the then coveted cadre of I.E.S., he replied that his 'Students' were his Certificate.

He took a leading part and presided over sections from the very inception in the All-India Oriental Conference; in the Indian Philosophical Congress; in the well-known Kāñcīpuram Pariṣat, and the Advaita Sabhā of S. India. He presided over the All-India Sanskrit Conference in Calcutta. He was the "Vidyāvācaspati" of the Bhārata Dharma Mahāmaṇḍal, "Darśana Kalānidhi" of H. H. Sri Sankaracharya Swamigal of Kanchi Kāmakoti Pīṭha, the "Kulapati" of H. H. the Sankaracharya of Govardhan (Puri) Mutt, and an "I.E.S." and "Mahāmahopādhyā" of the Government of India.

Besides his class-teaching, the Professor undertook to deliver under the auspices of the Madras University long courses of lectures on all the Śāstras, which formed the formative forces in the building up of his school of Research in this part of the country. The following represent his lecture work:

- 1913 20 lectures on Hindu Philosophy with special reference to *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*.
- 1918 20 lectures on Indian Epistemology.
- 1919 20 lectures on Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit.  
Another course on Indian Theism.



## DR. V. RAGHAVAN—ON SASTRIAR

vii

- 1927 Philosophy and Exegetics of the *Mīmāṃsā* System.
- 1928 "Sentence-split, Beginning and End" (*Vākyabheda, Upakrama and Upasamhāra*) (*Mīmāṃsā*).
- 1929 Thought-measuring Devices in Indian Dialectics (*Navya-Nyāya*).
- 1931 Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism (Annamalai University.)<sup>6</sup>
- 1940 Compromises in the history of Vedānta (Madras University).<sup>6</sup>

He contributed short but scholarly and inspiring forewords to many of the publications of his students, and the popular booklets of the Madras Samskrita Academy.

The late Professor undertook not only to rewrite for publication in book-form all his lectures in the Madras University, but also to write some works on Sanskrit Philology, Philosophy of Grammar, *Mīmāṃsā* etc., but he could never do any of these items of writing work. The following represent his books, written or edited :

1. Nearly 66 volumes of Descriptive Catalogue of the Madras Mss. Oriental Library.
2. *Padyacūḍāmaṇi*. Jointly edited. Madras Govt. Ori. Mss. Library.
3. *Viṇāvāsavadatta* (*J. O. R. Madras*. Jointly edited).
4. *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana (*J. O. R. Madras*. Jointly edited).
5. A Primer of Indian Logic (3 edns. K. S. R. I.)
6. *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana with Śaṅkhaṇḍī's commentary with elaborate Introduction (Madras Govt. Ori. Mss. Library).
7. *Dhvanyāloka*, with *Locana*, *Kaumudī* and *Upalocana* (the last by himself), *Uddyota I*, issued by the K. S. R. I.

His edition of part of the *Adhvaramīmāṃsākutūhalavṛtti* and some volumes of the Complete Works in the Śaṅkara Series of the Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam may also be mentioned.

No other Sanskritist of South India and few of the rest of India combined an all-round traditional Pāṇḍitya both in Śāstra and Sāhitya in such measure with modern scholarship ; and surely no single Sanskritist contributed so largely to the cause of Sanskrit learning and education in the Madras Presidency as the late Professor Kuppuswami Sastri. May the Research Institute which his students, admirers and friends have established in his name in Madras grow more and more and keep alight the lamp of learning lit by him !

<sup>6</sup> Both of these were posthumously published by the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute.



प्राच्यप्रतीच्यविद्याकूलङ्कषशेमुषीकानाम् ।

अनुकुर्युः के कीर्ति महामहाचार्यवयाणाम् ॥ १ ॥

पदे यत्पदं नैव चस्खाल, वाक्यं

यदीयं सदा वाक्यमाकाङ्क्षते स्म ।

प्रमाणे प्रमाणं च ये, ते महान्तः

त्रिधामान आसन् स्वमेधोरुगायाः ॥ २ ॥

येषामुपनिषन्मार्गे नासीदुपनिषत्कचित् ।

रसे रसो महान् येषां ते बभुः सर्वपार्षदाः ॥ ३ ॥

बह्वयः पद्धतयो यैः प्राचीनापूर्वखलुसशास्त्राणाम् ।

नीता पुनः प्रकाशं विद्याब्रह्माण एव ते रेजुः ॥ ४ ॥

विद्वद्विमर्शिसमितिः विद्याशालापि वा काचित् ।

सा नास्ति भारतोव्यां यस्यां ते नायका नासन् ॥ ५ ॥

ददुर्ज्ञानं ददुर्वृत्तिमूचुश्च प्रेमपेशलम् ।

जाजागरुश्च क्षेमाय को गुरुस्स्यात्तथा पिता ॥ ६ ॥

येषां स्वकीर्तेः शिष्याणां कीर्तिरिष्टा महात्मनाम् ।

उत्तवा तानस्मदाचार्यान् वक्ष्यामोऽन्यान् गुरुन् कथम् ॥ ७ ॥

मोदादपि भुवि ज्ञानदानं ये मेनिरेऽधिकम् ।

अपूर्वबोधिसत्त्वेभ्यः तेभ्यस्सन्तु नमसि नः ॥ ८ ॥



# LIFE AND WORK OF THE LATE Mm. PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI

## A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

By

DR. V. RAGHAVAN

- 15-12-1880 Born at Ganapati Agraharam on the banks of the Cauvery in Tanjore District as the fourth son of Sethurama Iyer.
- Studied Sanskrit and Śāstras in the traditional style, and English at Tiruvayyaru.
- 1896 Passed the Matriculation Examination.
- 1900 Graduated from the S. P. G. College, Tanjore, with Philosophy as his special subject.
- Was a clerk in the Revenue Board for a time; then a student of law at Madras and Trivandrum.
- 1905 Became Master of Arts.
- Was delivering religious lectures at the P. S. High School and other places in Mylapore.
- 1906 Appointed Principal of the Madras Sanskrit College, Mylapore, by its founder Sri V. Krishnaswami Iyer.
- 1906-10 Principal of the Madras Sanskrit College.
- 1907 Became Chairman of the Board of Examiners in Sanskrit in the Madras University.
- Edited the Adhvara-mīmāṃsā-kutūhala-vṛtti for the Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam.
- 1910 Re-organisation of the Rajah's College at Tiruvayyaru. Appointed Principal of that College.
- 1900-14 Principal of the Rajah's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Tiruvayyaru.
- Assisted the Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, in their edition of the Complete Works of Śankara.
- 1912 Appointed Acting Professor of Sanskrit, in the Presidency College, Madras, during the leave of Prof. M. Rangacharya.



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

Took leading part in the organisation and starting of the Śiromaṇi Course on the side of Oriental learning in Sanskrit along traditional lines in the Madras University.

- 1913 Delivered a course of 20 lectures in the Madras University on "Hindu Philosophy with special reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Systems".  
Appointed member of the Tamil Lexicon Committee.
- 1914 Appointed permanent Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the Presidency College, Madras, and Curator, Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, on the retirement of Prof. M. Rangacharya.
- 1914-36 Occupied the above position.
- 1914-36 Edited 8 Vols. with Prof. Rangacharya and 58 Vols. independently, of the Descriptive and Triennial Catalogues and Alphabetical Indexes of the Mss. of the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library.
- 1915 Became a member of the Senate of the Madras University.
- 1918 Delivered 20 lectures at the Madras University on Indian Epistemology.  
Became Chairman of the Board of Studies in Sanskrit in the Madras University.
- 1919 Promoted to the I. E. S.  
Delivered 20 lectures at the Madras University on 'Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit.'  
Presided over the Classical Sanskrit and Modern Vernaculars Section of the First All-India Oriental Conference, Poona. (5th, 6th, and 7th November 1919).  
Delivered another course of lectures at the Madras University on 'Indian Theism.'
- 1921 Edited jointly with Prof. M. Rangacharya the Padyacūḍāmaṇi in the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library Series.
- 1922 Presided over the Indian Philosophy Section of the Second All-India Oriental Conference, Calcutta and delivered the Presidential Address 'The Prābhākara School of Karma Mīmāṃsā.' (Proceed. pp. 407-412).
- 1923 Became a member of the Academic Council of the Madras University.
- 1924 Contributed an Introduction to the Nilakaṇṭha Vijaya Campū of Nilakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, published by the Balamanorama Press, Mylapore, Madras.
- 1925 Took part in organising the Third session of the All-India Oriental Conference at Madras.  
(Contributed two papers to the Third Oriental Conference, Madras (1) Further Light on the Prābhākara Problem and (2) Bodhāyana and Damaṇḍīyā presupposed by Rāmānuja. (Proceed. pp. 474-481. 465-473).



## DR. V. RAGHAVAN—ON SASTRIAR

xi

- 1925-26 Took leading part in the organisation and setting up of the Oriental Research Institute in the University of Madras.
- 1926 Contributed an Introduction to the *Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi* of Śaktibhadra, published by the Balamanorama Press, Mylapore, Madras.
- Presided (on 30th August, 1926) over the 10th All-India Sanskrit Conference at Calcutta and delivered a Sanskrit Address (*Samskr̥ta Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā*, Calcutta, Vol. IX No. 5, September, 1926, pp. 185-195).
- Presided again over the Indian Philosophy Section of the Fourth All-India Oriental Conference, Allahabad (5th, 6th and 7th November, 1926), and delivered the Presidential Address on 'A Few Problems of Identity in the Ancient Cultural History of India.'
- Honoured by the Bharata Dharma Mahamandal, Benares, with the title 'Vidyāvācaspati.'
- Started the Madras Sanskrit Academy in collaboration with Sri V. V. Srinivasa Ayyangar and other friends. Made the first President of the Madras Sanskrit Academy.
- 1927 Honoured by the Government of India with the title Mahāmahopādhyāya.
- Delivered Readership lectures at the Madras University on 'The Philosophy and Exegetics of the Mīmāṃsā System.'
- Started the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, in collaboration with Sir P. S. Sivaswami Iyer, Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer and others.
- Wrote in the *Journal of Oriental Research* an article on Sundarapāṇḍya (Vol. I, pp. 1-15), an article on 'Bhadanta' (ibid. pp. 25-26), an article on Aravaṇavaṭikal (ibid. pp. 119-201) and an article on Aravaṇavaṭikal again (vol. II, pp. 79-83).
- Delivered Readership lectures at the Madras University on Mīmāṃsā, 'Sentence-split, Beginning and End' (*Vākyabheda*, *Upakrama* and *Upasamhāra*).
- 1929 Wrote in the *JOR*, Madras, an article on Rāvaṇabhāṣya' (Vol. III, pp. 1-5).
- Wrote on 'Kośavān Ācāryaḥ' in the volume 'Essays by Diverse Hands', Madras Library Association.
- Delivered Readership lectures at the Madras University on Nyāya,—'Thought-measuring Devices in Indian Dialectics.'
- 1930 Contributed a Foreword to the *Naiṣadhīya Carita* edited by Pandit Vyasaraya Sastri, Vadhyar and Sons, Palghat.
- 1931 Delivered at the Annamalai University four lectures on 'Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit'. (Since published by the Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras).



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

Edited the 'Viṇāvāsavadatta' published in *JOR.*, Madras.

- 1932 Edited jointly with Pandit T. V. Ramachandra Dikshitar the 'Vibhramaviveka' of Maṇḍana Miśra. Wrote the 'Primer of Indian Logic'.

Began his edition of the Dhvanyāloka with Locana, Kaumudī and his own Upalocana.

Honoured by H. H. Sri Sankaracharya of Kamakoti Pitha with the title 'Darśanakalānidhi.'

- 1933 Honoured by H. H. Sri Sankaracharya of Govardhana Mutt with the title 'Kulapati'.

Assisted the Madras Law Journal Press in their edition of Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa, and wrote a foreword to it.

Contributed an Introduction to Swami Madhavananda's Translation of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, Mayavati, Almora.

- 1934 Presided over the Indian Philosophy Section of the Tenth All-India Philosophy Congress, Waltair, and delivered the Presidential Address on "Purnaism in Indian Thought." (Proceed. pp. 45-54).

Wrote on "Authorial Homonymy and Polyonymy" in the Classified Catalogue Code of the Madras Library Association (pp. 111-118).

- 1935 Delivered Readership lectures at the Madras University on 'Matter, Spirit and God in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.'

Wrote on 'Library Science as viewed by a Classicist' in the Annual Report of the Madras Library Association.

Presided over the Paṇḍita Pariṣad of the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, and delivered a Sanskrit address on 'Pāṇḍitya-Vimarśa-advaita,' (Synthesis of learning and research.) (Printed in the Proceedings).

Retired from the Professorship of Sanskrit in the Presidency College, Madras.

Started as Editor-in-Chief the work of the New Catalogus Catalogorum in the Madras University.

- 1936 Contributed an article in Sanskrit on 'Abrahmajijñāsā' in the Language Number of the Journal of the Madras University. (April).

Addressed the new Graduates at the Convocation of the Madras University (29th August).

Edited the Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra with Śaṅkhaṇḍī's commentary with critical introduction, etc. in the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library Series.



## DR. V. RAGHAVAN—ON SASTRIAR

xiii

Delivered the 11th Anniversary Address at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona on 'Maṇḍana-Sureśvara Equation in the History of Advaita'. Printed in the *Annals of the BORI*. Vol. XVIII. pp. 121-151. Was elected Honorary Member of the *BORI*.

Appointed Honorary Professor of Sanskrit at the Annamalai University, Annamalainagar.

1937 Wrote an article on 'Sri Ramakrishna and the Message of Hinduism' in the *Triveni* (Vol. IX, No. 10, April, 1937, pp. 35-38).

1940 Delivered at the Madras University the Krishnaswami Rao lectures on 'Compromises in the History of Advaitic Thought' (16th and 17th February). (Since published by the Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute).

Retired from the Annamalai University and settled down at his village.

5-9-1943 Passed away at Ganapati Agraharam.

---







COLLECTED WRITINGS  
of  
Mm. Prof. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI



COLLECTED WRITINGS

of

MR. P. R. K. MUTHULAKSHMI



## PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY IN THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA<sup>1</sup>

कति कवयः कति कृतयः कति लुप्ताः कति चरन्ति कति शिथिलाः ।

तदपि प्रवर्तयति मां प्राक्तनविश्लेषसंविधानेहा ॥<sup>2</sup>

Many a problem in the Cultural History of Ancient India reduces itself to one of who is who or which is which. There are several important problems of this kind which await solution in the various departments of Sanskrit Culture. Some interesting and useful data which are likely to facilitate the solution of these problems, have been collected in the course of my study and investigation. These data, it is proposed to make available to scholars in the sections which follow.

### A.—Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.

(i. Ācārya-Sundara-Pāṇḍya, a great Mīmāṃsaka and Vedāntin of South India in the ante-Kaumāṛila period, discovered.)

Who is the author of the three verses quoted by Śrī Śāṅkara towards the end of the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, in his *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya*? At the outset, as a first instalment, these questions will be considered. What is his place in the history of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā? Śrī Śāṅkara cites at the end of the Samanvayādhikaraṇa, (1-1-4) the following three verses, in support of his conclusion that all the Śāstraic injunctions and pramāṇas cease to exist and function as such after the realisation of self as the supreme soul and as the only reality transcending all differences and limitations of good and evil.

“तस्मादहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विषयः सर्वाणि चेताराणि प्रमाणानि । न ह्यहेयानु-  
पादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ निर्विषयाप्यप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्ति इति । अपि चाहुः —

‘गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।

सब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥

अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक् प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।

अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातृत्व पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥

<sup>1</sup> Presidential Address, IVth All-India Oriental Conference, Allahabad, Indian Philosophy Section. 1926, Printed in *J. O. R. I.*, 1927, pp. 5-15.

<sup>2</sup> This is *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇaya Campū* (of Nilakaṇṭha Dikṣita), I. 6—Ed.



देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ ' "

Vācaspati-miśra, in his *Bhāmātī*, introduces these quotations thus:—"अत्रैव ब्रह्मविदां गाथा-मुदाहरति." Presumably, Vācaspati is here referring to some famous philosopher of established reputation for Brahman-realisation, as the author of the three verses above cited. No further information about the name of this author or his work is furnished by Vācaspati.

The *Kalpataru* and the *Parimala* relating to this portion do not give us the required information in this connection. None of the commentaries on the *Sūtra Bhāṣya* throws any light on the source of the verses in question, from the oldest *Pancapādikā* downward to the *Ānandagiriya*, *Rāmānandīya* and *Brahma-vidyābharaṇa*, certain unprinted and rare commentaries like the *Prakaṣārtha-vivaraṇa* and Citsukha's *Bhāṣyabhāva--prakāśikā*, not being excepted. In fact, the *Pancapādikā* complicates the question by the misleading statement:—

“प्रसिद्धमेतद्ब्रह्मविदामिति पूर्वोक्तं न्यायं संक्षेपतः श्लोकैः संगृह्णाति—गौणमिध्यात्मन इति ”

(Vide p. 100. *Pancapādikā*, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.) Prakāśātman, in his *Vivaraṇa*, does not say anything to remove the misapprehension which Padmapāda's observation might cause, that the verses under reference were produced by Śaṅkara himself to summarise a few of his important conclusion.

Vācaspati, however, is quite clear that these verses were cited by Śaṅkara from a work of an earlier Vedāntin and omits to mention the name of that pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntin, probably because it was too well known in his days to require specification. Ātmasvarūpa, who was a disciple of Narasiṃhasvarūpa and wrote a commentary called *Prabodhapariśodhinī* on Padmapāda's *Pancapādikā*, throws some light on the source of the verses under consideration. This commentary has not been printed anywhere and is represented by the paper manuscript described under R. No. 3225 of the Triennial Catalogue of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. In the concluding part of this commentary, the commentator introduces thus the extract from the *Pancapādikā* given above:—

“श्लोकत्रयं सुन्दरपाण्ड्यप्रणीतं प्रमाणयतीत्याह-प्रसिद्धमिति ”

This information about the author of these hitherto unidentified verses luckily receives further confirmation in the subjoined extract. With particular reference to the third verse from Mādhavamantrin's *Tātparyadipikā*, the well-known commentary on the *Sūtasamhitā*—

तथा सुन्दरपाण्ड्यवार्तिकमपि—

‘देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन संमतः ।

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ इति ।



## IDENTITY IN CULTURAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA

3

(Vide p. 284-Madras Śāradā Mandiram edition of the *Sūtasamhitā*, muktikhaṇḍa, Ch. IV., verse, 12).

In the Vedhādyadhikaraṇa (III. iii. 25 sutra), Amalānanda cites the following verses from a treatise by Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya:—

“आह चात्र निदर्शनमाचार्यसुन्दरपाण्ड्यः—

निःश्रेण्यारोहणप्राप्यं प्राप्तिमात्रोपपादि च ।

एकमेव फलं प्राप्तुमुभावारोहतो यदा ॥ १ ॥

एकसोपानवर्त्येको भूमिष्ठश्चापरस्तयोः ।

उभयोश्च जवस्तुल्यः प्रतिबन्धश्च नान्तरा ॥ २ ॥

विरोधिनोस्तदैको हि तत्फलं प्राप्नुयात्तयोः ।

प्रथमेन गृहीतेऽस्मिन् पश्चिमोऽवतरेन्मुधा ॥ ३ ॥ इति ।

(p. 795-Kalpattaru, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.)

In the Balābalādhikaraṇa of *Tantravārttika*, Kumārilabhaṭṭa cites these three verses and two others also dealing with the same subject—

“आह च—

निःश्रेण्यारोहणप्राप्यं . . . . . ।

. . . . . पश्चिमोऽवतरेन्मुधा ॥

(verses 1 to 3 same as above.)

तेन यद्यपि सामर्थ्यं प्रत्येकं सिद्धमन्यदा ।

तथापि युगपद्भावे जघन्यस्य निराक्रिया ॥ ४ ॥

अन्यथैव हि शून्येषु दुर्बलैरपि चर्यते ।

अन्यथा बलवद्ग्रस्तैः सर्वशक्तियुक्ते सति ॥ ५ ॥ ”

(*Tantravārttika*, Benares Sanskrit Series, pp. 852-853.)

Bhaṭṭa Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā* or *Rāṇaka*, which is the most authoritative commentary on the *Tantra-vārttika*, introduces the passage cited above, with the remark—

“एतदेव द्रढयितुं वृद्धानां श्लोकपञ्चकं पठति—आह चेति ”

(*Nyāya-sudhā* p. 1228. Chowkh. Sanskrit Series—Benares.)



Thus, according to Bhaṭṭa Someśvara, all these five verses form a single illustrative unit by the same author; and according to Amalānanda, that author must be Ācārya-Sundara-Pāṇḍya. By way of briefly elucidating the subject-matter of these five verses, it would be useful to add in this connection that Sundara Pāṇḍya is here expounding the principle of अप्राप्तबाध of the third chapter of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, as distinguished from the प्राप्तबाध of the tenth chapter through the illustration of a staircase from the ground-floor to the upper floor of a mansion. There are two rivals trying to get at a single fruit on the top of mansion; for getting at it, they have but to reach the top-most of the staircase. One is anxious to forestall the other; one of them has got the start of one step and is standing on the first step, while the other is standing at the foot; their speed and progress being the same, the person who got the start of his rival gets first at the fruit, while the other gets down disappointed. Even so, the particular type of Bādha or annulment considered in the Balābalādhikaraṇa of third chapter is one of preclusion; whereas the Prāptabādha of the tenth chapter is of the nature of supersession. In this way, Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya illustrates, in the five verses quoted above, the principle of Aprāptabādha and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is relying upon these verses as authority. In a similar strain, Kumārila is found quoting a verse at page 357 and another verse at pages 280 281, of the *Tantravārttika* in support of his views:—

(a) आह च—

त्र्यंशवेदप्रमाणत्वादुद्भिदादि ततोऽधिकम् ।  
धर्मायानुपयुक्तं सदानर्थक्यं प्रपद्यते ॥

(pp. 280, 281, *Tantravārttika*, Benares.)

“ नोद्भिच्चित्रादिशब्दानां स्वरूपेणानर्थक्यं विवक्षितम् ; किंतु नामधेयत्वे सतीत्येतमर्थं दर्शयितुं  
\*वृद्धवाक्यमुदाहरति—आह चेति ”

( *Nyāyasudhā* on (a) p. 393 Benares.)

(b) “ आह च—

साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धः सर्वदा भावनाश्रयः ।  
तेन तस्य न सिद्धिः स्याद्भावनाप्रत्ययादृते ॥

(p. 357, *Tantravārttika*, Benares.)

एनमेव सिद्धान्तं \*वृद्धवचनेन द्रढयति—आह चेति ।

(*Nyāyasudhā* on (b) p. 589 Benares.)

That the foregoing quotations also, cited in the *Tantravārttika*, appear to have been taken from Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya's work is a perfectly legitimate suggestion which is warranted by a careful comparison of them and the avatārikās in the *Nyāyasudhā* relating to

\* Probably the *vṛddha* referred to here is Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya.



## IDENTITY IN CULTURAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA

5

them, with similar citations definitely ascribed above to Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya. Keeping oneself within strictly logical and historical limits and without treading the perilous path of speculation, one might reasonably arrive at the conclusions hereunder set forth, from a careful consideration of the various references and quotations given above.

(1) Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya must have been a highly esteemed and eminent authority in the Purvottaramīmāṃsā system, who was recognised as such and quoted by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila and Śaṅkara, the greatest champions of Vedānta in the 8th century A.D.

(2) He must have been the author of a metrical treatise called *Vārttika* which might have consisted mainly of anuṣṭubh verses similar to those of Kumārila and might have dealt with the topics of the Pūrvottara-mīmāṃsā system, in accordance with some old bhāṣya or vṛtti on the sūtras of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

(3) Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya must have flourished before the 8th century A.D.

(4) He must have been a great Mīmāṃsaka of the Pāṇḍya country and held a high place in the hagiology of South Indian Śaivism.

Of these four conclusions, the first and second rest upon the extracts given above. Amalānanda, who was the protege of Yadava Krishna (1250 A.D.) and Mādhavamāntrin, who was a distinguished disciple of Kriyāśakti Paṇḍita and flourished during the reign of Harihara II (1373 A.D.), refer to Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya as the author of a *Vārttika*. This *Vārttika* should have been based upon some old bhāṣya or vṛtti on the sūtras of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Having regard to the fact that his *vārttika* was relied upon by Kumārila and Śaṅkara in support of their views and considering that the verses quoted by Śaṅkara at the end of the Samanvayādhikaraṇa are as Advaitic in their tones as any of Śaṅkara's texts, one might well be justified in putting forward the conjecture that the old work, on which Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya based his *Vārttika*, was perhaps the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana Upavarṣa, (vide *Proceedings of the Third All-India Oriental Conference*. Madras, pp. 465-468). For certain reasons to be set forth *infra* Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya might be assigned to circa 650 A.D. In that case, it may be easily seen how his philosophical thought might have been largely influenced by the advaitic doctrines of pre-Śaṅkara advaitins like Bhartṛhari.

The third and fourth of the above conclusions require to be supplemented by such data as may be available from epigraphic and literary sources. In the first place, it would be useful to remember that the name Sundara Pāṇḍya unmistakably suggests that the forgotten author who had that name should have been intimately associated with the Pandya Country and Pandya Kingdom in South India. Since Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya is presupposed by Śaṅkara, and Kumārila, all the Pāṇḍya Kings later than the eighth century A. D. can be easily eliminated. If the Pandyan history prior to the 9th cent. A. D., is carefully examined, three important names have to be thought of as worthy of consideration in connection with the identification of Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya. These three names are King Arikesarin Māravarman or Neḍumāraṇ or Kūṇa Pāṇḍya or Kubjavardhana or Sundara Pāṇḍya, (2) Saint Tirujnānasambandhar, (3) Saint Sundaramūrti. Of these three, one may be tempted to think of the possibility of



equating the last-mentioned person, Saint Sundaramūrti with Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya. But it is generally accepted that Sundaramūrti was a contemporary of Seraman Perumal and should, therefore, be assigned to circa 825 A. D. He was also a contemporary of the Pallava King Dantivarman. Neither in ancient Tamil hagiology, nor in epigraphic records, is there anything to show that the Śaiva Saint Sundaramūrti was an eminent Sanskrit Scholar and writer. Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya must have been older than the eighth century A.D. and could not, therefore, be brought into relation with Sundaramūrti Nāyanār.

There are only three possibilities left to be considered here. Firstly, it is quite possible that Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya is identical with the Pāṇḍya King, Kubjavardhana or Kūna Pāṇḍya or Sundara Pāṇḍya. The accounts of the Tamil Śaiva hagiographic and epigraphic records alike refer to the Pāṇḍya King Neḍumāran or Sundara Pāṇḍya as a contemporary of Tirujñānasambandhar, whose date has been determined to be circa 640-655 A. D. (See. G. J. Dubreuil *Pallavas*, pp. 67-68). From the above-mentioned sources and from the *Hālāsya-māhātmya* in Sanskrit, it may be made out that Kubjavardhana was at first a Jaina heretic, subsequently married a Cola princess and came under the influence of the inspiring and marvellous personality of Tirujñānasambandhar, eventually became a staunch Śaiva saint under the name of Neḍumāran Nāyanār. King Sundara Pāṇḍya or Neḍumāran Nāyanār seems to have had a varied and rich experience in the sphere of religion and philosophy and acquired religious and philosophical insight under the inspiration which he had the opportunity to derive from his close contact with Tirujñānasambandhar. In the Sanskrit portion of the bigger Śiṅṅamaṇūr inscription, we find Arikesarin Sundara Pāṇḍya referred to as A KING WHO WAS LEARNED IN ALL THE ŚĀSTRAS<sup>1</sup>. Would it be a far-fetched suggestion to say that Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya, presupposed by Śaṅkara and Kumārila was none other than the Pāṇḍya King Arikesarin Sundara Pāṇḍya or Neḍumāran Nāyanār, who flourished about the middle of the seventh century A.D.? That Neḍumāran Nāyanār was a Śaiva saint and ought to have therefore attached greater importance to Śaivāgamas than the Vedas need not be regarded as clashing with the suggested identification. For, it is recognised by eminent and critical Tamil scholars that, during the period of *Devārams*, the Vedas and Vedāṅgas were widely recognised by all Śaivas to be of supreme importance (see p. 105 in the second part of the *Tamil Varalāru* by Mr. K. S. Srinivasa Pillai of Tanjore-1922). I do not agree with Mr. K. S. Srinivasa Pillai, (*Ibid.* Part ii. p. 104), that the *ekātmavāda* of the advaitins was not adequately recognised or influentially supported in South India before the time of Śaṅkara. There are positive proofs, on the contrary, to show that the *ekātmavāda* and *māyavāda* of the advaitins were well known and maintained by several great thinkers and writers of the pre-Śaṅkara period in the history of advaita. It would be of great advantage in this connexion to refer to my paper on *Draṁḍācārya*, published in pp. 468 to 473 of the *Proceedings of Third All-India Oriental Conference*, Madras. Bhaṭṭa Kumārila himself was a South Indian Scholar, as may be obvious from internal evidences in his *Tantravārttika*, such as his sneering disapprobation of the manner in which certain Aryan scholar would suggest fanciful etymologies for Tamil words (See p. 157 of the *Tantravārttika*, Benares). Bhaṭṭa Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārttika*, presupposes and refutes the *māyavāda* of the advaitins. (See p. 663, verses 84 to 86 of the

<sup>1</sup> See the *Madras Epigraphic Report* of the Assistant Archaeological Superintendent for Southern Circle for the year 1905-1907, pp. 63 and 64).



## IDENTITY IN CULTURAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA

7

*Śloka-vārttika*, Benares Edition). Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya, whether he was identical or not with the Pāṇḍya king of the same name above referred to, must have been a Śaiva Vedāntic teacher of South India, as his name and the foregoing Sanskrit extracts clearly indicate. Attention may, with advantage, be drawn in this connection to the following portions of the three verses quoted at the beginning of the paper —

“सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधि कार्यं कथं भवेत् ।”

“अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ।”

There is so much in common between these three verses and Śaṅkara's own conclusions about *ekātmavāda* and *māyāvāda*, that one might very reasonably say that Śaṅkara was the greatest of the teachers who inherited the philosophical heritage of an old type of Śaivādvaita, which was represented in the Upaniṣadic period by basic texts like the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, in the post-Upaniṣadic period, by authoritative works like the *Sundara Pāṇḍya Vārttika* and Śaṅkara's own *bhāṣyas*, beside his devotional hymns like the *Śivānandalaharī* and the *Śiva-bhujāṅga*, and in the post-Śaṅkara period, by the *Sivajñānabodha*-literature and works like the *Srikanṭha Bhāṣya* and *Sivārkamaṇīdīpikā*. Further, the seventh century A. D. in Indian history had to its credit two other eminent royal authors, Śrī Harṣa of Kāñya-Kubja and the Pallava King Mahendravarman I, the former of whom was a great statesman, warrior, patron of letters and eminent dramatist, and the latter, as Professor G. J. Dubreuil has pointed out in his treatise on Pallavas, was a saintly King and “a great poet, musician, architect, and administrator, who introduced in South India the art that obtained on the banks of the Kṛṣṇā and gave a new impulse to religion and literature in the Tamil country”. There appears to be nothing improbable in the same century of the Christian era claiming in South India, in the person of Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya (Neḍumāraṇ), a third royal saint, scholar and author of an authoritative *Vārttika* on the science and philosophy of Vedic exegesis, as embodied in the Sūtras of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Both Kumārila and Śaṅkara must have held Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya in very high esteem as they quote him with approval and respect. The stray reference to *Sundara Pāṇḍya Vārttika* in Mādhava-mantrin's *Tātparya-dīpikā* already alluded to, would come to acquire special significance and weight, should it be borne in mind that the old tradition of Śivādvaita was well preserved under the auspices of Harihara II of Vizianagara, by the great Śaiva teacher Kriyā-Sakti-Paṇḍita, whose disciple was Mādhava-mantrin and that the *Sūtasamhitā* itself is a work representing the old Śivādvaita school. There is an old tradition about Śaṅkara's relation to the *Sūtasamhitā* and it is embodied in this verse often quoted anonymously.

तामष्टादशधालोक्य शंकरः सूतसंहिताम् ।

चक्रे शारीरकं भाष्यं सर्ववेदान्तनिर्णयम् ॥

In the light of the fact behind this tradition, it would be easy to see how Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya* might have derived much valuable help and material from the work called *Sundara-Pāṇḍya-Vārttika* by Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya (Neḍumāraṇ Nāyanār?).



The second possibility is that Tirujñānasambandhar himself might have been known as Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya. The Tamil Śaiva hagiology contains abundant material in support of Sambandha Svāmin's marvellous genius and versatility. He was a Brahmana by birth, the greatest of the Śaivācārya and widely known as *Vaidikavāraṇa*. To attribute to him a monumental Vaidika treatise like the *Sundara Pāṇḍya-Vārttika*, dealing with the religion and philosophy of Veda and Vedānta, would not be unreasonable, if sufficient evidences could be adduced. Sambandha Svāmin, as the revered Ācārya of King Sundara Pāṇḍya, might very well have been honoured by the latter with the privilege of prefixing or affixing the royal name to his own appellation of Ācārya. There would appear to be nothing extraordinary or unusual in this mode of honouring Ācāryas, if we remember that particularly among the Pāṇḍya Kings, as numerous epigraphic records show, this prevailed almost as an established custom. Thus it was, that the great Śrī Vaiṣṇava saint, Nammālvār, came to obtain the honorific surname Parāṅkuśa from the Pāṇḍya King, whose minister, the saint's father Uttaramantri, otherwise known as Māṇkari, happened to be. (Vide T. A. Gopinath Rao's *History of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas*, pp. 18-19, Madras University Publication, 1923). Those who carefully study the hagiographic accounts of Sambandhar in Tamil and Sanskrit can easily see how it is quite possible that the greatest of Śaiva Saints came to have from his royal disciple, the honorific surname Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya.

Thirdly there is the possibility of this great Author being a highly respected Ācārya of Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃsā, who must have flourished before Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, during the period of one of the earlier Pandyas, who had the name Sundara Pāṇḍya. This is the least that one ought to concede. The obvious inference from the Sanskrit extracts quoted above, that Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya was one of the earliest makers of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, belonging to the ante-Kumārila period and that, from his monumental *Vārttika*, Kumārila and Śaṅkara derived much valuable material and help, can no longer be considered debatable or problematic. May the combined efforts of all the lovers of our ancient heritage lead to the unearthing of this long buried monument of Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃsā, the *Sundara-Pāṇḍya-Vārttika*, is the humble prayer of the writer of this paper!



## THE BRHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD<sup>1</sup>

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is the greatest of the Upaniṣads ; and Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on this *Upaniṣad* is the greatest of his commentaries on the Upaniṣads. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is the greatest not only in the extent ; but it is also the greatest in respect of its substance and theme. It is the greatest Upaniṣad in the sense that the illimitable, all-embracing, absolute, self-luminous, blissful reality—the *Bṛhat* or Brahman, identical with *Ātman*, constitutes its theme. And, according to Śrī Śaṅkara, it may be said to be the greatest Upaniṣad, also for the reason that it comprehends both the *upadeśa* or revelation of the true nature of the mystic experience of the *Brahman-Ātman* identity and the *upapatti* or logical explanation of that great doctrine of *advaita* through the employment of the dialectic modes of argumentation known as *jalpa* (arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory) and *vāda* (arguing for truth). Śrī Śaṅkara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya* is the greatest of his commentaries on the Upaniṣads in the sense that the great Ācārya shows in this *bhāṣya*, in a very telling manner, how the great truth *Brahman-Ātman* identity forms the main purport of all the Vedāntic texts in general and this great Upaniṣad in particular, and maintains by means of his powerful dialectics that the interpretation and views of others are unsound and untenable—those advanced by the Vedistic realists (Mīmāṃsakas), the creationistic realists (Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas) and the advocates of the doctrine of *bhedābheda* (difference-cum-identity) like Bhartṛprapañca. Śrī Sureśvara describes Śrī Śaṅkara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* in these terms in the second verse of his great *Vārttika* on his *Bhāṣya*:—

यां काण्वोपनिषच्छालेन सकलान्नायार्थसंशोधिनी ।

संचक्रुर्मुखोऽनुवृत्तगुरवो वृत्तिं सतां शान्तये ॥

The older meaning of the term Upaniṣad is 'Secret word' or 'Secret import' or 'Secret doctrine.' As long as it was understood in this sense, the emphasis was on the mystic and ultra-rational aspect of philosophical thought. When, however, Śrī Dramiḍācārya, one of the pre-Śaṅkara thinkers who commented upon the Upaniṣads, and Śrī Śaṅkara, following Śrī Dramiḍa, interpreted the term Upaniṣad as standing for the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* identity (*Brahmavidyā*), which annihilates the beginningless nescience called *avidyā*, or as standing for the ancient text helpful in that realisation, the emphasis was shifted to the harmony between the inner mystic vision of the unity and universality of *Ātman* as the absolute being-spirit-bliss (*saccidānanda*) and the philosophical conclusion that may be reached by a

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Ed. with Eng. Tranl. by Swami Madhavananda, Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora. 1933.



proper use of logic and dialectics. It is necessary to bear this in mind in endeavouring to appraise justly the philosophical and exegetic worth of Śrī Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.

This great Upaniṣad consists of three kāṇḍas—the first being called the Madhu-kāṇḍa, the second the Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa or the Muni-kāṇḍa, and the third the Khila-kāṇḍa. The first kāṇḍa conveys the main teaching of the advaita doctrine and is of the nature of *upadeśa*; the second embodies the logical argument and explanation showing the soundness of the *upadeśa*; and the third deals with certain *upāsana*s or modes of meditation. The first two chapters of the Madhu-kāṇḍa deal with the Vedic rite, Pravargya, which forms a part of the ritualistic section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the Veda; and according to Śrī Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣad really begins with the third chapter of the Madhu-kāṇḍa. In this chapter, the phenomenal superimposition of the world on Brahman is set forth and its origin, its full reach and its acme are indicated: and all this is presented as *adhyāropa* or supposititious positing. The fourth or the concluding chapter of the Madhu-kāṇḍa exhibits in a telling manner the sublation which follows and stultifies the supposititious positing of the world in the preceding chapter, and elucidates the nature of the *Brahman-Ātman* realisation which is invariably and synchronously concomitant with the sublation; and all this is *apavāda* or sublation through the stultifying realisation of truth. According to Śrī Śaṅkara, *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* constitute the chief means of fully realising the absolute reality called Śuddham Brahman. All the details of Vedic rituals, all the forms of meditation associated with them, even the greatest of them—the horse-sacrifice (*aśva-medha*) and the meditation associated with it, and all the results accruing from them—all these constitute the province of nescience (*avidyā*). This is the substance of the account of *adhyāropa* in the third chapter of the Madhu-kāṇḍa. In the fourth Brāhmaṇa of this chapter, the great rewards of activities and meditation are described, so that a pure and disciplined mind may see their impermanence and detach itself from them; the undifferentiated Brahman (*avyākṛta*) representing the meaning of 'Tat' and the differentiated spirit (*vyākṛta*) representing the meaning of 'Tvam' are then described; and after showing how, in the multifarious non-spirit, the nature of the *vidyā* or knowledge of the absolute spirit, which is the Ātma-vidyā or Brahman-vidyā and brings about the realisation of the allness and the wholeness of Ātman, is indicated in the *vidyā-sūtra*—*आत्मैवेवोपासीत*। This is introduced at the end of the description of *adhyāropa*, so that one may not lose oneself in it and may find one's way further to the stage of *apavāda*. Here Śrī Śaṅkara discusses the import of the *vidyā-sūtra*. It has to be considered whether this text should be taken as a complementarily restrictive injunction (*niyamavidhi*), or as an injunction of something not got at in any other way (*apūrvavidhi*), or as an exclusively restrictive injunction (*parisamkhyāvidhi*). From Śrī Śaṅkara's discussion of the import of *vidyā-sūtra* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya* and from his observations about the import of similar texts in the *Samanvayādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya*, it may be gathered that this should be understood as setting forth the great truth that the absolute Brahman indirectly indicated by the word Ātman, and not any form of matter, gross or subtle, or any of its functions, should



## THE BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANISHAD

11

be realised as the only reality; and as a matter of fact, there is no scope for any kind of injunction directly with reference to such reality. Such apparent injunctions look like injunctions at the initial stages of the quest for truth; but they ultimately turn out to be valid statements of the one great truth for which the advaita system stands. The fourth chapter of the Madhu-kāṇḍa, or the second chapter of the *bhāṣya*, is devoted to *apavāda* and to an elucidation of the purport of the vidyā-sūtra. After describing in an elaborate manner the corporeal and incorporeal forms of the corpus of the material universe superimposed on Brahman, this chapter proceeds to convey the great teaching embodied in the words of the oft-quoted text—

अथात आदेशो नेति नैति

and emphatically avers that Brahman is not *sūnya* and can never be brought within the scope of any affirmation, but one may only glimpse it indirectly through negations of eliminable factors—"Not this, Not this" (इति न इति न). The fourth Brāhmaṇa of the fourth chapter introduces Yājñavalkya as offering to divide all his earthly possessions between his two wives—Kātyāyanī and Maitreyī. Maitreyī asks if she can free herself from death by possessing the whole world filled with wealth, and Yājñavalkya says 'no'. Maitreyī refuses all the riches of the world, saying "If I am not thereby free from death, what are these to me?" Yājñavalkya commends the spiritual fitness of his wife's mind and proceeds to teach her the great truth of the Vedānta. Śrī Śaṅkara draws pointed attention, here, to the value of renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*) as the means of true knowledge (*jñāna*). There are two kinds of *saṃnyāsa*—that which the seeker for knowledge (*jijnāsu*) resorts to for realising, without any hitch, the blissfulness of the condition of liberation while living (*jīvanmukti*). King Janaka, the greatest of Yājñavalkya's disciples, continued to be a house-holder (*grhastha*) and served the world in perfect detachment as a *jīvanmukta*; but Yājñavalkya, who was also a *jīvanmukta*, after making momentous contributions to the educating and uplifting of the world in the sphere of spirituality, desired to renounce his life as a householder (*gārhaṣṭhya*) and to become a *saṃnyāsin*. The ideal of a *jīvanmukta* continuing to serve in society is not really opposed to the ideal of *saṃnyāsa* and is beautifully synthesised with it in the relation between Janaka and Yājñavalkya in the *Brhadāraṇyaka*; and similarly through the delightful liaison furnished by Maitreyī, the life of a *grhastha* is unified in the fourth Brāhmaṇa of this chapter with the life of a *saṃnyāsin*. Yājñavalkya conveys to Maitreyī the great truth that the pure spirit—Ātman—is the ultimate object of all forms of love and is therefore to be understood as the eternal bliss; and Ātman should be realised through the duly regulated scheme of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*—knowing the truth from the Upaniṣads, investigating and discussing it, and constant contemplation upon it—  
आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

The *upadeśa* in the Madhu-kāṇḍa is appropriately followed by the *upapatti* or argumentative and expository discourse in the Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa. The latter kāṇḍa consists of the



fifth and sixth chapters of the Upaniṣad. In the fifth chapter, the dialectic mode of argumentation known as *jalpa*, or arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory, is employed. Yājñavalkya is presented here as the stalwart dialectician in Janaka's assembly of learned philosophers and he fights his way to victory in the interest of philosophical truth. The most important Brāhmaṇa in this chapter is the eighth, in which Brahmatattva is elucidated in answer to the questions raised by Gārgī, the lady philosopher who stands out as the most outstanding personality among the philosophical interlocutors opposing Yājñavalkya. In the sixth chapter, King Janaka plays the role, not of a controversialist, but of one desirous of completely knowing the truth (*tattvabubhutsu*) and the discourse proceeds on the lines of argumentation for truth (*vāda*). In the third and fourth Brāhmaṇas of this chapter, an illustrative exposition of *paraloka* and *mokṣa* is given. The fifth Brāhmaṇa repeats the dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī and explains the means of self-realisation in the highest sense (*ātmabodha*). In commenting upon the concluding sentence of this Brāhmaṇa—एतावदरे रवत्वमृतत्वमिति होत्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो विजहार—as also in commenting upon the next—तस्माद् बाह्यः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य etc. at the end of the fifth Brāhmaṇa of the previous chapter and upon 6-4-22 of the sixth chapter, Śrī Śaṅkara discusses the place of *samnyāsa* and its value in the advaitic scheme of life and liberation, and emphasises the necessity for renunciation as providing special facilities for unhampered realisation; and in this connection, as elsewhere, he is not in favour of any kind of accommodation, in practice or theory, with the advocates of the *karma-mārga*.

The third division of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is known as the Khilakāṇḍa and deals with certain modes of meditation. The messages of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* ontology are conveyed in the texts—अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, आत्मैवेवोपासीत, अथात आदेशो नेति नेति—The pragmatic message of this Upaniṣad is embodied in the text—अभयं वै जनकं प्राप्तोऽसि।

The discipline of this Upaniṣad and its aim are embodied in the soul-elevating *abhyārohamantra*—‘From non-being, lead me to being; from darkness, lead me to light; from death, lead me to deathlessness’.

असतो मा सद्गमय, तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय, मृत्योर्माऽमृतं गमय ।

All the teachings of this Upaniṣad are summed up in the first mantra of the Khila-kāṇḍa—‘That is the whole; the whole is this; from the whole rises up the whole; and having seized the whole of the whole, the whole alone remains’—

ओं पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।

पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥

Such as are able to see the defects of the *holism* of General Smuts may find comfort in the unimpeachable *wholism* embodied in this mantra at the beginning of the Khila-kāṇḍa. The



## THE BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANISHAD

13

*holism* of General Smuts may have, indeed, a chance of meeting with the approval of advaitic dialectics, only if it links itself up, as an ancillary, to the *wholism* of the absolute monism of the *Brhadāranyaka*. The most striking message of this *Upanishad* on the ethical side is embodied in the lesson which every meditator is asked to read in the dental rumblings of the three *da*'s (द-द-द) of a thunder-clap, which are suggestive of self-restraint (*dayā*), self-sacrifice (*dāna*) and merciful benevolence (*dayā*). This great ethical teaching is embodied in the text—तदेतत्त्रयं शिक्षेद् दमं दानं दयामिति । and Prajāpati conveys it to his three classes of children—the devas, the manuṣyas and the asuras. Such of the men as are godly in their nature and are tossed about by *kāma*, though otherwise good, should be understood, according to Śrī Śaṅkara, as gods (*devāḥ*) among men; such of them as are grasping and greedy and actuated by *lobha*, should be taken as men (*manuṣyāḥ*) among men; and cruel men, demonised by *krodha*, should be taken as demons (*asurāḥ*). All men should constantly practise *dama*, *dāna* and *dayā* to exorcise the monsters of *kāma*, *lobha* and *krodha*.

Some alien and alien-minded scholars are not inclined to see any systematic presentation of a philosophical doctrine in the Upaniṣads and believe that the Upaniṣads, including even the *Brhadāranyaka*, form a spiritual conglomerate of several things of varying values belonging to different stages—of thaumaturgic pebbles, dualistic and pluralistic toys and monistic gems. Those who carefully study the *Brhadāranyaka*, and Śrī Śaṅkara's great *bhāṣya* thereon, cannot easily resist the feeling that the *Brhadāranyaka* thought is an integral whole which is rooted on the advaita doctrine and has it as its precious fruit, which uses a sound system of exposition and dialectics easily lending themselves to being expressed in the terms of the Gautamiya logic, and which refuses to accommodate itself in a satisfactory manner to any form of pluralistic realism or to any kind of the timid spiritual and metaphysical compromises involved in the *bhedābheda* (difference-cum-identity) phases of monistic thought belonging to the pre-Śaṅkara or post-Śaṅkara stage in the history of Vedānta.

ओं नमो ब्रह्मादिभ्यो ब्रह्मविद्यासम्प्रदायकर्तृभ्यो वंश-ऋषिभ्यो नमो गुरुभ्यः ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणानामालयं करुणालयम् ।

नमामि भगवत्पादं शंकरं लोकशङ्करम् ॥



# BODHAYANA AND DRAMIDACARYA TWO OLD VEDANTINS PRESUPPOSED BY RAMANUJA<sup>1</sup>

## PART I

### BODHĀYANA

In the very first sentence of the *Srī-Bhāshya*. Rāmanuja refers to a Vṛttikāra, as Bhagavad-Bodhāyana; the author of *Vṛtti* on the *Brahmasūtra*; and the same Vṛttikāra is referred to without the name Bodhāyana in six other places in the *Srī-Bhāshya*. The relevant extracts are given below :—

१. “ भगवद्बोवायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः संचिक्षिपुः । तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते ॥ ”

[*Srī-Bhāshya*-Part I, p-1. Ānanda Press, Madras.]

२. तदाह वृत्तिकारः—“ वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्मविविदिषा ” इति । वक्ष्यति च कर्मब्रह्ममीमांसयोरैकशास्त्र्यम्—“ संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्व-सिद्धिः ” इति ॥

३. वृत्तिरपि “ जगद्धापाखर्जं समानो ज्योतिषा ” इति । *Ibid*, p. 70.

४. तदाह वृत्तिकारः—“ सता सोम्य तदा सोम्यन्नो भवति इति सम्पत्त्यसम्पत्तिभ्यामेतदवसीयते ; प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तः—इति चाह ” इति । *Ibid*, p. 164

५. यथाह वृत्तिकारः—“ सर्वं खल्विति सर्वात्मा ब्रह्मेशः ”—इति । *Ibid*, p. 234.

६. तदाह वृत्तिकारः—“ भूमात्वेवेति भूमा ब्रह्म, नामादिपरम्परया आत्मन ऊर्ध्वमस्योपदेशात् ” इति । *Ibid*, p. 289.

७. तदाह वृत्तिकारः—“ अस्ति हि मध्वादिषु सम्भवो ब्रह्मण एव सर्वत्र निचाय्यत्वात् ” इति । *Ibid*, p. 332.

<sup>1</sup> A. I. O. C. Proceedings. III Madras. pp. 465-73.



## BODHAYANA AND DRAMIDACARYA

15

In some of the footnotes appearing in part I of the *Srī-Bhāṣya*, it is found that the Ānanda Press edition erroneously attributes certain extracts from the Vākyakāra's Commentary to the Vṛttikāra. The Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition of the Rāmānujīyas accepts Rāmānuja's identification of the Vṛttikāra with Bodhāyana. The identity of Bodhāyana, to whom a Vṛtti on the *Brahmasūtras* is attributed, has so far remained one of the obscure problems in the Cultural History of India. There does not appear to be any reliable evidence which would enable us to identify this Vṛttikāra-Bodhāyana with the Bodhāyana of Kalpa-Sūtra fame; nor is there any good reason to equate the former with Bhavadāsa, a Vṛttikāra of the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras* referred to by Kumārīlabhaṭṭa as having been presupposed by Śābara-svāmin. (See Kumārīla's *Sloka-vārttika* pages 11 and 21 Benares edition). Śaṅkarācārya presupposes in several places in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*, a Vṛttikāra, who seems to have written a Vṛtti on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtras* and *Brahma-Sūtras*; and this Vṛttikāra seems to be Upavarṣa, who is definitely referred to by Śābarasvāmin in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*. In the *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara refers to a Vṛttikāra, according to commentators, under I. i, 19 (Sūtra), I. i, 23 (Sūtras), I. i, 31 (Sūtra), and I. ii, 23 (Sūtra); and unmistakably refers, at the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* on 3-3-53 (Sūtras), Upavarṣa as having written a commentary on the *Brahma-Mīmāṃsa-Sūtras* and *Karma-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*, this Upavarṣa being identified with Vṛttikāra, both by Ānandagiri and Rāmānanda. The subjoined relevant extract from Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-Bhāṣya* deserves careful consideration.

“इह देहस्यातिरिक्तस्यात्मनः सद्भावः समर्थ्यते बन्धमोक्षाधिकारसिद्धये । न ह्यसति देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मनि परलोकफलाश्चोदना उपपद्येरन् ; कस्य वा ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्येत ? ननु शास्त्रमुख एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम् । सत्यमुक्तम् भाष्यकृता, न तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरस्सरं प्रतिष्ठापितम् ; इत एव चाकृष्य आचार्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणलक्षणे वर्णितम् अत एव च भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः । ”

(Śaṅkara's *Brāhma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* under 3-3-53.)

Upavarṣa is referred to the following extracts also:—

“अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः,”

*Sabara-Bhāṣya* p. 10, Chowkhāmba edition.

“वर्णा एव तु शब्द इति भगवानुपवर्षः”

(*Samkara-Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* I. iii, 28).



II. It can be clearly made out from these extracts that Upavarṣa was the Vṛttikāra presupposed by Śaṅkara and that Upavarṣa the Vṛttikāra was decisively in favour of treating the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and Brahma-Mīmāṃsā as forming the former and latter parts of an integral whole. Those who are sufficiently acquainted with the Vedānta-darśana know well that the interpretation of the first word 'अथ' in the first Sūtra of the *Brahma-sūtras* depends largely upon agreement or disagreement with the view indicated above regarding the inter-relation of the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā. While, in this matter, there is striking divergence between the above-mentioned view, associated with Upavarṣa-the Vṛttikāra and Śaṅkara's view, Rāmānuja's own view and what Rāmānuja attributes to Bhagavad-Bodhāyana-the Vṛttikāra are in complete harmony with Upavarṣa's view. In this connection, it would be useful, in particular, to compare the extract No. 2 from the beginning of the *Srī. Bhāṣya* given above with what Upavarṣa is said to favour in the beginning of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* under III. iii, 53 of the *Brahma-sūtras*. And it would also be of advantage to note how the particular interpretation of the word 'अथ' refuted by Śaṅkara in the first *adhikaraṇa* of his *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* happens to be identical with the view attributed by Rāmānuja to the Vṛttikāra. These facts would naturally lead to the inference that Bodhāyana-the Vṛttikāra and Upavarṣa-the Vṛttikāra presupposed by Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara respectively are identical. Some over-zealous latter-day representatives of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, however, like the late Paṇḍit Rāmamiśra Śāstrin who edited the *Siddhi-traya* in the Chowkhāmba series and the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, *Sāstra-Dīpikā* and *Vedārtha-Samgraha* in the Paṇḍit series of Benares, would insist that the *Bodhāyana-Vṛtti* relied upon by Rāmānuja should be differentiated from the *Upavarṣa-Vṛtti* sometimes relied upon and sometimes refuted by Śaṅkara in his *Brahma-sūtra-Bhāṣya*. Nevertheless, there are luckily available a few significant data which would enable us to definitely equate Bodhāyana-the Vṛttikāra with Upavarṣa—the Vṛttikāra. Vedānta-dēśika is discovered to clearly suggest this identity in the following sentence, which occurs as lines 7 to 10, at page 149, part II of his learned commentary called *Tattva-ṭikā* on Rāmānuja's *Srī-Bhāṣya*.

[वृत्तिकारोपज्ञं स्वमतमाह—शब्दस्येति । अपिदूषणसमुच्चयार्थः । अत्र शाबरम्—“गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? गकारौकारविसर्जनीयाः ” इति । वृत्तिकारस्य बोधायनस्यैव हि उपवर्ष इति स्यान्नाम । ]  
(*Tattva-ṭikā*, Conjivaram Oriental Library Institution series No. 6, Telugu edition 1906, Sudarśana Press, Conjivaram.)

III. The Bodhāyana-Upavarṣa-Vṛttikāra equation, suggested as it happens to be by Vedānta-Dēśika, one of the greatest authorities of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, and supported as it is by the other references given above, can easily be pulled up to the level of an historically acceptable fact. And the weight of evidence in favour of the view that Bodhāyana was perhaps the *gotra*-name of Upavarṣa himself would be considerably enhanced by the well-known fact that many an Indian philosopher had two or even three names, one of them being a *gotra*-name, as, for instance, in the case of (1) Kaśyapa-Kaṇāda-Ulūka (2) Vātsyāyana-Pakṣila Svāmin, (3) Ātreya-Brahma Nandin-Taṅka, and (4) Akṣapāda-Gautama.



## BODHAYANA AND DRAMIDACARYA

17

## PART II

## DRAMIDACARYA

IV. Yāmunācārya, the spiritual ancestor and Prācārya of Rāmānuja refers, in the beginnings of his *Siddhitrāya*, to a Bhāṣya-kṛt; and it is rightly believed that this Bhāṣya-kṛt is Dramidācārya.

“यद्यपि भगवता बादरायणेन इदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि, त्रिवृतानि च परिमितगम्भीरभाषिणा भाष्यकृता, विस्तृतानि च तानि गम्भीरन्यायसागरभाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणापि; तथापि आचार्य-टङ्क-भर्तृप्रपञ्च - भर्तृमित्र-भर्तृहरि - ब्रह्मदत्त-शङ्कर-श्रीवत्साङ्क-भास्करादि-विरचितसितासितविविधनिबन्धन-श्रद्धाविप्रलब्ध-बुद्धयो न यथावद् अन्यथा च प्रतिपद्यन्त — इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये युक्तः प्रकरणप्रक्रमः । ”

(*Siddhitrāya*-Chowkhāmbā edition, Benares—Pages 5 and 6)

V. Rāmānuja refers to Dramidācārya in several places in his *Vēdārtha-samgraha* and *Sri-Bhāṣya*, as the following extracts will show :

१. “ तत्त्वमसीतिसद्विद्यायामुपास्यं ब्रह्म सगुणं सगुणब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च फलमित्यभियुक्तैः पूर्वाचार्यैर्व्याख्यातम् । यथोक्तं वाक्यकारेण—‘युक्तं तद्गुणकोपासनात्’ इति ; व्याख्यातं च द्रमिडाचार्येण विद्याविकल्पं वदता—‘यद्यपि सच्चित्तो न निर्मुक्तदेवतं गुणगणं मनसानुधावेत् तथाप्यन्तर्गुणामेव देवतां भजते ’—इति ।

(*Vedārtha-Samgraha*) Paṇḍit edition, Benares, Page 138.

२. भगवद्बोधायन-टङ्क-द्रमिड-गुहदेव-कपर्दि-भारुचि-प्रभृत्यविगीतशिष्ट-परिगृहीतपुरातनवेदवेदान्त-व्याख्यानसुव्यक्तार्थश्रुतिनिकरनिदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः ।

(*Ibid* page 148).

N.B.—Here the *Tātparyā-dīpikā* of Sudarśanasūri says that Taṅka is Brahmanandin.—*टङ्को ब्रह्मनन्दी* (*Ibid Tātparyādīpikā* p. 148).

३. वाक्यकारश्च ध्रुवानुस्मृतेर्विवेकादिभ्य एव निष्पत्तिमाह—“तल्लब्धिविवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रिया-कल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्पेभ्यस्सम्भवान्निर्वचनाच्च”—इति । विवेकादीनां स्वरूपं चाह—“जाल्याश्रयनिमित्तादुष्टादन्नात् कायशुद्धिविवेकः ” इति । अत्र निर्वचनम्—आहारशुद्धौ सत्त्वशुद्धिः, सत्त्वशुद्धौ ध्रुवा स्मृतिः ” इति । \* \* \* “तद्विपर्ययजा तुष्टिरुद्धर्षः ” इति । निर्वचनमपि—“शान्तो दान्तः ” इति । ]

Madras Ānanda Press edition of the *Sri-Bhāṣya* Vol. I, pp. 11 and 19.



४. [द्रमिडभाष्यकारश्च—“ देवतासायुज्यादशरीरस्यापि देवतावत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिस्स्यात् ” इत्याह । ]

(Ibid. Vol. I, page 70.)

५. [यथाह द्रमिडभाष्यकारः—“ यथा लोके राजा प्रचुरदन्दशूके धोरेऽनर्थसङ्कटेऽपि प्रदेशे वर्तमानो व्यजनाद्यवधूतदेहो दोषैर्न स्पृश्यते, अभिप्रेतांश्च लोकान् परिपालयति, भोगांश्च गन्धादीन् विश्वजनोपभोग्यान् धारयति ; तथासौ लोकेश्वरः भ्रमत्स्वसामर्थ्यचामरो दोषैर्न स्पृश्यते, रक्षति च लोकान् ब्रह्मलोकादीन्, भोगांश्चा- विश्वजनो पभोग्यान् धारयति ” । ]

(Ibid. Vol. II, page 23.)

६. तथाह द्रमिडाचार्यः—“ फलसंविभत्सया हि कर्मभिरात्मानं पिप्रीषन्ति स प्रीतोऽलं फलायेति शास्त्रमर्थादा ” इति ।

(Ibid. Vol. II, page 75.)

From the foregoing extracts it may be made out that Dramiḍācārya wrote a *Bhāṣhya* on the *Chāndogya* and perhaps also on certain other Upaniṣads and that he also commented on the text of the aphoristic Vākyas of the Vākyā-kāra, otherwise known, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, by the names of Brahmanandin and Tanka. Vēdānta-Deśika also refers to Dramiḍācārya in the following places in Part I of his *Tattva-tikā*:—p. 7, lines 8 to 10 (The Sudarśana Press, Telugu edition of the *Tattva-tikā*—above referred to); Page 34 *Vākyā* and *Dramiḍa-Bhāṣhya* and *Vāmanatīkā* on the latter are referred to *Ibid.* p. 60, lines 1 and 2 *Ibid.* and p. 138—अत्र भाष्यकारो ब्रह्मनन्दिवाक्यव्याख्याता द्रमिडाचार्यः—*Ibid.*

VI. According to Ānandagiri, Śaṅkarācārya presupposes Dramiḍācārya, the author of a lengthy and learned commentary on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, in his introductory statement at the beginning of his *Bhāṣhya* on the *Chāndogya* :—

“ ओमित्येतदक्षरमित्यष्टाध्यायी छान्दोग्योपनिषत् । तस्याः संक्षेपतोऽर्थजिज्ञासुभ्य ऋजुविवरणमल्प-ग्रन्थमिदमारभ्यते ॥ ”

(Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣhya* on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*—p. I). Ānandagiri has the following note in this connection :—

ऋजुविवरणमिति—ऋजु पाठक्रमानुसारि विवरणम् अर्थस्फुटीकरणं प्रकृतोपनिषदः यस्मिन्भाष्ये तत्तथेति यावत् । अथ पाठक्रममाश्रित्यापि द्राविडं भाष्यं प्रणीतम्, तत्किमनेनेत्याशङ्क्याह ॥



At the end of Samkara's *Bhāshya* on II-32 of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*, the following quotation is found, from Dramiḍācārya's work according to Ānandagiri:—सिद्धं तु निवर्तकवादिष्व-गमविदां सूत्रम् . . . . . Again in the Sāmkara- *Bhāshya* on III-8 to 10 of the *Chāndogya-panishad*, Samkara is found relying upon Dramiḍācārya's explanation to meet a difficulty arising from an inconsistency between the *Chandogya-panishad* and the Paurāṇika account of the time of sunrise and sunset in the different parts of the world of Gods.

“ अत्रोक्तः परिहार आचार्यैः ”

Samkara-*Bhashya* on the *Chāndogya*—Ānandāśrama ed. p. 145.

In this connection Ānandagiri says—

“ यद्यपि श्रुतिविरोधे स्मृतिरप्रमाणम्, तथापि यथाकथंचिद्विरोधपरिहारं द्रविडाचार्योक्तमुपपादयति ”

(*Ibid.* p. 146.)

It may be observed here that the names द्रमिडाचार्य and द्रविडाचार्य occur as variants in Vedānta-Deśika's *Tattva-ṭīkā* (Telugu edition), the following quotations are found :—

तथा च वाक्यम् “ उपनिषण्णत्वादोपनिषत् ” इति । तत्र द्रमिडभाष्यम्—“ गहने हीयं विद्या संनिविष्टा ” इति । तस्य च वामनटीका—“ गहने ब्रह्मणि उपनिषण्णा ” इति ।

Careful scholars cannot miss the unmistakable echo of the above extract in the following passage from Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya* :—

“ उपनिषदिति विद्योच्यते ; तच्छीलिनां गर्भजन्मजरादिनिशातनात्, तदवसादनाद्वा, ब्रह्मणो बोपनिगमयितृत्वात् ; उपनिषण्णं वास्यां परं श्रेय इति । तदर्थत्वाद्ग्रन्थोऽप्युपनिषत् ” ।

(Śaṅkara's introduction to his *Bhāshya* on the *Taittirīyopanishad*.)

VII. It will be seen from p. XVI of the introduction of *Tarka-samgraha*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. III, that some scholars, like my friend, the late Mr. T. M. Tripāṭhi, are inclined to differentiate the Dramiḍācārya presupposed by Śaṅkara from the Dramiḍācārya presupposed by Rāmānuja and to identify the latter with the great Śrī Vaiṣṇava saint Nammālvār otherwise known as Śāthagōpa. There are, however, two conclusive evidences which would show that Śaṅkara's Dramiḍa and Rāmānuja's Dramida should be held to be identical and that Dramiḍa cannot be equated with Nammālvār. The sub-joined extracts from the third chapter of Sarvajñātman's *Samkshepa-Sārīraka* may be perused here with advantage:—

“ आत्रेयवाक्यमपि संव्यवहारमात्रं कार्यं समस्तमिति नः कथयांबभूव ।

सत्कार्यवादविषयो न हि दोषराशिर्मयामये भवितुमुत्सहते विरोधात् ॥

Chap. III. 217.



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

काणाददर्शनसमाश्रयदोषराशिदूरान्निरस्त इह संव्यवहारमात्रे ।  
वेदान्तभूमिकुशलो मुनिरत्रिवंश्यस्तेनाह कार्यमिह संव्यवहारदृष्ट्या ॥

Ibid, 218.

षष्ठप्रपाठकनिबद्धमुदीरितं यत् तत्सत्यमेव खलु सत्यसमाश्रयत्वात् ।  
अत्रैव यत्पुनरुवाच समुद्रफेनदृष्टान्तपूर्वकमदो व्यवहारदृष्ट्या ॥

Ibid, 219.

पूर्वं विकारमुपवर्ण्य शनैःशनैस्तदृष्टिं विसृज्य निकटं परिगृह्य तस्मात् ।  
सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्रमद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ॥

Ibid, 220.

अन्तर्गुणा भगवती परदेवतेति प्रत्यगुणेति भगवानपि भाष्यकारः ।  
आह स्म यत्तदिह निर्गुणवस्तुवादे संगच्छते न तु पुनः सगुणप्रवादे ॥

Ibid, 221.

VIII. In the commentaries published in the Poona Ānandāśrama edition of the *Samksepa-Sārīraka* and in Nṛsiḥmāśramin's commentary on this work, available in manuscript, the Vākyakāra referred to by Sarvajñātman as Ātreya is identified with Brahmanandin, and the Bhāṣyakāra, in verse 221 quoted above, is taken to be Dramidācārya, the author of a lengthy *Bhāṣya* on the *Chāndogyopanishad-vārtika* consisting perhaps of the aphoristic vākyas of Brahmanandin, otherwise known, in the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, as Taṅka, the Vakyakara. The last of the verses quoted above (221) requires particular attention, in this connection, as it is discovered to incorporate in the first pāda, an important part of the quotation from Dramiḍācārya's *Bhāṣya*, which is set forth above as occurring at page 138 of Rāmānuja's *Vedārtha-Samgraha*, Paṇḍit edition, Benares. Sarvajñātman was Surēśvarācārya's disciple and contemporary, as may be made out from the eighth and penultimate verses of the *Samksepaśārīraka*; and Sureśvara was one of Śaṅkara's (788—820 A.D.) disciples. If, as the late Mr. T. A. Gopinātha Rao says at p. 21 of his *History of Srī Vaiṣṇavas*, published by the Madras University, in 1923 at the Government Press, Madras, the first half of the ninth century A.D. is the time when Nammālvār lived and wrote his memorable *Tiruvāymoḷi*. Dramidācārya, the author of the old *Bhāṣya* on Brahmanandin's Vākyas and the *Chāndogyopanishad*, pre-supposed by Rāmānuja, Sarvajñātmamuni and Śaṅkara, must, for obvious reasons, be held to be different from Nammālvār.



## BODHAYANA AND DRAMIDACARYA

21

IX. A critical investigation of the hagiographic accounts of the Ālvārs and Ācāryas in the literature of Śrī Vaiṣṇava-Sampradāya, like the *Guruparamparāprabhāva* by Pinbālahiya-perumāl-jīyar, has led historians of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism to the conclusion that Tirumaliśai-Ālvār, who produced the *Tiruccanta-Viruttam* and *Nan-mukan-Tiruvantāti* and was contemporaneous with the three Mutalālvārs, was born in Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam and flourished there during the period of Pallava supremacy; and that he might, with good reasons, be assigned to the first quarter of the 8th century A.D. (See the late Mr. T. A. Gopinath Rao's *History of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas* already referred to—pp. 16 and 17). A careful examination of all the details relating to Tirumaliśai Ālvār in the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava Sampradāya literature, in comparison with the material gathered by me about Dramidācārya, also known as Dravida, from Vedāntic literature in Sanskrit, has revealed to me three striking correspondences between Tirumaliśai and Dramiḍa—(1) a biographic correspondence (2) a textual correspondence, and (3) a phonetic correspondence.

X. In the traditional accounts of Śrīvaiṣṇavas, it is stated that Tirumaliśai was born as the son of the sage Bhārgava, and afterwards became the foster-son of Tiruvālan, a Śūdra. After critically studying all the systems of philosophy, Tiruvālan's foster-son found complete satisfaction in Vaiṣṇavism. A reference to the Tirumaliśaippirān-vaibhavam in Pinbālahiya-perumāl-Jīyar's *Guruparamparā* and Periyavāccānpillai's introduction to his commentary on Tirumaliśai's *Tiruccantaviruttam* would show how Tirumaliśai was born of a sage, and thrown into the slums by adverse fate and reclaimed later by some great Ācārya. There is an interesting parallelism between this aspect of Tirumaliśai's life and an illustrative story which is known in the Vedānta-literature in Sanskrit as व्याधसंवर्धितराजपुत्राख्यायिका and which is found narrated *in extenso*, in verses 506 to 527 at pp. 970 to 972, in part II, Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāranyakabhāṣyavārttika* (Poona edition) and at pp. 152 to 154 in Haradatta's *Ujjvalā* on Āpastamba's *Dharma Sūtras*, Mysore Government Oriental Library edition. Ānandagiri, in his commentary on verse 506 of the *Sureśvara-vārttika* above referred to, definitely attributes the authorship of the व्याधसंवर्धितराजपुत्राख्यायिका to Dramidācārya. Would it require any great strain or imagination to see that, if Dramidācārya and Tirumaliśai Ālvār should be identical, the *ākhyāyikā* in question could easily be taken to strike an autobiographical note?

XI. The textual correspondence is such as might well support the suggestion that Dramidācārya should be identified with Tirumaliśai. At p. 75, Part II of the Madras Ānanda Press edition of the *Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja gives from *Dramiḍa-Bhāṣya* the extract:—  
 फलसंविभक्त्या हि कर्मभिरात्मानं पिप्रीषन्ति, स प्रीतोऽलं फलायेति शास्त्रमयादा ॥

Any scholar who has fully understood the meaning of this extract can easily realise how the same idea is reproduced in a slightly amplified form in the seventy second verse of Tirumaliśai-ālvār's *Nānmukan tiruvantāti*:—



“ இல்லற மில்லேல் துறவற மில்லென்னும்  
 சொல்லற மல்லனவும் சொல்லல்ல—நல்லறம்  
 ஆனவும் நால்வேத மாத்தவமும் நாரணனே  
 ஆவதீ தன்றென்பாரார். ”

XII. Would it now be felt a far-fetched suggestion that the phonetic parallelism between *Dramiḍa* and *Tirumaliśai* should be taken to be, not merely accidental, but full of significance? It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the *Dramiḍācārya*<sup>1</sup> who is presupposed by *Sureśvara* and *Sarvajnatman* and who is identical with the *Dramida* presupposed by *Samkara* and *Rāmānuja*, may well be assigned, on historically acceptable grounds to the first quarter of the eighth century A.D., to which period historians of Śrīvaiṣṇavism would assign *Tirumaliśai Ālvār*.

<sup>1</sup> For his advaitic views see “*Draviḍātreyadarśana*” by Polagam Rama Sastrigal. Madras. 1957—Ed.



# MANDANA'S BRAHMASIDDHI \*

## SECTION I

### THE SIDDHI-LITERATURE

“ सिद्धीनामिष्टनैकर्म्यब्रह्मगानामियं चिरात् ।  
अद्वैतसिद्धिरधुना चतुर्थी समजायत ॥ ”

This is the last of the epilogic verses which Śrī Madhūsudana-sarasvatī has appended to his famous Advaita work called the *Advaitasiddhi*<sup>1</sup>. Four great Advaitic works are referred to in this verse as bearing names, of which the word *siddhi* forms the latter member and the words *Iṣṭa*, *Naikarmya*, *Brahma* and *Advaita* form respectively the former members. These four works are the *Brahmasiddhi*, the *Naikarmyasiddhi*<sup>2</sup>, the *Iṣṭasiddhi*<sup>3</sup> and the *Advaitasiddhi*. Madhūsudana-sarasvatī flourished in the last three quarters of the seventeenth century; and his work—the *Advaitasiddhi*—is the latest of these four works and came to be written long after the other three *siddhi*—(*cirāt samajāyata*). Two other advaitic works bear similar names:—viz., *Advaita-brahmasiddhi*<sup>4</sup> and the *Svārājyāsiddhi*<sup>5</sup>. These six works, chiefly, may be taken to represent what may be called the *Siddhi-literature*<sup>6</sup> of the advaita school. There are also some other works belonging to the *Siddhi-literature* such as the *Vijnānamātrasiddhi* or the *Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi* by Vasubandhu, the *Sphōtasiddhi*<sup>8</sup> by Ācārya Maṇḍana, the *Sphōṭasiddhi*<sup>9</sup> by Bharatamiśra, the *Apōha-siddhi* and *Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi*<sup>10</sup> by Ratnakīrti,

---

\* Introduction to Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* with com., of Sankhapāṇi, Ed. by Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri, Madras Govt. Oriental Mss. Series, No. 4. 1937.

<sup>1</sup> A.S.N.S. Press 1917, p. 900.

<sup>2</sup> Nai-S.B.S.P.S. XXXVIII—1925.

<sup>3</sup> I.S.G.O.S. LXV—1933.

<sup>4</sup> A.B.S. Bib. Ind.

<sup>5</sup> Svā-S. Ārya. P.—Mad. 1927.

<sup>6</sup> Siddhi-literature; Literature-consisting of works, the names of which have the word 'Siddhi' as the last member.

<sup>7</sup> Edited by Sylvain Levi, Paris—1925. See Keith-Bud-Phil., p. 231 and Bhāva—Pra, pp. 190, 326, 339—Mys. Or. Ser.

<sup>8</sup> Sph. S. Madras Uni. Skt. Ser. No. 6—1931.

<sup>9</sup> Sph. S.T.S.S. No. LXXXIX—1927.

<sup>10</sup> Ap. S.S.B.N.T. Bib. Ind. Cal.—1910.

Ks. S.S.B.N.T. Bib. Ind. Cal.—1910.



the *Prabōdha-siddhi*<sup>1</sup>, by Udayanācārya, the *Advayasiddhi*<sup>2</sup> by Śrīdhara, and the *Ātma-siddhi*<sup>3</sup>, *Samvit-siddhi* and *Īśvara-siddhi* by Yāmūnācārya and Jñānottama's *Jñānasiddhi*.

Of all these works of the *Siddhi-literature*, bearing names ending with the word *siddhi*, excepting Vasubandhu's *Vijnānamātrasiddhi*, the *Brahma-siddhi* is the earliest work and investigates and elucidates the true nature of the Advaitic *Absolute* called *Brahman*, after discussing and confuting the adverse views and arguments put forward by previous and contemporary thinkers. The term *siddhi* stands for conclusive ascertainment as a result of careful investigation; and it presupposes discussion of a polemical nature, in many cases. The six Advaita works of the *Siddhi-literature* are all of them comprehensive treatises dealing with the salient features of Advaita philosophy and laying special stress upon a particular topic or aspect of Advaitism. The *Brahma-siddhi*, as its name signifies, discusses and maintains the theme that the infinite Absolute is unsurpassed, illimitable bliss—the one reality having no beginning or end; the unconditioned consciousness; the *Om* of all speech; the immutable, trans-empirical *all*; the otherless perfection of security; the ruling *spirit* of all born beings—the *Ātman* taught in the Upaniṣads; and kindred topics are also considered, such as the unsubstantiality of all differences, the true import of all the Vedāntic texts, the means and nature of liberation and the nature of nescience and error. The *Naiskarmya-siddhi* by Surēśvara brings into prominence the antithesis between *doing* and *knowing* and emphatically makes clear how knowledge (*jñāna*) transcends the sphere of action (Karman) and is the sole means of liberation. Vimuktātman, in his *Ista-siddhi*, discourses on *Avidyā*, as the pivotal principle of Advaitism and discusses fully the chief theories of error which have been propounded by Indian Philosophers. Madhusūdana-sarasvatī applies himself vigorously, in his *Advaita-siddhi*, to the great task of confuting the cavils and criticisms advanced by the leading exponents of Dvaita-vēdānta against the chief tenets of the Advaita system. The *Advaita-brahmasiddhi* by Sadānanda and the *Svārājya-siddhi* by Gaṅgādhara-sarasvatī are comparatively later and less important; and the former of these two works is similar to the *Advaita-siddhi* and controverts in general, the dualistic, pluralistic and non-vedic doctrines opposed to Advaitism, while the latter is a brief manual of Advaita ending with a poetic description of the Advaitic *heaven*<sup>4</sup> as equivalent to Brahman-realization of Kaivalya: If the

<sup>1</sup> Pr. S. Govt. O. Mss. L. Md. Triennial, C. No. 3377. This is otherwise called *Nyāya-parisiṣṭa*. See Cal. Skt. Ser. No. XXII.

<sup>2</sup> Adv. S. This is referred to on p. 5 of *Nyāyakandali* (V.S.S. IV. 1895), by Śrīdhara. It is also referred to by Hēlārāja, as one of his works, in his commentary on the *Dravyasamuddeśa* and the *Samkhyāsamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (Vāk. Pad. B.S.S., III kāṇḍa. p. 93 and T.S.S. No. 116, p. 117). It seems to be a treatise elucidating Bhartṛhari's monistic doctrine of Śabdādvaita. Manuscripts of the work are not known to be available anywhere. The learned editor of the *Kandali* in the V.S.S. attributes this work to Śrīdhara, though Śrīdhara himself, who refers to it, does not say that it is one of his works.

<sup>3</sup> Sid. Tr. Ch. S.S. No. 10—1900.

<sup>4</sup> Svā. S. III, 43 to 46.



*Brahma-siddhi* may be said to advert in particular to the doctrine of *Brahmādvaita* or *Sattād-vaija*—that Brahman, as absolute existence (Sat) is the only reality, the *Naiskarmya-siddhi* may be said to release knowledge from the thralldom of action and to establish, that Brahman, as absolute consciousness (*Cit*), is the only reality; the *Ista-siddhi* may be said to bring into prominence the view that Brahman is identical with *Ātman* as absolute bliss (*Ānanda*) and to elucidate the nature of the obscurative and perversive veil of nescience (*Avidyā*), which an Advaitin is particularly solicitous to establish, and which is his *Ista*<sup>1</sup> in this sense: and the *Advaita-siddhi* may be said to exhibit the full glory of the Advaitic Absolute in the Saccidananda synthesis, through a masterly exposition, in a polemical style, of Brahman as the only trans-phenomenal reality. Viewed in correlation with the opening sūtra of the *Brahma-mīmāṃsā*, the *Brahmasiddhi* may be said to devote itself mainly to the definition (*Lakṣaṇa*) and testimony (*Pramāṇa*) of Brahman referred to in the expression *Brahma-jijnāsā*—the *what* of the *Brahma-jijnāsā*; the *Naiskarmya-siddhi* may be regarded as paying particular attention to the meaning of the words *Atha* and *Atah* as understood by Śaṅkara—the *how* of the *Brahma-jijnāsā*; the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* may be made out as dealing chiefly with the nature and cause of erroneous super-imposition (*Adhyāsa*), according to Śaṅkara—the *why* of the *Brahma jijnāsā*—*adhyāsa* being the basic topic on which the *Brahma-jijnāsā* hinges; and the *Advaita-siddhi* sums up all the ideas coming under *Brahma-jijnāsā*. It may also be pointed out here, that, while the *Brahma-siddhi* concerns itself mainly with the *Ontology* of Advaita, the *Naiskarmya-siddhi* with its *ethology*, and the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* with its *epistemology*, the *Advaita-siddhi* comprises all the aspects of the Advaita metaphysics.

The other works known to us in the Siddhi-literature are the *Sphōtasiddhi* of Maṇḍana and Bharatamiśra, Ratnakīrti's *Apōhasiddhi* and *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*, Udayana's *Prabōdhasiddhi*, Śrīdhara's *Advayasiddhi*, Yāmūnācārya's *Ātmasiddhi*, *Īśvarasiddhi* and *Samvitsiddhi* and Jñānot-tama's *Jñānasiddhi*. The two works bearing the name *Sphōtasiddhi*, one by Maṇḍana and the other by Bharatamiśra, establish the *Sphōta doctrine* of the absolute monism of Vaiyākaranas like Bhartṛhari, and seek to harmonise Bhartṛhari's *Sabdādvaita* with the *Brahmādvaita* of the Upaniṣads by equating the *absolute one* forming the noumenal substratum of the phenomenal world of speech, *Sabda-brahman*—with *Suddha-brahman*, the *Absolute one* forming the noumenal substratum of the phenomenal world of objects signified by speech, the respective approaches in the two ways of realising the *Absolute reality* being laid out in the world of sounds (*Sabda-prapañca*) and in the world of objects (*Arthaprapaṇca*). The *Apōhasiddhi* seeks to reduce all the generic attributes (*Jāti*) connoted by words to what may be called the *not-others* phase of objects—their negative phase consisting in *Anyāpōha* or difference from the rest; and the *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi* maintains the Śāutrāntika doctrine of momentariness. The *Prabōdha-siddhi* renders intelligible the various types of futile responsiveness (*Jāti*) and vulnerable points (*Nigrahasthāna*), which form the offensive armoury of Gautamiya dialectics. The

<sup>1</sup> I. S., 347.

See also VIII—27 and 28.



*Advaya-siddhi*<sup>1</sup> seems to elucidate Bhartṛhari's monistic doctrine of *Sabādvaīta*. The true nature of the individual soul (*Ātman*), the Supreme Lord (*Īśvara*) and knowledge as distinct from object is explained from the standpoint of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* realism in the three *siddhis* (*Siddhitraya*) of Yāmunācārya. The *Jñānasiddhi*<sup>2</sup> presumably by Jñānōttama, is an Advaita work explaining the nature and means of the true knowledge of the advaitic Brahman. Vēdāntadēśika's<sup>3</sup> *Sarvārthasiddhi*, a commentary on his own *Viśiṣṭādvaita* treatise, called *Tattvamuktākālāpa*, may also be mentioned here, by the way along with<sup>4</sup> *Nyāyasiddhi*, a commentary on Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapancikā*<sup>5</sup>—a *Prābhākara* treatise.

SECTION II<sup>6</sup>THE AUTHOR OF THE BRAHMASIDDHI—HIS RELATION TO OTHER  
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITERS AND TEXTS

Maṇḍanamīśra is the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*. In the colophons of this and other works written by him and in the philosophical works of other authōrs, who refer to him, he is described as Ācārya Maṇḍanamīśra, Śrīmān Maṇḍanamīśra, Mahāmahōpādhyāya Maṇḍanamīśra, Ārya Maṇḍana. In none of these works, Maṇḍanamīśra is mentioned as a disciple of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa otherwise known as Bhaṭṭapāda, the renowned Vārtikakāra of Karma-mīmāṃsa, or as a disciple of Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara, the renowned Ācārya of the Advaita School of Vēdānta, or as identical with Surēśvarācārya, the renowned Vārtikakāra of Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the *Taittiriya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishads*, who is referred to in some works under the name of Viśvarūpācārya<sup>7</sup> and who was one of the four, famous, direct, Sannyāsin-disciples of

<sup>1</sup> This is but a conjectural description of Helārāja's *Advayasiddhi*. Mss. of this work are not known to be available any where.

<sup>2</sup> Manuscripts of this work are not known to be available anywhere. This is referred to in the *Nayanaprasādini*, a commentary on Citsukha's *Tattvapradipika* by Pratyakṣavarūpa-bhagavat as one of the works written by Citsukha's teachers, presumably *Jñānōttama*. (N.S.P.T.P., p. 385.)

<sup>3</sup> No. 76 Mys. S.S.—1933.

<sup>4</sup> This is an incomplete Ms. described under R. No. 3647-Ts. Cat. Skt. Mss., Vol. IV-C.

<sup>5</sup> Chow. S.S. No. 17.

<sup>6</sup> This Section II was the Paper read at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, on the XIth Anniversary Day of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar on 1936 under the title 'The Maṇḍana-Suresvara Equation in the History of Advaita'. This was later published in *A.B.O.R.I.*, XVIII, 1937, pp. 121-57,—Editor.

<sup>7</sup> See *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* Vīzianagaram Skt. Ser. p. 92 Bṛhad, Vār. Part II, p. 640, verse 1031 quoted under the name of *Viśvarūpācārya*. Also see *Parāśara madhaviya* B. S. P. S., Vol. I, Part I, p. 57; Bṛhad. Vār, Part I, verse 97 quoted under the name of *Viśvarūpācārya*,



Śaṅkara. There is, however, an old and generally accepted tradition that Maṇḍana was one of the eminent philosophical writers, who received instruction from Kumārilabhaṭṭa; such as Prabhākara and Bhaṭṭōmvēka. There is also a comparatively recent tradition, which supports the general belief that Maṇḍanamiśra was one of the disciples of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and equates him with Surēśvarācārya. Whether Maṇḍanamiśra, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, is identical with Surēśvarācārya, the author of the *Naishkarmyasiddhi* and the *Vārtikas* on the *Brhadāraṇya-kabhāshya* and the *Taittirīyakabhāshya* is the first question to be considered here.

This question relating to the *Maṇḍana-Surēśvara* equation is of as great importance in the evolution of the Advaita system, as in the history of Advaita literature. In my youth, when I was studying the recognised classics of Advaita literature under my Ācārya—the late Śrī Brahmēndra Sarasvatī, according to the traditional method, as also in the earlier years of my Professorial career, I took the *Maṇḍana-Surēśvara* equation for granted, as several other scholars did then, and do even to-day. My belief in this equation received its first stock, when I was studying Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* in manuscript in the years 1921-22, with a view to bringing out a critical edition of the work. In the (April, 1923 Jan. 1924) issues of the Royal Asiatic Society Journal of Great Britain and Ireland, my esteemed friend and colleague—Professor M. Hiriyanna of Mysore, contributed a short article on *Surēśvara and Maṇḍanamiśra*, in which he drew attention to three noteworthy points of doctrinal divergence between Maṇḍana and Surēśvara, which he gathered from certain advaita works like the *Samkshēpaśarīraka*, the *Laghucandrikā* and the *Brhadāraṇyakavārtika*; and these doctrinal distinctions have reference to Maṇḍanamiśra's views regarding the locus of Avidyā, the Bhāvādvaīta and the special value of meditation (Upāsana) in transmuting the Brahman-knowledge arising from the mabā-vākyas into Brahman-realisation. Professor Hiriyanna referred also in this article to a tradition preserved at Sringeri, and embodied in a poem called *Guru-varṇa-kāvya*, according to which Maṇḍana should be differentiated from Surēśvara. The least that may be said about the valuable evidence adduced by Professor Hiriyanna in this article is that it is sufficient to compel a careful investigation of the *Maṇḍana-Surēśvara* equation. A careful study of Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* in comparison with his other known works, all of which are now available in print, and with the known works of Surēśvara and Śaṅkara and in the light of the works of Vācaspatimiśra, Vimuktātman, Prakāśātman, Ānandabōdha, Prakāśārthakāra, Citsukha, Amalānanda, Ānandagiri, Vidyāraṇya, Madhusūdanasarasvatī, Brahmānandasarasvatī and several others representing the Advaita system and a careful consideration of the reference to Maṇḍana contained in certain important works of the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Dvaita-vēdānta and other systems have made it possible to assemble here several data of overwhelming cumulative weight, which would be quite sufficient to kill the common belief in the *Maṇḍana-Surēśvara* equation, and to exhibit Maṇḍana and Surēśvara as two different individuals, maintaining strikingly divergent views within the purview of Advaitism. These data are set forth below:



1. Maṇḍana maintains the Sphōṭavāda and Śabdādvaita of Bhartṛhari, in an elaborate manner, in his Sphōṭa-siddhi<sup>1</sup> and easily reads it into the Advaita-siddhānta in his amplification of the word 'akṣaram' in the opening verses of the Brahmasiddhi. Maṇḍana's attitude towards Śabdādvaita is much more than favourable; it is respectful. But Śaṅkara completely differs from Maṇḍana in this respect, and criticises, and entirely discards the Sphōṭa doctrine of Bhartṛhari. Surēśvara, who closely follows Śaṅkara, completely ignores the Sphōṭa-doctrine. While Maṇḍana maintains, in his Brahmasiddhi<sup>2</sup> that the Upaniṣadic texts "Om iti Brahma, om iti idaṁ sarvaṁ" should be understood as establishing the identity of Praṇava with Brahman and as supporting the Śabdādvaita doctrine. Surēśvara, following Śaṅkara, interprets<sup>3</sup> the same text as teaching the meditation on Praṇava as Brahman and as merely commending Praṇava. Advaitins like Vimuktātman, who follow Surēśvara in many respects, assume an attitude, which is worse than adverse—is positively derisive towards Śabdādvaita. In fact, Vimuktātman sneers at the Śabdādvaita as a travesty of Advaita and places it on a par with Jar-monism<sup>4</sup> (ghaṭādvaita).

2. In his exposition of the nature of erroneous cognition, in the Brahmasiddhi<sup>5</sup> and Vibhramavivēka<sup>6</sup>, Maṇḍana gives a prominent and honoured place to the Bhāṭṭa theory of viparītakhyāti or anyathākhyāti, which is the same as the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, with a slight variation. He maintains that this theory is sound, and when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory has to be reduced inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from the anirvacanīyakhyāti<sup>7</sup> of the Advaitins. In Maṇḍana's opinion, the anyathākhyāti or viparītakhyāti of the Bhāṭṭas should, for all practical purposes, be accepted by the Advaitins. It may be easily surmised, that Vācaspati-miśra, who follows Maṇḍana, in many details, in the exposition of the Advaita doctrine, should necessarily have followed the latter very closely in his commentary on the Brahmasiddhi—Tattvasamīkṣā, in maintaining the soundness of anyathākhyāti; and this is perhaps the reason why people generally came to believe that Vācaspati-miśra was in favour of anyathākhyāti, though he was really anxious to establish the anirvacanīyakhyāti in his Bhāmatī, as observed by Amalānanda<sup>8</sup>. Surēśvara, on the other hand, has no good word to say about anyathākhyāti, and refutes it in a cavalierly<sup>9</sup> manner.

<sup>1</sup> Verse 36 and the concluding portion of the commentary Gōpālikā on that verse.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Tai-Vārt, pp. 31-32, verses 37 to 42.

<sup>4</sup> Ishtasiddhi, p. 176.

“तस्मादात्माद्वैतमेव सिध्यति, न शब्दाद्वैतं घटाद्वैतं चाटाद्वैतं वेति सिद्धम् ।”

<sup>5</sup> pp. 136 to 150, Part I.

<sup>6</sup> Verses 46, 57, 62—M.L.J., 1932.

<sup>7</sup> Bra. Sid., p. 9, lines 11 to 20, Part I; Vibh. Vi., verses 35 and 36.

<sup>8</sup> Kalpataru-N.S. 1917-20, page 24.

“स्वरूपेण मरीच्यम्भो मृषा वाचस्पतेर्मतम् ।

अन्यथाख्यातिरिष्टास्येत्यन्यथा जगृहुर्जनाः ॥”

<sup>9</sup> Bṛhad. Vār, Part II, p. 484, verses 285 to 288; and p. 524, verse 453.



## MANDANA—SURESVARA EQUATION

29

3. In his *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana recognises <sup>1</sup> two kinds of nescience (*avidyā*)—viz: non-apprehension (*agrahaṇa*) and mis-apprehension (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) and points out how the *akhyāti* doctrine of the *Prābhākaras* runs counter to the well-established distinction between the two kinds of nescience. Maṇḍana also utilises this distinction in explaining the purpose of meditation in his scheme of the attainment of the final liberating realisation of Brahman and considers meditation necessary for completely removing the second <sup>2</sup> variety of nescience and for converting the first indirect knowledge of Brahman (*Parōkṣajñāna*) into the direct Brahman-realisation (*Aparōkṣa-brahma-sākṣātākāra*).<sup>3</sup> By the way, it may be noted here that Vācaspati also speaks of two <sup>4</sup> kinds of *Avidyā* in the opening verse of his *Bhāmatī*. Surēśvara scents danger in the recognition of two kinds of nescience, specifically refers <sup>4</sup> to Maṇḍana's view regarding *avidyādvaividhya*, and argues against it by urging certain reasons.

4. Maṇḍana definitely argues in favour of the view that *Jīva* (the individual soul) should be regarded as the seat or the locus <sup>5</sup> (*Āśraya*) of nescience (*Avidyā*), which obscures the true nature of Brahman and thus has Brahman as its object (*viṣaya*). Surēśvara sets his face wholly against any kind of differentiation between the *āśraya* and *viṣaya* of *avidyā* and maintains that Brahman itself is both the *āśraya* and *viṣaya*. The disagreement between Maṇḍana and Surēśvara on this matter served as the basis of the two different views regarding the locus and object of nescience, which are associated in later Advaitic tradition with what came to be known as Vācaspati's school and Vivaraṇakāra's (*Prakāśātman*'s) school. By the way, it may be observed here that most of the distinctive features of the Vācaspati-school have their roots in Maṇḍana's views as set forth in the *Brahmasiddhi* and most of the distinctive features of the Vivaraṇa-school are derived from Surēśvara's views as set forth in the *Vārtikas* and the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*.

5. The Upaniṣadic texts like “*Tattvamasi*” reveal the identity of Brahman with *Ātman* and give rise to the true knowledge of the One Absolute Real. The knowledge which arises from such texts, however, according to Maṇḍana, is indirect and mediate (*parōkṣa*) and necessarily involves relation in some manner (*saṁsṛṣṭa-viṣaya*), like any other cognition arising from a valid verbal testimony (*śābda-pramā*). Maṇḍana maintains <sup>6</sup> that such indirect knowledge of Brahman should pass through the furnace of meditation (*Upāsanā*) before the detractive and recessive elements of relation and mediacy could be removed from it, and before it could be

<sup>1</sup> P. 149.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.<sup>3</sup> *Bhāmatī*, verse i.

अनिर्वाच्याविद्याद्वितयसचिवस्य प्रभवतो

विवर्ता यस्यैते विद्यदलितेजोऽववनयः ।

<sup>4</sup> *Bṛhad, Vār.*, Part II, p. 1065, verse 199.<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 11.<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 134, 159.



refined into the pure, efficient and direct realisation of the Absolute Real (Brahmavidyā or Brahmasākṣātkāra). It is only this direct realisation which springs from meditation based upon the indirect knowledge arising from the Upaniṣadic texts, that is capable of bringing about liberation (mukti). Maṇḍana is thus seen to maintain what is known in Advaitic literature as the doctrine of prasaṅkhyāna. Consistently with this view, Maṇḍana interprets the text <sup>1</sup> “विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत” in his Brahmasiddhi. Vācaspati adopts Maṇḍana's view regarding the relation between Prasaṅkhyāna and Brahmasākṣātkāra and Amalānanda <sup>2</sup> specifically ascribes this view to Vācaspati, and says that Vācaspati understands the expression “Scriptural realisation (Śāstradrṣṭi),” as used by Bādarāyaṇa, to mean exactly what Maṇḍana understands to be Brahman-realisation springing from Prasaṅkhyāna—the true knowledge which arises from meditation on the true import of the mahāvākyas (śāstrārthadhyāna-jā pramā) and that this view is supported by Bādarāyaṇa in the Brahmasūtra <sup>3</sup>—“Api ca saṁrādhane pratyakṣānumānābhyām”. It may be said, by the way, that this is one of the instances in which Vācaspati is made responsible by later Advaitins for a view which was originally put forward by Maṇḍana, and only revived and read into Śaṅkara's system at a later stage by Vācaspati among the commentators on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. In this Naiṣkarmyasiddhi <sup>4</sup> and Vārtikas <sup>5</sup>, Surēśvara severely criticises this view with an unmistakable animus that is characteristic of an avowed opponent, and emphatically maintains the position that direct Brahman-realisation (Brahmāparōkṣajñāna) springs from the Upaniṣadic Śabda—the mahāvākyas, and meditation, however useful it may be, is not the cause which effectuates the liberating realisation. He repudiates also the Nyāya view <sup>6</sup> that Śabda can generate only an indirect cognition having a relational content. Relying upon the well-known illustration <sup>7</sup> of the ten men, who counted only nine, each leaving out himself, and of the tenth among them, who was thus unable to realise himself as the tenth, actually realising his identity as the tenth directly from the statement “Thou art the tenth”, which revealed his identity as the tenth, Sureśvara argues that Śabda, in certain special cases, is capable of producing an immediate cognition with a non-relational content. In this connection, in referring to Maṇḍana's view and similar views and refuting them, Surēśvara uses in his Vārtika, sneering and ironical expressions, with reference to Maṇḍana and such of his contemporaries and predecessors as happened to agree with Maṇḍana and describes those thinkers as “pedantic wiseacres” (paṇḍitammanyāḥ <sup>8</sup>), “profoundly conversant with recondite

<sup>1</sup> Bṛhad, Vār., Part II, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> Kalpataru, p. 218

“अपि संराधने सूत्राच्छास्त्रार्थध्यानजा प्रमा ।

शास्त्रदृष्टिर्मेता तां तु वेत्ति वाचस्पतिः परम् ॥”

<sup>3</sup> Bra. Sū.—3-2-24.

<sup>4</sup> pp. 38, 159-62, 175 to 177.

<sup>5</sup> Part I, pp. 225 to 233, Part III, pp. 1852 to 1878.

<sup>6</sup> Bṛhad. Vār., Part, pp. 1852 to 1854.

<sup>7</sup> Nai. S., pp. 146 to 149, Bṛhad. Vār., Part I, pp. 64-65

<sup>8</sup> Bṛhad. Vār., Part III, p. 1852, see also Ānandagiri's avatārikā to this verse.

मण्डनादीनां तद्व्याख्यामुत्थापयति — अन्ये त्विति ।”



## MANDANA—SURESVARA EQUATION

31

principles" (gambhīraṇyāyavēdinaḥ<sup>1</sup>), "complacent in their determination of the sense of the Veda" (Vēdārthaniścītāḥ<sup>2</sup>), and "courageous and great Mīmāṃsakas" (mahāmīmāṃsakā dhīrāḥ<sup>3</sup>). In a similar context in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Surēśvara sets forth and refutes the views of Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana in respect of the causal relation between Brahman-realisation and the Upaniṣadic Śabda; and in this context, Surēśvara says that these philosophers take their stand haughtily on the strength of their own tradition and say what they say in this matter (svasaṃpradāyabalāvaṣṭambhād āhuḥ<sup>4</sup>). It is clear from the context that the phrase—svasaṃpradāyabalāvaṣṭambhāt—is intended to be applied to both of the views that are clubbed together in the same paragraph, as forming the subject of refutation in verse 67 of chapter I, in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. In order to understand clearly the bearing of these Sanskrit phrases as applied to Maṇḍana by Surēśvara, on the contrast between these two Advaitins, it would be necessary to remember that Maṇḍana's exposition of the Advaita doctrine was based mainly on a pre-Śaṅkara phase of it, while Surēśvara's exposition of that doctrine was entirely dependent upon its Śaṅkara phase. The significance of the expression "dhīrāḥ", as applied to Maṇḍana may be understood fully, if it is remembered that the spirit of philosophical accommodation which Maṇḍana exhibits towards the Naiyāyikas, in respect of the nature of the cognition arising from Śabda and which his supporters and impartial critics would describe as the sweet reasonableness of a non-partisan Advaitin, is derided by Surēśvara as amounting to philosophical cowardice. It is worthy of notice here that Madhusūdanasarasvatī, when he refers to Maṇḍana's view about the mediate character of the knowledge that arises from the Upaniṣadic Śabda, frankly describes Maṇḍana and others who agree with him as (kēcit tārki-kēbhyō bibhyataḥ<sup>5</sup>) "philosophical cowards afraid of the tārkiikas."

6. Maṇḍana's interpretation of the Īśāvāsyā text (11) "vidyāṃ cāvidyāṃ ca . . ." is entirely different from Śaṅkara's interpretation of it as given in his Īśāvāsyā-bhāṣya or his bhāṣya<sup>6</sup> on Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkyakārikās (3-25) and from Sureśvara's interpretation of it as given in the Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika (Part II. pp. 779-80). Maṇḍana explains this mantra in two ways; in his first explanation<sup>7</sup>, the first half is taken to refer to the association of avidyā and vidyā as the means and the end (upāyōpēyabhāvāt sahitē) and the second half states the fact that, when a person removes his avidyā by avidyā, his self-realisation follows; and in his second<sup>8</sup> explanation, the first half refers to the fact that avidyā never exists without avidyā

<sup>1</sup> Bṛhad, Vār., Part III, p. 1854.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 1864, verse 876.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 1866, verse 891.

<sup>4</sup> Nai. S., p. 38.

<sup>5</sup> Vēd. Kalpa, Benares—1920, p. 68, line 6.

<sup>6</sup> अविद्यया कर्मणा अग्निहोत्रादिना, मृत्युं स्वाभाविकं कर्म ज्ञानं च मृत्युशब्दवाच्यमुभयम्, तीर्त्वा अतिक्रम्य, विद्यया देवतान्त्रानेन, अमृतं देवतात्मभावमश्नुते प्राप्नोति । तदध्यमृतमुच्यते यद्देवतात्मगमनम् ।

<sup>7</sup> Part I, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.



and there is no difference in the meaning conveyed by the second half. According to Maṇḍana, the word *mṛtyu* in the mantra means *avidyā*; the liberating knowledge, which is called *vidyā*, is nothing but the ever-revealed, all-revealing and eternal consciousness (which is identical with Brahman or Ātman): the appearances of *avidyā* are all dependent upon the eternal self-luminous light called Brahman; *avidyā* is non-ātman and has got a bad phase in the multifarious cognitions of difference and a good phase in the understanding of the truth from textual teachings (*śravaṇa*), the investigation of the truth in the light of reason (*manana*) and repeated contemplation upon the truth (*dhyānābhyāsa*); the bad phase of *avidyā* is the *mṛtyu*, which is removed by the good phase of it consisting in *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyānābhyāsa*, and the knower of the truth thus remains what he has always really been, the eternal, free, self-luminous Absolute. Maṇḍana quotes this mantra as a textual authority supporting his statement that the good phase of *avidyā* removes its bad phase and then passes away. Śaṅkara takes the word *avidyā* in this mantra to mean "the scriptural rites like *agnihotra*," "*mṛtyu*" in the sense of "natural activities and knowledge" (*svābhāvikaṁ karma jñānaṁ ca*), "*vidyā*" in the sense of "the knowledge of the particular deity" (*dēvatājñāna*), and the resultant *amṛta* as amounting to "becoming that particular deity" (*devatātmabhāva*). Surēśvara's interpretation of this mantra proceeds on entirely different lines. He is anxious that it should be so interpreted as not to give any handle to those Vēdāntins who advocate the combination of *karma* and *jñāna* in some manner (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) as the means of liberation. He seems to scent some danger even in Śaṅkara's interpretation, for the reason that Śaṅkara is prepared to take the first half of the mantra, with the two *cakāras* and the word *saha*, in the natural sense of *samuccaya* though the combination intended to be conveyed, according to Śaṅkara, is that of *dēvatājñāna* and *śāstriya-karma* and not that of *Ātmajñāna* and *karma*. Maṇḍana's interpretation of this mantra is not accepted by Surēśvara, for the reason that, according to Maṇḍana, the *avidyā* that is the means of removing *avidyā* admits of being accommodated to the combination of *Ātmajñāna* with *karma* in a manner which would be unacceptable either to Śaṅkara or to Surēśvara. As a result of this attitude Surēśvara gives a highly laboured <sup>1</sup> interpretation of this mantra, taking the words *vidyā* and *avidyā* in the first half in the sense of *śāstriyakarma* and *svābhāvikakarma* and understanding the same two words in the second half in an entirely different way, as denoting *Brahmajñāna* and *śāstriyakarma* respectively, the word *mṛtyu* in the second half being taken to denote what the word *avidyā* in the first half stands for. He also wishes that the two *cakāras* and the word *saha* in the first half should be understood as not referring to *samuccaya* in any manner, but merely as amounting to a *co-mention* <sup>2</sup> of two rival factors, even that not of any kind of *jñāna* and *karma* but of two kinds of *karma*. Thus Surēśvara squeezes out of this mantra the sense that "anyone who understands the contrast between the

<sup>1</sup> Part II, p. 769.

<sup>2</sup> Part II, p. 779, Ānandagiri says here:—

“अविद्या मृत्युमित्यत्र विहितकरणं निषिद्धसेवा च मृत्युः, तद्धेतुत्वात्; अग्निहोत्रादि शास्त्रीयं कर्म विद्यां चेत्यत्र विद्या; एतेनाविद्येत्यपि व्याख्यातम्. तस्य धीशुद्धिद्वारा तद्धेतुत्वात्; अशास्त्रीयं स्वाभाविकं कर्म मृत्युशब्दोक्तम्; अविद्यां चेत्यविद्या, तत्कार्यत्वात्; निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभावेन च तयोः सहोक्तिरित्यर्थः।”



## MANDANA—SURESVARA EQUATION

33

scriptural activities as the inhibitors (nivartaka) and natural activities as the inhibited (nivartya), attains Brahman-realisation and liberation in due course, after inhibiting the natural activities by spiritual activities." None can miss here the striking contrast between Maṇḍana's interpretation of this mantra and Surēśvara's interpretation of it.

7. Maṇḍana's evaluation of *karma* in relation to the liberating realisation of Brahman (*vidyā*) and his attitude towards the stage in religious life, which is called *saṁnyāsa* and is characterised by a complete renunciation of *karma*, exhibit certain features of striking contrast, when compared with the views of Śaṅkara and Surēśvara concerning the value of *karma* and *saṁnyāsa*. Maṇḍana notices, in his *Brahmasiddhi seven theories*<sup>1</sup> put forward by contemporary and earlier thinkers with reference to the question of the association of *karma* and *jñāna* in the scheme of discipline leading to liberation. These seven theories are :—that all the injunctions in the ritualistic portion of the *Vēda* are divertive in their purpose and tend to turn men away from natural activities in the direction of the meditative activity enjoined for the realisation of *Ātman*; that all these injunctions relating to *karma* are intended to kill desires through a process of enjoyment and cloying and thus to prepare the way for the meditative activity leading to *Ātmajñāna*; that the performance of *karma* is necessary to discharge the three congenital debts (*ṛṇatraya*) whose liquidation is an indispensable qualification for *Ātmajñāna*; that the activities prescribed in the *karmakāṇḍa* are *bi-functional* in their character and have two distinct functions (*saṁyōgapṛthaktva*) by conducing to their respective fruits and also to the realisation of *Ātman*; that all *karma* is intended to purify men and make them fit for *Ātmajñāna*; that *Ātmajñāna* should be regarded as a purificatory subsidiary to the agent, subserving the requirements of the various activities prescribed in the *karmakāṇḍa*; and that *karma* and *jñāna* are fundamentally opposed to each other and have no interrelation whatever. Maṇḍana accepts<sup>2</sup> the fourth and the fifth among these theories and discards all the remaining five. In doing so, he clearly enunciates his own view about the interrelation of *karma* and *jñāna* and is definitely in favour of a particular type of *samuccaya*. He is favourably disposed, in an equal degree,<sup>3</sup> to the fourth and fifth of these seven theories—*saṁyōgapṛthaktvapakṣa* and *saṁskārapakṣa*. He is emphatically of the opinion that *Agnihōtra* and such other obligatory rites form a highly valuable accessory to the repeated contemplation (*abhyāsa*) on the content of the verbal cognition (*śābdajñāna*) arising from the *mahāvākyas* of the *Upaniṣads*, in bringing about the final manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the eternally self-luminous light of *Ātman*, which amounts to what is called *Brahmavidyā*; that those who have chosen to enter the religious order of *saṁnyāsa* can and do come<sup>4</sup> by *Ātman-realisation*, exclusively through the tranquillising, self-effacing, soul-centered, non-possessive, contemplative discipline, without the performance of scriptural rites; and that the meditative discipline which brings about the manifestation of the pure *Brahma-vidyā*,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 36.



when implemented<sup>1</sup> by the prescribed *yajñas* and such other rites, enables one, presumably *grhastha*, to get at the final goal far more quickly than otherwise, when *karma* is not comprised in the means employed. In this connection, Maṇḍana clearly advocates his own view regarding *jñānakarmasamuccaya*, which consists not merely in the combination of repeated contemplation (*abhyāsa*)—a special form of mental activity—with the indirect knowledge of the One Absolute Reality derived from the Upaniṣadic *śabda*, but also in the association of that contemplative discipline with the ritualistic discipline of the prescribed *yajñas* and such other rites. It would be helpful in understanding Maṇḍana's position in contrast with Surēśvara's, to note here that Maṇḍana quotes the *Brahmasūtra*<sup>2</sup> “*sarvāpēkṣā ca yajñādiśruterāśvavat*” in support of his view of *samuccaya* and explains the illustrative expression *śvavat* thus<sup>3</sup>:—“Though the goal may be reached by plodding on, without a horse, yet a horse is sought to be employed for gaining time or for avoiding inconvenience”; and that Śaṅkara, anxious as he is to avoid giving any handle to the advocates of *samuccaya*, gives deliberately a somewhat strained, though ingenious, interpretation of the phrase *śvavat* in this way<sup>4</sup>—“Just as a horse is employed in drawing a chariot and not in an unsuitable work like ploughing, even so the prescribed rites like *yajña* are intended to serve the preliminary purpose of preparing the mind by generating the desire to know (*vividiṣā*) and thus helping in bringing about Brahman-realization”. Though there are certain minor differences<sup>5</sup> among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, like Vācaspatimiśra and Prakāśātman, about *karma* being conducive to *vividiṣā* or *vidyōtpāda*, it may be safely said that both Śaṅkara and Surēśvara are definitely against the type of *jñānakarmasamuccaya* which Maṇḍana advocates. Surēśvara, as well as Śaṅkara, would urge insistently that the whole function<sup>6</sup> of Karma is restricted to the preparatory stage and after purifying the mind and definitely orientating it in favour of true spiritual insight, all the prescribed religious activities like *yajña* vanish like clouds dispersing at the end of the rainy season. Further, Maṇḍana concedes, in a rather halting way, that it is quite permissible for a person to enter on the stage of *saṁnyāsa* directly from the stage of *Brahmacarya* and that, exclusively through *abhyāsa* in association with *Śama*, *dama* and such other aids and without performing *yajña* and such other spiritual rites, a *saṁnyāsin*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Bra. Sū., 3-4-26.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

“एषोऽर्थः—‘यज्ञेन दानेन’ इति श्रवणात् कर्माण्यपेक्ष्यन्ते विद्यायामभ्यासलभ्यायामपि, यथान्तरेणाप्यर्थं ग्रामप्राप्तौ सिध्यन्त्यां शैत्रयायाक्लेशाय वाश्वोऽपेक्ष्यते।”

<sup>4</sup> Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. 3-4-26.

“अश्ववदिति योग्यतानिर्देशेनम्। यथा च योग्यतावशेनाश्वो न लाङ्गलाकर्षणे युज्यते, रथचर्यायां तु युज्यते; एवमाश्रमकर्माणि विद्यया फलसिद्धौ नापेक्ष्यन्ते उत्पत्तौ चापेक्ष्यन्ते।”

<sup>5</sup> Siddhānta-leśasangraha, Benares—1916, pp. 402 to 408.

<sup>6</sup> Nai. S., pp. 30 to 32, Bṛhad. Vār., Part I, pp. 98-99, Part III, p. 1161, Śa. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. 3-4-3 and on 3-4-26; Bṛhad. Bhā. Ānandāśrama Press, pp. 412-413, pp. 657-658 and pp. 684 to 695.



reaches the final goal of *vidyā*; and according to Maṇḍana,<sup>1</sup> a *saṁnyāsin* can, at the best, plod on slowly to the final goal, while a person, who harnesses *yajña* in the service of *abhyāsa*, presumably a *grhastha*, gallops on very quickly to the final goal. Unlike Maṇḍana, Surēśvara and Śaṅkara are zealous propagandists of *saṁnyāsa* and affirm emphatically<sup>2</sup> that *saṁnyāsa* is indispensable of Brahman-realisation. This position is wholly foreign to Maṇḍana's Advaitism as embodied in his *Brahmasiddhi*; and it follows, as a necessary corollary from Maṇḍana's view in this matter, that the Advaitic scheme of discipline which is available to a competent *grhastha* is more efficient than that which a competent *saṁnyāsin* can avail himself of for the reason that the former may comprise *yajña* and such other prescribed rites and the latter cannot.

8. The doctrine of *Jīvanmukti* or 'liberation in the living state' is upheld by Surēśvara in a form<sup>3</sup> which does not come into any kind of conflict with Śaṅkara's views. Maṇḍana also supports the doctrine of *Jīvanmukti*<sup>4</sup>, but certain features of this doctrine as propounded by him come into direct conflict with Śaṅkara's views in the matter. Brahman-realisation completely destroys the accumulated *karma* of the past that has not yet fructified, and it prevents any future accumulation of *karma*. But there is a special type of the past *karma*, called *prārabdha*, which has fructified and begun to bear fruit; and this kind of *karma*, according to Śaṅkara<sup>5</sup>, is a live force, which must be allowed to work itself out through its own inevitable workings even in the case of a *jñānin*, who has realised himself to be Brahman. Such a *jñānin*, free from unfructified *karma* and living out only his fructified *karma* without being influenced and bound by it, is called a *jīvanmukta*—one who is liberated and yet alive. Śaṅkara maintains that there are numerous instances of high-souled *jīvanmuktas*<sup>6</sup>, like Apāntaratamas reincarnated as Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana, Vasiṣṭha reincarnated as Maitrāvaruṇa, Sanatkumāra reincarnated as Skanda, and Dakṣa and Nārada reincarnated in many a corporeal form; that they are all *ādhikārikas* who are charged by the Lord with the privileged duty of rendering various forms of service in the world of men and gods, in accordance with the nature and strength of their fructified *karma*; and that, while such *jīvanmuktas* are not in any way affected and bound by

<sup>1</sup> Bra. Sid. Part I p. 36.

“सत्यम्; तथा चोर्ध्वरेतसां चाश्रमिणां विनापि तैर्विशुद्धविद्योदय इष्यते; किं तु कालकृतो विशेषः; साधनविशेषाद्धि सा क्षिप्रं क्षिप्रतरं च व्यज्यते; तदभावे चिरेण चिरन्तरेण च । तदुक्तम्—“सर्वपेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्वत्” । एषोऽर्थः—“यज्ञेन दानेन” इति श्रवणात् कर्मण्यपेक्ष्यन्ते विद्यायामभ्यासकभ्यायामपि, यथान्तरेणाप्यश्वं ग्रामप्राप्तौ सिध्यन्त्यां शौचयायाक्लेशाय वाश्वोऽपेक्ष्यते ।”

<sup>2</sup> Nai. S. verses, IV 71 to 73; Bṛhad. Vār. Part II, p. 843, Part III, p. 1896, Part III, pp. 1257, 1274, 1923, and 1264-1265; Bṛhad. Bhā. Ānand., pp. 684 to 695; Śa. Bhā on Bra. Sū. 3-4-20 and 3-4-47.

<sup>3</sup> Nai. S. pp. 196 to 202; Bṛhad Vār, Part II, pp. 735 to 741.

<sup>4</sup> Bra. Sid. pp. 130 to 134, Part I.

<sup>5</sup> Bra. Sū. 4-1-15 and 19 and 3-3-32.

<sup>6</sup> Bra. Sū. 3-3-32.



the workings of their *prārabdha*, and live continuously in the bliss of their spiritual realisation, their fructified *karma* may come to an end with the death of the body in which they have come by Brahman-realisation or it may lead to their donning <sup>1</sup> many other corporeal forms, commissioned by God to do many things, before it comes to an end; that, in this manner, the force of the fructified *karma* is of varying strength in the case of different *jīvanmuktas*, it cannot be stopped like the force of a discharged arrow <sup>2</sup> and it must spend itself out through its workings being experienced (*bhōga* <sup>3</sup>) in one embodied form or another; that the *jīvanmuktas* who don many other corporeal forms remember <sup>4</sup> distinctly all their previous incarnations and should be differentiated from those who are reborn and remember distinctly their previous birth (*Jātismarāḥ*); that the state of *kaivalya*, which is entirely free from any possibility of living in the present or in any future body, is reached by a *jīvanmukta* only after a complete annihilation of his fructified *karma* through the experience of its workings (*bhōga*); and that the *sthītaprajña* <sup>5</sup>, referred to in the second chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* is the *jīvanmukta* who has realised himself to be Brahman and continues to live in his corporeal form. Maṇḍana's view in this matter exhibits a striking contrast in many respects. In discussing the question of the destruction of *karma* by the realisation of Brahman (*tattvadarśana*), Maṇḍana holds that two views can possibly be put forward:—one view <sup>6</sup> being that Brahman-realisation brings about the total annihilation of all *karmas*, the fructified as well as the unfructified, and that it is immediately followed by the falling off of the body (*dēhapāta*) and complete liberation from embodied existence (*videhakaivalya*); and the other view <sup>7</sup> being that, in some cases, even after realising Brahman, the body in which realisation is achieved does not fall off and persists for some time as the result of a trace of nescience (*avidyā-saṁskāra*) persisting 'in the form of *prārabdha* and that this condition is described as liberation in the living state' (*Jīvanmukti* <sup>8</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> Bra. Sū. 3-3-32.

“अपान्तरतमःप्रभृतयोऽपीश्वराः परमेश्वरेण तेषु तेष्वधिकारेषु नियुक्ताः सन्तः सत्यपि सम्प्रदर्शने कैवल्यहेतावक्षीणकर्माणः यावदधिकारमवतिष्ठन्ते ।”

<sup>2</sup> Bra. Sū. 3-3-32.

“प्रवृत्तफलस्य तु कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयान्निवृत्तिः ।”

<sup>3</sup> Bra. Sū. 3-3-32.

“सकृत्प्रवृत्तमेव हि ते फलदानाय कर्माशयमतिवाहयन्तः ।”

<sup>4</sup> Bra. Sū. 3-3-32.

“स्वातन्त्र्येणैव गृहादिव गृहान्तरमन्यं देहं संचरन्तः स्वाधिकारनिर्वर्तनाय अपरिमूर्षितस्मृतय एव देहेन्द्रिय-प्रकृतिवशित्वान्निर्माय देहान् युगपत् क्रमेण वा अधितिष्ठन्ति । न चैते जातिस्मरा इत्युच्यन्ते । ‘त एवैते’ इति स्मृतिप्रसिद्धः ।”

<sup>5</sup> Gītā, 2—54 to 72 and on Bra. Sū. 4-1-15.

<sup>6</sup> Bra. Sid., p. 130, Part I.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Bra. Sid., p. 132.

“सा चेयमवस्था जीवन्मुक्तिरिति गीयते ।”



The former of these two views rules out *Jīvanmukti*, while the latter supports it. While Maṇḍana indicates, in unmistakable terms, that the former view is perfectly logical and admits of being harmonised with all the *śrutis* and *smṛtis* dealing with *mukti*, he shows his definite preference for the latter view and elaborately explains and maintains it<sup>1</sup>. Unlike Śaṅkara, who rejects former view as coming into conflict with *śrutis* and *smṛtis*, Maṇḍana concedes that it may be maintained to be quite sound; and agreeably to this view, he interprets the *Chāndogya* text<sup>2</sup> “*Tasya tāvad eva ciram*” as conveying the idea of quickness (*kṣipratā*) or total absence of delay in having *mukti* and supports his interpretation by secular illustrations like “*Etāvan mē ciram yat snāto bhuñjānasya ca*”, (‘This will be the only delay for me—that I bathe and eat and get ready’), the intention in such cases being to convey total absence of delay. The conflict between the description of ‘*sthītaprajña*’ in the second chapter of the *Gītā* and the former view which supports *sadyōmukti* is removed by Maṇḍana by taking the *sthītaprajña* to be a highly advanced *sādhaka*<sup>3</sup> who has closely approximated to realisation and is awaiting it, and not a *siddha* who has realised Brahman and has annihilated all his nescience. In this connection, Maṇḍana discards<sup>4</sup> Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the text “*Tasya tāvadēva ciram*,” according to which it should be understood to convey the delay that is caused in the attainment of *kaivalya*, together with its utmost limit, which consists in the falling off of the *body* or *bodies* caused by the fructified *karma*; and according to Vācaspatimiśra’s *Bhāmātī* as interpreted by Amalananda, Maṇḍana, when he says that the *sthītaprajña* of the *Gītā* is a highly advanced *sādhaka*, and not *siddha*, should be understood as criticising<sup>5</sup> Śaṅkara’s view that the description of *sthītaprajña* in the *Gītā* should be taken to refer to a *Jīvanmukta* and to support the doctrine of *Jīvanmukti*. While Maṇḍana feels constrained to recognise the soundness of the doctrine of *sadyōmukti*, he prefers to accept *Jīvanmukti* in those cases in which the body persists even after realisation, owing to the persistence of a trace of *avidyā* (*avidyāsaṃskāra*). In

<sup>1</sup> Bra. Sid., compare, p. 130. Part I.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

“स्थितप्रज्ञस्तावन्न विगलितनिखिलाविद्यः सिद्धः, किं तु साधक एवावस्थाविशेषं प्राप्तः स्यात् ।”

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

“न हीयं श्रुतिश्चिरकालताविशिष्टं देहपातावधि मुक्तेराह किं तु क्षिप्रताम्; × × × अन्यथा ‘तावदेव’ इति न वाच्यं स्यात्, ‘चिरम्’ इत्येव ब्रूयात्; ‘तावदेव’ इति तु वचनात् क्षैप्र्यपरता गम्यते; अतः क्षिप्रैव मुक्तिः; न तु प्रतीक्षणीयमस्ति; देहपातप्रतीक्षा तु तत्र नान्तरीयकत्वाद्भवत्येव । अथवा चिरत्वमनूद्य देहपातावधित्वमत्रोच्यते; अन्यथा चिरत्वेऽवधिविशेषे चोच्यमाने वाक्यं भिद्येत ।” —

Cf. Sā. Bhā on Chānd, 6-14-2.

<sup>5</sup> Kalpataru, pp. 958 and 959.

“भाष्ये स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशो जीवन्मुक्तिसाधक उक्तः; तत्र स्थितप्रज्ञः साधको न साक्षात्कारवानिति मण्डन-मिश्रैरुक्तं दूषणमुद्धरति—स्थितप्रज्ञश्चेति ।”



Maṇḍana's opinion, the doctrine of *Jīvanmukti* can be harmonised with *śrutis* and *smṛtis* in a more satisfactory manner than the doctrine of *sadyōmukti*; the *Chāndōgya* text "*Tasya tāvad ēva ciram*" should be taken to convey only the limit of *dehapāta* with reference to the delay (*ciratva*) which must necessarily be recognised in the case of *Jīvanmuktas*; the *Gītā* text describing a *sthitaprajña* may be taken to refer to a <sup>1</sup> *Jīvanmukta*; the trace of *avidyā* (*avidyāśaṁskāra*) that survives in the case of a *Jīvanmukta* becomes exceedingly attenuated and is entirely powerless <sup>2</sup> to cause any physical experience (*bhōga*) of a binding character, though it contributes to the semblance of *bhōga*; a *Jīvanmukta*'s body and physical environment have really sloughed off <sup>3</sup> through his realisation, though they have not yet completely perished and they bear the same relation to him as a cast-off slough to the snake to which it once belonged; and a *Jīvanmukta* comes by *kaivalya* on the destruction of his present body <sup>4</sup>, in which he achieved Brahman-realisation. While, thus, maintaining the latter of the two views regarding *mukti* and accepting *Jīvanmukti*, Maṇḍana sets his face wholly against Śaṅkara's view that the force of *prārabdha* cannot be impeded and must be allowed to spend itself out through *bhōga* like the force of a darted arrow and that *Jīvanmuktas* like Apāntaratamas, Vasiṣṭha and Nārada should be recognised as having had several reincarnations through the workings of their *prārabdha*. From Maṇḍana's observations regarding *Jīvanmukti*, it inevitably follows that the texts dealing with *Ādhikārikas* should not be taken to refer to *Jīvanmuktas* in the strict sense; that the *Ādhikārikas* are merely *sādhakas* of the most advanced type: that a *Jīvanmukta* is absolutely free from the possibility of reincarnation and attains *kaivalya* on the destruction of the body in which he achieved *Jīvanmukti*; and that the force of the surviving trace of *avidyā* can, at the most, lead only to the persistence of a *Jīvanmukta*'s body for some time and that this force, like the force of a darted arrow, can be and is actually impeded and greatly mitigated <sup>5</sup> by Brahman-realisation. It may also be noted by the way that among post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, Vācaspatimiśra, who follows Maṇḍana in many respects, has chosen to deviate from Maṇḍana and follow <sup>6</sup> Śaṅkara in respect of *Jīvanmukti*; Vimuktātman, the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*

<sup>1</sup> Bra. Sid., Part I, p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 131

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 132.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 132.

"येन हि कर्मणा यच्छरीरमारब्धं, तत्रैव तद्विपाकशेषाभासः । × × × तस्मादनारब्धकार्याणामकञ्चवृत्ति-  
स्त्वादारब्धकार्यसंस्कारक्षयस्य च देहपातादवगमाद्विदुषः पतितेऽस्मिन् शरीरे कैवल्यमवश्यंभावि ।"

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. pp. 132-3

"ये तु मन्यन्ते—प्रवृत्तभोगानां कर्मणां प्रवृत्तवेगस्येषोरिव चक्रस्येव वा न शक्यः प्रतिबन्धः, अतो भोगेन  
क्षयप्रतीक्षेति । तदसत्; शक्यो हीषुः प्रतिबद्धं कुड्यादिभिः नाशयितुं च च्छेदादिभिः । स्वप्नादिसूचितोपस्थितविपाक-  
वर्तमानदेहभोग्यकर्मक्षयाथानि च शान्तिकानि कर्माणि । तस्मात् संस्कारादेव स्थितिः ।"

See also Bra. Sid. Vyā. Part II, p. 264, lines 12 to 24.

"भगवत्पादीयमतमुपन्यस्यति—ये हि वति । तद्दूषयति—तदिति ।"

<sup>6</sup> Bhāmātī, pp. 956 to 959.



(pp. 74-8), who prefers to follow Śaṅkara and Surēśvara in many respects, has chosen to adopt Maṇḍana's position regarding *Jīvanmukti*; and that Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (Laghucandrikā p. 3) who generally follows Śaṅkara and Surēśvara, and only maintains the reasonableness of Maṇḍana's views as against the adverse criticism of the Dvaita-Vēdāntins, has shown his definite preference for the view that *Jīvanmukti* is only a *so-called mukti* and that *mukti* in the strict sense of the term is *vidēhamukti* or *kaivalya* which is invariably concomitant with the total annihilation of the body.

9. In Advaita literature, there is a well-established tradition which recognises two ways of viewing the Advaita doctrine. One of them is generally known as *bhāvādvaita* or *sadadvaita*, which may be rendered in English by the expression *ens-monism*. According to this view, there is only one absolute reality of a positive kind, viz., *Brahman*; all the non-dualistic texts of the Vēdānta like "*Advitīyam*," "*Asthūlam anāṇvahrasyam*" and "*Nēti nēti*" teach the negation of the world (*prapañcābhāva*) as the great truth of Advaitism, which can be learnt only from Vēdāntic texts and not from any other source; the realisation of Brahman as the only absolute reality brings about the removal of nescience (*avidyānivṛtti*); the negation of the world and the removal of nescience are negative realities and do not come into conflict with the monism of Advaita, which excludes only a second positive reality (*bhāva*) and is quite compatible with the recognition of a negative reality other than Brahman, in the form of *prapañcābhāva* or *avidyādharmāsa*; in view of the necessity for recognising such negative realities, the scope of the Advaita doctrine should be restricted to positive entities other than Brahman and should not be understood as excluding certain negative realities; and the *advaita* taught by the Vēdānta texts reduces itself, in this manner, to the accommodating type of *advaita* known as *bhāvādvaita* or *sadadvaita* (*ens-monism*). In authoritative works on *Advaita* and *Dvaita*, this view is contrasted sharply with the uncompromising type of strict *advaita*, which excludes thoroughly the reality of every category, positive as well as negative, other than Brahman. Vēdāntic tradition in Advaita and Dvaita classics, associates *bhāvādvaita* specifically with Maṇḍanamīśra and refers to it as *Maṇḍanamata*. Though Maṇḍana does not use the expression *bhāvādvaita* anywhere in his *Brahmasiddhi*, a careful scrutiny of that work in the light of the references in later Vēdāntic works to *bhāvādvaita* as Maṇḍana's view, discloses that Maṇḍana is disposed to support *bhāvādvaita* and maintain it as a sound doctrine quite in harmony with the trend of the Vēdānta, more especially with the anti-dualistic texts in negative form. In the *Brahma-Kāṇḍa* of the *Brahmasiddhi* (Part I. pp. 4, 6, 119, 121), Maṇḍana introduces the *bhāvādvaita* view in the course of the statement of an objection and, while refuting the objection, implicitly accepts the reasonableness of *bhāvādvaita*. If this were all that could be gathered from the *Brahmasiddhi* concerning *bhāvādvaita*, it would not be unfair to say that the text of that work does not adequately warrant the specific ascription of *bhāvādvaita* to Maṇḍana in Vēdāntic tradition. In some places in the *Brahmasiddhi* (Part I, pp. 119, 121) Maṇḍana equates the removal of nescience (*avidyānivṛtti*) with Brahman-realization (*vidyā*); and this would appear to militate against the ascription of *bhāvādvaita* to Maṇḍana and one may justly wonder how his name came to be so prominently associated with this view. However, there should be no difficulty in seeing that Maṇḍana sets



forth and maintains in unmistakable terms, the bhāvādvaita view, in the Siddhi-kāṇḍa<sup>1</sup> of the Brahmasiddhi (p. 157) where he points out that the total negation of the world (prapañcābhāva) is the absolutely irreducible minimum of truth that could be exclusively attributed to Upaniṣadic teachings, having due regard to the fact that Brahman, in some manner or other, is presented in all kinds of cognition. Brahmānanda-sarasvatī explicates, amplifies and vindicates Maṇḍana's bhāvādvaita (Ibid. p. 326) as set forth in the Siddhikāṇḍa of the Brahmasiddhi. He points out that Maṇḍana should be taken to hold that the total negation of the world (prapañcābhāva) and the destruction of nescience (avidyādhvaṁsa) are the only two negations which should be recognized to be real (tāttvika), in the sense that they are not annulled by Brahman-realisation, that the negation of the world involved in the conception of its unreality has a type of existence (sattā) which is superior to that of the world, and that the recognition of the reality of prapañcābhāva and avidyādhvaṁsa does not come into any kind of conflict with the conception of advaita as bhāvādvaita. The full significance of the bhāvādvaita view is brought out clearly in the alternative expression abhāvādvaita which is sometimes used by the Dvaitins in their criticism of the Advaita doctrine. Maṇḍana's name has come to be prominently associated with bhāvādvaita, not so much for the reason that he considers avidyādhvaṁsa to be a real factor, as for the marked manner in which he stresses the reality of prapañcābhāva in the concluding part of his Brahmasiddhi and emphatically declares it to form the final and the otherwise-unascertainable (pramāṇāntarānadhigata) import of Vēdāntic texts. While Maṇḍana is prepared to reduce avidyānivṛtti to a positive form by equating it with vidyā, he points out that these two are coeval and indistinguishable realities and is clearly solicitous<sup>2</sup> of preserving the negative character of avidyānivṛtti in his endeavour to reconcile its reality with the Advaita doctrine. In respect of prapañcābhāva, he would frankly treat it as an irreducible negative reality, present as such alongside the absolute Brahman and forming the main theme of non-dualistic Vēdāntic texts. There is thus discernable in the text of the Brahmasiddhi more particularly in the Siddhikāṇḍa, ample ground for taking bhāvādvaita to be a distinctive feature of Maṇḍana's contribution to Advaita. A careful consideration Maṇḍana's bhāvādvaita in comparison with what Surēśvarācārya has said in his works with reference to prapañcābhāva and avidyānivṛtti would disclose a striking divergence and in some places, an irreconcilable opposition between the views of Maṇḍana and Surēśvara in regard to bhāvādvaita. Madhusūdanasarasvatī draws pointed attention, in his Vedāntakalpalatikā to the uncompromising antagonism which Surēśvara has shown to bhāvādvaita in the Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika. One of the Vārtika texts quoted in this connection in the Vedāntakalpalatikā—"Nābhāvanīṣṭhonyatrāpi niṣedhaḥ kimutākṣare"—is understood by Madhusūdanasarasvatī (p. 28) to refute the view that prapañcābhāva should be taken to be an irreducible negative reality present alongside the absolute Brahman; and in fact one may go a step further and find in this Vārtika text—

<sup>1</sup> "प्रपञ्चस्य प्रविलयः शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते ।"

× × × "किं तर्हि शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते ? प्रपञ्चाभावः ।"

<sup>2</sup> Bra. Sid., Part I, p. 122.



nābhāvaniṣṭhōnyātrāpi” a direct protest against Maṇḍana’s text—“Prapañcasya pravilayaḥ śābdēna pratipādyatē”—which forms the main basis of bhāvādvaita. By the way, it may be useful to consider here the attitude towards bhāvādvaita of the Advaitins, who came after Maṇḍana and Surēśvara. Vimuktātman, the author of the Iṣṭasiddhi, may be taken to have accepted Maṇḍana’s bhāvādvaita or Sadadvaita, as Madhusūdanasarasvatī (p. 26) suggests, for all practical purposes and the Iṣṭasiddhi (p. 85 and chap. VIII.) puts forward two views about the nature of avidyānivṛtti, one view treating it as a fifth indefinable something (pañcamaprakāra), anirvacaniya, in the sense that it cannot be said to be absolutely existent (sat), or absolutely non-existent (asat) or both or anirvacaniya as the equivalent of being removable by valid knowledge (Jñānanivartya); and a second view reducing it to Brahman-knowledge (Vidyā) or the pure, absolute Soul (ātman). Ānandabōdha does not vacillate between these two views as Vimuktātman does and maintains, in his Nyāyamakaranda (Chowk, ed. 1907. pp. 355-7) the former of these two views and discards the latter; and perhaps this is why the view that avidyānivṛtti is a fifth indefinable something (pañcamaprakāra) is attributed by Appayyadikṣita<sup>1</sup> to Ānandabōdha in a specific manner. Citsukha, in his Tattvapradīpikā (pp. 381-383) notices the view of Vimuktātman and Ānandabōdha, criticises them and holds that Advaita in the strict sense of the term, makes it necessary to equate Avidyānivṛtti with the absolute Ātman realised as such (“Nivṛttirātmā mōhasya jñātātvenōpalakṣitaḥ”). Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānandasarasvatī, while, in their polemics with Dvaitins, they seriously maintain the perfect tenability of the bhāvādvaita view, in the form in which Maṇḍana puts it forward as well as in the slightly modified form in which Vimuktātman and Ānandabōdha adopted it, point<sup>2</sup> out in the constructive parts of their works that it is but an accommodation to the dualistic leanings caused by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika obsessions relating to the category of negation (atyantābhāva and dhvaṃsa) and that Citsukha’s view embodied in the text “Nivṛttirātmā mōhasya XXXX” should be regarded as decisive and thoroughly in accord with Advaita in the strict sense. It may be safely stated here, that, in the whole range of Advaita literature before Citsukha, none could be said to have so frankly maintained the soundness of ens-monism (bhāvādvaita) or non-ens-dualism (abhāvādvaita) as Maṇḍana did in the concluding part of his work in connection with the exposition of his text “Prapañcasya pravilayaḥ śābdēna pratipādyate.”; and none could be said to have so uncompromisingly repudiated this view of Maṇḍana as Sureśvara did in the Bṛhadāranyakavārtika, in the observation—“Nābhāvaniṣṭho’nyātrāpi niṣēdhaḥ kimutākṣarē”. It must also be noted in this connection that Rāmātīrtha, in his commentary on the Saṃkṣēpaśāriraka (p. 227. A. S. S.) states specifically that it is Maṇḍana’s view that the niṣēdhavākyas (negative non-dualistic texts) should be taken to teach prapañcābhāva as

<sup>1</sup> Sid. leś. S. pp. 499 to 500.

<sup>2</sup> A. S. p. 467.

“वस्तुतस्त्वविद्यानिवृत्तेः पञ्चमप्रकारत्वं भावाद्वैतं चानभ्युपगमपराहतम् ।”

“ये तु पञ्चमप्रकारादिपक्षाः, ते तु मन्दबुद्धियुत्पादनार्था इति न तत्समर्थनमर्थयामः ।”

La. Ca. p. 885.



independently of the affirmative Vēdāntic texts (vidhivākyas) referring to Brahman or that the latter texts should be taken to be subsidiary to the former. Sarvajñātmamuni and Rāmatīrtha understand this to be Maṇḍana's view, presumably because it is clearly deducible from Maṇḍana's observations about the import of non-dualistic negative texts in the Brahmasiddhi. In this context, it is also pointed out in the Saṁkṣēpaśārīraka (A. S. S. I. vv. 250-2) that Maṇḍana's interpretation of the Niṣēdhavākyas obviates the need for having recourse to lakṣaṇā (secondary significative force) in the explanation of the meaning of Advaita texts.

10. Maṇḍana's attitude towards Śaṁkara, as far as it can be made out from his Brahmasiddhi, is that of a self-confident and self-complacent Advaitic teacher towards a rival Advaitic teacher, holding divergent views on certain questions; whereas Sureśvara's attitude towards Śaṁkara is, as frankly admitted by Surēśvara himself, that of a devoted disciple to his Godlike master. One of the striking features of Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi is that it is based chiefly on the basic texts of the Vēdānta system—the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and the Brahmasūtra; while Surēśvara Vārtika and the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi are admittedly based on and intimately connected with Śaṁkara's bhāṣyas and other Advaitic works. In the exposition of the Advaita doctrine, Maṇḍana does not own any special allegiance to any Advaita teacher and plays the role of a perfectly independent and self-reliant teacher of Advaita. In the Brahmasiddhi, there is absolutely no <sup>1</sup> instance at all in which Maṇḍana seeks to support his view with a quotation or extract from Śaṁkara's works; while he quotes a verse from Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkyākārikā <sup>2</sup> in one place, and is inclined to strengthen his Advaitic views by quoting Bhartṛhari <sup>3</sup>. There are unmistakable internal evidences in the Brahmasiddhi, showing that the antithesis between karma and jñāna, which is maintained by Śaṁkara by an elaborate process of reasoning and an overwhelming weight of scriptural authority, is wholly unacceptable to Maṇḍana and repudiated by him without any reservation.

<sup>1</sup> In the text of the Brahmasiddhi, Part I, page 26, the line

“अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते ।”

is found quoted. This line is found in the Sarvavedāntassiddhāntasārasaṁgraha (295), which is attributed by some scholars to Śaṁkara; and the authenticity of this work can be and has been challenged on very good grounds. In all the editions of Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā, in the course of commentary on verse 15, chapter 13, Śaṁkara quotes the line अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां . . . . as an extract from an earlier work, in this way:—

“तथा हि संप्रदायविदां वचनम्—‘अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते’ ।”

It is obvious, therefore, that the line अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां . . . . quoted by Maṇḍana in the Brahmasiddhi, was not taken from any of Śaṁkara's works. Perhaps, this line was taken, both by Maṇḍana and Śaṁkara, from Ācārya-Sundarapāṇḍya's Vārtika, from which Śaṁkara has quoted three verses at the end of the Samanvayādhikaraṇa-bhāṣya. (See J.O.R.M., Vol. I, pp. I to 15.)

<sup>2</sup> Bra. Sid., Part I, p. 150.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 26.



In the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Brahmasiddhi* (pp. 32-4, 35-6)<sup>1</sup>. Maṇḍana summarises and criticises Śaṅkara's view about the antithesis between karma and jñāna, rejects this view and gives his own verdict in favour of a certain type of jñānakarma-samuccaya, in which karma, in the form of Agnihōtra and such other sacrifices or at least in the form of meditation (prasaṅkhyāna), has an important place and function in the final stage of the causal scheme necessary to bring about Brahman-realisation. A careful comparison of Śaṅkara's remarks<sup>2</sup> on karma and jñāna in his *Catussūtribhāṣya* with Maṇḍana's criticism of Śaṅkara's position regarding the antithesis of jñāna and karma, as also with the relevant portions of Surēśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (I. 49, 61; III. 64-10) and Vārtika and of Vācaspatimiśra's *Bhāmatī* (pp. 51, 58),<sup>3</sup> would compel a critical student of these works to conclude that Maṇḍana's statement of Śaṅkara's view on karma and jñāna, as pūrvapakṣa, in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Brahmasiddhi*, was intended by Maṇḍana himself to be understood as a direct epitome of what all Śaṅkara had observed on this subject in his *Catussūtribhāṣya* and such intention was unambiguously indicated by Maṇḍana through the significant manner in which he wove into the closing part of the pūrvapakṣa portion of his own text, two of the unforgettable sentences extracted from the end of Śaṅkara's *Samanvayādhikaraṇabhāṣya*; that the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* was deliberately designed by Surēśvara, acting at the instance<sup>4</sup> of his great master Śaṅkara, to be a clear and effective counterblast to Maṇḍana's attitude towards Jñānakarmasamuccaya; and that Vācaspatimiśra, who wrote the *Bhāmatī* after writing the *Tattvasamikṣā* and who had been deeply steeped in Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* when he proceeded to interpret Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, felt constrained to draw attention to the

<sup>1</sup> See Commentary on Bra. Sid: Abhi. Pra. (R. No. 3853, Tr. C. S. Mss. in the Govt. Orl. Mss. Lib.), p. 47.

“तदेवं वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रादेव कृतकृत्यतेति मन्यमानानां मतमुपन्यस्य स्वाभिमतं ज्ञानकर्मणोः संबन्धमवतारयति—अत्रोच्यत इति ।

See also commentary on Bra. Sid: Bhā. Sū., R. No. 3967, Tr. C. S. Mss. in the Govt. Orl. Mss. Lib., p. 90.

“तदेवं वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रान्मोक्षमिच्छतां मतमुपन्यस्य स्वाभिमतं ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयमवतारयितुमाह—अत्रोच्यत इति ।

<sup>2</sup> Bra. Sū. Bhā. N.S., p. 1917, pp. 51 to 70; pp. 113 to 116, line 8 to p. 129. line 5.

<sup>3</sup> Here, it should be remembered that Vācaspatimiśra summarises Maṇḍana's *siddhānta* as stated in the portion of the *Brahmasiddhi* referred to in footnote 1 above and incorporates it in the pūrvapakṣa, which should be refuted before Śaṅkara's *siddhānta* is maintained. In fact, Vācaspatimiśra has woven into lines 7 to 14 on p. 58 of his *Bhāmatī* almost the very words of Maṇḍana in the *Brahmasiddhi* (pp. 12, 13, 35).

<sup>4</sup> Vid. sura. com on Nai. S. (R. No. 3354, p. 3.)

“शङ्करभगवत्पूज्यपादरूपिणा भाष्यकारेण सकृदुपदेशमात्रादेवापरोक्षीकृतब्रह्मात्मतत्त्वः परमहंसपरिव्राजक-श्रीसुरेश्वराचार्यो गुरुनियोगात् प्राणिनामुपकाराय श्लोकप्रबन्धरूपां नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिं श्रीमच्छारीरकप्रकरणमुपनिबबन्ध ।”



pronounced divergence between Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana in respect of karma and jñāna, by introducing certain portions of Śaṅkara's text as implying a refutation of Maṇḍana's view and by weaving relevant extracts from the Brahmasiddhi into the pūrvapakṣa portions of the Bhāmatī, although Vācaspati would prefer to retain as much as possible of his heritage from Maṇḍana and to read it into Śaṅkara's exposition of Advaita. In the interpretation of the text of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras, Maṇḍana adopts an independent line and has no hesitation to deviate from Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas, where he finds such deviation necessary to maintain his own views. Attention has already been drawn to the differences noticeable in Maṇḍana's interpretation of the śrutis "Om iti Brahma" "Vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta" "Vidyāṁ cāvidyāṁ ca" as compared with the interpretation of these texts by Śaṅkara and by his loyal and devoted disciple, Surēśvara. Again, pointed attention has already been drawn to the divergence between Maṇḍana on the one hand and Śaṅkara and Surēśvara on the other, in the interpretation of the Sūtra "Sarvāpēkṣā ca yajñādiśrutēraśvavat." A careful investigation of those sections of the Brahmasiddhi, in which Maṇḍana discusses the relation between karma and jñāna and the nature of Jivanmukti, would make it clear that his commentators<sup>1</sup> and Amalananda<sup>2</sup> are right in taking him as animadverting upon Śaṅkara's views and rejecting them. It is clear in almost every section of Surēśvara's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and Vārtika that he would consider it a sacrilege on his part or on the part of any other advaitin to treat Śaṅkara's views on certain questions in the manner in which Maṇḍana has done. It should be remembered here that Surēśvara avows it to be his chief task to interpret, amplify and vindicate the thoughts of his Divine Master Śaṅkara, while Maṇḍana plays the role of a perfectly independent advaitic teacher throughout his Brahmasiddhi. It is also noteworthy that, in the interpretation of what may be regarded as the pivotal aphorism of the Vēdānta system "Tat tu samanvayāt", Maṇḍana<sup>3</sup> does not care to follow Śaṅkara and wants us to take the word "tu" to indicate the difference between Dharma and Brahman, and the word 'samanvaya' in the sense of the interrelation of the meanings of words, Maṇḍana's interpretation<sup>4</sup> of the oft-quoted Muṇḍaka text "Vēdāntavijñānasuniścītārthāḥ xxxx" is completely at variance with Śaṅkara's interpretation of the same text and bears testimony to the striking contrast between Maṇḍana and Surēśvara in respect of their attitude towards Śaṅkara. In the bhāṣya on the Muṇḍakōpaniṣad

<sup>1</sup> Bra. Sid. Vyā, Part II, p. 264, lines 12 to 24.

"भगवत्पादीयमतमुपन्यस्यति—ये स्त्विति । तद्दूषयति—तदिति ।"

<sup>2</sup> Kalpataru, pp. 958-959.

"भाष्ये स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशो जीवन्मुक्तिसाधक उक्तः ; तत्र स्थितप्रज्ञः साधको न साक्षात्कारवानिति मण्डनमिश्रैरुक्तं दूषणमुद्धरति—स्थितप्रज्ञश्चेति ।"

<sup>3</sup> Bra. Sid., Part I, p. 155.

"तथा च 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' इति चोदनालक्षणाद्धर्मात् तुल्यभेदेन विशेष्यं ब्रह्म समन्वयगम्यमुक्तम् । समन्वयो हि पदार्थानां संसर्गो विनियोगः ; ततो ब्रह्म गम्यते न चोदनात् इत्यर्थः ।"

<sup>4</sup> Bra. Sid. Part I, p. 123.



(III. 26) Śaṅkara takes this mantra as referring to Jivanmuktas who have renounced all karma and firmly stand on saṁnyāsa and Brahman-realisation and become finally liberated in the sense that they realise themselves to be the absolute Brahman, the expression 'Brahmalōkēṣu' being understood to be the absolute Brahman itself as lōka and the plural number in that expression having reference to the apparent plurality of the adepts (sādhakas) before their mukti. Surēśvara quotes <sup>1</sup> this Muṇḍaka text in his Vārtika and follows up Śaṅkara's interpretation by pointing out that, according to this text, entering into the order of saṁnyāsa, in which all karma is renounced, is indispensable for Brahman-realisation. According to Śaṅkara and Surēśvara, 'Vēdāntavijñāna' in the Muṇḍaka text is the effective Brahman-realisation arising from the Mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads and 'saṁnyāsayōga' is the saṁnyāsāśrama itself, which is here described as yōga in the sense of unshakable fixation in Brahman (kēvalabrahmaniṣṭhā). Those who are familiar with the traditions of the Śaṅkara school know well that this Muṇḍaka text is usually cited as the distinctive motto of the saṁnyāsāśrama as conceived by Śaṅkara and his followers and that this is solemnly chanted on all occasions when anything is piously offered in the name of Śaṅkara or of any of his pontifical representatives. Maṇḍana, on the contrary, dissociates this Muṇḍaka text completely from the Saṁnyāsāśrama and explains it in a manner which would be characteristic of one, who refuses to believe in the supreme importance of that āśrama. According to him, the expression Vēdāntavijñāna refers only to the indirect verbal cognition of the truth arising from Vēdāntic texts and not to the direct and complete realisation resulting from constant meditation; the expression 'Saṁnyāsayōgāt' refers, not to saṁnyāsāśrama, but to the worshipful surrender of all actions and their results at the feet of God and constant meditation that all this is Brahman; and that the expression 'Brahmalōkēṣu' refers to the non-eternal producible world presided over by God Brahman (kāryabrahmalōka) and does not refer to the absolute Brahman. Further, it may be deduced, as a very natural and perfectly logical corollary, from Maṇḍana's criticism of Śaṅkara's views on the relation of karma and jñāna, that, if Maṇḍana should be asked to give his interpretation of the word 'atha' in the first Brahma-sūtra, he would have no hesitation to say that 'atha' should be taken in the sense of 'after investigating and understanding the nature of karma' (karmāvabōdhānantaram) and that one could hardly see any compelling necessity to take it in the sense of 'after equipping oneself with the fourfold scheme of preparatory means (sāadhanacatuṣṭayasampattyanantaram). When considering Maṇḍana's attitude towards Śaṅkara in contrast with Surēśvara's attitude towards him, Sarvajñātman's verdict <sup>2</sup> (Samkshepa-śārīraka A.S.S. ed., p. 555) that Maṇḍana-prasthāna is not Śaṅkaraprasthāna and is different from it, leaps up into one's view with added significance.

<sup>1</sup> Bṛhad. Vārt. Part III, p. 1264, verse 148.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

“ जीवन्मुक्तिगतो यदाह भगवान् सत्संप्रदायप्रभु-  
 र्जीवाज्ञानवचस्तदीदृगुचितं पूर्वापरालोचनात् ।  
 अन्यत्रापि तथा बहुश्रुतवचः पूर्वापरालोचना-  
 न्नैतन्न्यं परिहृत्य मण्डनवचस्तदध्यन्यथा प्रस्थितम् ॥



11. In none of the available authoritative works on the advaita system Maṇḍanamīśra is identified with Surēśvara, while, in many Vēdāntic works of the Advaita and Dvaita schools, Maṇḍana and Surēśvara are distinguished as two different advaitins. As already pointed out, there is sufficient evidence to show that Surēśvara himself criticises some of the views put forward by Maṇḍana in his *Brahmasiddhi*. Sarvajñātmanuni and the commentators<sup>1</sup> on the *Samkṣēpaśāriraka* differentiate Maṇḍana from Śurēśvara and draw attention to the fact that the former's prasthāna is different from Śāṅkaraprasthāna, while the latter closely follows Śāṅkara, Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* (p. 105) and Śābdanirṇaya (T. S. S. ed. p. 71) vindicates the views of Padmapāda and Surēśvara and criticises Maṇḍana's views; and where he quotes Maṇḍana with approval, he refers to him as the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* and not as Surēśvara. Ānandabōdha quotes extracts from the *Brahmasiddhi* in many places in his *Nyāyamakaranda* (pp. 231, 234, 256), accepts Maṇḍana's views in some cases and criticises them in cases where he prefers to adopt Surēśvara's views; and Citsukha identifies all these references in his commentary on the *Nyāyamakaranda* (pp. 231, 234, 256, 290 and 291.) but nowhere identifies the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* with the author of the *Vārtika*. On the contrary, Pratyakṣvarūpa, in his commentary *Nayanaprasādinī* (pp. 333, 340) on *Tattvapradīpikā* carefully differentiates Maṇḍanamīśra from Surēśvarācārya. Ānandānubhava, a great saṁnyāsin of the advaita school, who is presupposed by Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* (p. 6) and who is the author of an advaita treatise called—*Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī* (R. 5505 in ms.) distinguishes Maṇḍana and Surēśvara in unmistakable terms<sup>2</sup> in that section of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī* in which the saṁnyāsa of the Tridaṇḍin type advocated by Bhāskara and his followers is assigned to an inferior place and saṁnyāsa in the strict sense of the term is maintained to be of the Ekadaṇḍin type, involving the total renunciation of all the Vēdic rites and of the two external symbols of Vedic rites—the sacred thread (*Yajñōpavīta*) and the tuft of hair on the crown (*Śikhā*). In this section of the *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, Ānandānubhava refers to Viśvarūpa, Prabhākaraḥ, Maṇḍana, Vācaspati and Sucaritamiśra as reputed and reliable exponents of Vēdic religion and as having signified their approval of the saṁnyāsa of the Ekadaṇḍin type. It is also stated in the same section of the same work that Viśvarūpa and Prabhākara themselves<sup>3</sup> became Ekadaṇḍi-saṁnyāsins, that Viśvarūpa expressed himself in favour of Ekadaṇḍi-saṁnyāsa, in the smṛti work<sup>4</sup> which he wrote when he was a gṛhastha

<sup>1</sup> See the commentaries of Agnicitpuruṣōttama and Rāmatīrtha on *Sam. Śā.* p. 555 verse 174.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

“किंच प्रसिद्धप्रभावैर्विश्वरूपभाकरमण्डनवाचस्पतिसुचरितमिश्रैः शिष्टाग्रणीभिः परिगृहीतस्य कथं द्वेषमोहाभ्यां विनापलापसंभवः ।

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

“ननु विश्वरूपभाकरौ भवत्पक्षपतितौ; तावप्येकदण्डिनौ ।

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

“गृहस्थावस्थायां विरचिते च विश्वरूपग्रन्थे दक्षितवाक्यपरिग्रहो दृश्यते । न चासौ ग्रन्थः संन्यासिना विरचितः तथाहि परिव्राजकाचार्य-सुरेश्वरविरचितेति ग्रन्थे नाम लिखेत्; लिखितं तु भट्टविश्वरूप-विरचितेति ।



and not subsequent to his becoming a *saṁnyāsin*, and that *Viśvarūpa* came to be known as *Surēśvara* in his *Samnyāsāśrama*. It may also be clearly made out from this work that *Maṇḍana* did not himself become a *Samnyāsin*, though he was prepared to recognise Śāstraic sanction in favour of *Ekadaṇḍi-saṁnyāsa*, while *Bhaṭṭa-viśvarūpa* himself became a *saṁnyāsin* of the *Ekadaṇḍin* type. A reference to *Viśvarūpa's* *Bālakrīḍā* (T.S.S. ed., part II pp. 29-31) would show that *Ānandānubhava* is presumably having in his mind, in this connection, the strong advocacy by *Viśvarūpa* of the *Ekadaṇḍi-saṁnyāsa* in the lengthy discussion of this subject, which is appended to his commentary on verse 66 in the *Prāyaścittādhyāya* of *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*. *Ānandagiri*, who wrote a commentary on *Ānandānubhava's* *Nyāyaratnadīpāvali* and also a commentary on *Surēśvara's* *Vārtika*, besides several other works, has no doubt whatever that *Surēśvara* and *Maṇḍana* are different persons and points out that *Surēśvara* repudiates *Maṇḍana's* view in favour of *prasaṁkhyāna* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika*. *Amalānanda*, in his *Kalpataru*, (p. 921) draws attention to the fact that *Maṇḍana*, as an *advaitin*, criticises some of *Śaṁkara's* views and assumes that *Surēśvara's* *Vārtika* should be taken to elucidate *Śaṁkara's* views and that *Maṇḍana* and *Surēśvara* were two different *advaitins* adopting different viewpoints. *Vidyāraṇya*, in his *Vivaraṇapramēyasamgraha* (p. 92) quotes *Surēśvara* under the name *Viśvarūpācārya*, thereby clearly indicating the identity of *Viśvarūpa* and *Surēśvara* and refers (p. 224) to *Maṇḍana*, the author of *Brahmasiddhi*, as a distinct person. In his *Vārtikasāra* (p. 573 Chowk. ed.,) *Vidyāraṇya* refers to *Brahmasiddhikāra* as a great writer who had an insight into the spirit of the *Vēda* (*Vēdarahasyavit*) and quotes the verse “*Sarva-pratyaya-vēdyē vā \* \* \**” from the *Brahmasiddhi* in support of one of the alternative interpretations of the text “*athāta ādēśō nēti*.” It is clear, from this portion of the *Vārtikasāra*, and the commentary thereon, called *Laghusamgraha*, that *Vidyāraṇya* and the commentator *Mahēśvaratīrtha* take *Maṇḍanamīśra* and *Surēśvara* to be different persons. To avoid any possible misapprehension here, it would be necessary to observe that, according to *Vidyāraṇya's* analysis in the *Vārtikasāra* (pp. 573-5) *Surēśvara* interprets the text “*athāta ādēśō nēti nēti*” in three ways in his *Vārtika*; that the first interpretation avoids *lakṣaṇā* and takes the negative text to express directly the negation of the word (*prapañca*); that the second interpretation has recourse to *lakṣaṇā* and takes the negative text to indirectly convey an affirmation of the identity of *jīva* with *Brahman*; that the third interpretation also proceeds on the basis of *lakṣaṇā* and presents the negative text as conveying indirectly the identity of *jīva* with *Īśvara*; and that the second interpretation is more satisfactory than the first and that the third is most satisfactory. It should also be noted that, while there is some agreement between *Surēśvara* and *Maṇḍana*, as pointed out in the *Vārtikasāra*, in the first of these three interpretations, *Surēśvara's* attitude is one of half-hearted acquiescence in it. None, who remembers *Madhusūdanasarasvatī's* remarks on *Surēśvara's* opposition to *Maṇḍana's* *bhāvādvaita*, can miss in the *Vārtika* portion setting forth the first interpretation, these facts :—that *Surēśvara* expressly repudiates<sup>1</sup> the *bhāvādvaita* implication in it by adducing the argument that the *niṣēdha* also comes within the scope of *dvaita* and, as such, comes within the scope of *dvaitaniṣēdha*, while *Maṇḍana* emphasises the *bhāvādvaita* implication

<sup>1</sup> *Brhad. Vār.*, Part II, p. 1025, verses 196 to 199.



here and accepts it as a position quite consistent with the conception of advaitabrahman ; and that Surēśvara considers it safe, in the interest of advaita in the strict sense, to discard the first interpretation which comes dangerously near Maṇḍana's position and, after, criticising Maṇḍana's position proceeds to set forth, in the Vārtika, the second and third interpretations. From the way in which Appayyadīkṣita refers to (Siddhāntalēśasaṃgraha. pp. 418, 498) Vārtikakāra and Brahmasiddhikāra, it may be made out that he knows that the authors of the Vārtika and the Brahmasiddhi are two different persons. However, in the Siddhāntalēśasaṃgraha, (p. 473) the first half of a verse from the Vārtika and Acyutakṣṇānandatīrtha also, in his commentary on the Siddhāntalēśasaṃgraha, assumes that the Vārtikakāra, Surēśvara is the author of this verse. It would be a mistake to suppose from this erroneous reference that Appayyadīkṣita believed Maṇḍana to be identical with Surēśvara ; for Appayyadīkṣita wrote a complete commentary on the Kalpataru and must have been quite aware that Amalānanda assumed that the Brahmasiddhi was written subsequent to Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras and that Maṇḍana criticised Śaṅkara's views on certain question ; and Dīkṣita must also have been aware that Surēśvara's exposition of advaita doctrine was based entirely on Śaṅkara's works, while Maṇḍana's exposition of advaita doctrine did not follow Śaṅkara's works and constituted a different prasthāna, as pointed out by Sarvajñātmapamuni, in his Saṃkṣēpaśāriraka—a work with which Dīkṣita was thoroughly familiar<sup>1</sup>. This misquotation, therefore, has to be accounted for as one of the possible oversights, for which he seeks the indulgence of his scholarly readers in the apologetic verse at the end of the Siddhāntalēśasaṃgraha ; or the expression “ityādivārtikavirōdhaḥ” (p. 473) may be the result of some scribal corruption of “ityādi-vacanavirōdhaḥ”, in the manuscripts ; or this expression has to be explained by understanding Dīkṣita to mean that the idea contained in Maṇḍana's text is in agreement with Surēśvara's views as expressed in his Vārtika and any conflict with this idea would amount to conflict with the Vārtika. It may be noted here that the last explanation suggested above may be supported by a reference to Vidyāraṇya's Vārtikasāra, and Vyāsatīrtha's Nyāyāmṛta, (vol I p. 163). which draw pointed attention to the agreement between Surēśvara and Maṇḍana in respect of the idea embodied in the line “Sarvapratiyayavēdē vā \* \* \*”. Further, the Dvaita tradition, as recorded in Dvaita-vēdānta works, clearly differentiates Maṇḍana and Surēśvara ; and this is quite evident from the manner in which Vyāsatīrtha quotes Maṇḍana, in his Nyāyāmṛta, as holding a certain view in a previous sentence, and in the next sentence quotes Surēśvara, as a different advaitic writer and as holding a very similar view. Madhusūdana-sarasvatī and Brahmanandasarasvatī nowhere equate Maṇḍana with Surēśvara and assume in all their works that Maṇḍana and Surēśvara were two distinct individuals. This is quite clear from the manner in which the Vēdāntakalpalatikā (pp. 26-8) quotes the Vārtika and Brahmasiddhi in successive sentences, as works by two different authors on Advaita and sets forth Surēśvara's Vārtika in sharp opposition<sup>2</sup> to Maṇḍana's bhāvādvaita or sadadvaita. This is also clear from the way in which the Advaitasiddhi (p. 318), the Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 62, 75, 82, 270, 339 and 340.

<sup>2</sup> Vēd. kalpa, p. 12.



## MANDANA—SURESVARA EQUATION

49

(p. 21), the Laghucandrikā (p. 326) and the Gurucandrikā (Mysore ed. pp. 190-1, 484) refer to Maṇḍana and his views on advaita. It is also worthy of notice that the Siddhāntadīpa,<sup>1</sup> the *Sambandhōkti*<sup>2</sup>, the *Subōdhinī* (A.S.S. p. 555), the *Anvayārthaprakāśikā* and the *Sārasaṅgraha* (Benāres ed. p. 106), all these commentaries on the *Samkṣēpaśārīraka*, when commenting on the reference to Maṇḍana by Sarvajñātman in verse 174 of chapter II of the *Samkṣēpaśārīraka*, differentiate Maṇḍana's advaitic *prasthāna* from Surēśvara's *prasthāna* in such a striking way that it would be impossible to equate Maṇḍana with Surēśvara. It would also be of great advantage to note here that Jñānāmṛta, in his commentary on the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, called *Vidyāsurabhi*, while criticising (R. No. 3354. p. 350) Maṇḍana's view that *prasaṅkhyāna* brings about Brahman-realization and *śabda* cannot and maintaining the soundness of Surēśvara's view that *śabda* can and does bring it about, emphatically suggests (Ibid. p. 351) that, though Maṇḍana is a great *Mīmāṃsaka*, his *advaitasaṁpradāya* as embodied in *Brahmasiddhi*. is not *satsaṁpradāya* (good and approved advaitic tradition), while Surēśvara's advaitic tradition, based as it is on Śaṅkara's works, is *satsaṁpradāya*.

There are numerous works in Sanskrit purporting to give an account of Śaṅkara's life. They mix up in a hopelessly confused manner legendary and historical materials. It would be very unreasonable to base any conclusion on the statements contained in these works, without adducing corroborative evidence from other and more reliable sources. The Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, contains over a dozen works in manuscripts form, which purport to give an account of Śaṅkara's life and some of which, like the *Śaṅkaravijaya* ascribed to Vidyāraṇya and Śrī Gōvindanātha's *Śaṅkarācāryacarita*, are available in print. A poem, called the *Guruvamśakāvya* (Vani Vilas ed.) dealing with the life of Śaṅkara and his disciples and written by Vidvadbālaka-kāśī-lakṣmaṇaśāstri, about the end of the 18th century, is available in print. The late Mr. T. S. Narayana Sastri, in his incomplete work on the age of Śaṅkara, speaks of ten *śaṅkaravijayas* and refers (Madras ed. Part I pp. 30, 31) also to certain other sources of information about Śaṅkara and his disciples. Almost all these works refer to Maṇḍana and Surēśvara. Some of them identify Maṇḍana with Surēśvara and the *Śaṅkaravijaya* (VII. 113-7) ascribed to Vidyāraṇya proceeds further to identify Surēśvara with Viśvarūpa Maṇḍana and Bhattōmvēka. Some others distinguish Maṇḍana and Surēśvara as two distinct individuals, the latter being known by the name of Viśvarūpa in his *grhasthāśrama*. In one of these works, Maṇḍana is referred to as Kumārila's sister's husband. Another work states that Maṇḍana was living in *Vidyālayadēśa*, identified with the place called *Cijjalacīdu*. Citsukha records, in his *Tativapradīpikā* (p. 265) an old and reliable tradition that Bhattōmvēka

<sup>1</sup> Viśvaveda's commentary (R. No. 1558)—

“मण्डनमिश्रस्य तु प्रस्थानान्तरत्वात्तदीयं वचो यथाश्रुतमेवास्तु ।

<sup>2</sup> Vedānanda's commentary (R. No. 2919).

“अयमेव न्यायो वार्तिकादिषु नेतव्यः, परिहृत्य मण्डनवचः, तस्यान्यथा प्रस्थितत्वात् ।



is identical with Bhavabhūti, the author of the *Mālatīmādhava* and other dramas. Almost all the traditions embodied in these works are unanimous in associating Maṇḍana and Viśvarūpa with Kumārila as his pupils, in identifying Viśvarūpa with Surēśvara and ascribing to him the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and the *Vārtikas* on Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittiriya Upaniṣads*, and in not ascribing the *Brahmasiddhi* to Surēśvara or Viśvarūpa. The traditions in these works, which come down to the level of pseudo-biographies containing more of legendary and less of historical material, must be discarded as unreliable in so far as they come into conflict with the weighty internal evidences in authoritative Vēdāntic works, to which attention was drawn in the foregoing paragraphs. How unreliable the materials contained in the *Śaṅkaravijaya* attributed to Vidyāraṇya are may be easily seen from the way in which Vidyāraṇya, in his *Vivaraṇapramēyasamgraha* and *Vārtikasāra*, differentiates Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi*, from Surēśvara, otherwise known as Viśvarūpācārya and from the agreements adduced by some writers to show the spurious<sup>1</sup> character of the *Śaṅkaravijaya* ascribed to Vidyāraṇya. As a result of a careful consideration of the host of literary evidences adduced in the foregoing paragraphs from authoritative Vēdāntic literature, besides the conflicting and confused accounts of Maṇḍana and Surēśvara furnished in the pseudo-biographies above referred to, three important conclusions emerge: *firstly*, that Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* was never a disciple of Śaṅkara, did not become a saṁnyāsin, was not identical with Surēśvara and represented an advaitic *prasthāna* different from *Śaṅkaraprasthāna*; *secondly*, that Surēśvara, who was known as Viśvarūpa in his *grhasthāśrama*, was a pupil of Kumārila when he was a *grhastha* and came to be known by the name of Surēśvara when he became a *saṁnyāsin* and a disciple of Śaṅkara; that, in his *Vārtika* and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, he controverted many an advaitic doctrine expounded by Maṇḍana in his *Brahmasiddhi*; and that Surēśvara nowhere departed from his avowed allegiance to *Śaṅkaraprasthāna*; and *thirdly*, that Maṇḍana should have written his *Brahmasiddhi* after seeing Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas, more particularly the *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya*; and that Surēśvara should have written his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, mainly as a *Śaṅkara* counterblast to the *Brahmasiddhi* probably in compliance with Śaṅkara's desire. If the *Maṇḍana-Surēśvara* equation looms large, at present, in the world of advaitic scholars and continues to hold sway over the belief of many of them, it is because they have not so far examined the grounds of this belief in the light of the internal evidence available in the *Brahmasiddhi* and a host of other advaitic works; and it may now be reasonably expected that, after the publication of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*, scholars will see that Maṇḍana and Surēśvara are two distinct individuals. It may not be out of place to add here that, even in the midst of the scurrilous and blasphemous references to Śaṅkara in the *Mādhva* work, *Maṇimañjari*, by Narayana Pandita (VIII 1, 8, 9) one could find that the correct tradition differentiating Maṇḍana from Viśvarūpa is preserved.

<sup>1</sup> The age of Śaṅkara, *Ibid.* pp. 148 to 159; J.O.R.M., Vol. I, 1927. "The last days of Śri Śaṅkarācārya," pp. 330 and 331.



## SECTION III

MANDANA'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY :  
HIS CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Maṇḍana's date is not difficult to determine. From the references considered in the previous section, it would be clear that he was later than Bhartṛhari and earlier than Śālikanātha and that he must have been a younger contemporary or Kumārila and an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara and Surēśvara. In all probability, Maṇḍana was a younger contemporary of Prabhākara; for while he quotes extracts from Prabhākara's *Bṛhātī*<sup>1</sup> and criticises them, Prabhākara himself does not presuppose Maṇḍana's works; but Śālikanātha, one of Prabhākara's pupils and the most authoritative scholiast on Prabhākara's works, quotes<sup>2</sup> extracts from Maṇḍana's works and *refutes Maṇḍana's views*. The cumulative effect of the data assembled together in the article on the date of Śaṅkarācārya which appeared recently in the *Journal of Oriental Research, Madras* (Vol. III. pp. 39-56) compels a reconsideration of the date generally accepted for Śaṅkara—788 to 820 A.D.—; and in the light of these data, it would be reasonable to assign Śaṅkara's literary activity to the period—632 to 664 A.D. The following provisional scheme of dates is suggested for the philosophical writers, whose dates have a direct or indirect bearing on the chronological position of Maṇḍana in the history of Indian Philosophy; and this scheme relies upon Bhartṛhari's date of death recorded by I-Tsing as a landmark and takes duly into consideration all the evidences which may be gathered from relevant references in Śāstra-literature and from the traditions embodied in the various Śaṅkaravijayas and similar works.

Gauḍapāda : 520-620. A.D.  
 Govindabhagavatpāda : 560-650 A.D.  
 Dharmakīrti : 600-650 A.D.  
 Bhartṛhari : 591-651 A.D.  
 Śaṅkara : 632-664 A.D.  
 Padmapāda : 625-705 A.D.  
 Viśvarūpa (Surēśvarācārya) : 620-700  
 A.D.

Kumārila : 600-660 A.D.  
 Prabhākara : 610-690 A.D.  
 Maṇḍana : 615-695 A.D.  
 Bhaṭṭōmveka (Bhavabhūti) : 640-725 A.D.  
 Śālikanātha : 650-730 A.D.

This scheme may be taken to exhibit, in a fairly satisfactory manner, the chronological relation which Maṇḍana bears to other leading advaitins and Mīmāṃsakas mentioned here, though the dates given are of a tentative character.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Bra. Sid., Part I, pp. 23 to 26 and 77. *Bṛhātī*, Madras ed. pp. 20 and 22; and compare Vidhiviveka (Pandit-Benares), p. 109, with *Bṛhātī*, Madras, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix V. pp. 51 and 52; *Rjuvimalā*, Mad. Uni. Skt. S. No. 3, pp. 90 and 21.



Maṇḍana holds a very high place in the history of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita. Among his contemporaries and successors, he is recognized as a high authority on Mīmāṃsā<sup>1</sup> as represented by the Bhāṭṭa school, next in importance only to the greatest Acārya of the Bhāṭṭa school—Kumārila-bhaṭṭa. Pārthasārathimīśra, one of the most authoritative exponents of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's views, in the course of his exposition of the signification of *vidhi* on the basis of Kumārila's *vārtika* "*Abhidhābhāvanāmāhuḥ* \* \* \*", shows a great solicitude for reconciling<sup>2</sup> his view with that of Maṇḍana, though, in fact, Pārthasārathi's view that the primary significative power of a *vidhi* (*abhidhā*) turns out to be identical with the *motivatory force* (*pravartanā*) constituting the meaning of a *vidhi*—stands out in marked contrast with Maṇḍana's view—that *contributoriness to a desired end* (*iṣṭasādhana*) is the *motivatory force* (*pravartanā*) constituting the meaning of a *vidhi*. The laboured reconciliation attempted by Pārthasārathi between his view and Maṇḍana's view in this connection is a clear indication of the profound influence which Maṇḍana's views exercised in the sphere of the Bhāṭṭa literature. Not merely among the Mīmāṃsakas, but also in the world of Advaitins, Maṇḍana is known as profoundly conversant with the Mīmāṃsā-Śāstra (*mīmāṃsāniṣṭhā*) and as 'one who has mastered all the secrets of the Vēdic culture' (*Vēdarahasyavit*). That Śālikanātha, one of Prabhākara's pupils, when he had to refute the *advaitasiddhānta*, chose to state it in the words of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*, and not in the words of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣyas* and that, likewise, Jayantabhaṭṭa, who wrote his *Nyāyamañjarī* shortly after Vācaspatimīśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, chose to review the advaita doctrine in the words<sup>3</sup> of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* and not in the words of Śaṅkara—may well be taken as good ground for the inference that, during the age of Śaṅkara and for some centuries immediately following it, Maṇḍana's authority on questions relating to the *advaitasiddhānta* was recognized to be at least as high and important as that of Śaṅkaraprasthāna, some like Surēśvara, Vimuktātman, Prakāśātman and Ānandānubhava, assume an attitude of frank opposition to Maṇḍana, where they find him deviating from Śaṅkara, though Prakāśātman, the leading representative of the *Vivaraṇa* school, does not hesitate to seek Maṇḍana's support in matters in which Maṇḍana agrees with Śaṅkara; Vācaspatimīśra, in particular, among the earlier commentators on Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* reads Maṇḍana's views<sup>4</sup> into Śaṅkara's text whether he finds it possible to do so and refers to those views as the *pūrvapakṣa* sought to be refuted, in several instances where Śaṅkara's observations are irreconcilably opposed to them; and several post-Śaṅkara advaitins, like Ānandabōdha, Cituska, Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānanda, have given, in their works, an honoured place to Maṇḍana as a great authority on Advaita.

<sup>1</sup> See Nyāyakaṇikā (Pandit-Benares) introductory verse 4, Nyāyaratnamālā, Ch. S. S., 52, last line.

<sup>2</sup> Nyāyaratnamālā pp. 52-3.

<sup>3</sup> See Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 526 to 527.

<sup>4</sup> Bhāmatī p. 57.



Maṇḍana wrote three works on Mīmāṃsā—the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*,<sup>1</sup> the *Bhāvanāvivēka*<sup>2</sup> and the *Vidhivivēka*,<sup>3</sup> one work on the philosophy of language—the *Sphōṭasiddhi*,<sup>4</sup> one work on Epistemology—the *Vibhramavivēka*<sup>5</sup> and one work on Advaita—the *Brahmasiddhi*<sup>6</sup>. In the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*, Maṇḍana epitomises, in brief and terse anuṣṭubh verses, the siddhāntas of each of the adhikaraṇas of Jaimini's sūtras, according to Śābarasvāmī's bhāṣya. The *Bhāvanāvivēka* is an exposition of the nature of the activatory force, called *arthabhāvanā*, in accordance with Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *vārtika* and differentiates it, as the signification of the non-modal generic phase of verbal endings, called *ākhyāta*, from the meaning of the roots, after controverting the Vaiyākaraṇa view which includes *bhāvanā* in the meaning of the roots. In the *Vidhivivēka*, which is the biggest of the Mīmāṃsā treatises written by Maṇḍana, he makes his special contribution to the Mīmāṃsā theory of interpretation of mandatory propositions (*vidhis*) and maintains, after an elaborate course of reasoning, that the motivatory force, called *pravartanā*, which is conveyed by mandatory suffixes, reduces itself to the form of 'contributoriness to a desired end' (*iṣṭasāadhanatva*), the main thesis of the work being embodied in the oft-quoted verse :—

“ *Puṁsō nēṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvanyaḥ pravartakaḥ |*

*Pravṛttihētuṁ dharmān ca pravadanti pravartanām || ”*

The special value of Maṇḍana's theory of *vidhyartha* consists in this—that, while it utilises with a sweet reasonableness, the most acceptable part of the old Nyāya theory of *vidhyartha*, it furnishes to the advaitin a very powerful argument by which he could easily disarm his Mīmāṃsaka opponent of the Bhāṭṭa as well as the Prābhākara school and render nugatory the Mīmāṃsakas' endeavour to show that the Upaniṣads would be purposeless unless their teaching could be subordinated to the injunctions of the *Karma* or *Upāsānā* sections of the Vēda. After showing in his *Vidhivivēka* why *iṣṭasāadhanatva* should be recognised as the *vidhyartha*, Maṇḍana finds it easy to show in his *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 115) that the *Nīyōga* of the Prābhākaras would turn out to be an unmeaning shibboleth, unless it comes to be equated with *iṣṭasāadhanatva* and that, even on the view that the validity of śāstras rests upon their bringing about a fruitful activity and not merely upon giving correct information about truth, the Upaniṣadic text could be maintained to be purposeful and valid, inasmuch as they lead to the highest kind of *pravṛtti* (p. 159) in the form of meditation on the Absolute Brahman as the only reality, such *upāsānā* being indispensable for transforming the indirect knowledge of Brahman arising from the

<sup>1</sup> Edited by Dr. Ganganath Jha in the Ch. S. S. Benares.

<sup>2</sup> The Princess of Wales, Sarasvati Bhavana text—Benares No. 6.

<sup>3</sup> The Pandit, Benares.

<sup>4</sup> Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Madras Oriental Series No. 1, M.L.J. Press, Mylapore.

<sup>6</sup> The present edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*.



*Mahāvākyas* into direct Brahman-realisation and such *praytti* being directed towards the highest end of human endeavour, viz., Brahman-realisation concomitant with complete liberation from bondage (*mukti*). The *Sphōṭasiddhi* is a spirited defence of the *sphōṭa* theory of Vaiyākaranas, as expounded by Bhartṛhari, and meets the objections advanced against the *sphōṭa* theory by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhākara. Maṇḍana's view is that the *siddhānta* of the Mīmāṃsakas would in no manner be prejudiced by the acceptance of the *sphōṭa* theory, but would gain immensely,<sup>1</sup> on the contrary, through that theory, by finding its ultimate fulfilment in the absolute monism of *advaita*. Maṇḍana uses rather strong language<sup>2</sup> in the second and concluding verses of his *Sphōṭasiddhi*, in referring to the opponents of the *sphōṭa* theory. In the second verse, he says that his object is to vindicate the *sphōṭa* theory against the sneering attacks by some perverse and ill-bred scholars and in the concluding verse he describes such scholars as dull-witted persons whose inner vision has been obscured by the cataract of ignorance. These uncomplimentary references should not be understood as including within their scope even Kumārilabhaṭṭa; for in that case, these references would militate against the tradition generally accepted by almost all the great śāstraic authors, that Maṇḍanamīśra was one of the senior pupils of Kumārilabhaṭṭa. There is nothing in any of Maṇḍana's works to show that he was disrespectful to Kumārila and there is sufficient evidence to show that he had a great regard<sup>3</sup> for Kumārila's views on points on which he agreed with him. It is a fact that Maṇḍanā criticises Kumārila's views in many places, but it should be remembered that he does not hesitate to criticise the views of any philosopher, however eminent he may be, whenever he finds good reason for an honest difference of opinion. A careful comparison<sup>4</sup> of the earlier portions of the *Sphōṭasiddhi* with the relevant portions of the *Bṛhaṭi* by Prabhākara would induce one to think that Maṇḍana has in his mind Prabhākara's sneering remarks<sup>5</sup> against *sphōṭa* theory and in fact, the learned commentator on the *Sphōṭasiddhi*—*Rṣiputra-paramēśvara*—is

<sup>1</sup> Sph. Sid., verse 2, See commentary on the expression and see verse 36.

<sup>2</sup> Sph. Sid., verse 2, p. 7.

दुर्विदग्धैरवक्षिंसे दर्शने पददर्शनाम् ।  
यथागमं यथाग्रहां न्यायलेशो निदर्शयते ॥

and see p. 264.

सान्द्राविद्यातिमिरपटलाच्छादितान्तादृशो ये  
दृष्टि मन्दा वरमुनिमते कुर्वते सावमानम् ।  
तेभ्योऽविद्यातिमिरपटलोलेखिनी संहितेयं  
स्पष्टन्यायैर्घटितसुमतिर्दर्शिता स्फोटसिद्धिः ॥

<sup>3</sup> Vibhramavivēka, verses 126 and 127.

<sup>4</sup> Compare *Sphōṭasiddhi*, pp. 21 to 23 with *Bṛhaṭi*, pp. 145 and 146 (Mad. ed.)

<sup>5</sup> See *Bṛhaṭi*, p. 160.

“ तस्माद्विदग्धैर्वा ‘विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन’ इति । ”



inclined to believe that Maṇḍana is referring to Kumārila's pupils when he uses the phrase "*durvidagdhairavakṣiptē*"—(p. 8). It should also be remembered here that, throughout his criticism of Bhartṛhari's *sphōṭa* theory, Kumārila adopts a respectful and apologetic attitude, never uses any sneering remark which may be brought under the category of *avakṣēpa* and apologetically observes, at the end of the criticism of *sphōṭa* in the *Ślōkavārtika*, (pp. 510-44) that he has to discard the *sphōṭa* theory as it would be incompatible with the realism of the Mīmāṃsā-siddhānta, particularly in respect of the reality of Vēdic texts.

Maṇḍana's view on the nature of *bhrama* or erroneous cognition, from the advaitic standpoint, is set forth on pages 136-150 of the *ṇiyōga-kāṇḍa* of the *Brahmasiddhi*, partly in verse and partly in prose. Error or erroneous cognition, which is the central problem of epistemology, is the main theme of another work by Maṇḍana called *Vibhramaviveka*, which may be said to be the metrical counter-part of pages 139-150 of the *Brahmasiddhi*. The four chief theories of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*)—*Ātmakhyāti*, *Asatkhyāti*, *Akhyāti* and *Anyathākhyāti*—are briefly stated and critically reviewed in the *Vibhramavivēka* and the Bhāṭṭa theory of *Viparītakhyāti*, which is practically the same as the Nyāya theory of *anyathākhyāti*, is sought to be maintained. In his *Brahmasiddhi* (pp. 136-50) Maṇḍana maintains that the Bhāṭṭa theory of *viparītakhyāti* should, for all practical purposes, be adequate even from the advaitic view-point and when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory reduces itself to a form in which it is hardly distinguishable from the *anirvacanīya-khyāti* of advaitins.

It would be very helpful to students of Indian epistemology to make, in this connection, a critical and comparative study of the various theories of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*) propounded by the different schools of Indian philosophy. There are five theories of *bhrama*; viz., the theory of *self-apprehension* (*ātmakhyāti*), the theory of *non-being's apprehension* (*asatkhyāti*), the theory of *non-apprehension* (*akhyāti*), the theory of *mis-apprehension* (*anyathākhyāti*), and the theory of *indefinable's apprehension* (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*). The Yōgācāra school of Buddhism, otherwise known as the Vijñānavāda school, explains erroneous cognition as consisting in the 'self' which is identical with consciousness, externalising itself in the form of objects like silver; all determinate cognitions of objects, according to the Yōgācāra subjectivists, are erroneous: this theory of *bhrama* is called *ātmakhyātivāda* (theory of *self-apprehension*). The Nihilistic school of Buddhists, otherwise known as the Mādhyamika school, explains *bhrama* as consisting in the cognition of a *non-being* (*asat*); in the case of the erroneous cognition 'this is silver', which arises where there is no silver, the object of the cognition is a non-being (*asat*); on the strength of experience, even non-being should be taken to admit of being cognized; this theory of *bhrama* is known as *asatkhyātivāda*. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas explains all cases of *bhrama* as cases of *non-apprehension*. They contend that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen, two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the perception of nacre in the general way as *this* (*idam*) and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreness, and the other cognition being the recollection of silver previously cognized elsewhere. The recollection



of silver in this case is not identified by the knower as recollection, but is cognized by him merely as cognition, since the object or recollection, viz., silver is thought of merely as silver, stripped of its association with past time and the particular place where it was seen. The Prābhākaras describe such recollection by the phrase 'pramuṣṭatattākasmarāṇa' or 'recollection of an object robbed of its that-ness'. In certain other cases of bhrama like 'the conch is yellow' (pīṭaḥ śaṅkhaḥ), the Prābhākara theorist explains that two imperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour being missed, and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (pittadravyapītimā), the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance being missed. Thus in all cases of bhrama, two distinct cognitions—either a perception and a recollection, or two perceptions—arise; their distinction is missed and the difference between objects comes to be missed for the time being; as a result of such non-discrimination, volitional decision (*pravṛtti* or *yatna*) leading to voluntary activity arises; a voluntary activity with a view to seizing the object of *bhrama*, such as silver, follows; the knower in such cases, acting on his knowledge, realises through his experience that his activity has become futile, as he finds only nacre on the particular spot and no silver at all; and in those cases, in view of the fact that the volitional decision (*pravṛtti*) of the knower concerned leads to a futile activity, the cognitive antecedent of such a futile *pravṛtti* is technically called *bhrama*. It will be seen that, while the Prābhākaras are prepared to give a place to the term *bhrama* in their vocabulary, they maintain that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*) and that the so-called cases of *bhrama* are only undiscriminated jumbles of cognitions whose objects also happen to be undiscriminated for the time being (*jñānayōḥ viśayayōśca vivēkāgrahāt bhramaḥ*). In other words, according to the Prābhākaras, to experience is to experience validly and to err in experience is to experience imperfectly, though validly, the imperfection consisting merely in non-discrimination and not in misapprehension.

The Bhāṭṭas, for all practical purposes, adopt the Nyāya theory of *bhrama*, with this difference—that they describe a *bhrama* as *viparītakhyāti* or contrary experience; that they do not account for *bhrama* through extra-normal sense-relation, and that the relation (*saṃsarga*) between nacre and silverness (*rajatatva*) or 'idam' and 'rajatam' (this and silver), in the case of the misapprehension of nacre as silver, is a non-being<sup>1</sup> (*asat*).

Among the Vedāntins, those of the dualistic school (*Dvaitinaḥ*) maintain what they call their own version of *anyathākhyāti* and contend that in cases of erroneous experience like *śukṭirajatabhrama*, the silver which is presented in *bhrama* is non-being out-and-out (*atyantāsat*) within the sphere of nacre, though it is real elsewhere, and the chief argument in support of

<sup>1</sup> See Sā. Dip. N.S.P., p. 58, lines 4, 5 and 6.



## MANDANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO ADVAITA

57

this view is that the sublating cognition (*bādhakapratīti*), which arises later takes the form—“there was no silver at all here in the past; it is not here now, and it will never be here in the future” (*nātra rajatam āsīt, asti, bhaviṣyati*), and it totally denies the existence of silver within sphere of nacre in the past, the present and the future. The Vēdāntins of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school<sup>1</sup> adopt the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* with certain modifications and their version of *akhyāti* is known as ‘non-apprehension cum apprehension of reality’ (*akhyātisaṁvalitasatkhyāti*). Śrī Rāmānuja and his followers hold that the object of *bhrama* is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at all. In the perception of nacre as silver, it is the silver which is included among the component parts of nacre that is seen. They assume that substances which are similar must have some component parts in common, that silver is made up of parts of nacre and parts of silver and is called silver because the constituent parts represented by silver predominate; that in the constitution of nacre, likewise, the predominating part is represented by nacre and there is a small portion of silver; and that this small portion of silver it is, that happens to be seen when nacre is seen as silver. Thus according to the school of Śrī Rāmānuja, a person who errs in cognition really blunders into a subtle truth, which under normal conditions, is missed or ignored.

A critical student of Indian philosophy would find reason to be dissatisfied with every one of these theories of *bhrama*. The non-existent or non-being (*asat*) is an absolute zero and cannot be presented in any experience, though the Mādhyamikas insist that we are helpless in the matter and have to recognise the possibility of *asat* being presented in experience on the strength of experience itself. The Yōgācāra idealist endeavours to improve upon the nothingistic explanation of the Mādhyamikas by saying that consciousness comprises its configuration (*sākāraṁ vijñānam*), and in its externalized form, it is presented in itself as its object. But one can easily see that this explanation involves a number of inconsistencies. The Nyāya realist realises that nothing but reality (*sat*) admits of being presented in experience; he explains that error consists in confounding one reality with another reality and complicates his theory by trying to bring the absent reality within the range of the sense-organ concerned through the extra-normal relation (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) represented by some form of cognition itself (*jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*). The Bhātta realists, while adopting the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, find it necessary to accommodate themselves to the *asatkhyāti* theory, in holding that the *saṁsarga* element, in the apprehension of nacre as silver and in such other cases, is a non-being (*asat*). The Prābhākara realist sees the danger of compromise with the *asatkhyāti* on the one side, and on the other side, sees how the Nyāya theory that one reality is present as another reality (*sadantaraṁ sadantarātmanā grhyate*) would inevitably reduce itself to a variety of *asatkhyāti* for the obvious reason that one reality never exists (is *asat*) in the form of another reality. In order to avoid all these difficulties the Prābhākara realist adopts the extreme theory

<sup>1</sup> Śrī Bhāṣya, pp. 183 to 188 (N.S.P.)—1916.



of *akhyāti*. Though this is the only theory which could be said to be perfectly consistent with realism, it is not adequate to account for the volitional decision (*pravṛtti*) and the further activity that follows a *bhrama*. As Vācaspatimiśra points out in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* (p. 89) and *Bhāmātī*, (p. 28) in the *akhyātivāda*, one could find as much justification in non-identification (*abhēdāgraha*), for the two cognitions in cases of *bhrama* appearing as two cognitive units and consequently for the two objects in such cases appearing as different, as in non-discrimination (*bhēdāgraha*), for the two cognitions and their two objects in such cases appearing as one and the same; and as a result, if there should be volitional decision in the direction of activity on the latter ground, there should be volitional decision in the opposite direction of abstention on the former ground and the knower should hang between *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. These difficulties, the Advaitins endeavour to meet by propounding the theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* and explaining *bhrama* as experience of a relatively real object, which is neither absolute being (*sat*) nor absolute non-being (*asat*) nor both. According to the Advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, for instance, what happens is this:—over the real substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) represented by a nacre, nacre, or more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (*śuktyavacchinnacaitanya*), the beginningless positive mist of nescience (*anādhībhāvarūpājñāna*) happens to be thrown; when the sense of sight comes into relation with nacre in a general way, the mist is partly dispelled by the cognitive modification of *antaḥkaraṇa*, which takes the form “this” (*idaṁākāravṛtti*); the mist of nescience however, continues to veil the nacreness of what is seen as “this” (*idaṁ*), and reinforced by the prepossessions of the knower’s mind and the similarity between the object seen as “this” and silver, undergoes transformations, with the result that silver comes into being also with the cognition of silver, which is but a cognitive modification of nescience (*śuktyavacchinnacaitanyā-dhiṣṭhitāvidyā rajatarūpēṇa rajatākāravṛttirūpēṇa ca parīnamatē*<sup>1</sup>); silver, which thus comes into being has relative reality; it is said to be *anirvacanīya* in the sense that it does not admit of being definitely described as *sat* (being), or *asat* (non-being), or both; and it is also said to be *prātibhāsika* in the sense that it is coterminous with its presentation in cognition. It will thus be seen that the Advaitin’s theory of *bhrama* regards it as a cognitive complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of them being a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* and the other being a *vṛtti* of *avidyā*. According to this theory, the object of a *bhrama* is real in a relative sense and comes into being along with the *bhrama* and lasts as long as the *bhrama* lasts; and there is no need for accommodation to *asatkhyāti* or for any complication in the form of extra-normal (*alaukika*) sense-relation. That the Advaitins have no particular animus against the advocates of *anyathākhyātivāda* is evident from the way in which they are readily willing to accept the explanation of *anyathākhyāti* in the case of what is known as *sōpādhikabhrama*, where the object of *bhrama* happens to be within the normal scope of the sense-organs, as for instance, in the erroneous perception of a crystal (*sphaṭika*) as red coloured, when a *japā* (China rose) is seen to be in its vicinity. Such students of Indian philosophy, as are capable of critically reviewing the five

<sup>1</sup> Advai. Parī. Venk P., p. 118.



“theories” of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*) set forth here, would not find it difficult to conceive of an appropriate graph by means of which the epistemological interrelation of these theories may be exhibited and comprehended. If one could imagine that epistemological thought starts with *asatkhyāti* as centre and, in its endeavour to escape from it, swings forcibly between the two diametrical termini of *anyathākhyāti* and *akhyāti*, it would not be difficult to imagine that such thought inevitably describes a comprehensive epistemological circle in the form of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, which easily accommodates itself to *akhyāti* in respect of the non-discrimination of the two *vṛttis* constituting a *bhrama* and to *anyathākhyāti* by complete surrender in the case of *sōpādhikabhrama*.

It would be quite appropriate to consider here the various views regarding the way in which the validity and invalidity of a cognition, or truth and error, or *prāmānya* and *apramānya* have to be accounted for and ascertained. The Naiyāyikas hold that validity and invalidity of cognitions are made out through extrinsic considerations and are brought about by extrinsic circumstances. In other words, according to the Naiyāyikas, validity and invalidity cannot be said to be intrinsically made out (*svatōgrāhya*) or intrinsically brought about (*svatōjanya*). Intrinsicity (*svatastva*) in respect of the knowledge of reality consists in reality being made out by every means by which the cognition having it is ascertained but not ascertained to be invalid. This definition of *svatōgrāhyatva* is expressed thus in the technical language of Nyāya:—<sup>1</sup> “*Prāmānyasya jñaptau svatastvaṁ tadapramānyāgrāhakayāvajjñānagrāhakaśāmagrāgrāhyatvam*”. Whenever a person knows that he cognises and does not know for the moment that he errs, he also knows that he validly cognizes:—this is the contention of the advocates of *svatōgrāhyatva* or the theory that validity is intrinsically made out. Thus, if a person could become aware of the existence of a cognition in him in a hundred ways without becoming aware that that cognition is erroneous and if in any one of those cases he becomes aware of the cognition only without becoming aware of its validity, the definition of *svatōgrāhyatva* would not hold good and the view that validity is made out extrinsically (*paratōgrāhya*) has inevitably to be accepted. The Naiyāyikas explain their position thus in regard to this question. A determinate cognition like “this is silver” (*idaṁ rajatam*) is called *vyavasāya* and it is presented first in the *anuvyavasāya* (after-cognition or consciousness of a cognition) which takes a form like this—“I cognize this silver” (*idaṁ rajatam jānāmi*), and in this *anuvyavasāya*, the validity of the cognition referred to is not presented. If such *anuvyavasāya* were to invariably take cognisance of the validity of such *vyavasāya*, it would not be possible to account for the doubt which an inexperienced person feels regarding the validity of such *vyavasāya*. So, in such cases, the validity of the *vyavasāya* “this is silver” should be ascertained through the practical result to which it leads. If the voluntary decision and activity following such *vyavasāya* should turn out to be fruitful and if the knower should actually find himself in a position to get the silver which he wanted, such *vyavasāya* (cognition) is recognized to be valid.

<sup>1</sup> Ta. Dip. Bal. P., p. 359.



The process of inference through which one's mind may pass in such cases is usually put in this form :—' This cognition is valid, because it leads to a fruitful effort ; any cognition that leads to a fruitful effort is valid, as another valid cognition already realized to be such in experience (*idaṁ jñānaṁ pramā; saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt; yadyat saphalapravṛttijanakam tat jñānaṁ pramā; yathā pramāntaram*). It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that causing fruitful effort is, according to Nyāya, the ground of inferring validity, while validity itself consists in the cognition in question cognising a thing as possessing an attribute which it really has. In that the Naiyāyikas make the ascertainment of the truth of a cognition depended upon its agreement with its expected workings or, in other words, with the consequences which are expected to arise from it in the experience of the active subject, their view would appear to be closely similar to that of the modern pragmatist. However, they do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is only a method of ascertaining truth, that this method itself presupposes truth whose nature has to be explained independently of agreement with practical workings and that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmatic argument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically through inference, the fault of regressus ad infinitum would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such difficulties, the Naiyāyikas define truth as consisting in correspondence with reality and thus combine their pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in common with what is known as the correspondence notion of truth in western philosophical literature. The Nyāya definition of validity (*pramātva*) makes it clear that truth consists in correspondence with reality. The Naiyāyikas also point out that, only in cases where a cognition leads to effort in practical experience or it happens to be *pravartaka*, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to ensure unfaltering effort (*niṣkampapravṛtti*); and that, on the first occasion of halting effort (*sakampapravṛtti*), it is not necessary that the cognition leading to such effort should have been definitely made out to be valid and it would do if such cognition should not have been definitely ascertained to be invalid. It can be easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear of *anavasthā* (endless regression) or *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring truth as employed by the Naiyāyikas. In respect of the question how validity and invalidity are brought about, the Nyāya theory is that they are brought about by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake of convenience, are called *guṇas* (good features) and *dōṣas* (defects); in other words, the Nyāya theorists maintain *paratastva* (extrinsicity) in respect of the *utpatti* (production) of validity and invalidity of a cognition as well as in respect of their *jñapti* (knowledge). For instance, the validity of a perception is secured by the good feature (*guṇa*) consisting in the adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ concerned and its object; and its invalidity is the result of defects such as distance and some disease affecting the sense-organ.

It would be interesting to make here a comparative study of the epistemological theories put forward by other schools of Indian philosophy about the way in which truth and error are made out. The Sāṃkhya maintain that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made out in the sense that it is by virtue of the reflection or proximity of the same *cit* (self-luminous consciousness), that the existence of a cognitive *vṛtti* and its validity or invalidity are illuminated.



The Prābhākaras make no difference between vyavasāya and anuvyavasāya and maintain that, in every cognition, the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity, are presented. They advocate the theory of intrinsicity (svatastvapakṣa), in so far as validity (pramāṭva) is concerned; and there is no question of error (apramāṭva) in their theory, since they maintain that all experiences are valid (anubhūtiḥ pramā). The Bhāttas contend that cognition is to be inferred through its effect called jñātātā or prākāṭya, which consists in what some of them describe as temporary luminosity (prakāśa) arising in known objects and referred to in proposition like 'this is known' (ayaṁ jñātaḥ) and that, in such inference, the cognition which has caused jñātātā and its validity are presented. The validity which is thus intrinsically made out may be stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition; and thus, in the Bhāṭṭa theory, invalidity (apramāṭva) is extrinsically made out. The Bhāttas are, therefore, to be taken to advocate svatastva in the case of validity and paratastva in the case of invalidity. Murārīmiśra, who does not go the whole hog either as Prābhākara or as Bhāṭṭa, but who is undoubtedly a Mīmāṃsaka, recognises, like a Naiyāyika, that a cognition (vyavasāya) is cognised by its after-cognition (anuvyavasāya), but maintains, unlike a Naiyāyika, that the validity of vyavasāya is also presented in the same anuvyavasāya. It will thus be seen that Murārīmiśra is an advocate of the theory of the intrinsicity of validity (pramāṭvaṁ svatō gṛhyatē). The Bauddhas, on the other hand, hold that all determinate knowledge (savikalpaka), in so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous (apramā) and its apramāṭva is intrinsically made out; while, through inference, the validity (pramāṭva) of indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka) is extrinsically made out. The Buddhists thus advocate the theory of extrinsicity (paratastvapakṣa) in regard to validity and intrinsicity (svatastvapakṣa) in regard to invalidity. According to the Advaitins, the validity of a cognition is intrinsically made out in the sense that the witnessing inner spirit (sākṣicaitanya) which illuminates the valid cognitive vṛtti, also illuminates its validity (pramāṭva) and the invalidity (apramāṭva) of a cognitive vṛtti is inferred extrinsically, through the resultant effort becoming futile.

In order to evaluate adequately the different theories of pramāṭva and apramāṭva set forth here, it is necessary to note that the Naiyāyikas would answer in the affirmative, the question 'Is error possible in realism'—and would explain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive (viśeṣya) and a real attribute (prakāra) may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and thus save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error. The Prābhākara realists think that any concession of the possibility of error (bhrama) would spell the ruin of realism and insist that all experiences are valid (anubhūtiḥ pramā) and that the so-called bhramas involve an element of non-discrimination (avivēka). The Bhāṭṭa realists adopt the anyathākhyāti of Nyāya with the suitable modifications; and in order to effectively preserve realism, they would make the knowledge of cognition (jñāna) dependent upon the knownness (jñātātā) of the object (jñēya) and thus provide an effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to merge all jñeya in jñāna. The Buddhist idealist rules out truth and considers all determinate knowledge (savikalpaka) erroneous. The advocates of the theory of intrinsicity of validity (pramāṇyasvatasatvavādinḥ), more especially the Bhāttas and the Advaitins, would generally



emphasise the ideas that, in a valid cognition, the object is not stultified by a subsequent cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a reminiscent impression, the former of these two features being stressed in particular; and this way of looking at *pramāṭva* would be quite in accord with the view that *apramāṭva* is made out extrinsically and *pramāṭva* intrinsically. It may also be noted, with advantage, that, in the Nyāya theory, *anuvyavasāya* (the subject-centred after-cognition) is regarded as self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) in the sense that it reveals itself along with the *vyavasāya* (the object-centred cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not presented); and that, in this respect, the Nyāya realist seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with an aspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incompatible with his realism. In this kind of compromise, a danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily see, and this danger consists in the manner in which the Nyāya view lends itself to *anuvyavasāya* being treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute reality represented by the absolute self-luminous consciousness called *cit*.

An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of *bhrama* known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five *khyātivādas* (theories explaining the nature of *bhrama*). In the *asatkhyāti* doctrine, the negative element is obvious; and in *ātmakhyāti* doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the *anyathākhyāti* view, the negative element is to be found in the *samsarga* part or in the idea that one reality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not; and in the *akhyāti* doctrine, one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of non-discrimination (*avivēka*). The *anirvacanīyakhyāti* doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element for the conception of '*bhrama*'; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by relativity, which implies a negative element and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predication (*nirvacana*) with reference to the object. A careful investigation of the Advaitin's *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, as compared with the other theories of *bhrama*, would lead to the mystery of error being unravelled through the disentanglement of negativity, which is the inner core of *bhrama*. But this would not amount to all the theories of *bhrama* being reduced to the level of *asatkhyāti*; for, it should be remembered that negativity is only the other side of relativity and one aspect of reality. If one might be permitted here to indulge for a while in epigrammatising, one might well say that yes (*sat*) and no (*asat*) are the fulcra of all epistemology as they are of all metaphysics; that yes and no are but phases of the same reality; that all appearances are the off-spring of a cross between yes and no; that it will be evident through the germination of yes and no, that yes is no and no is yes and that error (*bhrama*) is the antechamber of truth (*pramā*).

Maṇḍana's contribution to advaitic ontology and advaitic exegesis and ethics is no less important than his contribution to advaitic epistemology. In the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* of the *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana elucidates the nature of reality as the absolute Brahman and shows that, according to the Upaniṣads, it is the only reality and absolute existence, consciousness and bliss (*sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*) and that as absolute *ānanda*, it constitutes the highest *puruṣārtha*.



## MANDANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO ADVAITA

63

viz , mōkṣa (pp. 4, 5) and incidentally, the negative conception of apavarga, which, according to the Naiyāyikas, consists in the annihilation of all the duḥkhas, is shown to be unsustainable. (p. 16). In the Tarkakāṇḍa of the Brahmasiddhi (pp. 39-44), Maṇḍana maintains by an elaborate process of reasoning, the relative superiority of the advaita texts, as pramāṇa, in relation to perception and other pramāṇas, refutes (pp. 63-70) the doctrine of bhēdābhēda advocated by Kumārila and Bhartṛprapañca, and in a brilliant critique (pp. 44-63) of the concept of difference (bhēda), shows how the reality of this concept cannot be maintained with the help of any of the recognised means of valid knowledge. In the Niyōga-kāṇḍa of the Brahmasiddhi, Maṇḍana exposes fully (pp. 115, 117), the hollowness of the Prābhākara concept of niyōga or kārya, shows how this concept would turn out to be an unmeaning shibboleth unless it is reduced to the form of iṣṭasādhana-tva (contributoriness to a desired end) and explains fully (pp. 74, 75, 151-5), how it would be vain to attempt to bring Brahman-realisation directly within the scope of any kind of injunction (vidhi); and incidentally in this kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana's views about Jīvanmukti (pp. 129-33), the place of karma and Upāsana in the advaitic scheme of mukti and the nature of bhrama (erroneous cognition) are also fully discussed (pp. 136-50). In the fourth kāṇḍa of this work, called the siddhi-kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana winds up his exposition of the Brahman-doctrine, by setting forth his bhāvādvaita interpretation of the negative Upaniṣadic texts (niṣedhavākyaṇi) and by pointing out how even vedantic texts may be linked with purposeful activity<sup>1</sup> (pravṛtti) by taking into account the pravṛtti in the direction of the meditation (upāsana) necessary for transforming the indirect verbal cognition arising from the mahāvākyas into direct Brahman-realisation (Brahma-sākṣātkāra).

Several striking features are noticeable in Maṇḍana's philosophical attitude. He shows a refreshing independence of judgement, but never carries it to the point of a rebel mentality and readily benefits himself by loyalty to reliable and sound authority and tradition whenever he finds it desirable to do so. He is perfectly loyal to Kumārila on the main questions of Mīmāṃsā-exegesis but criticises him in a fearless manner when he has to do so in the interest of advaita-siddhānta of the Upaniṣads. He derives his advaitic inspiration mainly from the pre-Śaṅkara phase of Śābdādvaita and Sattādvaita expounded by Bhartṛhari; but he does not hesitate to discard the view of Bhartṛhari and other Vaiyākaraṇas in regard to the concept of bhāvanā. He refuses to be dazzled by the brilliant glamour of Śaṅkara's exposition in regard to the question of complete renunciation of all kinds of activities (karma) and has the courage to adopt a reasonable compromise with the Mīmāṃsakas by assigning to karma and upāsana their place in his scheme of Brahman-realization. He has also the clarity of vision and sobriety necessary for duly appreciating the soundness of the contention of the Naiyāyikas that Śabda can give rise only to a determinate judgement involving relation and he holds that the direct realization of the absolute unrelated Brahman (nirguṇa-brahmasākṣātkāra) results from

<sup>1</sup> यदि मतम्—प्रत्यक्षादीन्यपि प्रवृत्त्यङ्गान्येव, हानोपादानादिलक्षणायाः प्रवृत्तेस्तन्मूलत्वात्; ईदृश प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वमत्राप्यस्त्येव, शब्दात्मनो ब्रह्मणि साक्षात्करणाय प्रवृत्तेरित्त्वात् ।” (p. 159)



constant contemplation (prasaṅkhyāna) on the knowledge of the truth got from the Upaniṣadic texts. He accepts the sphōṭavāda, without losing himself in the mysticism of śabda-brahman. He recognises (p. 36) the value of Saṁnyāsāśrama but refuses to elevate it above the gṛhasthāśrama (pp. 36-7). He recognises the possibility of jīvanmukti (p. 132) but sees clearly the difficulties in the view which recognizes the possibility of jīvanmuktas reincarnating themselves in many an embodied existence. It would be clear from a perusal of Maṇḍana's works that they constitute a well-rounded scheme of philosophical thought which passes through important stages of accommodation with the Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā systems of thinking, in respect of the nature of śabdajñāna, sphōṭa and pravartanā (as iṣṭasādhanaṭva), and culminates in the Brahmādvaita of the Brahmasiddhi. These compromises came to be viewed by some of Maṇḍana's contemporaries like Surēśvara and by some post-Śaṅkara advaitins like Madhusūdanasarasvatī, as symptomatic of philosophical nervousness. But, having regard to the fact that Maṇḍana expounded his advaita doctrine with all these features of compromise in an age which was dominated by the uncompromising type of advaita preached by Śaṅkara in an overwhelmingly brilliant style, the fairer view would appear to be that Maṇḍana had the courage to refuse to play to the gallery and fearlessly preferred to remain a sweetly reasonable accommodating and electric type of advaitin, not caring for the plaudits which he might have, gained by adopting Śaṅkara's aggressive and uncompromising advaitism. The heritage which Maṇḍana has left in his works has influenced contemporary and later writers in a remarkable manner. The criticisms of the concept of bhēda found in advaitic literature, including the works of Surēśvara,<sup>1</sup> are mostly polemical amplifications of the critique of difference in Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi. Maṇḍana's view that iṣṭasādhanaṭva is vidhyartha is found used even by Surēśvara<sup>2</sup> in criticising the Mīmāṃsā view that all the Vedic texts should be understood to teach directly or indirectly some form of activity. All the distinctive features of what is known as the Vācaspatiprasthāna in the post-Śaṅkara literature are really inherited from Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi. An impartial estimate of Maṇḍana's works would certainly result in a full vindication of the claim which Maṇḍana himself puts forward in the concluding verse of his Brahmasiddhi—in the lines:—

—“ *Sadyaḥ prakṣālayantī ghanamapi jagatām tīrthadustarkapaṅkam*  
 \* \* \* *Brahmasiddhiḥ.*”

<sup>1</sup> Bṛhad. Vārt, pp. 1670 and 1685.

<sup>2</sup> Bṛhad. Vārt, (Sambandhavārtika), verses 632 and 637.



## COMMENTARIES ON BRAHMASIDDHI

65

## SECTION IV

## THE COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMASIDDHI

So far, four commentaries are known to have been written on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*. The earliest of them is the *Tattvasamīkṣā* by Vācaspatiśiśra, written in the former half of the 9th century A.D. It is known only through references,<sup>1</sup> and no manuscript of this commentary has yet been discovered to exist anywhere at the present moment. All that can be said about the *Tattvasamīkṣā* is that it is an extensive and learned work written in the same characteristically rhythmic and stately style that readers of Vācaspati's available works are familiar with. Cīṭ-sukha, who flourished in the beginning of the 13th century, wrote a brief commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*, called *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā* and it is available in manuscript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (R. No. 3853). Ānandapūrṇa alias Vidyāsāgara, wrote, in the latter part of the 16th century, a copious commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*, called *Bhāvaśuddhi*, and this also is available in manuscript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (R. No. 3967). The commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*, now published in this edition as Part II, is by one Śaṅkhaṇḍi, about whom nothing definite is known. The only information available about this commentator from a Malabar tradition is that he was a Nambudiri Brahmin of Malabar. In one of the Manuscripts of Śaṅkhaṇḍi's commentary, which is noticed in Part II (p. 147) of the Adyar Library catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts, the name "*Samīkṣāphakkikā*" is reported to have been given on a fly-leaf and this name is given within brackets in that catalogue. From this name it may be conjectured, that Śaṅkhaṇḍi's commentary closely follows Vācaspatiśiśra's *Tattvasamīkṣā*. The copiousness and lucidity of Śaṅkhaṇḍi's commentary and its close relation to the *Tattvasamīkṣā* are the chief reasons which have determined the inclusion of this commentary in this edition.

---

<sup>1</sup> Bhāmatī, p. 1020, epilogic verse 3.



## VIBHRAMAVIVEKA OF MANDANA MISRA\*

The text of the *Vibhrama-viveka*, by Ācārya-Maṇḍana-miśra, which appeared in Vol. I of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, is based on a single ms. of the work deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The ms. shows lacunae in several places and corrupt readings in several others. However, much of the matter in the *Vibhrama-viveka* is found partly in verse and partly in prose in the *niyogokāṇḍa* of Ācārya-Maṇḍana's great Advaita work—*Brahmasiddhi*. (Vide pp. 136-150 of the third kāṇḍa of the *Brahmasiddhi*, edited by Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri—to be issued shortly from the Government Press, Madras). With the help of this portion of the *Brahmasiddhi* and the other works of Maṇḍana, more especially his *Vidhiviveka*, and with the help of Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*, it has been found possible to suggest additions and emendations for filling up the lacunae and removing the errors. These additions and emendations are enclosed within square brackets and they are the best that the editors could possibly suggest with the available material.

Ācārya-Maṇḍana was a great Mīmāṃsaka and Advaitin. In all probability, he was one of the disciples of Kumārila and was one of the elder contemporaries of Śaṅkara. He was one of the foremost exponents of a pre-Śaṅkara phase of advaita, which exhibited striking doctrinal differences as compared with Śaṅkara's advaita, such as, for instance, the non-recognition of Jīvan-mukti and the insistence on meditation as an indispensable aid to the mahāvākyas leading to Brahman-realisation. The common belief that Maṇḍana is identical with Sureśvara, one of the Sannyāsin disciples of Śaṅkara, is based on some recent confusion introduced in some of the *Śaṅkaravijayas* and is wholly at variance with fact. The reasons which lead to these conclusions are explained at some length in introduction of the edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*, above referred to. In addition to the *Vibhrama-viveka*, Ācārya-Maṇḍana wrote the *Vidhiviveka*, *Bhāvanā-viveka*, *Brahmasiddhi*, *Sphoṭa-siddhi* and *Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣyānukramanikā*. Of these six works, the printing of the *Brahmasiddhi* and *Sphoṭasiddhi* is finished and they will shortly be issued respectively from the Government Press and the Sanskrit department of the Oriental Institute of the Madras University; and the other four works have already been made available in print.

Error or erroneous cognition is the central problem of epistemology and it is the main theme of this work. The four chief theories of *bhrama* (*Khyātivāda*)—*ātma-khyāti*, *asat-khyāti*, *akhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*—are briefly stated and critically reviewed in this work and the Bhāṭṭa theory of *viparītākhyāti*, which is practically the same as the Nyāya theory of *anyathākhyāti* with slight variation, is sought to be maintained. In doing this, Maṇḍana incidentally prepares

---

\* Introduction to the text ed. by Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri and T. V. Ramachandra Dikshitar. Madras Oriental Series No. I. 1932.



the way for the advaita theory of *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. The *akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākaras is fully refuted by an elaborate course of reasoning.

It would be very helpful to students of Indian epistemology to make, in this connection a critical and comparative study of the various theories of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*) propounded by the different schools of Indian philosophy. There are five theories of *bhrama*; viz., the theory of self-apprehension (*ātmakhyāti*), the theory of non-being's apprehension (*asatkhyāti*), the theory of non-apprehension (*akhyāti*), the theory of misapprehension (*anyathākhyāti*), and the theory of indefinable's apprehension (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*). The Yogācāra school of Buddhism, otherwise known as the Vijñānavāda school, explains erroneous cognition as consisting in the 'self', which is identical with consciousness, externalising itself in the form of objects like silver; all determinate cognitions of objects, according to the Yogācāra subjectivists, are erroneous; this theory of *bhrama* is called *ātmakhyātivāda* (theory of self-apprehension). The Nihilistic school of Buddhists, otherwise known as the Mādhyāmaka school, explains *bhrama* as consisting in the cognition of a non-being (*asat*); in the case of the erroneous cognition 'this is silver' which arises where there is no silver, the object of the cognition is a non-being (*asat*); on the strength of experience, even non-being should be taken to admit of being cognised; this theory of *bhrama* is known as *asatkhyātivāda*. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsakas explains all cases of *bhrama* as cases of non-apprehension. They contend that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen, two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the perception of nacre in a general way as this (*idam*) and not as possessing the distinctive feature of nacreness, and the other cognition being the recollection of silver previously cognised elsewhere. The recollection of silver in this case is not identified by the knower as recollection, but is cognised by him merely as cognition, since the object of recollection—viz., silver is thought of merely as silver, stripped of its association with past time and the particular place where it was seen. The Prābhākaras describe such recollection by the phrase *pramuṣṭata-tākasmaraṇa* or 'recollection of an object robbed of its that-ness'. In certain other cases of *bhrama* like 'the conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhah*), the Prābhākara theorist explains that two imperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour being missed and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (*pittadravyapītimā*), the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance being missed. Thus in all cases of *bhrama*, two distinct cognitions—either a perception and a recollection or two perceptions—arise; their distinctions is missed; and the difference between objects comes to be missed for the time being; as a result of such non-discrimination, volitional decision (*pravṛtti* or *yatna*) leading to voluntary activity arises; a voluntary activity with a view to seizing the object of *bhrama*, such as silver, follows; the knower in such case, acting on his knowledge realises through his experience that his activity has become futile, as he finds only nacre on the particular spot and no silver at all; and in those cases, in view of the fact that the volitional decision (*pravṛtti*) of the knower concerned leads to a futile activity, the cognitive antecedent of such a futile *pravṛtti* is technically called *bhrama*. It will be seen that, while the Prābhākaras are prepared to give a place to the term *bhrama* in their vocabulary,



they maintain that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*) and that the so-called cases of the *bhrama* are only undiscriminated jumbles of cognitions whose objects also happen to be undiscriminated for the time being (*jñānayoḥ viśayayośca vivekagrahāt bhramah*). In other words, according to the Prābhākaras, to experience is to experience validly and to err in experience is to experience imperfectly, though validly, the imperfection consisting merely in non-discrimination and not in misapprehension.

The Bhāṭṭas, for all practical purposes, adopt the Nyāya theory of *bhrama*, with this difference—that they describe a *bhrama* as *viparītakhyāti* or contrary experience; that they do not account for *bhrama* through extra-normal sense-relation; and that the relation (*samsarga*) between nacre and silverness (*rajatatva*) or ‘*idam* and *rajatam*’ (‘this’ and ‘silver’), in the case of the misapprehension of nacre as silver, is a non-being (*asat*).

Among the Vedāntins, those of the dualistic school (*dvaitinah*) maintain what they call their own version of *anyathākhyāti* and contend that, in cases of erroneous experience like *śuktirajata-bhrama*, the silver which is presented in *bhrama* is no-being out-and out (*atyantāsat*) within the sphere of nacre, though it is real else-where; and the chief argument in support of this view is that the sublating cognition (*bādhakapratīti*), which arises later takes the form—“There was no silver at all here in the past; it is not here now; and it will never be here in the future” (*nātra rajatam āsīt, asti, bhaviṣyati*), and it totally denies the existence of silver within the sphere of nacre in the past, the present and the future. The Vedāntins of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school adopt the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* with certain modifications and their version of *akhyāti* is known as ‘non-apprehension cum apprehension of reality’ (*akhyātiṣamvalita-satkhyāti*). Śrī Rāmānuja and his followers hold that the object of *bhrama* is always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid cognition at all. In the perception of nacre as silver, it is the silver which is included among the component parts of nacre that is seen. They assume that substances which are similar must have some component parts in common, that silver is made up of parts of nacre and parts of silver and is called silver because the constituent parts represented by silver predominate; that in the constitution of nacre, likewise, the predominating part is represented by nacre and there is a small portion of silver; and that this small portion of silver is, that happens to be seen when nacre is seen as silver. Thus according to the school of Śrī Rāmānuja, a person who errs in cognition really blunders into a subtle truth, which, under normal conditions, is missed or ignored.

A critical student of Indian philosophy would find reason to be dissatisfied with every one of these theories of *bhrama*. The non-existent or non-being (*asat*) is an absolute zero and cannot be presented in any experience, though the Mādhyamikas insist that we are helpless in the matter and have to recognise the possibility of *asat* being presented in experience on the strength of experience itself. The Yogācāra idealist endeavours to improve upon the nothingistic explanation of the Mādhyamikas by saying that consciousness comprises its con-figuration (*sākāram vijñānam*), and in its externalised form, it is presented in itself as its object. But



## VIBHRAMAVIVEKA OF MANDANA MISRA

69

one can easily see that this explanation involves a number of inconsistencies. The Nyāya realist realises that nothing but reality (sat) admits of being presented in experience; he explains that error consists in confounding one reality with another reality and complicates his theory by trying to bring the absent reality within the range of the sense-organ concerned through the extra-normal relation (alaukika-sannikarṣa) represented by some form of cognition itself (jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti). The Bhāṭṭa realists, while adopting the theory of anyathākhyāti, find it necessary to accommodate themselves to the asatkhyāti theory, in holding that the samsarga element in the apprehension of nacre as silver and in such other cases is a non-being (asat). The Prābhākara realist sees the danger of compromise with the asatkhyāti on the one side, and on the other side, sees how the Nyāya theory that one reality is presented as another reality (sadantaram sadantarātmanā gṛhyate) would inevitably reduce itself to a variety of asatkhyāti for the obvious reason that one reality never exists (is asat) in the form of another reality. In order to avoid these difficulties the Prābhākara realist adopts the extreme theory of akhyāti. Though this is the only theory which could be said to be perfectly consistent with realism it is not adequate to account for the volitional decision (pravṛtti) and the further activity that follows a bhrama. As Vācaspati-miśra points out in the Tātparyaṭikā and Bhāmati, (in the akhyātivāda) one could find as much justification in non-identification (abhedagraha), for the two cognitions in cases of bhrama appearing as two cognitive units and consequently for the two objects in such cases appearing as different, as in non-discrimination (bhedagraha), for the two cognitions and their two objects in such cases appearing as one and the same; and as a result, if there should be volitional decision in the direction of activity on the latter ground, there should be volitional decision in the opposite direction of abstention on the former ground and the knower should hang between pravṛtti and nivṛtti. These difficulties, the Advaitins endeavour to meet by propounding the theory of anirvacanīya-khyāti and explaining bhrama as experience of a relatively real object, which is neither absolute being (sat), nor absolute non-being (asat), nor both. According to the advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, for instance, what happens is this:—over the real substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) represented by a nacre, or more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (śuktyavacchinnacaitanya), the beginningless positive mist of nescience (anādivāvarūpajñāna) happens to be thrown; when the sense of sight comes into relation with nacre in a general way, the mist is partly dispelled by the cognitive modification of antaḥ-karaṇa which takes the form 'this' (idamākāravṛtti); the mist of nescience, however, continues to veil the nacreeness of what is seen as this (idam), and reinforced by the prepossessions of the knower's mind and by the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, undergoes transformation, with the result that silver comes into being also with the cognition of silver, which is but a cognitive modification of nescience (śuktyavacchinnacaitanyā-dhiṣṭhitāvidyā rajatarūpeṇa rajatākāra-vṛttirūpeṇa ca pariṇamate); silver which thus comes into being has relative reality; it is said to be anirvacanīya in the sense that it does not admit of being definitely described as set (being), or asat (non-being) or both: and it is also said to be prātibhāsika in the sense that it is coterminous with its presentation in cognition. It will thus be seen that the Advaitin's theory of bhrama regards it as a cognitive complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of them being a vṛtti of antaḥkaraṇa and the



other being a *vṛtti* of *avidyā*. According to this theory, the object of a *bhrama* is real in a relative sense and comes into being along with the *bhrama* and lasts as long as the *bhrama* lasts; and there is no need for accommodation to *asatkhyāti* or for any complication in the form of extra-normal (*alaukika*) sense-relation. That the Advaitins have no particular animus against the advocates of *anyathākhyātivāda* is evident from the way in which they are readily willing to accept the explanation of *anyathākhyāti* in the case of what is known as *sopādhikabhrama*, where the object of *bhrama* happens to be within the normal scope of the sense-organ, as, for instance, in the erroneous perception of a crystal (*sphaṭika*) as red-coloured when a *japā* (China rose) is seen to be in its vicinity. Such students of Indian philosophy as are capable of critically reviewing the five 'theories' of *bhrama* (*khyātivāda*) set forth here would not find it difficult to conceive of an appropriate graph by means of which the epistemological interrelation of these theories may be exhibited and comprehended. If one could imagine that epistemological thought starts with *asatkhyāti* as centre and, in its endeavour to escape from it, swings forcibly between the two diametrical termini of *anyathākhyāti* and *akhyāti*, it would not be difficult to imagine that such thought inevitably describes a comprehensive epistemological circle in the forms of *anirvacaniyakhyāti*, which easily accommodates itself to *akhyāti* in respect of the non-discrimination of the two *vṛttis* constituting a *bhrama* and to *anyathākhyāti* by complete surrender in the case of *sopādhikabhrama*.

It would be quite appropriate to consider here the various views regarding the way in which the validity and invalidity of a cognition, or truth and error, or *prāmāṇya* and *apramāṇya* have to be accounted for and ascertained. The Naiyāyikas hold that validity and invalidity of cognitions are made out through extrinsic considerations and are brought about by extrinsic circumstances. In other words, according to the Naiyāyikas, validity and invalidity cannot be said to be intrinsically made out (*svatogrāhya*) or intrinsically brought about (*svatojanya*). Intrinsicity (*svatastva*) in respect of the knowledge of reality consists in reality being made out by every means by which the cognition having it is ascertained but not ascertained to be invalid. This definition of *svatogrāhyatva* is expressed thus in the technical language of Nyāya:—"prāmāṇyasya jñaptau svatastvam tadapramāṇya-agrāhakayāvajjñānagrāhaka-sāmagrigrāhyatvam." Whenever a person knows that he cognises and does not know for the moment that he errs, he also knows that he validly cognises:—this is the contention of the advocates of *svatogrāhyatva* or the theory that validity is intrinsically made out. Thus, if a person could become aware of the existence of a cognition in him in a hundred ways without becoming aware that that cognition is erroneous and if in any one of those cases he becomes aware of the cognition only without becoming aware of its validity, the definition of *svatogrāhyatva* would not hold good and the view that validity is made out extrinsically (*paratogrāhya*) has inevitably to be accepted. The Naiyāyikas explain their position thus in regard to this question. A determinate cognition like "this is silver" (*idam rajatam*) is called *vyavasāya* and it is presented first in the *anuvyavasāya* (after-cognition or consciousness of a cognition) which takes a form like this—"I cognise this silver" (*idam rajatam jñāmi*), and in this *anuvyavasāya*, the validity of the cognition referred to is not presented. If such *anuvyavasāya*, were to invariably takes cognisance of the validity of such *vyavasāya*, it would not be possible to account for the



doubt which an inexperienced person feels regarding the validity of such *vyavasāya*. So, in such cases, the validity of the *vyavasāya* "this is silver" should be ascertained through the practical result to which it leads. If the voluntary decision and activity following such *vyavasāya* should turn out to be fruitful and if the knower should actually find himself in a position to get the silver which he wanted, such *vyavasāya* (cognition) is recognised to be valid. The process of inference through which one's mind may pass in such cases is usually put in this form: "This cognition is valid, because it leads to a fruitful effort; any cognition that leads to a fruitful effort is valid, as another valid cognition already realised to be such in experience. (*Idam jñānam pramā; saphalapravṛttijanakatvāt; yadyat saphalapravṛttijanakam tat jñānam pramā; yathā pramāntaram*). It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that causing fruitful effort is, according to Nyāya, the ground of inferring validity, while validity itself consists in the cognition in question cognising a thing as possessing an attribute which it really has. In that the Naiyāyika makes the ascertainment of the truth of a cognition dependent upon its agreement with its expected workings or, in other words, with the consequences which are expected to arise from it in the experience of the active subject, their view would appear to be closely similar to that of the modern pragmatist. However, they do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is only a method of ascertaining truth, that this method itself presupposes truth whose nature has to be explained independently of agreement with practical workings and that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmatic argument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically through inference, the fault of regressus ad infinitum would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such difficulties, the Naiyāyikas define truth as consisting in correspondence with reality and thus combine their pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in common with what is known as the correspondence notion of truth in Western philosophical literature. The Nyāya definition of validity (*pramātva*) makes it clear that truth consists in correspondence with reality. The Naiyāyikas also point out that only in cases where a cognition leads to effort in practical experience or it happens to be *pravartaka*, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to ensure unfaltering effort (*niṣkampapravṛtti*); and that, on the first occasion of halting effort (*sakampapravṛtti*), it is not necessary that the cognition leading to such effort should have been definitely made out to be valid and it would do if such cognition should not have been definitely ascertained to be invalid. It can be easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear of *anavasthā* (endless regression) or *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring truth as employed by the Naiyāyikas. In respect of the question how validity and invalidity are brought about, the Nyāya theory is that they are brought about by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake of convenience, are called *guṇas* (good features) and *doṣas* (defects); in other words the Nyāya theorists maintain *paratastva* (extrinsicality) in respect of the *utpatti* (production) of validity and invalidity of a cognition as well as in respect of their *jñapati* (knowledge). For instance the validity of a perception is secured by the good feature (*guṇa*) consisting in the adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ concerned and its object; and its invalidity is the result of defects such as distance and some disease affecting the sense-organ.



It would be interesting to make here a comparative study of the epistemological theories put forward by other schools of Indian philosophy about the way in which truth and error are made out. The Sāṃkhya maintain that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made out in the sense that it is by virtue of the reflection or proximity of the same cit (self-luminous consciousness), that the existence of a cognitive *vṛtti* and its validity or invalidity are illuminated. Prābhākara make no difference between *vyavasāya* and *anuvyavasāya* and maintain that, in every cognition, the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity, are presented. They advocate the theory of intrinsic validity (*svatastvapakṣa*), in so far as validity (*pramāṇa*) is concerned; and there is no question of error (*apramāṇa*) in their theory, since they maintain that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*). The Bhāṭṭas contend that cognition is to be inferred through its effect, called *jñātātā* or *prākāṣa*, which consists in what some of them describe as a temporary luminosity (*prakāśa*) arising in known objects and referred to in propositions like 'this is known' (*ayam jñātaḥ*); and that, in such inference, the cognition which has caused *jñātātā*, and its validity are presented. The validity which is thus intrinsically made out may be stultified by a subsequent subverting cognition; and thus, in the Bhāṭṭa theory, invalidity (*apramāṇa*) is extrinsically made out. The Bhāṭṭas are, therefore, to be taken to advocate *svatastva* in the case of validity and *paratastva* in the case of invalidity. Murāriśāstra, who does not go the whole hog either as Prābhākara or as Bhāṭṭa, but who is undoubtedly a Mīmāṃsaka, recognises, like a Naiyāyika, that a cognition (*vyavasāya*) is cognised by its after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) but maintains, unlike a Naiyāyika, that the validity of *vyavasāya* is also presented in the same *anuvyavasāya*. It will thus be seen that Murāriśāstra is an advocate of the theory of the intrinsic validity (*pramāṇam svato gṛhyate*). The Buddhists, on the other hand, hold that all determinate knowledge (*saṃkalpaka*), in so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous (*apramā*) and its *apramāṇa* is intrinsically made out; while, through inference, the validity (*pramāṇa*) of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka*) is extrinsically made out. The Buddhists thus advocate the theory of extrinsic validity (*paratastvapakṣa*) in regard to validity and intrinsic validity (*svatastvapakṣa*) in regard to invalidity. According to the Advaitins, the validity of a cognition is intrinsically made out in the sense that the witnessing inner spirit (*sākṣīcaitanya*), which illuminates the valid cognitive *vṛtti*, also illuminates its validity (*pramāṇa*); and the invalidity (*apramāṇa*) of a cognitive *vṛtti* is inferred extrinsically, through the resultant effort becoming futile.

In order to evaluate adequately the different theories of *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* set forth here, it is necessary to note that the Naiyāyikas would answer in the affirmative, the question—'Is error possible in realism?' and would explain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive (*viśeṣya*) and a real attribute (*prakāra*) may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and thus save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error. The Prābhākara realists think that any concession of the possibility of error (*bhrama*) would spell the ruin of realism and insist that all experiences are valid (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*) and that the so-called *bhrama* involves an element of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). The Bhāṭṭa realists adopt the *anyathākhyāti* of Nyāya with suitable modifications; and in order to effectively preserve realism, they would make the knowledge of cognition



(jñāna) dependent upon the knownness (jñātātā) of the object (jñeya) and thus provide an effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to merge all jñeya in jñāna. The Buddhist idealist rules out truth and considers all determinate knowledge (savikalpaka) erroneous. The advocates of the theory of intrinsic validity (prāmānyasvatastva-vādinah), more especially of Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins, would generally emphasise the ideas that, in a valid cognition, the object is not stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a reminiscent impression, the former of these two features being stressed in particular; and this way of looking at pramāṭva would be quite in accord with the view that apramāṭva is made out extrinsically and pramāṭva intrinsically. It may also be noted, with advantage, that, in the Nyāya theory, anuvyavasāya (the subject-centred after-cognition) is regarded as self-luminous (svaprakāśa) in the sense that it reveals itself along with the vyavasāya (the object-centred-cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not presented); and that, in this respect the Nyāya realist seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with an aspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incompatible with his realism. In this kind of compromise, a danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily see, and this danger consists in the manner in which the Nyāya view lends itself to anuvyavasāya being treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute reality represented by the absolute self-luminous consciousness called cit.

An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of bhrama known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five khyātivādas (theories explaining the nature of bhrama). In the asatkhyāti doctrine, the negative element is obvious; and in ātmakhyāti doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the anyathākhyāti view, the negative element is to be found in the samsarga part or in the idea that one reality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not; and in the akhyāti doctrine, one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of non-discrimination (aviveka). The anirvacanīyakhyāti doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element from the conception of bhrama; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by relativity which implies a negative element and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predications (nirvacana) with reference to the object. A careful investigation of the Advaitin's anirvacanīyakhyāti, as compared with the other theories of bhrama, would lead to the mystery of error being unravelled through the disentanglement of negativity, which is the inner core of bhrama. But this would not amount to all the theories of bhrama being reduced to the level of asatkhyāti; for, it should be remembered that negativity is only the other side of relativity and an aspect of reality. If one might be permitted here to indulge for a while in epigrammatising, one might well say that 'yes' (sat) and 'no' (asat) are the fulcrums of all epistemology as they are of all metaphysics; that 'yes' and 'no' are but phases of the same reality; that all appearances are the offspring of a cross between 'yes' and 'no'; that it will be evident through the germination of 'yes' and 'no', that 'yes' is 'no' and 'no' is 'yes'; and that error (bhrama) is the antechamber of truth (pramā).

<sup>1</sup> The history of Bhrama-theories has been dealt with by Prof. Sastri in his *Int. to Brahmasiddhi* also.—Ed.



# COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT<sup>1</sup>

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DAYS  
OF BRAMANANDA SARASVATI

(I)

I am thankful to the Syndicate of the Madras University for the honour they have done me by inviting me to deliver this year<sup>1</sup>, the lectures instituted in commemoration of Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao. I have undertaken to lecture to you on compromises in the development of advaitic thought. There will be two lectures. In the first lecture, to-night, I propose to speak chiefly about certain typical cases of accommodation, which are worthy of notice in the course of the development of Advaitic thought during the Vedic age and the early post-Vedic age. The second lecture, which will be delivered to-morrow, will comprise two parts, the former of which will deal with the noteworthy instances of compromise during the later post-Vedic age, and the latter will suggest the lines on which all these cases of compromise may be evaluated.

*Accommodation*, economy, management, conformity or *compromise*—these terms stand for a pacific, conciliatory, synthesising attitude of mind, tending to differences being minimised and settled through adjustment of principles and views. As stated by John Morley,<sup>2</sup> “the one commanding law is that men should cling to truth and right, if the very heavens fall. In principle, this is universally accepted. To the partisans of authority and tradition it is as much a commonplace as to the partisans of the most absolute and unflinching rationalism. Yet in practice all schools alike are forced to admit the necessity of a measure of accommodation in the very interests of truth itself.” All the results of the working of the spirit of accommodation or compromise in the interests of truth would come under the category of what may be called *legitimate compromise*. Many other kinds of accommodation, resting mainly on the “paramount wisdom of counting the narrow, immediate, and personal expediency” and making chiefly for individual gain in the shape of immediate material benefit or emotional gratification are of the sordid type of what may be called *illegitimate compromise*.

It would be of great interest and value to study the various results of accommodation in the development of Advaitic thought through the different ages of intellectual life, which, for the sake of convenience, may be described as the *early Vedic period*, the *later Vedic period*, mainly the age of the *Upanishads*, the *pre-Samkara stage* in the post-Vedic age, including the epic and puranic ages, the age of *Samkara*, the *early post-Samkara period*, down to the end of the eleventh century A.D., and the *later post-Samkara period*, from Sri Harsa (twelfth century A.D.) down to Brahmananda Sarasvati (circa eighteenth century A.D.). In this kind of study, the demands of historical criticism would require some attention being paid to the more prominent types, at least, of accommodative or compromising suppression of advaita and secession from it.

*The early Vedic period.*—During this period, the progress of philosophical thinking along the groove of Advaitic thought may be taken to have reached its culminating point in the *monistic absolute* boldly intuited by some Rgvedic seers in the well-known verses :— “Reality is the One, whom the wise call by many names, Agni, Yama, and Matarisvan.”

<sup>1</sup> 1940. Later published by the Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> Morley : “On Compromise,” pp. 3-5, Eversley edn.



## COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

75

“एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति  
अग्निं यम मातरिश्वानमाहुः ।” (I-164-46)

“That one breathed, windless, by its own power”.

“आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्” (X-129-2)

To attempt to read into these old verses of the Rgveda the Advaitic theory in its finished form, with the concept of the One Absolute Existent as the real *substratum* (Adhithana) of the whole phenomenal world of names and forms (*namarupatmaka-prapanca*) and of *Maya*, as the incomprehensible matrix of the world, would become easily, liable to the charge of anachronism. However, with a little stretch of imagination, one might find in the two hymns—R.V. I, 164 and X. 129—read together, an unmistakable foreshadowing of vacillation, unintentional or otherwise, in the process of thinking—that kind of vacillation which generally precedes *accommodations* emerging from conflicts of mutually impingent factors—such as the *One*, to which thinking inherently tends and the *many* which thinking inherently shuns. “Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness ; indistinguishable, this all was water. That, which, coming into being, was covered with the void, that One arose through the power of heat.” X. 129-3.

तम आसीत्तमसा गूहळमग्रेऽ-  
प्रकेतं सलिलं सर्वमा इदम् ।  
तुच्छयेनाश्वपिहितं यदासीत्  
तपसस्तन्महिनाजायतैकम् ॥ X-129-3.

Pursuing this line of thought, it would be scarcely difficult to realise the accommodative significance of the expression “*call variously*” (*bahudha vadanti*) in the former verse from the first Mandala, while it would be certainly difficult to miss the compromise sought to be effectuated between the original *One* and the originated *many* through *tamas* (darkness) and *tucchya* (non-existent or void)—two concepts leading themselves to equation, as Sayana points out, with the positive entity of *nescience* which is neither existent nor non-existent and described in later Advaitic works as *sadasadvilakshana-bhavarupajnana*.

That the spirit of compromise was perhaps the dominating feature of all types of religious and philosophical thinking in the Rgvedic age is not at all difficult to maintain. In fact, this would be a very reasonable thesis to put forward, seeing how, as Prof. Max Muller pointed out, the accommodative vacillation in the religion of the Rgveda was constantly manifesting itself in the *henothistic* exaltations of different deities, in the course of progress towards *monotheism*, *pantheism* and *monism*, and considering how the Rgvedasamhita strikes a highly significant note in the concluding hymn, in the verse, “*Samgacchadhvam, samvadadhvam, sam vo manamsi janatam*”, “Meet together, talk together (in an accommodative spirit, so as to give and take, to live and let live) and may your mind apprehend (the truth) alike.” It is noteworthy that the central concept of *samvada* in this verse, as opposed to *vivada*, comprises the spirit of compromise, as one of its essential components, and perhaps, in this way, by encouraging an ever-increasing stress on *samvada sampratipatti*, *parasparabhavana*—mutual adjustment, mutual regard and mutual concession, in the sphere of thinking, speaking and doing (*manas, vak, kaya*):—thus, perhaps, it is that, all through the ages, the cultural life of India has been growing, with its distinctive features of *absorption*, *tolerance*, *synthesis* and *accommodation*. We may be forcefully reminded at this stage of what Manu—one of our oldest lawgivers—has said about the accommodation of *satya* with *priya*—of what is *true* with what is *agreeable, beautiful and good*.



सत्यं ब्रूयात् प्रियं ब्रूयात् सत्यमप्रियम् ।  
प्रियं च नानृतं ब्रूयादेष धर्मः सनातनः ॥

Manusmṛti IV, 138.

This great maxim deserves to be amplified fully in a discourse on compromise ; and such amplifications, as are relevant, are reserved for the latter part of the second lecture in connection with the evaluation of the different kinds of compromise adverted to.

*Later Vedic period—The age of the Upanisads.* Some alien scholars, well-intentioned and known for their thoroughness, have attempted to study the Upanisads and find out their dominating theme, without giving due weight to the traditions of Indian thought, which form the background of the Upanisads. The results of this kind of study, even in the case of the earlier group of Upanisads constituting the basic Śrutis on which the whole structure of the Vedānta-darsana rests, such as the Brhadaranyaka and the Chandogya, are found embodied in two propositions :—that the fundamental part of the Upanisads is all thaumatourgy, and that all the Vedantic Upanisads, in the form in which they are available to us, are illogical strings of *disjecta membra*, belonging to different types of thought and different stages of development and any effort to find unity of thought in any of the Vedantic Upanisads or to discover their dominating theme would be merely ploughing the sands. These two propositions have not found any encouragement at the hands of Indian scholars and have been viewed with strong disfavour, particularly by those scholars, Indian as well as foreign, who have carefully studied the Vedantic Upanisads, in the light of such aspects of the cultural traditions of India as deserve due consideration in the interpretation of ancient Indian texts. The best and the most thorough going exposition of the philosophy of the Upanisads, with special reference to the original texts and the traditional culture of India, that has so far been undertaken and successfully completed by any foreign scholar is what Dr. Deussen has given to the world in his treatise on the philosophy of the Upanisads. Many Indian scholars who are sufficiently familiar with Dr. Deussen's works would readily acclaim Dr. Deussen as one of the greatest Sankarites of the modern world, who happens to be clothed in Kantian garb by the accident of birth. With a remarkably high degree of perspicacity, Dr. Deussen rightly lays hold of the principle of accommodation, which has been freely and frequently used by later vedantist teachers in explaining many a clash or hitch in the process of vedantic thinking and points out that "the idea of accommodation becomes a key which is fitted to unlock the secrets not only of the doctrinal developments of the Upanisads, but of many analogous phenomena in Western philosophy."\* An important limitation of this accommodation theory is, as Dr. Deussen points out, that the accommodative adjustments may have been unintentional in many cases ; and in many others, as an attempt at a fair evaluation of them will reveal, it must be remembered that they are believed to be necessary and legitimate, though intentional.

A few typical instances of accommodative adjustments in the Upanisads may now be considered. Upanisadic thought uses two brief mystical formulas—"Amṛtam satyaena channam" (Brh. I, vi, 3)—"the immortal (Brahman) veiled by the (empirical) reality ;" and "Satyasya satyam" (Brh. II, vii, 6)—"the reality of reality". Such formulas are frequently employed by Yajñavalkya and many other Upanisadic teachers. In such formulas, the working of the accommodative spirit is plainly discernible in applying the term *satya* (reality) to the empirical world of plurality revealed by experiential knowledge as contrasted with the "reality of reality" (*Satyasya satyam*), while, in fact, *Brahman* or *Atman* is the only reality. In accommodative formulas of this type, one may easily find the source of the compromise adopted by later Vedantists in all their explanations in which they draw a distinction between phenomenal or empirical reality (*vyavaharika-satta*) and absolute reality (*paramarthika-satta*).

\* See page ix of the author's preface—English translation of Deussen's work—"The Philosophy of the Upanisads".



## COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

77

The earliest Upanisads, the Brhadaranyaka and the Chandogya, describe Brahman as the *One*, *incomprehensible*, *absolute reality*, and the later Upanisads amplify this description in poetic style by means of paradoxes suggesting a negation of all empirical attributes. The Brhadaranyaka text—“*Athata adeso neti neti*” (II, iii, 6) directly conveys the incomprehensibility of Brahman. Nevertheless, all the Upanisads are very particular about equating Brahman with *Being* (*sat*), *Consciousness* (*cit*) and *Bliss* (*ananda*). The Brhadaranyaka text “*Vijnanam anandam Brahma* (Brh. III, ix, 28) and the Taittiriya text “*Satyam jnanam anantam*” in Taittiriya, II. 1) are too well known to need any special amplification. In these two texts, one can easily find the source of the later formula—*Saccidanandapuram Brahma*, so often repeated in later texts as well as popular parlance that it has become a common practice in Hindu society to use it (*saccidananda*) as a proper name. The Upanisads are all emphatic about the incomprehensibility of Brahman; however, the process of thought and exposition adopted by great Upanisadic teachers like Yajnavalkya is often constrained to use positive terms like *sat*, *cit* and *ananda* and thereby accommodate itself to the inveterate habit of thinking in positive terms, which the human mind has formed. In considering the accommodative process involved in the idea behind the formula—*saccidananda*, a shrewd philosophical critic may also pause, by the way, to admire the farsightedness of Upanisadic philosophers in equating Brahman not merely with *cit* but with *sat* and *ananda*. In this connection, Dr. Deussen regretfully remarks “that the philosophising spirit of mankind in India, Greece and modern times has, with remarkable unanimity, fallen into an error, which we can most briefly describe by the word *intellectualism*”<sup>1</sup>.

This criticism overlooks the fact that *sat* in the Upanisadic thought, as Dr. Deussen himself has repeatedly pointed out, comprehends the whole province of reality, the outer world as well as the inner nature of man. If the advaitic Absolute were equated with consciousness (*cit*) alone, the Advaita doctrine would have easily come within the ambit of the charge of cold intellectualism. But Yajnavalkya and other Upanisadic philosophers describe *cit* as “*the light of light*, (*jyotisam jyotih*: Gita, xiii, 17), *svayam jyotih purusah*, (Br. up. iv. iii. 9), and the concept of *cit* in the *saccidananda* equation stands hemmed in between the existential and emotional aspects of reality (*sat* and *ananda*) and thus merged in the highest peak of advaitic synthesis, *viz.*, *saccidananda-rupa-brahman*.

Every careful student of the chief vedantic Upanisads is apt to be strongly impressed with the type of accommodation which has found a sufficiently prominent place for the pantheistic mode of thinking in the Upanisadic thought “without abandoning the fundamental idealistic principle, by conceding the reality of the manifold universe, but at the same time maintaining that this manifold universe is in reality Brahman (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*—Chand. III, xiv. 1). Here, idealism accommodates itself to the realistic view of the world and presents itself as *pantheism*.<sup>2</sup> It would be interesting to note how the empirical category of causality is introduced to remove the obscurity felt in the nature of the relation of *identity* between *Atman* and *Universe*, how in a later stage, represented by the *Svetasvatara* and *Mahanarayana*, the supreme and individual souls appear in marked contrast with each other, and theism emerges in a *definite* form and accommodated itself to the earlier types of thought—*advaitic* idealism and pantheism.

The original form of the doctrine of emancipation (*mukti*), as it appeared in the earliest Upanisads, is that the intuitive knowledge of *Atman* is itself emancipation. Strictly speaking, in its original form, *mukti* in the advaitic sense is only *Jivanmukti* and it is not a becoming something. The Katha text—*vimuktasca vimucyate* (V. 1) throws a flood of light on the manner in which the later contrast between *mukti* before the cessation of corporeal existence (*Jivanmukti*) and final deliverance after the

<sup>1</sup> See p. 132, “*The Philosophy of the Upanisads* by Deussen—English translation.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Deussen’s *Philosophy of the Upanisads*, 153—162, 335—361, 398—405.



cessation of corporeal existence (*videhamukti*), arose and grew from the Upanisadic accommodation of the advaitic truth of *Atman* being eternally *mukta* to the empirical way of fancying *Atman* as becoming a *mukta*; and this kind of compromise with empirical modes of thinking led to the formation of eschatological theories, like the theory of the way of the gods (*deva-yana*), on which the *muktas* were led after death through a series of attractive intermediate stages to union with Brahman.

In the *early post-Vedic stage, the epic and puranic ages* evolved numerous interesting compromises in the sphere of religion and philosophy. The greatest monument of the spirit of accommodation and compromise, viewed as one of the most potent of the factors contributing to the conservation, continuity and growth of Hinduism, is the *Bhagavad-gita*. The *Gita* is called a Yoga-sastra chiefly because its preponderant note is a synthesis of all the ways of spiritual life, with their shifting emphasis laid alternately on true insight (*jnana*), genuine devotion (*bhakti*) and dedicated service (*karma*), through all legitimate types of compromise. If the workings of the spirit of accommodation in the sphere of the religion of the Rgveda could be summed up in the novel term '*Henotheism*' brought into vogue by Professor Max Muller, similar accommodative processes may be described by the term '*Henopatism*',<sup>1</sup> signifying an accommodative synthesis of diverse ways of living leading to the final goal. The most telling type of compromise, which the *Gita* teaches between the highest type of *jnana* and the numerous kinds of *karma* which a person has to do is found incorporated in verses 11 to 26 in Chapter III. Three striking ideas, which may be of great value, or principles underlying certain important, useful and legitimate types of compromise, emerge from these verses :—the need for giving and taking (*paraspara-bhavana*); adherence to the established ways of the world with a view to its orderly maintenance and healthy advancement (*loka-samgraha*); avoidance of a revolutionary unsettlement of the minds of the ignorant and lifting them up by setting a healthy and feasible example in one's own conduct.

देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।

परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥ 3-11

"With this shall ye cherish the gods, and the gods shall cherish you. Thus cherishing one another ye will obtain the highest good."

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः ।

लोकसंग्रहमेवापि संपश्यन्कर्तुमर्हसि ॥ 3-20

"It is by works alone that men like Janaka became blest; and works thou shouldst also do with a view to maintaining the world."

यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः ।

स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते ॥ 3-21

"Whatever a great man does, the same is done by others as well. He sets up a standard and it is followed by the world."

सक्ताः कर्मण्यविद्वांसो यथा कुर्वन्ति भारत ।

कुर्याद्विद्वांस्तथासक्तश्चिकीर्षुर्लोकसंग्रहम् ॥ 3-25

<sup>1</sup> Heis (hen) Gk. = One; Patos. = Gk. = (Cf. Path, Panthah,—Skt.) = Bridge.



## COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

79

“As ignorant men act from attachment to their work, O Bharata, so too should an enlightened man act, but without any attachment, so that he may maintain the order of the world.”

न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्मसङ्गिनाम् ।

जोषयेत्सर्वकर्माणि विद्वान्युक्तः समाचरन् ॥ 3-26

“Let no enlightened man unsettle the minds of the ignorant, who are attached to their work. Himself doing all works, with faith, he should make others do so as well.”

In these verses, a careful thinker cannot miss the excellent accommodative device, which Sri Bhagavan Kṛṣṇa has furnished in the shape of “selfless work in a spirit of dedication”, whenever one’s mind happens to be agitated over the collision between the ideal of right conduct and the *trans-moral*, *advaitic* ideal of self-realisation (*atma-jnana*), as taught in the Hindu scriptures.

The *Srimad-bhagavata* is the greatest monument of compromise, typifying the developments distinctive of the later stages of the Puranic age. In this Purana, there is a clear elevation of the ideal of *bhakti-yoga* and an equally clear endeavour to adjust it to the Advaita ideal of *jnana* and the Advaita doctrine of identity between *Brahman* and *jiva* (God and man). Attention is solicited in this connection to these two verses extracted from the *Srimad-bhagavata*.

“या निर्वृतिस्तनुभृतां तव पादपद्म-

ध्यानाद्भवज्जनकथाश्रवणेन वा स्यात् ।

सा ब्रह्मणि स्वमहिमन्यपि नाथ मा भूत्

किं त्वन्तकासि लुलितात्पततां विमानात् ॥

(श्रीभागवते ध्रुवस्तुतौ ।)

IV. ix. 11

In the former of the two extracts, devotion to Kṛṣṇa is exalted above the realisation of the *advaitic Brahman*. In the latter, the *advaitic* theory of *jiva* being the reflection (*pratibimba*) of *Isvara* (viewed as *bimba*) is used in explaining the idea that a worshipper is really worshipping himself by worshipping God.

नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो

मानं जनादविदुषः करुणो वृणीते ।

यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधीत मानं

तच्चात्मने प्रतिमुखस्य यथा मुखश्रीः ॥

(श्रीभागवते प्रह्लादस्तुतौ)

VII. ix. 10

(II)

The former part of this lecture will be devoted to a brief account of the compromises which are associated with the names of Badarayana, Jaimini, Bhartṛprapanca, Brahmadatta, Kumarila, Prabhakara, Gaudapada and Mandanamisra, representing the pre-Samkara stage in the development of Advaita during the later post-Vedic period; those which are advocated by Samkara, Padmapada, Vacaspati, Udayana, Vimuktatman, Sarvajnatman, Anandabodha and Sri Harsa; those which are found incorporated in the systems of Ramanuja and Madhva; and lastly, those compromises



which are found advocated by Vijnanabhikṣu, Appayyadikṣita, Madhusudana-sarasvatī and Brahmanandasarasvatī. The latter part of this lecture will endeavour to give a brief estimate of these compromises.

**BADARAYANA AND JAIMINI.**—Badarayana and Jaimini are the earliest systematic and authoritative exponents of the principles of exegesis, as applicable to the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* and the *Karma-kāṇḍa* of the Veda. According to some later Advaitins like Suresvara (see *Naiskarmyasiddhi*, p. 52), Badarayana and Jaimini were both of them Brahma-vādins and old Advaitins. They provided Indian exegesis with highly elastic principles of interpretation which were all developed round the pivotal principle of thought-unity or sentence-unity—the *samanvaya* of the *Brahmasūtras* and the *eka-vākyata* of the *Karma-mīmāṃsa-sūtras*; and they were perhaps satisfied that the accommodative processes resulting from a wide use of the principles of *samanvaya* and *eka-vākyata* by competent thinkers would eventually lead to the establishment of the Advaita doctrine, together with all the admissible ways of compromise. Badarayana and Jaimini themselves would appear to have exercised a wise reticence in respect of their own philosophical convictions. Perhaps they believed that philosophical thinking and the quest for truth would gain immensely by their Sūtras being so composed as to admit of use by several *bhāṣyakaras* in support of Advaita, Viśiṣṭadvaita and Dvaita.

**PRAPANCA-PRAVILAYA-VĀDA.**—A careful examination of the Upanisads would reveal that many a gentle and acceptable device came to be adopted as transitional adaptations for facilitating the shifting of stress in thought and conduct from the ritualism of the Brahmanas to the Upanisadic doctrine of self-realisation. One of those devices is the association of a suitable meditative process with some appropriate *karma* or *karmāṅga*, so that the karma itself may be gradually replaced by a suitable mental process—*dhyāna* or *jñāna*.

There are references in the works of Samkara<sup>1</sup>, Suresvara and later writers, which show that in the pre-Samkara stage, groups of philosophers called *prapañcapravilaya-vādinah* and *kāma-pradhvaṃsa-vādinah* arose.<sup>2</sup> Their method is a somewhat forced accommodation between the ritualistic sections of the Veda known as *karma-kāṇḍa* and the Upanisads forming the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. They sought to subordinate the whole ritualistic scheme to *jñāna*, by putting forward the negative view that every injunction or prohibition in the *karma-kāṇḍa* is intended to keep a person engaged in a particular act so that he might eliminate the rest and avoid yielding to impulses of various kinds and sublimate his self gradually and realise its true nature as transcending the world (*nīṣprapañca*). This view called *prapañca-pravilaya-vāda* is found set forth and criticised by Samkara and post-Samkara Vedantins, and it is specifically ascribed to an old school of Advaitins, *Jarāṇmayavādinah*, as Sudarsanabhāṭṭa describes them.<sup>3</sup> The whole spirit of the *prapañca-pravilaya-vāda* may be embodied in a telling epigram like this :—

“*Ay is otherwise nay, to get at is to forego, to do is to forbear, and to enjoy is to cloy.*”

Numerous accommodative processes of the nature of *adhyarōpa* (supposititious make-shift) and *apavāda* (eventual elimination of make-shifts by outgrowing them) were advocated in the Upanisads in teaching Advaita and came to be crystallised in post-Upanisadic Advaita in the oft-quoted dictum—

अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चयते ।

<sup>1</sup> E. g. Samkara on *Vedānta Sūtra*, III, ii, 21.

<sup>2</sup> See P. of. M. Hiriyanna, J.O.R., Madras, Vol. I, pp. 109—116.

<sup>3</sup> *Srutaprasaṅga* on I. i. 4.



## COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

81

Though it may be quite legitimate to attempt to familiarise thought with the acosmic (*nisprapanca*) aspect of Brahman, by a series of unobjectionable *adhyaropas*, the accommodation in the *prapanca-pravilaya* theory did not find favour with the majority of Vedantins, chiefly on account of the obvious risk of a moral bankruptcy or chaos, which could be justly apprehended as a very probable consequence of the practical applications of that theory in life.

BHATTA KUMARILA, the leading exponent of the Bhatta school, and PRABHAKARA, with whose name the Prabhakara school is prominently associated, were both of them well-disposed to the Advaita doctrine and give indications of their preference for that doctrine, in their works—the *Slokavarttika*, the *Tantravarttika* and the *Brhati*. Prabhakara's observations, in the concluding part of the *atma-vada* in his *Brhati*, are very significant in this connection. It is clear that Prabhakara believes in the soundness of the advaitic theory of *adhyasa* and also in the soundness of the admonition conveyed in the Gita text "*Na buddhibhedam janayed ajnanam karmasanginam*".

यदुक्तम्—“अहंकारममकारावनात्मन्यात्माभिमानो” इति मृदितकषायाणामेवैतत् कथनीयम्, न कर्मसङ्गिना-मित्युपरम्यते। आह च भगवान् द्वैपायनः “न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्मसङ्गिनाम्” इति रहस्याधिकारे।

(Madras University edition of *Brhati*, p. 256). Prabhakara's attitude towards the advaitic theory of *adhyasa*, and *atman* as the only reality is typical of the pro-Advaita bent of the early Mimamsakas who would not hesitate to go to the length of suppression and accommodation, in those cases where adequate justification could be found for these processes in the interests of Advaitic truth and in the environment of the people to whom that truth had to be taught.

BHARTRAPRAPANCA and BRAHMADATTA, who belonged to the pre-Samkara stage in the history of Advaita, lost their nerve in their allegiance to Advaita. Bharttrprapanca's views regarding the advaitic theory are available in the references found in the works of Samkara and Suresvara. The post-Samkara survivals of Bharttrprapanca's views are used by Bhaskara in his *bhasya* on the *Brahma-sutras*.<sup>1</sup> Bharttrprapanca found handy the convenient and highly accommodative concept of *difference-cum-identity* (*bhedabheda*) which had already been introduced in philosophical thinking and proceeded to build up a monistic scheme of unity in which *Brahman*, *Jiva* and the *world* found their place as different entities, without abandoning the reality of any of them. The compromise of *bhedabheda-vada* adopted by Bharttrprapanca led ultimately to his secession from the acosmic form of Advaita and to the formation of a special group of *bhedabheda-vadins* of whom Bhaskara was the most prominent in the post-Samkara stage.

BRAHMADATTA was a pre-Samkara Advaitin, who was very particular about the adjustments which should be effected between the advaitic ideal of *Brahman* realisation and the discipline of *karma*. He attempted to effect the needed compromise by his *dhyana-niyoga-vada* and *samuccaya-vada*. According to him, *Jiva* originates from Brahman and gets absorbed in it at the time of liberation; the final liberation is achieved by a co-ordination of *karma* with *jnana* and through the contemplation of *Jiva* as identical with Brahman; and the central teaching of the Upanisads is to be found in the injunctions requiring the constant meditation of *Jiva* as Brahman, till the end of life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For instance on *Vedanta Sutra*s, I, i, 4 and II, i, 13. See also Prof. P. N. Srinivasacharya: *The Philosophy of Bhedabheda*.

<sup>2</sup> See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's article "Brahmadatta, an Old Vedantin", in J.O.R., Madras, Vol. II, pp. 1—9.



Among the pre-Samkara Advaitins, GAUDAPADA and MANDANAMISRA are the most outstanding thinkers representing the Advaita doctrine as it stood before Samkara. Gaudapada has developed an aspect of the Advaita doctrine which lent itself readily to being used as the basis of the Samkara form of Advaita. Mandanamisra's exposition of the Advaita doctrine, in so far as it could be studied in the *Brahmasiddhi*, preserved the fundamental part of the Upanisadic Advaita and advocated some noteworthy compromises with non-advaitic modes of thought. Though Mandanamisra is one of the elder contemporaries of Samkara, the heritage of pre-Samkara compromises which he advocates in his work, would make it more appropriate to refer to him as a pre-Samkara Advaitin.

Gaudapada has placed himself on the highest peak, of Advaitic thought and has declared the highest truth in the *Karika*.

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न बद्धो न च साधकः ।  
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

II 32

“No dissolution ; no origination ; none in bondage ; none disciplining himself towards release ; none seeking release ; and likewise, none becoming released—this is the great truth.” Still, in his *Karika*, he sees the need for accommodating his great intuition of Advaita with what he regards as *sattraka*, sound reasoning, and adjusts himself, at every important stage of his exposition, to the requirements of rationalism, and points out how the highest acme of harmony, which he calls *avirodha-yoga*, *avivada-yoga*, *nirdvandva-yoga*, *advaya-yoga*, *samatva-yoga*, can be realised only in the Advaitic scheme of thought and life. Only a true Advaitin can afford to adopt and advocate the most far-reaching type of compromise without any risk to truth and any disadvantage to the ordinary world :—

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।  
परस्परं विरुद्धयन्ते तैरयं न विरुद्धयते ॥

III 17

Two of the verses in the concluding portion of Gaudapada's *Karika* are full of significance in more than one direction :

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद् भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः ।  
ते हि लोके महाज्ञानाः तच्च लोको न गाहते ॥

IV 95

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।  
बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥

IV-100

In these two verses, Gaudapada indicates how the highest peak of advaitic thought is too high to be reached by ordinary people, and even a great gifted soul like Gaudapada cannot stand long on this height and has to get down to lower levels to accommodate himself to ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. Gaudapada says “*Namaskurmo yathabalam*”. *Namaskara* to *nirgunabrahman*—the attributeless absolute—presupposes accommodation ; the expression *yathabalam* (according to strength) clearly refers to the need for varying the modes of adjustment according to the requirements of the thinkers concerned.

Of the pre-Samkara Vedantins who continued to be active thinkers as elder contemporaries of Samkara, Mandanamisra is the most prominent. He inherited the Upanisadic tradition of Advaita along with the ideas associated with the Sabdadvaita mode of Advaitic thought, advocated by



Vaiyakarana philosophers like Bhartṛhari. Mandanamisra adopts and advocates certain valuable compromises in advaitic epistemology, advaitic ontology and advaitic ethics. In Mandana's opinion, the *anyatha-khyati* or the *viparita-khyati* of the Bhattas should for all practical purposes be accepted ; and when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory has to be reduced inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from the *anirvacaniya-khyati* of the Advaitins. He definitely argues in favour of the view that the *Jiva* should be regarded as the locus of *avidya* (nescience), which obscures the true nature of *Brahman* and thus has *Brahman* as its object (*visaya*) ; and in doing this, he clearly accommodates himself to the prevailing theistic sentiment against the view that *Brahman* is both the *asraya* and *visaya* of *avidya*. Mandana maintains what is known in Advaitic literature as the doctrine of *prasamkhyana* and holds that the indirect knowledge of *Brahman*, arising from texts like *tat tvam asi* should pass through the furnace of meditation (*upasana*) before the detractive and recessive elements of relation and mediacy could be removed from it, and before it could be refined into the pure, efficient and direct realisation of the Absolute Real (*Brahma-saksatkara*). Here, Mandana is accommodating himself to the common view that *sabda* can generate only an indirect cognition having a relational content. Mandana's name has come to be prominently associated with *bhavadvaita* ('ens-monism'), not so much for the reason that he considers *avidya-dhvamsa* to be a real factor, as for the marked manner in which he stresses the reality of *prapancabhava* in the concluding part of his *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 157) and emphatically declares it to form the final and otherwise unascertainable import of Vedantic texts. Herein a discerning student of Advaita may easily see Mandana's readiness to compromise with Dvaita, where absolutely necessary. In fact, two famous Dvaita writers—the authors of the *Nyayamṛta* and of the *Tarangini*—have brought out the significance of this accommodation by equating *bhavadvaita* with what may be called *abhava-dvaita*.<sup>1</sup> Again Mandana is prepared to accept Bhartṛhari's *sadbhavadvaita* in so far as it does not come into conflict with the *brahmadvaita* for which he himself stands. Mandana rejects Samkara's view about the antithesis between *karma* and *jnana* and gives his own verdict in favour of a certain type of *jnana-karma-samuccaya* in which *karma*, in the form of *agnihotra* and such other sacrifices or at least in the form of meditation, has an important place and function in the final stage of the causal scheme necessary to bring about Brahman-realisation. In the concluding part of his work, *Brahmasiddhi*, Mandana points out, in an accommodative spirit, how vedantic texts may be linked with purposeful activity (*pravṛtti*) by taking into account the *pravṛtti* in the direction of the meditation necessary for transforming the indirect verbal cognition arising from the *mahavakyas*, into direct *Brahman-realisation*.

SAMKARA, the greatest of Advaita teachers has confined himself in his works to certain very legitimate types of accommodation for which one could find adequate support in the Upanisads. In his brilliant statement of the theory of *adhyasa*, he clearly shows how the recognition of *ajnana* or nescience as a beginningless, indefinable, positive entity is the least objectionable solution for all the difficulties felt by philosophers in bringing together *the one* and the *many*, *reality* and *non-reality*, *Brahman* and *prapanca*, *satya* and *anṛta*. He realises clearly that the differences revealed in experience cannot be all reduced to nullity, and that they cannot be as real as Brahman or atman—the reality of reality (*satyasya satyam*) spoken of in the Upanisads. He utilises effectively this upanisadic suggestion by recognising a contrast, purely tentative as it may be in Advaitic thought, between absolute reality (*paramarthika-satta*) and relative reality (*vyavaharika-satta*). He has developed this type of compromise in his works in such a way that the adverse comments usually made by certain thinkers on the Samkarite scheme of thought might lose their force on scrutiny. Repeatedly he emphasises the idea that the world is *mithya* only in the sense that it is *anirvacaniya*. For all practical purposes in life, the world is as important to Samkara as to anybody else. The very first expression that he uses in

<sup>1</sup> See Nyayamṛta I. 23. p. 198; Cf. also IV. 1.



his monumental *bhasya* on the *Brahmasutras* is a strong evidence in favour of his readiness to make all reasonable concessions to the realist ways of thinking. Further, in his minor works especially, as also in his *bhasyas*, he has definitely indicated the limits within which accommodation to the theistic sentiment would be sufficiently warranted in Advaitic thought. The distinction between *para-vidyā* (Brahman-realisation) and *apara-vidyā*, as represented by all forms of knowledge within the empirical sphere tending to the achievement of the goal of *para-vidyā*, which has its root in the Upanisads themselves (cf. *Prasna Up.*, v. 2), is, in Samkara's opinion, the most comprehensive type of legitimate compromise with the realist and pluralist ways of thinking that advaitic thought may justly allow. In the sphere of ethical discipline the only kind of accommodation which Samkara considers reasonable is what is implied in the *sadhanacatustaya* scheme, namely that while *karma* may be given the place of greatest importance at the door of even the innermost shrine of advaitic truth, *karma* in no sense should be co-ordinated with *jñāna*.

According to Samkara and Suresvara, a *jīvanmukta* may continue to live and re-incarnate himself in many a corporeal form through the force of his fructified *karma* and may attain to *kaivalya* either on the fall of the body in which he has come by Brahman-realisation or may don other corporeal forms till his fructified *karma* is exhausted. And in this way of describing a *jīvan-mukta*, Samkara has found a means of continued service in society for those who have reached the pinnacle of knowledge. Mandana, however, is not prepared to go as far as Samkara in regard to the doctrine of *jīvan-mukti* and would make a Brahman-knower, functioning in society, strictly limited to the fall of the body in which he has come by Brahman-knowledge. In regard to *sannyasa*, again, Sankara and Suresvara hold that *sannyasa-asrama* is a better way of reaching the highest goal, than the *grhasthasrama*. Mandana, in this matter, accommodates himself more to the common run of mankind and views *grhasthya* as providing a quicker method than *sannyasa*, for reaching the highest goal, and Mandana's chief ground is that there is full scope for having knowledge implemented by dedicated or selfless work in the life of a householder.

Among Samkara's disciples, PADMAPADA is less unaccommodative than SURESVARA. The former perpetuates the spirit of accommodative reasonableness of his great master, while the latter, in most of his works shows himself to be rather over-zealous in preserving strictly the integrity of advaitic thought. One has only to be invited to consider in this connection the following two typical extracts :—

आनन्दो विषयानुभवः नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते ।

*Pancapaadika*, p. 4, Vizianagaram Series,

अद्वातममनादृत्य प्रमाणे सदसीति पे ।

बुभुत्सन्तोऽन्यतः कुर्युस्तेऽङ्गणापि रसवेदनम् ॥

*Naishkarmyasiddhi*, III. 117.

नूनं ते नासिकाग्रेण वीक्षन्ते सूर्यमण्डलम् ।

*Bṛhadaranyaka-varttika*, p. 735, verse 1521.

It would be obvious from the first of these extracts that Padmapada is a very reasonable accommodationist, adjusting the requirements of realism, pluralism and Advaitism wherever there is a need to do so. From the latter extracts it would be equally obvious how cavalierly uncompromising Suresvara's attitude is.



## COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

85

With regard to VACASPATIMISRA, it would be enough to say that he carries Mandana's accommodativeness to the length of effecting a merger, as far as possible, in Sankara's view. It may also be noted in this connection that Vacaspatimisra has amplified in his *Bhamati*, Mandana's epistemological attitude by clearly showing how *anirvacaniya-khyati* emerges from a critical review of the theories of *asatkhyati*, *akhyati* and *anyathakhyati*.

SARVAJNATMAMUNI of the 10th century, who was a close follower of Suresvara, though not a disciple as generally believed, is far less unaccommodative in his attitude than the latter. The most striking type of accommodation which he commends to an Advaitin, relates to causality. If space and time furnished the bricks of the empirical wall separating the "reality of reality" from the world of empirical reality, causation may well be described as forming its foundational structure. It may be said to be one of the highest types of accommodative spirit in the sphere of Advaita to view the three theories of causality *arambha-vada*, *parinama-vada* and *vivarta-vada*—as the three steps of the ladder through which thought has to rise to the highest metaphysical peak represented by the one absolute *Brahman*, the lowest rung being the creationistic view, the next higher step being the transformationistic view, and the highest step being the transfigurationistic view. This verse from the *Samksepasariraka* deserves to be noted and remembered in this connection.

विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वभूमिः वेदान्तवादे परिणामवादः ।

व्यवस्थितेऽस्मिन् परिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः ॥ II-61.

See also II-70.

VIMUKTATMAN, the author of the *Ista-siddhi* is far less accommodative than either Mandana or Vacaspatimisra. The doctrine of Maya as expounded by Samkara and his immediate followers is amplified as the main scheme of his work by Vimuktatman, and this doctrine is rounded off with the view that *avidya-nivrtti* is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *both* nor *anirvacaniya*, but a something of the fifth variety. In this view, one may find a clever way in which an advaitic dialectician may accommodate himself to a non-advaitic one.

UDAYANA is treated by Brahmanandasarasvati<sup>1</sup> as an Advaitin at heart and the Nyaya-Vaisesika treatises produced by Udayana should be regarded merely as counterblasts to the Buddhist tenets of idealism and nihilism. Some of Udayana's statements in his *Atmatattvaviveka*.

बलिनि वेदनये जयश्रीः ।

सा चावस्था न हेया मोक्षनगरगोपुरायमाणत्वात् ।<sup>2</sup>

where he refers to Advaita, justify Brahmananda's view. Udayana's accommodative concern for the *vyavaharika* world must have made him suppress his own Advaitic conviction.

ANANDABODHA has simply maintained the accommodative level of Samkara and abandoned some of the compromises introduced by Mandana and adopted by Vacaspati.

SRI HARSA's *Khandana-khanda-khadya* is a full vindication from a polemical viewpoint of all the possibilities and limits of compromise which Samkara's Advaita may allow, with reference to the world of empirical reality. The inexhaustible resources which an Advaitin may command in the direction of accommodation with realist ways of thinking, through the concept of *anirvacaniyatva* are

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 226-30, Anantakrishna Sastri's edn. of the *Advaita-siddhi*.

<sup>2</sup> See *Atmatattvaviveka*, Chowkhanba edn., pp. 230 and 451.



fully described in the *Khandana-khanda-khadya*. In the rationalistic sphere of enquiry, according to Sri Harsa, *anirvacaniyatva-vada* and the absolute one-ness of *cit* as recognised by the Advaitins are the only two admissible things ; and nothing else would bear scrutiny.<sup>1</sup> Even Sri Harsa in *Khandana-khanda-khadya* when he places himself on the level of a non-combative, pacific teacher of great truths, becomes very soft and pliable under the influence of the accommodative spirit which he inherited from early advaitic tradition, and points out that the discipline of *bhakti* is generally necessary for ordinary people as an important step leading to the advaitic goal.<sup>2</sup>

In the history of Vedantic thought there are two groups of teachers who seceded from Advaita. One group is headed by RAMANUJA who is solicitous to accommodate his way of monistic thinking on the one side to pluralistic realism, and on the other, to advaitic monism. The crowning achievement of this group is typified in the denomination *Visistadvaita* which has been accepted as the most significant name that could be given to Ramanuja's school of Vedanta.

अशेषचिदचिदात्मकशरीरविशिष्टस्य शरीरिणोद्धैतम् ।

Unity of God as the inner spirit, quickening the whole universe, which bears to Him the same relation that the body of an individual bears to the embodied *Jiva*. Through the idea that Brahman is the inner self of the *Jiva* and the material world, Ramanuja seeks to safeguard the claims of non-dualism and dualism. In the final state of release, Ramanuja recognises the possibility of a *mukta-jiva* realising *Brahmananda*. As Appayya Diksita has pointed out,<sup>3</sup> this is in the direction of compromise with the Advaitin's doctrine and if pressed further, would only result in the recognition of the identity of the *Jiva* with Brahman. It is easy to see how this result would follow. One's *ananda* cannot, for obvious reasons, be experienced by another.

Another group of seceders from Advaita, showing a somewhat unaccommodative attitude, is headed by the strongest and the boldest of India, viz. MADHVACHARYA. As Appayya Diksita himself points out, even the Dvaita mode of thinking cannot entirely shake off its leanings in favour of Advaita. This may be seen in the manner in which what the Dvaitins call *sanmukti* would entitle a *sanmukta* to become absorbed into the body of Narayana and to experience all His delights through His *indriyas*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>5</sup>APPAYYA DIKSITA, the renowned polymath of the sixteenth century, has clearly shown in his *Anandalahari* how the advaitic scheme of thought and discipline may be accommodated completely to the visistadvaitic scheme through the device of treating *saguna-brahman* as the intermediate purport (*avantara-tatparya*) of vedantic texts, and *nirguna-brahman* as the ultimate purport. Only his pre-established Saiva obsessions have made him restrict this kind of accommodation to the Visistadvaita thought in the Srikantha-bhasya and unwilling to extend it to the teachings of the Sribhasya.

MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI AND BRAHMANANDA SARASVATI are the greatest champions of Advaita dialectics. Madhusudana seeks to harmonise all the systems of thought and religion through the great accommodative device of difference in fitness (*adhikara-bheda*) and rounds off the ladder theory put forward by Sarvajnatman.

<sup>1</sup> See *Brahmanandiya*, p. 225.

<sup>2</sup> See *Siddhantabindutika*, verse 8.

<sup>3</sup> In his *Anandalahari*, Bharati Mandiram Sanskrit Series, p. 146.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 145-6 and Madhvacharya's *Brahma-sutra-bhasya* IV. iv. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Here the late Professor had proposed to add a paragraph about VIJNANABHISU.



सर्वेषां च संक्षेपेण त्रिविध एव प्रस्थानभेदः । तत्र आरम्भवाद एकः, परिणामवादो द्वितीयः, विवर्तवादस्तृतीयः । . . . सर्वेषां प्रस्थानकर्तृणां मुनीनां विवर्तवादपर्यवसानेन अद्वितीये परमेश्वरे एव प्रतिपाद्ये तात्पर्यम् । न हि ते मुनयो भ्रान्ताः, सर्वज्ञत्वात्तेषाम् । किन्तु बहिर्विषयप्रवणानामापाततः पुरुषार्थे प्रवेशो न संभवतीति नास्तिक्यवारणाय तैः प्रकारभेदाः प्रदर्शिताः ।

(*Prasthanabheda*, p. 10. Anandasrama edn.)

Having perched himself high on the advaitic peak of *nirakara-vada*. Madhusudanasarasvati feels nervous, and his thought seeks emotional comfort in giving vent to his *bhakti* impulse in the famous verse he composed at the end of the *nirakara-vada* section of the *Advaita-siddhi*.

वंशीविभूषितकरान्नवनीरदाभात्  
पीताम्बरादरुणबिम्बफलाधरोष्ठात् ।  
पूर्णेन्दुसुन्दरमुखादरविन्दनेत्रात्  
कृष्णात्परं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने ॥

(p. 750).

Further, he considers it perfectly legitimate to effect a compromise between the *bhakti* ideal as presented in the *Gita* and the *Bhagavata* with the advaitic ideal of Brahman-realisation. This harmonious adjustment he secures through the account he has given of *bhakti* as the highest *rasa*, in his famous work called the *Bhakti-rasayana*. And in this connection, he naturally presses into his service the pliable text of the *Taittiriya Upanisad* रसो वै सः<sup>1</sup>. Within the sphere of the advaitic school of Vedantins, Madhusudanasarasvati prefers to show a high degree of accommodativeness to the views of accommodative Advaitins like Mandana and Vacaspati, as well as the uncompromising Advaitins of the type of Suresvara. Brahmanandasarasvati mostly endorses Madhusudanasarasvati's view and develops further some of the accommodative theories. In this connection, Brahmananda's amplification of Mandana's *bhavadvaita* and justification of it deserve attention. (p. 326). In regard to some matters like *jivanmukti*, Brahmananda is not so accommodative as Madhusudana or Sankara himself. (*Brahmanandiya*, pp. 252, 255).

So far we have been considering various instances of compromise in the history of advaitic thought. It would be difficult to decide which of them are wholly legitimate and which wholly illegitimate. As John Morley<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, a wise suspense in forming opinions, a wise reserve in expressing them, and a wise tardiness in trying to realise them—these are the three provinces of compromise, and they should be differentiated carefully “from unavowed disingenuousness and self-illusion, from voluntary dissimulation and from indolence and pusillanimity”. It should also be pointed out here that there is a fourth distinction which Deussen has pointed out, though omitted by Morley ; and it is unintentional accommodation as distinguished from intentional accommodation. And all the three distinctions pointed out by Morley come under the category of intentional accommodation. The quest for truth is a very complex process of thinking and most of the accommodative devices which thought itself spontaneously introduces should generally be considered legitimate and unintentional, even in cases where such accommodative devices result from the exhaustion of the rationalistic resources, after all possible effort.

<sup>1</sup> *Bhagavadbhaktirasayana*, Achyutagranthamala edn., Benares, III, 22-24, pp. 142-4.

<sup>2</sup> “On compromise,” pp. 4, 88.



Some difficulty arises particularly in the pleas for compromise implied in the Gita theory of *loka-samgraha* and in the idea of *provisional usefulness* advocated by the author of the *Prasthanabheda* through his ladder theory. Hume says "It is putting too great a respect on the vulgar and their superstitions to pique one's self on sincerity with regard to them. . . . I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular." Morley criticises Hume's attitude and describes it as a revolting case of moral improbity and soul-less cynicism. What would Morley say to Bhagavan Kṛṣṇa's plea of *loka-samgraha*? Certainly he would approve of it, if he believes, like most of us, that the teacher of the Gita knows everything about what contributes to individual and social well-being, and he would not certainly regard it as a case of voluntary dissimulation or an instance of indolence and pusillanimity. In evaluating the instances of intentional compromise described in these lectures, it would be useful to remember the distinction between what may be called a courageous compromise and what may be called a timid compromise. For instance, in estimating the compromise for which Mandana is responsible, it may be pointed out that in adopting a reasonable compromise with the Mimamsakas by assigning to *karma* and *upasana* their due place in his scheme of Brahman-realisation, Mandana has shown a rare courage by fearlessly preferring to remain a sweetly reasonable accommodative and eclectic type of Advaitin, not caring for the plaudits he might have gained by following Saṃkara closely.

One word more. The boundaries of compromise are set clearly by Manu in his memorable dictum *satyam bruyat*, etc. The interests of truth can never be sacrificed to what is *priya*, what is good and beautiful and helpful. In the sphere of thought, word and deed, truth must be maintained at all costs. All legitimate concessions that can possibly be made whenever there is a clash between what is true and what is good and agreeable must be made, and it must always be remembered that in determining what is *satya* and what is *priya*, the society as a whole matters as much as the individual concerned. I cannot more appropriately wind up these lectures than by quoting again Manu's words with the two emendations which I would like to make for *bruyat*, namely, *kuryat* and *dhyayet*.

सत्यं ब्रूयात्प्रियं ब्रूयान्न ब्रूयात्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं ब्रूयादेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥

सत्यं कुर्यात्प्रियं कुर्यान्न कुर्यात्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं कुर्यादेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥

सत्यं ध्यायेत्प्रियं ध्यायेन्न ध्यायेत्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं ध्यायेदेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥



## PURNAISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY-THE WHOLISM OF ANCIENT INDIA \*

I would first express my thankful appreciation of the kindness of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for having given me this opportunity to participate in its great and noble work.

Badarayana's samanvaya or Plato's synoptic method, when applied to Indian philosophical thought with an attitude of mind which may be described as holistic in the language of a distinguished Modernist-General, the Right Hon. J. C. Smuts, is sure to yield results of considerable philosophical interest and value. One of such results may be found in what may be called Purnaism or the wholism of ancient India ; and I propose to discourse upon this subject in the address which I have to deliver as President of the Indian Philosophy Section of the tenth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

What Purnaism is, requires explanation ; and what it is not should also be made clear. The term Purnaism is based on the Sanskrit word Purna. This Sanskrit word is derived from the root *pr* (to fill) and is usually understood to mean "filled or full". But it may also be taken to mean filling or "that which fills". Sri Sankara takes this word in the latter sense in his *bhasya* on the Brhadaranyaka mantra "Puranamadah Purnamidam" (V, i, I). The suffix in the word *purna*, according to Sri Sankara, should be taken in an active sense. Thus, the Upanisadic Purna, as elucidated by Sri Sankara, is the illimitable, whole-making, all-filling, all-whole, all-soul, Absolute ; and it is not a mere whole appearing as an evolute in what is claimed by General Smuts to be an ever progressive, but is what logically appears to be an endlessly regressive, texture of holistic evolution. Purnaism is the view which recognises the Upanisadic Purna in Sri Sankara's sense, as the ultimate reality implied in all empirical knowledge and in all finite existence—as the supreme, undetermined, all-whole, all-soul, Absolute, which is the ground and consummation of all processess—creation (*arambha*), transformation, evolution or emergence (*parinama*), and transfiguration (*vivarta*). In it the Upanisadic 'pleromatism' which maintains that on the pleroma or fulness of the Absolute are grounded all the wholes of life and all the wholes of mind, and matter, larger or smaller. The Purna of Sri Sankara is the philosophic absolute whole, which is not a mere composite or complex structure consisting of parts, but is whole in the sense that it comprehends everything and that it is the fundamental, all-pervasive, all-including reality serving as the substratum in which all the parts and the wholes find their being. The Purna is *that*, the *yonder whole*, the infinite, all-pervading, all-filling whole, the supreme unconditioned Brahman ; the *purna* is *this whole*, the conditioned Brahman ; emanating from the infinite as effect and manifesting through name and form in the empirical universe ; from *that whole*, *this whole* rises up ; in this process, the wholeness which is the essence of *that* infinite, *this* conditioned whole continues to have in itself ; and when all this is realised, the seeming otherness of *this* whole is removed and the infinite whole remains as the unbroken pure cit or consciousness, transcending all the parts and distinctions of inner and outer and past and present. This is purnaism and it is the greatest Vedantic message conveyed in what is traditionally regarded as the pivotal text (*santimantra*) of the Brhadaranyakopanisad :

"Purnamadah Purnamidam Purnat Purnamudacyate  
Purnasya Purnamadaya, Purnamevavasisyate" (v, i, I).

\* Presidential Address at the Xth Indian Philosophical Congress, Waltair, 1934. Printed in the Proceedings Part II pp. 45-54.



The Purnaism described above is the central theme of the Brhadaranykopenisad and it is also the theme of the mahavakyas like 'Tattvamasi' and "Aham Brahmasmi". It involves a type of wholism which should be carefully differentiated from the holism of General Smuts. In the Upanisadic Purnaism set forth and maintained by Sri Sankara, the cosmic process of creative evolution is but a transfiguration of the absolute Purna in several ways and all this transfiguration is the result of the delimiting of the absolute Purna by the non-whole or non-purna called avidya (nescience).— In all the creative activities of the empirical world, the absolute whole projects itself and shows out in the three predications 'is' (asti), comes to be known or illuminated (bhati), is good and desirable (priya)—through name and form (nama, rupa) belonging to the world.

“ Asti bhati priyam rupam nama cetyamsapancakam  
 Adyatrayam brahmarupam prapancasya tato dvayam ”.

The active, creative function of the purna, which consists in filling or pervading (purana, vyapana), is also the result of the delimiting of the purna-avidya. It is this function by virtue of which the monistic absolute of Purnaism cannot justly be said to be sterile or barren. This function obviates the antithesis which, in its absence, might arise between Purnaism or Absolutism and progress or evolution. In the light of this function, all the activities and processes which take place in the world may be interpreted as tending towards the unfoldment and realisation of the Purna and as the striving of the lesser wholes to become the *all-whole* or the *absolute-whole*; and all the lesser wholes are but fragmentary appearances of the absolute-whole. This again is a beneficent function of the primal *non-whole* called avidya and is the *holistic nissus* of General Smuts, “ which rises like a living fountain from the very depths of the universe ”. According to General Smuts, *holism* is the “ fundamental, synthetic, ordering, organising, regulating activity in the universe ” and it is “ the inner, shaping, directive activity working through the wholes and in the variations which creatively arise from them ”. General Smuts is unwilling to go further and fears that the metaphysical concept of all-whole or the eternal absolute whole might be ruinous to the holistic nissus which forms the most vital part of his holism. The unsoundness of General Smuts' metaphysical position has been explained in an admirably telling manner by Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan in the last chapter of his work “ An Idealist View of Life ”. Smuts' holistic nissus, as a creative force running through all nature, becomes intelligible only when it is understood as the primal viksepasakti of the primal non-whole called maya or avidya in Upanisadic Purnaism; and the whole-making potency of the primal non-whole may be explained as the result of its association with the external, absolute, all-whole, which the Upanisads have called Purna. If holism constitutes and connects the four great series in reality-matter, life, mind and personality and if these series are but “ steps in the progressive evolution of one and the same fundamental factor, whose pathway is the universe within us and around us ”, Smuts is certainly presupposing a whole which includes all the others. He chooses, however, to adopt an agnostic attitude about the nature of this all-comprehending whole and about its relation to the other wholes in the universe. The needed explanation in this connection can be found in the Purnaism of Sri Sankara, which recognises one eternal all-pervading absolute whole (Purna) and postulates also its association with the primal non-whole called avidya, though the empirical relation of identity-in-difference (tadatmya), the distinctive feature of this relation being that it is self-multiplying and self-discrepant in its character and that any attempt to analyse it would only lead to a beginningless chain of tadatmyas within the empirical plane. If, in Smuts' holism, “ the ideals of well-being, of truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly grounded in the nature of things and are not endangered or lost ”, they must be connected with an eternal and never-failing source and spring of Truth, Beauty and Goodness; and all this, one may find in the Purna of the Upanisads, which is explained by Sri Sankara as the never-failing source and spring of Truth, Beauty and



# PURNAISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY-THE WHOLISM OF ANCIENT INDIA 91

Goodness, of asti, bhati and priyam and of sat, cit, and ananda. Mr. Smuts' holism reduces God to a stream of holistic tendency and is in no way better than naturalism in this respect. The Upanisadic Purnatism, on the other hand, views God as the highest Purna in the empirical sphere, though He is a lower Purna as compared with the Absolute Purna viz. Suddha-brahman. Smuts recognises selection, direction, and control, right through the entire forward movement of holism, but fights shy of Teleology or purpose; while Sri Sankara's Purnatism can easily find a place for Teleology or Purpose within the empirical sphere and can base it on the eternal and absolute intelligence (suddha-cit) otherwise known as Purna. Smuts refuses to view the ideal or spiritual element in the universe as the dominant factor or as implicit in the beginnings of things and warns that the spirit to-day "should not be retrospectively antedated to a time when the world existed without it." Smuts asks: "Where was the Spirit when the warm Silurian seas covered the face of the earth, and the lower types of fishes and marine creatures still formed the crest of the evolutionary wave? Or going still further back, where was the Spirit when, in the Pre-Cambrian system of the globe, the first convulsive movements threw up the early mountains which have now entirely disappeared from the face of the earth, and when the living forms, if any, were of so low a type that none have been deciphered yet in the geological record? Where was the Spirit when the Solar System itself was still a diffuse fiery nebula?" To all these questions, the answer which Sri Sankara's Purnatism gives is "every-where"; and the answer which the Upanisadic Purnatism vouchsafes should be found in the Brhadaranyaka text—"This was verily Brahman in the beginning. It realised only itself—I am Brahman. Therefore it became all". "Brahma va idamagra asit Tadatmanamevaveda aham Brahmasmiti. Tasmāt tat sarvamabhavat". (I. iv, 10). Smuts' questions would remind an Indian Theist who believes in Purnatism, of similar questions raised and disposed of in the following well-known verse of Pushpadanta's Mahimanastuti:—

"Kimiha kim kayah sa iha kimupayastribhuvanam  
Kimadharo dhata srjati kimupadana iti ca."

"Atarhyaisvarye tvayyanavasaratustho hatadhiyah,  
Kutarko'yam kamscin mukharayati mohaya kudhiyam"

"When God created the three worlds, what did He want to get? What was His body? What means did He employ? Where did He take His stand? What was the material which He used?—Questions like these are unwarranted and deserve to be brushed aside by saying that they never arise in the case of God whose omnipotence is of a transcendental character."

The most attractive feature of Smuts' holism is the emphasis which it rightly lays on a holistic synthesis of things. The attitude of holistic synthesis which Smuts advocates is one that may, with advantage, be adopted in a general review of Indian philosophy. The element of authoritarianism in Indian philosophy and its attitude towards the Sabdapramana or valid verbal testimony would become perfectly intelligible to a modern student of philosophy, if he approaches the question with a holistic attitude of mind and view it in a holistic setting. Perception and inference (pratyaksa and anumana) are, in their very nature, subject to several empirical limitations and cannot be considered adequate, in any sense, to grapple with the ultra-empirical, absolute, ultimate reality called Purna; and these two pramanas are adapted to the requirements of the non-purna in their very nature. In so far as the Purna is concerned, pratyaksa and anumana have to be reinforced by the trustworthy records called agamas, which embody the great intuitions of the disciplined minds of the past. Such agamic intuitions remove the imperfections of pratyaksa and anumana and all these three together constitute an acceptable approach to the absolute purna.



In a similar way, a holistic view of the Gita discloses a holistic synthesis as the dominating feature of that great scripture. The Gita is a great scripture of synthesis (yoga-sastra). It deals with the three main types of synthesis—the Karmayoga, the Bhaktiyoga and the Jnanayoga. All activities spring from a sense of imperfection and are whole-making in their nature. Their aim is to create a sense of wholeness through the attainment of their fruits in one who happens to labour under a sense of non-wholeness without such fruits. But the wholes thus formed through the attainment of the fruits of actions are only smaller wholes, as compared with the absolute all-whole called Purna. To be subjected to the thralldom of smaller wholes in the form of karmaphala is certainly an obstacle in the way of the realisation of the absolute Purna ; and this obstacle has to be removed only by doing what one has to do without any thought of the result. Thus, the scheme of karmayoga or nirabhisandhikarma should be understood as a holistic scheme making for a progressive realisation of the absolute all-whole in the form of Purna. In the holistic setting, *ananyabhlakti*, or whole-hearted and exclusive devotion to the Lord, is but the dedication of the non-purna to the nearest approximation of the Purna, with a view to eventually realising the Purna itself. From the way in which the Lord of the Gita equates the man who knows with Himself (*jñāni tvatmaiva me matam*, VII, 18), it may be easily seen that jñāna in the Vedantic sense consists in the perfect realisation of the Purna.

It would be highly interesting here to review from the holistic standpoint some of the more important doctrines of Indian philosophical systems. The Carvaka doctrine is but an effort to fit the purna into the scheme of *pratyakṣa* ; and the only way in which this has to be done is by travestying the purna by equating it with the corporeal and material aspects of individual personality. The Upanisadic purna appears to glimpse in one way, in the Jaina conception of the liberated soul freely soaring higher and higher in an eternally blissful condition in the immense ultra-mundane space (*alokakāśa*) ; and it appears to glimpse in another manner in the Buddhist conception of nirvana and nihil (*sunya*). The Mimamsaka touches the fringe of the Upanisadic Purna in his conception of *svarga* and ascribes to the Vedic law all the holistic nusus of his ritualistic universe. The *parinamavāda* of the Sankhyas assign all holistic functions to the *Prakṛti*, with a view to setting free the *puruṣas* and finding in them what may be regarded as a plurilistic miniature of the Upanisadic Purna—a wholly unsustainable position. The yoga system proceeds a little further in the direction of Purnatism by super-adding a Purnaic Teacher of Teachers—viz. God or *Isvara*. The efforts of the Nyaya-Vaisesika realism in the direction of Purnatism have become crystallised in two of the most important doctrines of Nyaya—firstly, in the cumulative view of *pramāṇas* according to which *anumāna* or *anvikṣa* is a necessary ancillary to *pratyakṣa* and *āgama* ; and secondly, in its scheme of *mukti* which presents the innumerable *jīvas* as so many all-pervasive wholes stripped of all producible qualities and in its conception of *mahapralaya* as a state of universal liberation (*sarvamukti*). The Upanisadic Purnatism exhibits itself in a marked manner in the sphere or Vedānta. Sri Madhva's dualistic or pluralistic from of purnatism lays particular stress upon the perfection of the relation of master and servant between the Purna and the non-purna (*jīva*) and thus detracts from the absolute wholeness of the All-whole. Sri Ramanuja's Purnatism is of the organic type and conceives of the Upanisadic Purna as the organic whole, of which all the lesser material and spiritual wholes are the constituent parts. Sri Sankara's Purnatism is the genuine Upanisadic Purnatism, which exhibits the Purna in its full glory, as the absolute All-whole which ought to be recognised as the ground and goal of *Smṛtī*'s holistic universe and through which flows a progressive and perennial stream of lesser wholes.

The strongest point in the Upanisadic Purnatism is that it conserves satisfactorily all the values of life within the empirical sphere. In terms of the universally accepted value of *ananda* or bliss, the Purna of the Upanisads glimpses everyday, of your life, in dreamless sleep, in *susupti*.



## PURNALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY-THE WHOLISM OF ANCIENT INDIA 93

Here, what the polymathic philosopher Vacaspatimisra (Bhamati, 1, 3, 5, 15) has said deserves to be remembered and revolved in our minds.

“ Alas ! This is a great wonder and pity that the creatures, who fail to understand the nature of reality, miss the absolute real whole though they have it themselves. The travellers who proceed on their life's journey in quest of wealth tread on pieces of gold scattered on their path and overgrown with dense, age-long, dirt and yet do not take these golden pieces, mistaking them for groups of pieces of stones :—with this idea and with a mingled feeling of wonder and pity, the Sruti says “ All these creatures reach this world of the blissful whole every day and yet do not know it.” <sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Bataho kastamidam vartate jantunam tattvabodhavikalanam, yadebhih svadhinamapi Brahma na prapyat. Tadyatha cirantananirodhanibidamalapihitam kaladhauta-sakalanam pathi patitanam uparyupari sancaradbhirapi panthairdhanayadbhirgravakhandanivahavibhramanaitani nopadiyanta ityabhisandhimati sadbhutamiva sakhedamiva srutih pravartate :- “ Imah sarvahi prajah aharahargacchantya etam Brahmam lokam na vindanti.” (Chandogya, VIII, iii. 2.)



## अब्रह्मजिज्ञासा \*

“अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” इति भगवद्वादरायणप्रणीतानां ब्रह्मसूत्राणामादिमं सूत्रं नानाविधानां गम्भीराणामाशयः विशेषाणां सूचकं पूर्वाचार्यैर्बहुधा व्याख्यातं बहुमुखं प्रयते। तत्र परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्यैः भगवत्पादैः श्रीशंकराचार्यैः प्रणीते प्रसन्नगम्भीरे सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धे सर्वसहृदयचमत्कारिणि अलौकिक-सारस्वतगीतिरीत्यास्वादनीये-भाष्ये, अध्यासं सपरिकरं निरूप्य, शास्त्रारम्भसमर्थनप्रस्तावे, सूत्राक्षराण्येवं व्याख्यातानि दृश्यन्ते—“तत्राथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते... सति चानन्तर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम्।... उच्यते—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादि साधन-संपत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये। ..... अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्वेद एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयः—साधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति—‘तद्यथेहकर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते’ इत्यादिः; तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति—‘ब्रह्मा विदाप्नोति परम्’ इत्यादिः; तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधन-संपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (ब्रह्मविचारः) कर्तव्या” इति।

एवमाधिकारिप्रयोजनाद्यनुबन्धसूचकतया प्रवृत्ते श्रीमति शांकरे भाष्ये केचिदेवमाक्षिपेयुः—यस्य साकल्येन साधन-चतुष्टयसंपत्तिः स एवाधिकारियेत ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्। तादृशोऽधिकारी पुरुषधौरेयः श्री शंकरभगवत्पादसदृशः अति-दुर्लभोऽस्मिन् लोक इति किञ्चिदिव लोकस्थितिपर्यालोचने सुविशदं भासते। कियन्तोऽद्यत्वे सन्ति, ये शुद्धान्तःकरणाः नित्यानित्ये सत्यासत्ये सुखदुःखे सम्यग्विविच्य निश्चिन्वन्ति, ये फलेभ्यः सर्वेभ्य ऐहिकेभ्य आमुष्मिकेभ्यश्च विरज्यन्ति, येषां च मनः प्रसंख्यानान्ध्यासलब्धवैराग्यपरिपाकभग्नरागादिकषायमदिरामदं वशीकृतं तत्त्वविषयविनियोगयोग्यतां च नीतम् येषां च विषयतितिक्षातदुपरमतत्त्वश्रद्धा अविकलाः? सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया गवेषणेऽपि पञ्चषा अपि दुर्लभास्तादृशाः। सत्येवं वस्तुवृत्ते, ‘सर्वे ब्रह्मवदिष्यन्ति संप्राप्ते तु कलौ युगे’ इत्युक्तिरीत्या बहूनामस्मादृशानाम्मितम्पचमतीनामिन्द्रिय-ग्रामारामाणां व्युत्पन्नानां व्युत्पित्सूनां च वेदान्तशास्त्राध्यापनाध्ययनादिरूपेण तत्र तत्र समुज्जृम्भमाणे ब्रह्मविचारे प्रवृत्तिरुचिता सफला वा कथं भवेत्!

अतैवं व्यञ्जनापथमनुसृत्य रमणीयया रीत्या भगवत्पादैरेव प्रतिविहितम्—योऽयं ब्रह्मविचारः साक्षाद्ब्रह्मभवेने पर्यवस्यति, तत्राधिकारिणः सम्पन्नसाधनचतुष्टयाः; अस्य ब्रह्मविचारस्य द्वारभूतः अब्रह्मविचारः, येन क्रमशः साधन-चतुष्टयमविकलं संपादयितुं शक्यते; तत्रोच्चावच-मूर्तामूर्तात्मकप्रपञ्चरूपस्याब्रह्मणः विचारे, ये सुकृतपरिपाकवशात् साधन-चतुष्टयमविकलं संपादयितुमभिलषन्ति, ते सर्वेऽप्यधिकारिण एव—इति। अयं च समीचीनः समाधिः श्री शंकराचार्यै-रथातःशब्दार्थविचारात्पूर्वमेव अध्यासभाष्ये अब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणमुखेन वेदान्तशास्त्रमुपक्रममाणैः युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरं वस्तुतो जघन्यमपि मुख्यमिव सादरमादिवाक्ये परामृशद्भिरभिव्यञ्जितः शास्त्ररसिकैरास्वादयितुं युज्यते। इयमेव रीतिरनुसृता दृश्यते, महता परिकरबन्धेन मूर्तामूर्तात्मकं प्रपञ्चं निरूप्य तन्निषेधमुखेन ब्रह्मनिरूपणे प्रवृत्तेन बृहदारण्यकेन। “अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चयते” इति संप्रदायविदां वचनस्याप्ययमेव सारः। अद्वैतसिद्धिद्वैतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिपूर्विका—इति शास्त्रदृष्ट्या वदन्तोऽपि वेदान्तकेसरिणः मधुसूदनसरस्वतीप्रभृतय एवमेवाशेरते। अत एव बादरायणसूत्रेषु नवतिः सूत्राण्यब्रह्म-विवेचनपराणि दृश्यन्ते। यथा च, तथा पूर्वमीमांसाप्रथमसूत्रे अधर्मजिज्ञासापि प्रस्तुतेति प्रमाणिका अङ्गीकुर्वन्ति। तथै-वोत्तरमीमांसासूत्रेष्वपि प्रथमसूत्रे अब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि प्रस्तुतेति वदन्तो वयं प्रामाण्यपथात्र मनागप्यपेता भवामः। एवं सति आद्यस्य ब्रह्मसूत्रस्य एवमप्यर्थो वर्णनीयः—अथ साधनचतुष्टयलिप्सानन्तरं, अतः ब्रह्मविचारार्थं साधनचतुष्टयस्यावश्य-कत्वाद्धेतोः अब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (अब्रह्मविचारः) कर्तव्या इति। एवं च शांकरमध्यासभाष्यमुत्सूत्रमिति केषांचिदाक्षे-पोऽपि प्रतिक्रियते; सर्वेऽप्यस्मादृशाः असिद्धसाधनचतुष्टयाः अद्वैताध्ययने तदध्यापने च प्रवृत्ता अनुगृह्येरन्।



# THE PRABHAKARA SCHOOL OF KARMA-MIMAMSA \*

## I

The weakest spot in the history of Indian Darsanas may be said to be the history of the Prabhakara School of Karma Mimamsa. The study of the Purva-Mimamsa system has of late been most undeservedly neglected even in the world of traditional Sastraic scholarship. However, of the two chief schools of Purva-Mimamsa, the Bhatta School has all along been receiving better attention at the hands of the students of Sanskrit Darsanas than its sister school, *viz.*, the Prabhakara School. Till the publication of the *Prakarana-pancika* by Salikanatha about two decades ago and of Dr. Ganganath Jha's thesis in English on the Prabhakara School, all the knowledge that the world of Sanskrit scholars possessed concerning this school was restricted practically to the references given in the Sanskrit works relating to the Bhatta, Nyaya-Vaisesika and Vedanta systems. In Salikanatha's *Prakarana-pancika*, we find a learned and scholarly Prakarana epitomising and maintaining the distinctive tenets of the Prabhakara School. Dr. Ganganath Jha's thesis is the English counterpart of the *Prakarana-pancika*, presenting in a lucid and readable style the main principles of the Prabhakara School and giving for the first time, very valuable information about Prabhakara's commentary on Sabarasvamin's Bhasya, known as *Brhati-tika*. In his learned introduction to his treatise above referred to, Dr. Jha seeks to make out from certain internal evidences furnished by the *Brhati*, the *Prakarana-pancika* and certain other Prabhakara works, that Prabhakara was not, as tradition would have it, a rebellious and disloyal pupil of Kumarila Bhatta, the earliest leading exponent of the Bhatta School ; that Prabhakara's works must be assigned to the ante-Kumarila period of Mimamsa ; and that they do not presuppose Kumarila Bhatta's *Varttika*, while the latter might, in all probability, be said to presuppose Prabhakara's works. Dr. Keith reiterates Dr. Jha's opinion in his recent book on Karma-Mimamsa and seems to go further than Dr. Jha in assigning both Prabhakara and Salikanatha to a date earlier than that of Kumarila.

I had access to a transcript of the *Brhati*, that I recently got made for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras, through the courtesy of Dr. Jha, from his incomplete copy of the *Brhati*. In the course of my official duties as Ex-Officio Curator of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras, I had opportunities of examining, besides the *Brhati*, the following important Prabhakara manuscripts :—

- (1) *Rjuvimala-pancika*—a commentary on the *Brhati* by Salikanatha.
- (2) *Parisista*—a brief annotation on the *Bhasya* of Sabarasvamin by Salikanatha.
- (3) *Nayaviveka*—an exhaustive treatise by Bhavanatha based on the *Brhati*, *Rjuvimala* and *Prakarana-pancika*.
- (4) *Nyayakosa*—a Prabhakara treatise by Govinda Bhatta based mainly on the works of Salikanatha and Bhavanatha.
- (5) *Prabhakara-vijaya*—a short epitome of the Prabhakara School.

As a result of the examination of these manuscripts and of the study of several works relating to the Bhatta and other Indian systems, various interesting facts came to my notice, a few of which bearing upon the history of the Prabhakara School, I propose to embody in this short paper to be placed before the Second Oriental Conference.

\* A.I.O.C. Proceedings II. Calcutta 1922 pp. 407-12. (Presidential Address at the Indian Philosophy Section)



Prabhakara, Salikanatha and Bhavanatha are the three greatest exponents of the Prabhakara School, so far definitely known to us. Salikanatha, in the first verse of Nitipatha, (section II of the *Prakarana-pancika*), refers to himself as Prabhakara's pupil. In the *Prakarana-pancika*, several quotations from the *Sloka-varttika* are found. For instance, on pp. 5, 114 and 122 of the Benares Sanskrit Series edition of the *Prakarana-pancika*, the following verses from the *Sloka-varttika* are found :—

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा सूत्रमाद्यमिदं कृतम्—p. 5

गेहाभावस्तु यः शुद्धः . . . . . । p. 114

स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्ट्वापि . . . . . । p. 122

Similar quotations from Kumarila Bhatta's *Sloka-varttika* are found in Salikanatha's *Rjuvimala* and *Parisista*, some in the first *adhikarana* and in the sections relating to *Arthapatti* and *Abhava* in the *Tarkapada* of the former work, and some others in the *Tarkapada* of the latter work.

Again, in the *Tarkapada* of the *Rjuvimala*, on the first leaf which, in the palm-leaf manuscript recently brought on loan to the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, is found broken and in a crumbling condition, I find the following portions of the *Avatarika* to the first sentence in the *Brhati* :—

लोक इत्यादि भाष्यं यत्तनौखं प्र . . . . . between तिककारेण व्याख्यातम् । तत्तु मन्दप्रयोजनमिति  
मत्वा टीकाकारः प्रयोजनं दर्शयति — लोक इत्यादि भाष्यस्येत्यादिना ।

The following further extract also from the same broken leaf is worthy of note :—

. . . . . त्वाद्विप्रतिपन्नत्वान्च अथातःशब्दयोरेव अलौकिकार्था शङ्कानिवृत्ति . . . . .  
योजनं . . . . . लौकिक . . . . .

However imperfect the above extracts may be, to my mind it is clear that two inferences could be unmistakably drawn from them. Firstly, Salikanatha assumes that Prabhakara is refuting the views of 'Varttikakara' with reference to the purpose of the opening sentence in the Bhasya. Secondly, Prabhakara interprets the Bhasya-kara as reaffirming the view of an earlier commentator, that 'Athatah' should be interpreted as a single significative unit. Though I agree with Dr. Ganganath Jha in thinking that there might have been more than one Varttikakara and that one of them was Kumarila and the 'Varttikakara' quoted frequently by Salikanatha and Bhavanatha, in support of the Prabhakara doctrines must have been different from Kumarila and probably earlier than both Kumarila and Prabhakara, yet I am strongly inclined to think that the Varttikakara referred to in the above extract from the *Rjuvimala* must be Kumarila himself, one important reason being that the other Varttikakara is generally found invoked only in support of Prabhakara's view and not for offering refutatory comments. The earlier commentator alluded to in the second of the two inferences above set forth, I venture to think is Bhavadasa, the Vrttikara, spoken of as alluded to by Sabarasvamin, in *Slokavarttika*—verses 35<sup>1</sup> and 63<sup>2</sup> of the first sutra. In this connection, it may be noted, with advantage, that Bhavanatha's amplification, in the *Nayaviveka* of the foregoing

1 प्रसिद्धातिः शब्दानामप्रसिद्धे च कल्पना ।

न कार्या वृत्तिकारेण सति सिद्धार्थसम्भवे ॥

2 प्रदर्शनार्थमित्येके केचिन्नानार्थवाचिनः ।

समुदयादवच्छिद्य भवदासेन कल्पितात् ॥



extract from the *Rjuvimala*, carries us considerably further in the belief that Prabhakara's opening remarks in the *Brhati* may be taken as presupposing—

लोक इत्यादिभाष्यस्य पदार्थान् संप्रचक्षते ।

(v. 96, under sutra 1)—*Sloka varttika*.

Salikanatha, who describes himself as Prabhakara's pupil, refers to Mandanamisra in his *Prakarana-pancika* (on p. 178), in which a well-known verse from Mandana's *Vidhiviveka* is quoted, viz. : पुंसां नेष्टाभ्युपायत्वात् । etc. Mandana is generally believed to be one of the pupils of Kumarila-bhatta. Mandana refers to Prabhakara and *Brhati* in the *Vidhiviveka* (already printed) and in the *Brahmasiddhi* (my edition of which, for the first time, is under preparation), in several places with the animus generally characteristic of a contemporaneous opponent. The renowned Vacaspati-misra, known to Vedantic tradition as Saddarsanavallabha, speaks of Prabhakara as the Tikakara in his *Nyayakanika*, and in the same work speaks separately of a Nibandhanakara. In this connection, it is worthy of note that in the *Nyayakanika*, Vacaspati distinguishes between two sets of Prabhakara viz. : *Jaratprabakarāh* and *Navyaprabakarāh*.

In his *Nyayaratnakara*, a commentary on the *Slokavarttika*, Parthasarathi Misra observes as follows under the verse, प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा etc. (p. 4—*Slokavarttika*).

प्रायेणेति—मीमांसा हि भर्तृमित्रादिभिर् अलोकायतीति सती लोकायतीकृता, नित्यनिषिद्धयोरिष्टानिष्टं फलं नास्तीति बह्वपसिद्धान्तपरिग्रहेण ।

It is noteworthy here that the 'apasiddhanta' referred to in this extract is widely known to the world of Indian philosophers as one of the distinctive tenets of the Prabhakara School. If Bhartrmitra, and not Prabhakara, is associated with this tenet as its exponent presupposed by Kumarila, one is tempted to fancy that perhaps Prabhakara's relation to Bhartrmitra was similar to Sankara's relation to Gaudapada.

An old verse traditionally handed down in South India runs thus :

उर्वेकः कारिकां वेत्ति चम्पू वेत्ति प्रभाकरः ।

मण्डनस्तुभयं वेत्ति नोभयं वेत्ति रेवणः ॥

The same verse is found quoted by Mr. S. P. Pandit in his learned introduction to the *Gaudavaho* published in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, with the difference that the words *Tantra* and *Vamana* respectively replace the words *Campu* and *Mandana*. In Mr. S. P. Pandit's introduction to *Gaudavaho* and in the introduction to the *Mahavidyavidambana* recently published in the Gackwad's Oriental Series, it is clearly shown why Umveka should be identified with Bhavabhuti and regarded as one of the pupils of Kumarilabhatta and how, in Citsukha's *Advaitapradipa*, Umveka is spoken of as identical with Bhavabhuti, the author of the *Malatimadhava*. Further, in Ramakrsna's commentry, *Tuktisnehaprapurani*, on the Tarka-pada of the *Sastradipika*, Bhattomveka is referred to on pages 2 and 30 of the Nirnayasagara press edition. The subjoined extract from page 30 of this work appears to leave no alternative except to assume that Umvekabhatta was one of the pupils of Kumarilabhatta.

अत्रोम्बेकभट्टैरिदं वार्तिककारीयं दूषणं समर्थनं च सर्वमेवालूनविशीर्णमित्यादिना : . . . . गुरोरप्यवलिप्तस्यां कार्यकार्यमजानतः । उत्पथं प्रतिपन्नस्य परित्यागो विधीयते ॥—इत्यन्तेन भाष्यं वार्तिकं च दूषितम् ।

In the South Indian version of the verse quoted above, Prabhakara, hemmed in as he is found between two pupils of Kumarila, would appear to be also one of Kumarila's pupils.



The following conclusions may be taken to follow from the above data :—

(1) The tradition that Prabhakara-guru was one of Kumarila's pupils cannot be brushed aside easily, particularly because it is supported by the historically acceptable grounds indicated above.

(2) Prabhakara's *Brhati* could not be assigned to a date earlier than that of Kumarila, if the high authority of Salikanatha and Bhavanatha is accepted.

(3) Prabhakara was not the founder of the Prabhakara School, which according to Parthasarathimisra's *Nyayaratnakara*, must have been represented in the ante-Kumarila period of Mimamsa, by writers like Bhartṛmītra. Probably Bhartṛmītra was the author of the *Prabhakaravarttika* frequently relied upon by Salikanatha.

(4) Bhavadasa was undoubtedly the Vṛttikara, whom, Bhasyakara is interpreted by Kumarila as refuting, and by Prabhakara, in his *Brhati*, as supporting.

(5) The conjecture, that the *Nibandhana* of the Prabhakara School is different from the *Brhati* would appear to be more reasonable than Dr. Jha's conjecture that the *Brhati* is identical with the *Nibandhana*.

(6) Bhavabhūti the poet, alias Bhattomveka, Prabhakara and Mandana were all Bhattakumarila's pupils.

## II

In continuation of the paper read by me in 1922 at Calcutta, as President of the philosophy section of the Second Oriental Conference, it is proposed in this short paper to draw attention to a few noteworthy points which would throw further light on the Prabhakara problem in the history of the Mimamsa-Sastra.

(2) In a Prabhakara-work called the *Mimamsanyaya-kosa*, of which an incomplete ms. is available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, it is clearly stated on p. 10 that the *Varttika-kara* has given *ten* interpretations in *one place* and *six* in *another place*, for the introductory passage (लोक इत्यादि भाष्यम्) in the *Bhāṣya* of *Sabarasvamin* :—

“लोके येष्वर्थेषु-इत्यादेराद्यस्य भाष्यस्य वार्तिककारैरेकत्र दशार्थाः संभावितत्वेनोक्ताः ; तत्र दशमोऽर्थ औचित्यानुभाषणम् । तथा अन्यत्र षड्ार्थाः ; तत्रापि षष्ठमौचित्यानुभाषणम् । ततश्च औचित्यानुभाषणरूपोऽर्थ उभयत्रानुवर्तमान एक एवेति संकलने पञ्चदशैवार्थाः । पृथग्गणने तु षोडशत्वव्यवहारयोग्यता । तदभिप्रायो ‘गुरुः सप्तदशमर्थमाह’ इति विवेकग्रन्थः । तत्र पञ्चदशस्वप्पर्थेषु औचित्यानुभाषणमेव स्वीकृतं वार्तिककारैः । तदप्यनुवादमात्रपरत्वात् वाक्यान्तरार्थत्वात् अथपदमात्रदोषपरत्वात् मन्दमिति परव्याख्यानमयुक्तम्—इति मत्वा ‘लोक इत्यादिभाष्यस्य अथात इत्येतस्मिन् पदद्वये अलौकिकार्थशङ्कानिवृत्तिः प्रयोजनम्’ इति गुरुणा व्याख्यातम् ।”

p. 10 मीसांसान्यायकोश ms. in the Government Oriental MSS. library, Madras.

A careful consideration of this extract, beside the corresponding portion in the Tarkapada of Bhavanatha's *Nayaviveka* and the introductory passage at the beginning of the *Rjuvimala* by Salikanatha, would leave no alternative except to admit the following :—



that the *Paramata* referred to by Bhavanatha in this connection is Varttikakara's view ;

that the same Varttikakara gives six interpretations in one place and ten interpretations in another place ;

that the identity of this Varttikakara with Kumarilabhatta is strongly supported by the text of Kumarila's *Sloka-varttika* beginning with the following verse :—

लोक इत्यादिभाष्यस्य षडर्थान् संप्रचक्षते ।

भाष्यकारानुसारेण प्रयुक्तस्यादितः पृथक् ॥

v. 26 on pp. 8 and 9 Benares ed.

that, as interpreted in the *Mimamsa-nyaya-kosa*, both Salikanatha and Bhavanatha assume that Prabhakara's *Brhati* presupposes Kumarilabhatta's *Varttika* ;

and that एकत्र in the above extracts from the *Mimamsanyaya-kosa* refers to some work by Kumarilabhatta which is not at present known to be available anywhere even in ms. ; and अन्यत्र in the same extract undoubtedly refers to the *Slokavarttika* of the same author.

(3) At present only three of Kumarila's works in Mimamsa are accessible to scholars—viz., the *Slokavarttika*, the *Tantravarttika* and the *Tup-tika*. In addition to these three, two other works named *Madhyamatika* and *Brhattika* are attributed to Kumarila by Madhavasarasvati in his *Sarvadarsana-kaumudi*, a ms. of which is available in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The relevant extract is given below :—

“तत्र सहस्राधिकरणद्वादशलक्षण्या मीमांसायाश्चतुर्विंशतिसहस्रं शबरस्वामिकृतं भाष्यम् । तदुपरि प्रस्थानद्वयम्—  
भाट्टं प्राभाकरमिति । तत्र भट्टाचार्याणां पञ्च व्याख्यानानि भाष्यस्य ; एका बृहट्टीका, द्वितीया मध्यमटीका, तृतीया  
टुष्टीका, चतुर्थी कारिका, पञ्चमं तन्त्रवार्तिकमुक्तानुक्तदुष्टकृतचिन्तकम् । तत्र बृहन्मध्यमटीके सम्प्रति न वर्पेते” ।

(p. 121 of the ms. of the *Sarvadarsana-kaumudi* in the Government Oriental MSS. library, Madras.)

Of the two lost works of Kumarilabhatta, viz. :—*Brhattika* and *Madhyamatika*, extracts from the former are found quoted by Bhatta-Somesvara in his *Ranaka (Nyayasudha)* in several places (vide, for instance, pp. 201, 329, 330 and 393 of the Benares edition of the *Nyayasudha*). In all probability, the *dasapaksi* referred to in the beginning of the *Nayaviveka*, or in other words, the ten interpretations attributed to Varttikakara in the above extracts from the *Mimamsanyaya-kosa*, were given by Kumarilabhatta in one of his two lost works—*Brhattika* or *Madhyamatika*.

(4) At p. 56, line 7, and page 77, line 1 of the ms. of the *Brhati* in the Madras Government Oriental Library, Prabhakara is discovered quoting, in a felicitous manner, the quarter—*अविवेकः परमापदां पदम्* which forms part of the first half of the following oft-quoted verse 30 in the second canto of Bharavi's *Kiratarjuniya*—

“सहसा विदधीत न क्रियामविवेकः परमापदां पदम् ।

वृणते हि विमृश्यकारिणं गुणलुब्धाः स्वयमेव सम्पदः ॥”

This famous verse is generally recognised to be characteristic of the gionic verses in the *Kiratarjuniya* and is sometimes brought into relation with an anecdote as to how Bharavi once very



narrowly escaped committing a most heinous sin. Prabhakara quotes the second quarter of this verse in a context which is inseparably bound up with what is usually considered one of the fundamental doctrines of the Prabhakara epistemology viz :—*akhyativada*. The name *Prabhakara* is almost synonymous with the name *Bharavi*. In the second verse, at page 1 of the *Slokavarttika*, Kumarilabhata does homage to his revered teacher in these terms :—

अभिवन्द्य गुरुनादौ शिष्यधीपद्मिनीरवीन् ।

तत्प्रसादात्करिष्येऽहं मीमांसाश्लोकवार्तिकम् ॥

There is a story which makes out Kumarilabhata as having been guilty of academical treason by his avowed and determined attack of his *guru* and as having atoned for this sin by some kind of self-immolation. And the veteran scholar of Allahabad, Dr. Ganganath Jha, more than thirteen years ago, suggested that Prabhakara's works must be assigned to the *ante-Kumarila* period of Mimamsa. The cumulative effect of all these points is very likely to make itself felt in a strong temptation to equate *Prabhakara* with the poet *Bharavi*, whom the Aihole inscription of 634 A.D. refers to as a famous poet, and to assign Prabhakara to the earlier part of the seventh century A.D. in agreement with Dr. Keith. (see Dr. Keith's *Karma-Mimamsa*, p. 9, the Heritage of India series). There is, however, conclusive evidence which makes it impossible for careful scholars to yield to this temptation. At page 84 of the Madras Government Oriental Library manuscript of the *Brhati*, in lines 13 and 14, the following quotation is found :—

“तदुक्तम्—ऋषीणामपि (यज्ञानां (?)) (यज्ज्ञानं) तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ।”

This represents the second half of 1-30 of Bhartrhari's *Vakyapadiya*. The full text of the verse is:—

“न चागमादुक्ते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।

ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ॥”

Page 15, Benares edition of *Vakyapadiya*.

In fact, Prabhakara is discovered using in a somewhat waggish way, the very name of Bhartrhari's famous work—*Vakyapadiya*, in connection with his exposition of the *Anvitabhidhana* doctrine ; and this will be evident from the following extract :—

“अत एते पदार्थाः, एवमभिधानानि, तदिदं वाक्यपदीयम् ; अन्यथा ह्यवगम्यमानः पदार्थविवेकोऽपह्नुतिर्भ भवति ”

(lines 3 & 4 at page 89 of the Madras Government Oriental Library manuscript of the *Brhati*.)

it seems to me obvious that Prabhakara is referring at p. 35 of his *Brhati* (Madras manuscript), to the Sphota-doctrine as stated by Bhartrhari ; and at p. 55, lines 12 and 13, and at the end of p. 58 and beginning of p. 59, in the same ms., that phase of the Advaita system is referred to, which, in the pre-Samkara stage, should be specially associated with Gaudapada. According to the Chinese pilgrim, I-tsing, Bhartrhari's death took place about 650 A.D. ; and Prabhakara, who makes use of Bhartrhari's *Vakyapadiya* should certainly be considerably later than 650 A.D.

(5) In the Madras ms. of the *Sarvadarsana-Kaumudi* by Madhava-sarasvati, referred to above, it is stated that Prabhakara wrote two commentaries on the *Sabara-bhasya*, viz. *Vivarana* and *Nibandhana*. The following extract gives this information and some interesting particulars about the Prabhakara literature.



“प्राभाकरप्रस्थानं तु—भाष्यस्य प्रभाकरकृतं व्याख्यानद्वयम् । एकं विवरणं पट्सहस्ररूपं । अपरो निबन्धनसंज्ञः द्वादशसहस्रम् । विवरणस्य ऋजुविमला, निबन्धनस्य दीपशिखा, टीकाद्वयं शालिकनाथकृतं प्रकरणं शालिकानाम् । नयविवेको भवनाथकृतं प्रकरणं द्वादशसहस्रम् । तट्टीका वरदराजकृता अष्टचत्वारिंशत्साहस्री ।”

(P. 122 of the *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* ms.)

From the foregoing extract, it is clear that Prabhakara's *Brhati* should be identified with the *Vivarana*, and the *Nibandhana*, which Dr. Jha identifies with the *Brhati* (see lines 18 and 19 at p. 9 of Dr. Jha's book—*Prabhakara school*), turns out to be different from the *Brhati*; for the commentary on the *Vivarana*, called *Rjuvimala*, by Salikanatha, deals with the *Brhati* and not with the *Nibandhana*. The colophon 'इति प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे' reported by Dr. Jha as found at the end of the second pada of the second Adhyaya in the *Brhati* ms. belonging to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, supports the identification of the *Brhati* with the *Vivarana*. On p. 413 of the Benares edition of Mandanamisra's *Vidhiviveka* with Vacaspatimisra's *Nyayakanika* while commenting upon the text

“नह्येप प्रयोगविधेर्विषयः अननुष्ठेयत्वाद्, अशब्दार्थत्वात्, क्रमवद्व्यतिरेकेणेदन्तया अनिरूपणात् ।”

Vacaspatimisra observes—

“तत्र विवरणकृतो हेतुमाह—अननुष्ठेयत्वात् । निबन्धनकृतो हेतुमाह—अशब्दार्थत्वात् ।”

With reference to the same question relating to *krama*, as dealt with in the 3rd and 5th chapters (तार्तीयक्रम and पाञ्चमिकक्रम), Parthasarathimisra says at page 148 of his *Nyayaratnamala*, Benares edition—

“तस्मात्सर्व एव तार्तीयः पाञ्चमिकश्च क्रमो न विधेयः—इति विवरणकारः । निबन्धनकारस्त्वाह—भवतु तार्तीयक्रमस्य संख्यायाश्चैकादशादिकाया अभिधानसम्भवात् ग्रहणेन विध्यैदमर्थे सति विध्याक्षिप्तानुष्ठानतया विधेयत्वम्, नत्वेवं पाञ्चमिकस्य क्रमस्य सम्भवति ; न हि तस्य किञ्चिदभिधानमस्ति ।”

Prabhakara's remarks at the beginning of the first adhikarana of the 5th chapter of the *Brhati* are in perfect agreement with what is stated by Vacaspatimisra and Parthasarathimisra in the above extracts as the view held by Vivaranakara.

(6) Salikanatha is the oldest commentator on Prabhakara's works, who is definitely known to us. He could not have been removed from Prabhakara by a long interval. In fact, he seems to have been one of Prabhakara's pupils. In this connection, the following extract from page 31 of the Benares edition of the *Prakaranapancika* may, with advantage, be considered, beside the first verse of the Nitipatha—section 2 of the *Prakaranapancika*—

“अर्थसिंस्पर्शिताशङ्का यथा शब्दस्य दायते ।

प्रभाकरगुरोः शिष्यैस्तथा यत्नो विधीयते ॥”

(Page 23 *Prakaranapancika*, Benares edition).

“यद् बह्वीषु ज्वालास्वेकवर्तिवर्तिनीषु ज्वालात्वं सामान्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञागोचरः कैश्चिदिष्यते, तदपि गुरुरस्माकं मृष्यति”

(P. 31, lines 20, 21 Ibid)

Mandanamisra quotes at page 199 of his *Vidhiviveka* (Benares edition), the following extract appearing at page 10, line 18 of the Madras manuscript of the *Brhati* :—

“कर्तव्यताविषयो नियोगः न पुनः कर्तव्यतामाह”



While commenting upon this extract, Vacaspatimisra makes these remarks :—

“अत्रैव जरत्प्राभाकरोन्नीतार्थं गुरोर्वचः सङ्गच्छत इत्याह . . . . . नवीनास्तुनयन्ति—अनिरूपितनियोगव्यापारस्येदं चोद्यमित्युपक्रम्येदमुक्तम् । कर्तव्यताविषयः . . . . . इति । यागकर्तव्यतानुष्ठानं विषयो यस्य नियोगस्य स तथा । तेन हि, नियोगः साध्यते, न पुनर्नियोगो यागस्यानुष्ठानं ज्ञापयति ।”

—P. 103, Benares edition of the *Nyayakanika*, with the text of the *Vidhiviveka*

The above extract from the *Brhati* quoted by Mandana is found explained as follows in the Madras Government Oriental Library manuscript of the *Rju-vimala*—

“टीकार्थस्तु अनिरूपितनियोगव्यापारस्य—न निरूपित उपादानलक्षणो नियोगव्यापारो येन तस्य—इदं चोद्यम् । यागकर्तव्यतानुष्ठानं विषयो नियोगस्य, तेन नियोगः साध्यते न तु नियोगो यागस्यानुष्ठानं ज्ञापयति ।”

(*Rju-vimala*-Tarkapada page 24—lines 14 to 17).

From these extracts it will be seen that what Vacaspatimisra attributes to the *navyas* is identical with what Salikanatha says in this connection in his *Rju-vimala*. Probably the *Jarat-prabhakara* referred to by Vacaspati in the above extract from the *Nyayakanika* was but an older contemporary of Salikanatha and an earlier commentator on Prabhakara's *Brhati*, such references to older and younger contemporaries as *pracyas* and *navyas* being very common in Indian tradition, as for instance, in the case of Jagadisa and Gadadhara in the history of Nyaya. It must be remembered that Vacaspati's date is 841 A.D. and he presupposes both Samkara (788-820 A.D.) and Mandana. Salikanatha quotes from Kumarila in several places in his *Prakaranapancika* and *Rju-vimala*. The following quotation, for instance, occurs at p. 64 of the Madras ms. of the *Rju-vimala*, Tarkapada-

तदाहुर्वातिककारमिश्रा :—

गम्यमानस्य चार्थस्य नैव दृष्टं विशेषणम् ।

शब्दान्तरैर्विभक्त्या वा धूमोऽयं ज्वलतीतिवत् ॥” इति

(See p. 858 lines 4 and 5 of the *Slokavarttika*, Benares:)

On pp. 5, 114 and 122 of the Benares edition of the *Prakaranapancika* quotations from the *Slokavarttika* occur, as already pointed out by me elsewhere. (See p. 408 of the *Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*). At p. 178 of his *Prakaranapancika*, Salikanatha quotes the following verses from Mandana's *Vidhiviveka*:

“पुंसां नेष्टाभ्युपायत्वात् . . . . . ।”

P. 243 Benares edition of the *Vidhiviveka*.

“कर्तुरिष्टाभ्युपाये हि . . . . . ॥”

P. 302 *Ibid*.

From a perusal of the text of Mandana's *Brahmasiddhi*, (my edition, under the auspices of the Madras Government, Oriental Mss. Library) it will be seen that Salikanatha in the course of his refutation of the *Advaitasiddhanta* at pp. 154 and 155 of the *Prakaranapancika* quotes the second verse of the Tarka-kanda of the *Brahmasiddhi*. That Salikanatha definitely presupposes Mandana's *advaita*, and not Sankara's is a fact which is full of significance in this connection. In my critical introduction to my edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*, it has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Mandana-Suresvara equation in the history of Advaita is a myth; that Mandana is a representative Advaitin



of the pre-Samkara stage in the history of *Advaita*, who closely follows, whenever possible Bhartṛhari's *Sābdadvaitasiddhanta* ; that Vacaspatimisra, only slightly later than Samkara, reconciles, as far as possible, the views of *Mandana* and *Samkara*, who have shown sharp divergences in many respects ; and that *Mandana* is not, but *Suresvara* undoubtedly is, a disciple of *Samkara*.

(7) *Bhattomveka*, already referred to by me elsewhere (see pp. 410 and 411 of the *Proceedings of the Second Conference*) is found to be the author of a commentary on *Mandana's Bhavanaviveka*, which was edited by Dr. Jha and published recently as No. 6 of the Princess of Wale's *Sarasvati Bhavana* Texts, in Benares. A careful consideration of the independent discussion closing with the verse "बहुवर्गवर्तमश्नुन् . . . . ." in the commentary at p. 76 of the *Bhavanaviveka* and of the *Varia Lectio* "प्राधान्यं तन्निबन्धनादिति (न) समीचीनः पाठः" noted in the commentary at p. 77, line 18 of the same work, renders highly dubious the identity between *Mandana* and *Bhattomveka*, which is found to be proposed by Dr. Jha in his introduction to the *Bhavanaviveka* ; for, it would be absurd to suppose that the author of the *Bhavanaviveka* is himself referring to a variant reading in his own work. It is worthy of note that, at p. 43 of the *Bhavanaviveka*, in lines 16 and 17 (Benares edition), *Bhattomveka* refers to *Kumarila* as *Bhattachapada* and as *Guru*, while quoting the following verse from the *Tantravarttika* p. 351 Benares edition :—

"यथोक्तं भट्टपादैः—“अन्यदेवहि धात्वर्थं(यागादौ) सामान्यं करणात्मकम् । यथोक्तं गुरुणा—अन्यच्च भावना नाम साध्यत्वेन व्यवस्थितम् ॥”

Would it be too much to say, at this stage, that it would follow as a legitimate conclusion from the above data considered in relation to the data already furnished by me elsewhere (see pp. 408 to 412 of the *Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*), that *Prabhakara*, *Mandana* and *Umveka* (*Bhavabhuti*) might have been younger contemporaries of *Kumarila*, who might safely be assigned to the beginning of the 8th century A.D., that *Salikanatha* and *Umveka* might have been younger than *Prabhakara* and *Mandana*, and that all these *Mimamsakas* might well have preceded *Samkaracarya* ?



## NYAYA-VAISESIKA—ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT\*

### Preliminary : Logic in the West and in India

In the cultural history of Europe, over twenty-two centuries ago, thinking, like speaking, needed an elucidative and regulative aid and found it in a distinct branch of investigation, which was founded and organised in Greece by Aristotle and which came to be designated *Logic*. It is significant that the name *logic* is etymologically connected with the Greek word *logos*, which denotes both 'thought' and 'word' or 'discourse'. The significance of this etymological connection can be adequately appreciated if it is remembered that *logic*, in its rise and development in the western world, particularly in Greece, was closely connected with *rhetoric*. Thus the name *logic* is of a tell-tale character in its application to logic in the West ; and it may be taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, western logic found itself in the firm grip of formalism and how it took more than twenty centuries for the scientific method underlying Aristotle's *Organon* to be redeemed, brought into prominence and implemented in the *Novum Organum* of Francis Bacon (1561—1626). The term *logic* should not be taken to carry with it all these implications of European history when it is used in the phrase *Indian logic*. This phrase is usually rendered by the Sanskrit equivalents—*anviksiki*, *nyayavistara*, *nyayadarsana*, *tarkasastra* and *pramanasastra*. It is also usual to describe *Indian logic* by the anglicised phrase *Nyaya-Vaisesika system* and it is usually described thus in this work. All these phrases are significant and appropriate in one way or other, particularly in view of the place which Indian logic occupies in the cultural history of India and of the manner in which it arose and grew—not as a mere grammar of thinking, but as an orthodox (*astika*) system of philosophy with a special stress on the science of methodical reasoning in both its inductive and deductive aspects, this science forming its dominant and distinctive part. Indian logic is *anviksiki* or *nyayavistara* or *nyayadarsana* in the sense that it is a philosophical system, of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme ; it is pre-eminently the science of ratiocination or *tarkasastra* ; and in contrast with the *padasastra* or "the science of grammar" (*Vyakarana*) and with the *vakyasastra* or "the exegetics" (*Mimamsa*), it is described as the *pramanasastra* or the epistemological science, chiefly concerned with valid knowledge and its sources. That Indian logic is usually described as the *Nyaya-Vaisesika system* is not because it is the result of the *syncretism* of the two opposing systems—Nyaya realism and Atomistic pluralism ; rather it is so described because at a very early stage in the history of Indian logic, the Vaisesika stress on the *inductive* phase of inference came to be synthesised with its *deductive* phase in the Nyaya theory of syllogistic reasoning. Those who are familiar with Western logic and desirous of studying Indian logic from a historical and comparative point of view will do well to bear in mind the fact that, while one may find striking parallels in the Indian and Western systems of logic, one should not be misled by such parallels and lose sight of the fundamental differences in respect of scope and method, which Indian logic discloses in its rise and development, as compared with Western logic.

### Antecedents and foreshadowings of the Vaisesika and Nyaya

The story of India's quest for truth and of India's attempts to lay out suitable ways and approaches to truth is long and varied and it has been reconstructed with a considerable measure

\* Introduction to Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri's "Primer of Indian Logic," Published by K.S.R. Institute, 1932, 1951, 1961.



of success by several eminent scholars, Indian and alien, from the ancient literary monuments of India, which are mostly in the form of Sanskrit works. In all this quest and these attempts, a careful student of the history of Indian philosophical thought may discern, almost from the very beginning, two tendencies—the *intuitionistic* and the *rationalistic*, and two chief aims—the achievement of *Dharma* and the realisation of *Brahman*. If one of the Rg-Vedic seers could be said to have boldly intuited the *monistic absolute* in the well-known verse “That *One* breathed breathlessly by itself” (*Anidavatam svadhaya tadekam* : Rv. X. 129.2), it would not be far-fetched to find the rationalistic exhortation of another Rg-Vedic seer in the verse “Meet one another, discuss and understand your minds” (*Samgacchadhvam samvadadhvam sam vo manamsi janatam* : Rv. X. 191.2). These two tendencies came to exhibit themselves throughout the Vedic age, in close association with the two aims mentioned above. On one side, as a result of the influence of the rationalistic tendency on the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, ritualistic and exegetic doctrines, which, in due time, emerged as Jaimini’s system of Purva-Mimamsa, were developed. And, on the other side, the combined workings of the intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direction of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led to the emergence of the Upanisadic philosophy of *Atman*. This philosophy was marked by a pronounced emphasis on the efficacy and value of intuition, which culminated in Badarayana’s system of Vedanta. The dominant feature of the philosophy of the Upanisads is its monistic absolutism, which led up, within the Upanisadic period itself, to rationalistic reactions of different types, representing collateral and casual phases of Upanisadic thought—some of them coming to be systematised later on in the dualism and realism of Kapila’s Samkhya and the allied discipline of Patanjali’s Yoga, some others eventually giving rise to the pluralistic rationalism of Kanada’s *Vaisesika* system and its complementary *Nyaya* of Gautama, and yet others emerging as anti-Vedistic rebels in the form of the *Jaina may-be-ism* (*syadvada*), the *Bauddha idealism* (*vijnanavada*) and nihilism (*sunyavada*), and the *Carvaka materialism*. All these post-Upanisadic systems came to be called *darsanas* (*darsanani*). It should be noted here that the term ‘system’ is very inadequate as the English equivalent of the Sanskrit word ‘*darsana*’. While the former word brings into prominence the idea of systematisation, the latter word brings into relief the fact that the plenary intuition of *truth* or *spirit* (*tattvadarsana* or *atmadarsana*), which a gifted saint or seer came to have, lies at the *root* of every system of Indian philosophy and forms its *fruit* also. A long-established and widely accepted tradition classifies these *darsanas* into *nastika* and *astika*. The history of the meaning of these two words throws some light on the manner in which the ground of classification happened to be shifted under varying circumstances. Panini’s sutra 4.4.60 (*asti nasti distam matih*) gives the derivation of the words *astika*, *nastika* and *daistika* : and according to Panini, *astika* is “one who believes in the other world”, *nastika* is “one who does not believe in the other world” and *daistika* is a ‘pre-destinarian’ or ‘fatalist’. This is the oldest recorded explanation of these words. On the basis of this explanation, even Jainism, and Buddhism in some of its aspects, could be described as *astika* systems. An old popular tradition would take the word *astika* in the sense of “one who believes in God”. If this should be accepted, Jaimini’s Purva-Mimamsa and Kapila’s Samkhya, which are usually included in the *astika* list, ought to be dropped from that list, as they do not recognise *Ivara*. A post-Buddhistic, but pre-Christian, tradition fixed the meaning of the word *astika* as “one who believes in the infallibility and the supreme authority of the Veda” and of the word *nastika* as “one who does not believe in it”. This tradition has been widely accepted for a long time. According to this, the Samkhya and Yoga, the Vaisesika and Nyaya, the Purva-Mimamsa and Vedanta are described as *astika-darsanas*, and the Carvaka, Jaina and Bauddha systems as *nastika-darsanas*. In this context, whenever the terms *orthodox* and *heterodox* happen to be used as the English equivalents of *astika* and *nastika*, it should be remembered that they have reference to belief and disbelief in the authority of the Veda.



Though the first beginnings of the Vaisesika and Nyaya systems are misty in certain respects, a careful student is not likely to miss the foreshadowings of the central doctrine of these systems in the Upanisads. In the well-known three-fold scheme of self-culture leading to self-realisation, as taught in the oft-quoted Upanisadic text "Verily, Maitreyi, the *Spirit* should be realised, heard, discussed and constantly contemplated upon" (*Atma va are drastavyas srotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavyah*—Brhad. IV. 5), it is generally accepted that hearing or initial comprehension (*sravana*) represents the inaugural stage, investigation and discussion with the help of reason (*manana*) represent the central stage and constant contemplation (*nididhyasana*) stands for the culminating stage. The grim spiritual teacher of the Kathopanishad, *Death (Tama)*, pulls up the rationalist of the Upanisadic age with the warning "Self-realisation cannot be got through ratiocination or *tarka*" (*Naisa tarkena matirapaneya*—Katha II. 9). From these foreshadowings of deliberate attempts to exercise reason, when considered together with the fact that philosophical debates such as those that were carried on under the auspices of Ajatasatru and Janaka were very common during the Upanisadic age, the inference is irresistible that, already during the period of the Upanisads, some logical doctrines should have not only begun to appear, but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.

#### **How the Vaisesika and Nyaya schools emerged and when their doctrines were redacted into Sutras**

Before the end of the Upanisadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and Upanisadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. This should have resulted in the development of the pre-Buddhistic Nyaya method in close association with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier use of the term Nyaya in the sense of "the principles and the logical method of Mimamsa exegetics." This also accounts for the fact that, even after the disentanglement of the Nyaya logic from Vedic exegetics, the legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yajnavalkya emphatically recognised the importance and value of logical reasoning (*tarka*) in a correct comprehension of *dharma* as taught by the Vedas (*Manu* XII. 105 and 106 ; *Yajnavalkya* I, 3). Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thralldom of Vedic religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into the Samkhya thought of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaisesika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis and with a simple rationalistic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge—perception and inference (*pratyaksa* and *anumana*). It is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of the pre-Buddhistic Samkhya and the anti-Vedic logic and epistemology of the pre-Buddhistic Vaisesika paved the way for the development and systematisation of Buddhism. It may here be borne in mind that Buddhistic tradition, as preserved in ancient Chinese records, readily recognises the priority of the Samkhya and the Vaisesika to Buddhism. (See *Ui's Vaisesika Philosophy*, pages 3 and 4.)

About the fifth century B.C., when the anti-Vedic movements of Buddhism rose and began to spread, the exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt the need for showing greater accommodation to rationalistic modes of thought. The rationalistic resources available for Vedic religion and philosophy had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive and offensive use, as against the impact from collision with *avaidika* developments. On the one side, it was found easy to disentangle from its Vedistic environment the logical method (*Nyaya*) of Vedic exegetics ; and



on the other side, to bring the unfettered methods of reasoning and analysis known to the early Vaisesika under the influence of the attempts for *rapprochement* made by the Vaidika thinkers turned out to be an easy task, chiefly as a result of the disquieting nihilistic excesses of early Buddhism. Thus, the *Nyaya* of the Vedic exegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early *anti-Vedic Vaisesika* came to fraternise with each other and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning—the *Vaisesika school* mainly concerned with inductive observation and analysis, and the *Nyaya school* chiefly concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoning. These two schools should have appeared in a fairly definite form, with their characteristic methods of reasoning and metaphysics, by the middle of the fourth century B.C. though the chief doctrines of these schools came to be systematised and redacted in their basic sutras at a relatively later date. This statement may receive good support from the following facts, if they could be taken to be conclusively established. Bhadrabahu, a Jaina sage, whose activity as a Jaina logician may be assigned to about 357 B.C., was quite familiar with an old theory of ten-membered syllogism. The Nyaya logic was known to Katyayana of the fourth century B.C., as Goldstucker has shown in his work on "*Panini and his Place in Sanskrit Literature*". Badarayana's Vedanta-sutras (II-ii 11 to 17) definitely presuppose the Vaisesika. The *Lalitavistara* and *Milindaparha* mention the Vaisesika. Even the Vaisesika-sutras, which were, in all probability, produced later than the middle of the fourth century B.C., do not controvert any of the Buddhistic doctrines, while Buddhistic tradition generally recognises the pre-Buddhistic origin of the Vaisesika. These considerations, which tend to show that the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools came into being in a definite form before the middle of the fourth century B.C., cannot be lightly brushed aside.

The doctrines of these two schools were systematised and redacted in the form of the Nyaya-sutras and Vaisesika-sutras. The authorship of the former is ascribed to Gautama, and that of the latter to Kanada. According to the generally accepted Indian tradition, which goes back to the early centuries of the Christian era, Gautama is otherwise known as Aksapada and Kanada is otherwise known as Uluka and Kasyapa. It will be obvious to those who are familiar with the traditions of ancient India that *Aksapada* was the *personal* name and *Gautama* the *gotra*-name of the author of the Nyaya-sutras, and that *Kanada* and *Uluka* are the *personal* names and *Kasyapa* the *gotra*-name of the author of the Vaisesika-sutras, in the same way as *Paksilasvamin* is the *personal* name and *Vatasyana* the *gotra* name of the author of the Nyayabhasya. Though the exact dates of Kanada and Gautama are not known, the dates of their sutras can be fixed within fairly definite limits. Jacobi, in his well-known article on the date of the philosophical sutras (*Journal of the American Oriental Society* XXXI, 1911), endeavours to show that the Nyaya-sutras and the Brahma-sutras were redacted between 200 and 500 A.D., that the Vaisesika-sutras and Mimamsa-sutras were redacted at a somewhat earlier date, that the redaction of the Yoga-sutras should be assigned to about 450 A.D., and that the Samkhya-sutras were produced at a much later date, later than the fourteenth century. With regard to the Samkhya-sutras, it is generally accepted that they were composed later than the fourteenth century, though the *Tattva-samasa*, which may be regarded as the nucleus of the basic sutras of the Samkhya system, is perhaps older than Isvarakrsna and the Christian era and is certainly older than the *Bhagavadgita*, a farce earlier than the seventh century A.D. (See *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. II. pages 145 to 147). If the Bhiksu-sutra referred to in IV. iii. 110 of Panini's *Astadhyayi* and the Brahma-sutra mentioned in XIII, 4 of the Gita could be taken to refer to Badarayana's Brahmasutras, it would be difficult to accept, without due reservations, Jacobi's argument in its application to the Vedanta-sutras. The name Patanjali, borne by the author of the Yoga-sutras, presents some difficulties to Jacobi, as the date of Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, is accepted to be the middle of the 2nd century B.C. But Jacobi would attempt to differentiate



the author of the Mahabhasya from the author of the Yoga-sutras, though, as a matter of fact, the ancient tradition identifying the two Patanjalis is sound and maintainable on reasonable grounds. The central point of Jacobi's argument relates to the internal evidences furnished by the nature of the Buddhist doctrines controverted in some of these sutras. The Nyaya-sutras, according to Jacobi, refute the nihilistic *sunya-vada* of Nagarjuna (3rd century A.D. circa) and do not refute the idealistic *vijnana-vada* of Asanga and Vasubandhu (middle of the 4th century A.D.). But, according to Vatsyayana and Vacaspatimisra, the Nyaya-sutra IV. 2.26 refutes the *vijnana-vada*. It should also be remembered here that the *sunya-vada* and *vijnana-vada* doctrines were not introduced in the world for the first time by Nagarjuna and Asanga and Vasubandhu and that, before these Buddhist teachers, these old doctrines had been in existence for a long time. Even if this line of argument adopted by Jacobi should be accepted as satisfactory, it does not touch the Vaisesika-sutras; and if the obverse of this argument were to be applied to these sutras, the logical result would be that they should be held to be pre-Buddhistic. Kautaliya Arthasastra mentions the types of thought comprising *anviksiki* in the statement :—*Samkhyam yogo lokayatam cetyanviksiki* (Vol. I. page 27, Trivandrum edition). Though the date of the Kautaliya is not yet finally settled, the general trend of well-informed and unprejudiced opinion among Indian and alien Indologists is in favour of assigning that great work to 304 B.C. In this extract from the Kautaliya, there is no specific mention of Nyaya or Vaisesika as such. Attention is drawn by Ui and Randle to noteworthy cases of parallelism between the Vaisesika-sutras and Nyaya-sutras, in which it would be more reasonable to say that the former sutras were used in the composition of the latter (See Ui's "*Vaisesika philosophy*", Introduction, page 16, note 1; and Randle's "*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*", Introduction, page 7, note 1). There is evidence to show that the sixth Jaina schism (18 A.D.) presupposes the Vaisesika redaction (Ui's "*Vaisesika philosophy*", Introduction, page 34). Chiefly, on these grounds, it is surmised by several scholars that the Vaisesika-sutras should have been redacted in the pre-Christian era, subsequent to 300 B.C.; and that the Nyaya-sutras should have been redacted about the time of Nagarjuna and Deva, between 150 and 250 A.D. may be inferred from the fact that the sutras 2.2.17—19 seem to presuppose the refutatory comments in Nagarjuna's *Vigrahavyavartani* on the realistic position regarding the relation between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇya* (Ui's *Vaisesika Philosophy*, Introduction pages 84 to 86). Randle concludes that the "Vaisesika and Nyaya were systematised between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D., the Vaisesika being the earlier of the two"; and that "the indications, such as they are, point to the beginning of the first century A.D., as the latest date for the systematisation of the Vaisesika". (Randle's "*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*", Introduction, pages 16 and 17.)

These conclusions, based as they are on good grounds as far as they go, would appear to require reconsideration on a careful scrutiny of all the evidences available. That the redaction of the Nyaya-sutras presupposes that of the Vaisesika-sutras may be readily admitted. It is not easy to establish that the Vaisesika-sutras were redacted subsequent to 300 B.C., on the ground that the name Vaisesika is not contained in the extract from the Kautaliya quoted above. Those who are sufficiently familiar with the use of the word *yoga* in its old sense of *vaisesika*, as it is found used, for instance, in Vatsyayana's *bhasya* on 1.1.29, are not likely to consider it a strained interpretation to take the word *yoga*, as used in the Kautaliya, in the sense of *vaisesika*. In fact, according to Vacaspatimisra's *Tatparyatika* and the *Bhasyacandra* on the *bhasya* on 1.1.29, the word *yoga* may be taken in the somewhat comprehensive sense of Nyaya, including the Vaisesika, the Nyaya being a philosophical school laying special stress upon *yoga* or *yukti* or reasoning (*yogo yuktih pradhanataya vidyate yesam*—*Bhasyacandra*, Further, in the extract quoted above from the Kautaliya, scholars have generally overlooked one important point, to which sufficient prominence ought to be given in this connection. In chapter 2, the *Vidyasamuddesa* section of the Kautaliya, the chief branches of knowledge (*vidya*), according



to Kautalya, are stated at the outset. These are four :—*anviksiki* (logic and philosophy), *trayi* (the Vedic religion and philosophy of *dharma* and *adharma*), *varta* (the economic science and philosophy of wealth) and *dandaniti* (the science and philosophy of polity). Then there is a reference to the view of the *Manavas* (Manu's disciples or ancient legislators), according to which *anviksiki* should be regarded as a special part of *trayi*. This view, it may be noted, is consistent with the spirit of the Vedic and Upanisadic age, when *logic* (Nyaya) had not yet been disentangled from its applications to Vedic religion and philosophy. There is also a further reference to the materialistic doctrine of the Carvakas (the followers of Brhaspati), that *trayi* (including *anviksiki*) is only a pretension or imposture of one who knows the ways of the world and that only *varta* and *dandaniti* should be reckoned with as the two real *vidyas*. The followers of Usanas (the teacher of the Asuras) are afterwards referred to as recognising only one *vidya*—viz., the *dandaniti*. At the end of this chapter, Kautalya reiterates his views about the four branches of learning and explains their nature and aim. In the concluding para of this chapter, he makes two important observations. One is to the effect that *anviksiki* consists of Samkhya, Yoga and Lokayata. The other is that *anviksiki* is helpful to the world through its ratiocinative process in the investigation of the soundness or unsoundness of the conclusions and doctrines of the different branches of knowledge.

*Samkhyam yogo lokayatam cetyanviksiki. Dharmadharmau trayyam. Arthanarthau vartayam. Balabale  
cailasam hetubhiranviksamana anviksiki lokasyopakaroti ; vyasane abhyudaye ca buddhimavasthapayati ;  
prajnavakyakriyavaisaradyam ca karoti.*

*Pradipah sarvaavidyayam upayah sarvakarmaram |  
Asrayah sarvadharmaram sarvadanviksiki mata ||*

(Pages 27 and 28 of Vol. 1 of the Kautaliya, Trivandrum edition.)

It is evident here that Kautaliya elucidates the two meanings of the term *anviksiki*. One is the general sense, *philosophical enquiry or philosophy*. In this sense, it is used in the first sentence of the above extract. As already pointed out, the word *yogah* in this sentence refers to the Vaisesika logic ; or even if it be taken in the special sense of the *yoga* discipline of Patanjali's system, the word *lokeyata* does not refer to the materialism of the Carvakas, but very probably it refers to the logic of the Vaisesika and Nyaya in its secularised form and as disentangled from its Vedic associations. It should be noted here that the view of the Carvaka materialist is separately mentioned in a previous part of the same chapter and Kautalya rejects it and is not prepared to bring the Carvaka doctrine under any recognised *vidya* or branch of learning. Vatsyayana, in the concluding part of his *bhasya* on 1.1.1, amplifies the second sense of the word *anviksiki*, i.e.—“logic which investigated by means of rationalistic methods” (*hetubhiranviksamana*) and gives Kautalya's verse quoted above, with its last quarter modified as “*vidyoddesa prakirtita*”. It is quite clear from this amended quarter of the verse, as given by Vatsyayana, that he is quoting from the *Vidyasamuddesa* section of the Kautaliya. It is hardly necessary to point out that a careful consideration of the above extract from the Kautaliya in comparison with its striking parallel in Vatsyayana's *bhasya* on 1.1.1 would make it very difficult to believe that *anviksiki*, in the sense of “system of logic”, was not presupposed by the *Arthasastra* of Kautalya. Further, a careful consideration of the extract from Nagarjuna's *Vigrahavyavartani*, which Ui gives in pages 84 and 85 of his introduction to the “*Vaisesika philosophy*”, in comparison with its parallel in the Nyaya-sutras 2.2.17—19, would tend to show that Nagarjuna is presupposing these sutras and refuting the view embodied in them, rather than support Ui's inference in the reverse direction. Patanjali, at the end of his *bhasya* on Panini's 3.2.123, remarks—“Other thinkers hold that there is nothing known as the *present time*” (*Apara aha—asti vartamam kala iti*) and gives five verses in support of this view. This portion of the *Mahabhasya* closes with the remark “Another



thinker holds that there is such a thing as the *present time*, and it is not perceived in the same way as the Sun's motion is not perceived" (*Apara aha—asti vartamanah kalah*) and supports this view with one verse. Between this portion of the Mahabhasya and the Nyaya-sūtras 2.1.40—44, there is a striking parallelism, which none can miss. A careful consideration of these two texts would lead to the impression that Patanjali is here using not only the ideas in the Nyaya-sūtras referred to, but also the phraseology in those sūtras, in his characteristically graphic narration of a discourse between two imaginary dialoguists. All these considerations may reasonably lead to the conclusion that the Vaisesika-sūtras and the Nyaya-sūtras were redacted between the middle of the fourth century and second century B.C., perhaps towards the end of the fourth century B.C., the Vaisesika-sūtras being earlier than the Nyaya-sūtras.

### **The names Vaisesika and Nyaya ; the nature, aim and scope of the two systems**

It is generally accepted that the names *Vaisesikadarsana* and *Nyaya-darsana* are based upon the terms—*visesa* and *nyaya*. It is not possible now to ascertain exactly what these two terms signified to the early exponents of these two systems, who were responsible for devising and introducing these two names. According to an old tradition recorded by the Chinese Buddhists—*Ci-tsan* (549-623 A.D.) and *Kiwei-ci* (632-682 A.D.), Kanada's work came to be called the *Vaisesika-sastra*, since it excelled works of the other systems, more especially the Samkhya and it was differentiated from them, the term *vaisesika* being taken in the sense of "superior to" or "distinct from". (See *Ui's Vaisesika Philosophy*—pp. 3 to 7). Indian tradition is in favour of connecting the name *Vaisesika* with the doctrine of *specialities* (*visesah*), *visesa* being regarded as the distinctive category of the *Vaisesika* scheme of categories. The Vaisesika-sūtra—1.1.4—which practically represents the beginning of Kanada's sūtras, lays special emphasis, not upon any of the categories, but upon "the comprehension of truth through similarities and dissimilarities" (*sadharmyavaidharmyabhyam tattvajnanam*)—upon the striking out of the *one* in the *many*; and this amounts to an unmistakable stress on "the *analytic* or *inductive* method of philosophical reasoning". Gautama's *Nyaya-darsana* took its name from *nyaya*, which means "the *synthetic* or *deductive* method of syllogistic demonstration". Gautama's system lays particular stress on the synthetic method of syllogistic reasoning. One of the earlier meanings of the term *nyaya* is "exegetic principle or maxim"; and after logical reasoning had been released from *Vedic exegesis*, the term *nyaya* developed the specialised sense of syllogistic reasoning. The appropriateness of using the term *nyaya*, in this specialised sense, as the name of Gautama's system lies not only in the historical connection between the Nyaya and Mimamsa systems; but it lies also in the fact that the term *nyaya* means *illustration* or *example* and that example (*udaharana*) is the most important of the five members constituting Gautama's syllogistic expression. Thus it may be seen that the names *vaisesika* and *nyaya* may be connected with the two aspects of sound reasoning—the *analytic* or *inductive* aspect which mounts up from particulars (*visesa*) to the general or universal (*samanya*) and the *synthetic* or *deductive* aspect which moves on from the universal (*samanya*) to the particulars (*visesa*). In these logical notions, it would be in keeping with the history of Indian philosophical thought to recognise the basis of the names, *vaisesika* and *nyaya*, rather than in the ontological doctrines of *atomism* and *pluralistic realism*. This would account better for the way in which the interrelation of the Vaisesika and the Nyaya came to be conceived of as two sister systems in spite of their differences on the metaphysical side.

The Vaisesika and the Nyaya, in their early and later phases, are not restricted in their scope and aim to logic in a narrow sense. Like other Indian systems, these two form self-contained philosophical disciplines of a complex character, with a distinctive central theme correlated to their



special goal. The final cessation of all miseries (*apavarga*) is the goal of the Vaisesika and the Nyaya. The Vaisesika stresses the analytical side of reasoning and furnishes the metaphysical background and the inductive basis of the Nyaya system. With the Vaisesika material, suitably modified in minor details, the Nyaya builds up a complete system of epistemology and logic, combined to some extent with psychology, ethics, ontology and religion. Such a mixed composition of Indian philosophical systems is due not to any lack of appreciation of differences of value in different things, but rather to the cultural outlook of India, which is dominated by an intense desire to synthesise all the departments of knowledge in a scheme of progressive realisation of life's ends culminating in final emancipation (*mukti*) conceived of as the *summum bonum*. Methodical reasoning, involving a critical investigation of knowledge got through perceptual experience and verbal testimony, *i.e.*, *anviksa*, with the help of the five-membered scheme of syllogistic expression (*nyaya* or *pancavayava-vakya*), forms the distinctive contribution of the Nyaya to philosophical thought. Since its first redaction, the Nyaya system has permanently secured for itself a position of importance in the Hindu scheme of Vedic religion and philosophy, chiefly by the ancillary role which it has assumed in its relation to the Veda; and if the Vaisesika also is given a place among the *astika* systems, it is due mainly to its fraternity with the Nyaya. Gokulanatha, a Naiyayika of the 16th century A.D., suggests in his philosophical drama, called *Amrtodaya*, that *Anviksiki* is the amazonian commander-in-chief of *Sruti*—the empress ruling over the empire of knowledge and emancipation. This poetic representation would be very helpful in appreciating the exact position of the *Nyaya-vaikesika* system in the scheme of *astika* schools of philosophy.

### Syncretism And Synthesis

It has now become usual among modern scholars, when speaking about the historical development of the Vaisesika and Nyaya systems, to refer to the tendency to *syncretism* in these two schools. In Chapter II, Part I, of "*Indian Logic and Atomism*", Dr. Keith dwells upon what he describes as "the syncretism of the schools" and the "syncretist school". Syncretism, in its strict sense, means the tendency to reconcile and blend two opposing and irreconcilable systems, by minimising differences. In this sense, it would be correct to speak about syncretism in the Vaisesika and Nyaya only with reference to their condition before their redaction into sutras, and even then, with due reservations. It may be said that, in the pre-Buddhistic age, rationalistic thinking came to have a schismatic split which resulted in two opposing types of rationalistic thought, one linking itself with Vedic tradition and the other antagonising it. As already pointed out at page xi-supra, a *rapprochement* was effected between these two types of thought; and as a result of this, the Vaisesika and Nyaya arose in the form of two sister schools. The tendency which led to the first redaction of these two schools in a fraternal relation may be appropriately described as *syncretism*. Since their definite emergence as two distinct and allied systems about the fourth century B.C. to this day, the Vaisesika and Nyaya have been treated as sister schools, fundamentally agreeing with each other in respect of important metaphysical and logical doctrines and persistently showing some comparatively minor differences; and in this condition, they were never regarded as opposing schools and it would not be quite accurate to speak of syncretism in them, in the strict sense of the term. In the somewhat larger sense, however, of synthesis, one may well speak of *syncretism* in these two sister schools from and after their first redaction. In the history of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, the Vaisesika and Nyaya schools were never regarded as rival schools. Nor were their differences ever forgotten: and till recently, separate Nyaya and Vaisesika treatises continued to be written. In fact, even as late as in the seventeenth century A.D., separate handbooks dealing with the Vaisesika doctrines, like Gangadharasuri's *Kanadasiddhanta-candrika* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. XXV), were written. It should be remembered here that Aksapada-Gautama, effected the momentous synthesis between



the *inductive* (*Vaisesika*) and *deductive* (*Nyaya*) types of rationalistic thinking, in his doctrine of five-membered syllogistic expression (*nyaya-prayoga*) hinging upon the *example* (*udaharana*) as the central member. The Nyaya ontology is built upon the atomic theory and pluralistic realism of the Vaisesika. The Nyaya epistemology, with its fourfold scheme of *pramanas* is distinctly *pro-Vedic*; and in this respect, it shows a sharp contrast with the Vaisesika scheme of *pramanas* which consists of perception and inference and which betrays *anti-Vedic* leanings. Such points of contrast have only led to Vaisesika gradually losing its hold and influence. Indian philosophical tradition recognises three important pairs of allied systems (*samana-tantrani*)—viz., the *Samkhya* and *yoga*, the *Vaisesika* and *Nyaya*, and the *Mimamsa* and *Vedanta*. Vatsyayana, in his *bhasya* on the Nyaya-sutra (1.1.22), speaks of the *Vaisesika* and the *Nyaya* as *samana-tantra*. It is noteworthy that, while the *Samkhya* and *Yoga*, and the *Mimamsa* and *Vedanta* grew as two pairs of allied systems, the *Vaisesika* and *Nyaya* came to be more closely knit together and grew as *twin* systems, chiefly as a result of the complete *synthesis* which the Nyaya effected in its logical method.

### After the sutras to Udayana

The extant early works, forming the basic source-books of the Vaisesika system, are Kanada's sutras and Prasastapada's *Padarthadharma-samgraha*, better known under the name of *Prasastapada-bhasya*. According to Udayanacarya's *Kiranavali*, as interpreted by Padmanabhamisra in his *Kiranavali-bhaskara* (Benares Sanskrit Series, *Kiranavali*, page 5), Prasastapada's *Padarthadharma-samgraha* is a comprehensive epitome of the Vaisesika system which presupposes an extensive Vaisesika-bhasya, known as *Ravana-bhasya* and attributed to an ancient philosopher called Ravana. At page 278 of the manuscript of the commentary called the *Prakatarthavivarana* on Samkara's *Brahmasutrabhasya*, preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Ravana's *bhasya* on the Vaisesika-sutras is cited. (See p. 491 of Pt. of the edition of this work in the Madras University Sanskrit Series). *Prakatarthavivarana* is earlier than 13th century A.D. An interesting confirmation of the tradition about *Ravana-bhasya* is contained in the *viskambha* to the fifth Act of the *Anargharaghava* (Nirayasaagara edition, page 161). There is evidence to show that this drama must be earlier than the latter part of the ninth century A.D. In this connection, attention is invited to my paper on the *Ravana-bhasya*, which appears in volume III of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, pages 1 to 5. In this paper, it is indicated that it may not be unreasonable to conjecture that the *Ravana-bhasya* was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as were quite in keeping with the text of the Vaisesika-sutras and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the *Vaisesikas* as *ardhavainasikas* (semi-nihilists), while the work of Prasastapada gave a theistic turn to the Vaisesika system and presented its doctrines in an anti-Buddhistic *astika* setting. There is conclusive proof to show that Prasastapada should be earlier than Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyayavartika*, who flourished in the latter part of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century A.D. Professor Ui, in his introduction to the *Vaisesika Philosophy*, draws attention to the evidences showing that Prasastapada should be earlier than Paramartha and Dharmapala. Though Keith emphatically asserts in his "*Indian Logic and Atomism*" that Prasastapada's indebtedness to Dignaga is undoubted, it must be said that Prasastapada's debt to Dignaga has not yet been proved. If, on the other hand, Prasastapada could be taken to be presupposed by Vatsyayana on the ground relied upon by Mr. Bodas in his introduction to the *Tarkasamgraha* (Bombay Sanskrit series, No. LV). Dignaga, who presupposes Vatsyayana, must be later than Prasastapada. The two most authoritative commentaries on Prasastapada's *Bhasya* are Sridhara's *Kandali* and Udayanacarya's *Kiranavali*. Sridhara's date is given as 991 A.D. in his *Kandali* and Udayana's date is given as 984 A.D. in one of his works—*Laksanavali*. Sridhara's reputation is restricted to his Vaisesika work; but Udayana



holds a far higher place in Indian philosophy and he is held in high esteem as the Nyayacarya *par excellence*.

The extant basic works of Nyaya are Gautama's Nyaya-sutras, the Nyaya-bhasya by Vatsyayana, otherwise known as Paksilasvamin, and the Nyaya-vartika by Uddyotakara. In the Nyaya-vartika and other works, there is sufficient evidence to show conclusively that Dignaga, the famous Buddhist logician, adversely criticised the Nyaya-bhasya. Vasubandhu, the famous teacher of Dignaga, criticised Nyaya-sutras and the Nyaya-bhasya does not reply to Vasubandhu's criticisms. From these facts, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Nyaya-bhasya is earlier than about the middle of the fourth century A.D., which is the date for Vasubandhu. Vatsyayana suggests alternative interpretations to some of the sutras, as, for instance, in his Bhasya on 1.1.5. This may lead to the inference that Vatsyayana wrote his Bhasya, long after the Sutrakara, perhaps at a time when the meaning of some of the sutras had already become a matter for speculation. There has been some controversy among scholars as to whether there was any commentary on the Nyaya-sutras before Vatsyayana, and whether the aphoristic statements, which the Bhasyakara introduces in the course of his exposition, are really quotations from some earlier commentary on the sutras. Professor Windisch and several others are inclined to think that such aphoristic statements are citations from an earlier commentary. Professor Randle discusses this question in his recent work "*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*" (pages 19 to 24) and concludes that these aphoristic statements are not citations from any author but should be viewed as forming "the heritage of the school and as carrying an authority only less than that of the sutras themselves". Indian tradition, however, is wholly against any speculation of this kind in regard to the aphoristic statements in the Bhasya above referred to. In Sastra literature, more especially in old works like the Bhasyas on the various systems, it is a common stylistic device to put forwards a main thesis or argument in the form of a terse aphoristic statement and amplify it in an expository note. Several old Bhasyakaras have adopted this device and hundreds of instances can be given from the *Mahabhasya* of Patanjali and Sankara's Bhasyas on the Brhadaranyakopanisad and the Brahma-sutras. In fact, the aphoristic statements which Vatsyayana makes at the beginning of his expository sections form integral parts of Vatsyayana's own composition; and it would be as absurd to ascribe such statements to any author different from Vatsyayana, as it would be to ascribe the aphoristic statement, "Since there is no difference from cattle and other lower animals" in Sankara's Bhasya on the Brahma-sutras (*pasvadibhiscavisesat*-1.1.1) to some author different from the Bhasyakara, who amplified that statement in the following expository paragraph beginning with the words "*yatha hi pasvadayah*". Students of Indian logic will do well to remember that Vatsyayana is the earliest known writer who drew pointed attention to the reason why Gautama's Nyaya came to be regarded as the science of epistemology and logic (*Pramanasastra*, *Anviksiki* or *Nyaya-sastra*). It is worth remembering, in this connection, that Vatsyayana indicates in the very first sentence of his Bhasya how valid thinking (*prama*) and fruitful doing (*atmakriya*) serve as each other's axle in each other's wheelings and how they constitute real living with all its complexity in the pluralistic universe of the Nyaya-Vaisesika realism. It is also worth noting that it is Vatsyayana who first explained how the entire epistemological scheme of Pramanas could be synthesised in a valid syllogistic expression, (*vide* pages 30 to 42 of his Bhasya on 1.1.1, Chaukhamba edition) and how, for this reason, logic proper justly came to exercise a profound influence over the whole realm of philosophical thought in India.

About the end of the sixth century A.D., or in the former half of the seventh century, Uddyotakara wrote his *Nyaya-vartika*, the earliest extant commentary on the *Nyaya-bhasya*. Some scholars like Dr. Keith maintain that Uddyotakara was a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakirti. Hiuen-tsang (629-645 A.D.) does not speak of Dharmakirti, while I-tsing (671-695 A.D.) refers to



him. The reference in the *Nyaya-vartika* to a *Vada-vidhi* (page 117, line 21, Chaukhamba edition) is the only argument relied upon for showing that Uddyotakara is not earlier than Dharmakirti. This argument assumes that Dharmakirti is the author of the *Vada-vidhi*. Sufficient evidence has not been adduced in support of the view that the *Vada-vidhi* is one of Dharmakirti's works. Chinese tradition definitely lends support to the identification of the *Vada-vidhi* with one of Vasubandhu's works. Further, in the *Vartika* on 1.1.4, Dignaga's definition of perception is criticised ; and it is generally accepted by Brahmanical and Buddhistic authorities alike that Dharmakirti was responsible for the introduction of the additional word *abhvranta* in that definition, chiefly with a view to meeting the objections raised by Uddyotakara against it. These considerations tend to show that it would be reasonable to assign Uddyotakara to the end of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century A.D. and to assign Dharmakirti to about the third quarter of the seventh century A.D. Uddyotakara's great service to Nyaya consists in his successful endeavour to lift it up from the slough into which it was thrown by Dignaga's confutation of Vatsyayana's Bhasya. After Uddyotakara, the philosophical contest between the anti-Vedic and pro-Vedic sides of the Nyaya thought was keenly carried on by great Buddhistic logicians like Dharmakirti, Dharmottara and Ratnakirti and eminent Brahmanical logicians like Vacaspatimishra, Jayantabhatta, Bhasarvajna and Udayana. Vacaspati has himself given 841 A.D. as the date of the composition of his index to Gautama's sutras, called *Nyaya-sucinibandha*. Vacaspati is famous for his polymathic learning and dispassionate philosophical outlook. He is the author of many important and authoritative treatises, mainly in the nature of expository and critical commentaries, on almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. His *Brahmatattvasamiksa* on Mandanamisra's *Brahmasiddhi* and *Bhamati* on Sankara's *Brahmasutra-bhasya* represent the Advaita system ; his *Samkhya-tattvakaumudi* and *Yoga-bhasya-vaisharadi* represent the Samkhya-Yoga system ; and his *Nyaya-sucinibandha* and *Nyaya-vartika-tatparya-tika* represent the Nyaya system. There is evidence to show that *Bhamati* should have been his latest work. In his *Nyaya-vartika-tatparya-tika*, he renders intelligible the difficult portions of the *Nyaya-vartika* and incidentally discusses several obscure portions of the *Nyaya-bhasya* and the *Nyaya-surtas*, in accordance with the Nyaya tradition handed down to him by his Nyaya teacher—Trilocana. For the monumental contribution which he made to Nyaya in his *Tatparya-tika*, he came to be known as the *Tatparyacarya* in Nyaya literature. He justly claims, in his *Tatparya-tika*, special credit for having redeemed from oblivion Uddyotakara's work, which came to be regarded very old and nearly forgotten in the ninth century A.D. Jayantabhatta, who presupposes Vacaspati in his work and refers to Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyaloka* (Vide page 48 lines 21 to 25, *Nyayamanjari*, Benares), should be taken to be later than the middle of the ninth century A.D. ; and with the help of the particulars furnished by Jayanta's son, Abhinanda, in the *Kadambarikathasara*, Jayanta may be assigned to the third quarter of the ninth century A.D. Jayanta's chief contribution to Nyaya is his *Nyayamanjari*. This work is of the nature of an elaborate *vr̥tti* (expository gloss) on select sutras of Gautama. Jayanta himself says that the *Nyaya-manjari* was so well appreciated by his contemporaries that he came to be recognised as the *Vr̥tti-kara* of Nyaya. Bhasarvajna, who flourished perhaps about the beginning of the tenth century A.D., is the author of an important Nyaya work called *Nyaya-sara* ; and the distinctive feature of this work is its epistemology which deviates in certain respects from established Nyaya tradition, as for instance, in discarding *upamana* as a distinct *Pramana* and in recognising six *hetvabhāṣas* including *anadhyavasita*. Udayanacarya is the greatest Naiyayika of the tenth century A.D. At the end of one of his works, *Lakṣanavali*, he has given 984 A.D. as the date of its composition. Besides his erudite commentaries on Prasastapada's Bhasya and Vacaspati's *Tatparya-tika*—*Kiranavali* and *Tatparya-parisuddhi*, he wrote three important Nyaya works—the *Prabodhasiddhi*, otherwise called *Nyayaparisista*, the *Atma-tattva-viveka*, otherwise called *Bauddhadhikkara* and the *Nyaya-kusumanjali*. The first of these three works contains an elucidative and illustrative exposition of the subtleties of



*jati* (futile response) and *nigrahasthana* (vulnerable points) in accordance with the dialectics of early Nyaya. The *Atma-tattva-viveka* is a brilliant exposition of the Nyaya metaphysics with particular reference to the Nyaya conception of the *self* (*jiva*) and contains a forcible refutation of the Buddhistic doctrines of momentariness (*ksana-bhanga*) and voidness (*sunya*). The *Kusumanjali* is Udayana's masterpiece. It is devoted to a refutation of the anti-theistic theories maintained by the Vedistic, Samkhya, nihilistic and naturalistic schools of his age and to the amplification and vindication of the Nyaya theism, chiefly on the basis of the creationistic view of causation. Udayana's theistic argument consists of two main parts :—one part arguing *towards* values, design and causation in the sense of creation and the other part arguing *to* God *from* values, design and creation. His monumental contribution to Indian theism has secured for him the high rank of *Nyayacarya*. From the references given on page 21 of the Sanskrit introduction to the *Kandali* (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series), it may be safely concluded that Udayana was a contemporary of Sridhara.

### After Udayana to Annambhatta

Sivadityamisra's *Saptapadarthi* is a short and simple manual setting forth the essentials of the Vaisesika system chiefly in accordance with Prasastapada's Bhasya. It also makes use of the Nyaya material in Bhasarvajna's *Nyaya-sara*, to some extent. Sivaditya's text giving his scheme of six fallacious types of *probans* with *anadhyvasita* corresponding to *asadharana* (uncommon *probans*) as a distinct type, is practically a reproduction of the corresponding text of Bhasarvajna. (Compare page 23, *Saptapadarthi*—Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, with page 25 in the *Nyayasara*—Poona Oriental Book Agency). A careful comparison of Sivaditya's *Saptapadarthi* with Udayana's *Kiranavali* would lead one to believe that the *Saptapadarthi* utilised the material in the *Kiranavali*. For instance, the definition of darkness on page 71 of *Saptapadarthi* appears to presuppose Udayana's remarks about darkness on pages 111 and 112 of the *Kiranavali* (Bibliotheca Indica) ; the definition of *jati* on page 70 of the *Saptapadarthi* appears to presuppose Udayana's enumeration of *jatibadhakas* on page 161 of the *Kiranavali* and the definition of *laksana* (definition) found on page 192 of the *Kiranavali* is reproduced on page 35 of the *Saptapadarthi*. Sriharsa, the author of the *Khandanakhandakhadya*, and Gangesa, the author of the *Tattvacintamani*, undoubtedly refer to Sivaditya. (Vide introduction to the *Saptapadarthi*—page 2.) On these grounds, it would not be unreasonable to assign the *Saptapadarthi* to the eleventh century A.D. (circa). The importance of the *Saptapadarthi* lies in the fact that later writers like Annambhatta used it as their model for their primers of Nyaya, as may be unmistakably made out from the close correspondence between several portions in the *Saptapadarthi* and primers like the *Tarkasamgraha*.

The greatest Nyaya work, which was written after Udayana, is the *Tattvacintamani* by Gangesopadhyaya. In this monumental work, Gangesa utilised all the constructive, expository, critical and polemical material in the earlier works on Nyaya and Vaisesika and gave the final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of Nyaya. In treating the various topics of Nyaya, the earlier writers usually adopted the *categoristic* method, which was inaugurated by Gautama. This method as expounded by Vatsyayana, consists in enumeration and classification (*uddesa* and *vibhaga*), definition (*laksana*), careful investigation and discussion (*pariksa*). Varadaraja's *Tarkikaraksā* (1100 A.D. circa) is the latest important work on Nyaya, which adopts the old *categoristic* method in accordance with the Nyaya-sutras and Bhasya. It was Gangesa who replaced this old method by what may be described as the *epistemological method* or the *pramana* method, which definitely shifted the emphasis from the categoristic treatment of the topics (*padarthah*) of Nyaya to the epistemological treatment of the four means of valid cognition (*pramanani*) recognised by the Naiyayikas. Thus, the Nyaya-sastra which had remained hitherto a mere *padartha-sastra*, for all practical purposes, was turned into



a full-fledged *pramana-sastra* in Gangesa's *Tattvacintamani*; and in this partly lies the epoch-making character of this monumental work on Nyaya. That the *Tattvacintamani* serves as the basic work on which the whole literature of what is commonly known as *navya-nyaya* (modern Nyaya) rests is also another reason for regarding it as an epoch-making work. The *Tattvacintamani*, or the *Mani* as it is popularly known, consists of four main divisions represented by the four chapters (*khandas*) on perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), assimilation in the sense of analogising (*upamana*), and verbal testimony (*abda*). In the course of an elaborate elucidation and discussion of the nature and objective reach and content of these four *Pramanas*, the relevant topics of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system are considered in the *Mani* in comparison with the kindred topics of other philosophical systems. The language of Gangesa's *Mani* is also of an epoch-making type. Such of the modern students of Nyaya literature as are not equipped with the required control over the terminology of *navya-nyaya* are apt to indulge in the ill-conceived criticism that the language of the *Mani* and the connected works is spoiled by a huge over-growth of inflated and hair-splitting logic-chopping. The key to *navya-nyaya* is its terminology. Those who have controlled this terminology are sure to find in the *Mani* and allied works a discipline of unique subtlety and value. The history of philosophical thought shows that lack of precision in expression seriously hampers its progress. In Indian thought, this defect was sought to be remedied by Naiyayikas like Gangesopadhyaya through several thought-measuring devices, which chiefly consisted of formulas in Sanskrit constructed with the aid of terms like *avacchedaka* (the delimitor), *avacchedya* (the delimited), *nirupaka* (co-forming), *mirupya* (co-formed), *anuyogin* (containing correlate) and *pratiyogin* (the other correlate or counter-correlate). All the Indian dialecticians, who wrote after Gangesopadhyaya, were influenced by the thought-measuring formulas used by Gangesa. By using such formulas, it was possible for later dialectics in Indian philosophical literature to achieve a remarkable degree of quantitative precision in measuring the *extent* (temporal and spatial), *content* and *intent* (purpose and potency) of cognition (*jnana*).

Gangesa quotes Sriharsa (the *Khandanakara*) and refutes his view (page 233 of the *Mani*—*anumana*, Bibliotheca Indica). There is sufficient evidence in favour of assigning Sriharsa to 1136 A.D. circa. Paksadharamisra, otherwise known as Jayaedva, wrote a commentary called *Aloka* on the *Mani*. This Jayadeva is believed to be identical with Jayadeva, the author of the *Prasannaraghava*. A verse from this drama (*kadali kadali* etc., I. 37) is quoted in the *Sahityadarpana*, as pointed out by Mr. P. V. Kane in his introduction to the latter work. Thus Paksadharamisra, alias Jayadeva, must have been considerably earlier than the *Sahityadarpana* (1300 A.D. circa). These facts will show that it would not be reasonable to assign Gangesa to any date much earlier than 1200 A.D. and that he may be assigned to the former half of the thirteenth century A.D.

Vardhamanopadhyaya, the only son of Gangesa according to tradition, was also a reputed Naiyayika of this period. He wrote several learned and illuminating works, generally known as *Prakasa*, in the form of commentaries on Udayana's treatises, Gangesa's *Mani* and Vallabhacharya's *Nyayalilavati*. Jayadeva's pupil, Rucidatta, was a logician of considerable repute and was the author of a well-known commentary called *Makaranda* on Vardhamana's *Prakasa*.

The end of the fifteenth century, as also the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, may well be described as marking the heyday of Nyaya dialectics in Nuddea (Navadvipa, Bengal). Vasudeva Sarvabhauma was the greatest Naiyayika who flourished about the end of the 15th and the earlier part of the 16th century. He had the unique privilege and glory of having taught Nyaya to four of the greatest personalities of the 16th century: viz.—Caitanya, the greatest Vaishnava teacher and reformer of Bengal in the 16th century; Raghunatha, otherwise known as *Tarkika-siromani* (the crest-jewel of all logicians); Raghunandana, a famous Bengal lawyer; and Krsnananda, a reputed



*tantrika*, who was a great authority on the different forms and charms of the Sakta cult. Raghunatha (*Tarkika-siromani*) was admittedly the greatest logician of the sixteenth century. He wrote several treatises on Nyaya, mostly in the form of commentaries and the greatest and the most famous of the works is the *Didhiti*, an expository and critical commentary on Gangesa's *Mani*. Mathuranatha was the most famous of Raghunatha-siromani's pupils and wrote authoritative commentaries on the *Mani* and the *Didhiti*. Jagadisa and Gadadhara were the greatest exponents of *navya-nyaya* as represented by the *Mani* and the *Didhiti*, and flourished in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, Jagadisa is famous as the author of the commentary on the *Didhiti*, popularly known as *Jagadisi*. the *Sabdasakti-prakasika*—an independent treatise on the speculative Semantics of Nyaya, a short-manual called the *Tarkamrta* and a commentary called the *Bhasya-sukti* on the Bhasya of Prasastapada. Gadadhara is famous as the author of the commentary, popularly known as the *Gadadhari*, on the *Didhiti*, the commentary called the *Mulagadadhari* on portions of the *Mani*, commentaries on Udayana's *Atmatattvaviveka*, and fifty-two dialectic tracts and treatises—such as the *Vyutpattivada* and *Saktivada* (dialectic treatises on the speculative Semantics of Nyaya). The more important works of Jagadisa and Gadadhara are still studied carefully by those students who seek to specialise in *navya-nyaya* and they are regarded as constituting an indispensable discipline of high value to every scholar who wishes to be recognised as a sound *sastrin*. The dialectic literature of later Nyaya is a vast *banyan tree*, which had its roots struck deep and its huge trunk fully developed in Mithila in the *Tattvacintamani*, had its immense branches and foliage stretched out and ramified in the *Didhiti* in Nuddea, and bore fruit in the rich fruitage of *Jagadisi* and *Gadadhari*, which formed the colossal monument of Indian dialectics in the seventeenth century. If Raghunatha is regarded as the crest-jewel (*siromani*) of logical dialecticians, Gadadhara may well be characterised as the prince of Nuddea dialecticians, who wears the diadem inlaid with this brilliant crest-jewel.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Nyaya scholars interested themselves chiefly in the interpretation of the earlier and later works on Nyaya and in the production of introductory hand-books. Three of such scholars may be mentioned here—Samkara-misra, Visvanatha-pancanana and Annambhatta. Samkara-misra wrote a commentary on the *Jagadisi* and a comprehensive commentary called the *Upaskara* on Kanada's sutras. Visvanatha-pancanana wrote a commentary on the Nyaya-sutras in 1634 ; and he is famous as the author of the popular hand-book of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, called the *Bhasaparincheda* or *Karikavali*, which consists of 168 easy verses. The *Karikavali* is accompanied by the author's own commentary called the *Nyayasiddhantamuktavali*. According to the traditional methods of study, the *Muktavali* is widely studied by students of Nyaya, immediately after finishing the study of Annambhatta's *Tarkasamgraha* and *Dipika*.

Annambhatta was an Andhra scholar who flourished in the latter part of the seventeenth century. He was a versatile scholar and a reputed polymath. He wrote several learned works on almost all the important branches of Sastraic learning. In this connection, attention may be invited to some of Annambhatta's known works. In the sphere of Purvamimamsa and Vedanta, he is known as the author of the massive commentary called the *Ranakojjivani* on Bhatta Somesvara's *Nyaya-sudha*, otherwise known as *Ranaka*, and of a commentary on the Brahma-sutras. In Vyakarana, he is famous as the author of an easy commentary on Panini's *Astadhyayi* and of an extensive commentary called *Uddyotana* on Kaiyata's *Pradipa*. In the sphere of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, he wrote a learned commentary called *Siddhanjana* on Jayadeva's *Manyaloka*, as also the most popular handbook of Indian logic called the *Tarkasamgraha* and its expository and supplementary gloss called the *Dipika*. The name *Tarkasamgraha* is interpreted by Annambhatta himself as a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories of the Vaisesika system, other ontological categories of the Vaisesika system, which are accepted by Nyaya. These two



works—the *Tarkasamgraha* and the *Dipika*—fulfil the object mentioned in the concluding verse of the *Tarkaa samgraha* and are described by some as miniature *Gadadhari* (*Balagadahari*), in the sense that they, taken together, miniature the later Nyaya dialectics also.

### Concluding Remarks

The Nyaya-Vaisesika system originated in the rationalistic tendency of the Upanisadic age. The original current of rationalistic thought came to be broken into two streams, the *Vedistic* Nyaya and the *anti-vedistic* Vaisesika. After some time, there was a rapprochement between these two schismatic developments. The Vaisesika emphasis on the inductive side of reasoning, together with its realism and pluralism, served as the basis for the development of the Nyaya theory of deductive reasoning through a well-defined scheme of syllogistic expression. All along, the Vaisesika and the Nyaya have been treated as sister systems (*samana-tantra*) with a common rationalistic stress and realistic background, in spite of certain epistemological and ontological differences. The Nyaya-Vaisesika is a self-contained system of philosophy. Its roots strike deep into its pluralistic realism. Its scheme of external relation, its theory of truth and error, and its creationistic view of causation (see Part III) constitute its main-stay. Its thought-measuring devices and precise formulas form its ever-spreading and never-fading foliage. Its fruit is the virile, though negativistic, doctrine of *abhava* (non-existence) and *apavarga* (final liberation). Its chief solace and comfort is in its rationalistic theism, with its demiurgic, omnipotent and omniscient *Isvara*. Its chief boast is its logical and dialectic machinery, which the believers and the heretics, the *Astikas* and the *Nastikas* alike, cannot do without. Whoever knows *Nyaya*, knows the *pramana*—is a *pramanavit*, a philosopher in the strict sense, according to Indian tradition.



## RAVANA—BHASYA\*

There is a tradition that a commentary called *Ravana-Bhasya* on Kanada's Vaisesika sutras was written by an ancient philosopher called Ravana and that this work preceded the famous commentary by Prasastapada on the same sutras, which has been preserved under the name *Padartha-dharma-sangraha* and generally accepted as one of the most important basic works of the Vaisesika system. The tradition about *Ravana-Bhasya* is supported by certain references which sought to carry considerable weight with all discerning critics.

In his commentry called *Kiranavali*, on Prasastapada's *Padartha-dharma-sangraha*, Udayanacarya (circa 984 A.D.) annotates the phrase “*Padartha-dharma sangraha*” as follows :—

पदार्थधर्मसङ्ग्रह इति । पदार्था द्रव्यादयः, तेषां धर्माः साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य-रूपाः । त एव परस्परं विशेषणीभूतास्तेजनेन सङ्गृह्यन्ते, शास्त्रे नानास्थानेषु विनता एकत्र सङ्कलय्य कथ्यन्ते इति सङ्ग्रहः । स प्रकृष्टो वक्ष्यते ; प्रकरणशुद्धेः सङ्ग्रहपदेनैव दर्शितत्वात् ; वैशद्यं लघुत्वं कृत्स्नत्वं च प्रकर्षः । सूत्रेषु वैशद्याभावात् भाष्यस्य च विस्तरत्वात् प्रकरणादीनां चैकदेशत्वात् ।

Benares Sanskrit Series, *Kiranavali*, p. 5.

Padmanabhamisra, who flourished in the latter part of the 16th century, has the following note in his *Kiranavali-Bhaskara*, a commentary on Udayana's *Kiranavali*, with reference to the concluding part of the extract given above.

ग्रन्थान्तरेणान्यथासिद्धिमपाकरोति—सूत्र इति ।

Padmanabhamisra is an authority on the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems, who cannot be easily brushed aside. According to him and according to Udayana's *Kiranavali* as interpreted by him, Prasastapada should be understood to have presupposed Ravana's *Bhasya* which was too big and extensive to be controlled by ordinary readers, and should therefore be taken to have designed his own work as a comprehensive treatise of an epitomical type (*Sangraha*), though Udayana, Sridhara and later exponents of the Vaisesika system would unhesitatingly apply the designation—*Bhasya*—to Prasastapada's work as well, chiefly, perhaps, in view of Prasastapada's rank as a rsi.

Sri Samkaracarya, in his *Bhasya* on 2-2-11 of the *Brahmasutras*, makes the following statements in the course of his exposition of *Paramanu-Karana-vada* :—

यदापि द्वे द्व्यणुके चतुरणुकमारभते, तदापि समानं द्व्यणुकसमवायिनां शुक्लादीनामारम्भकत्वम् । अणुत्व-ह्रस्वत्वे तु द्व्यणुकसमवायिनी अपि नैवारभते, चतुरणुकस्य महत्त्व-दीर्घत्व-परिमाण-योगाभ्युपगमात् । यदापि बहवः परमाणवः बहूनि वा द्व्यणुकानि द्व्यणुकसहितो वा परमाणुः कार्यमारभते तदापि समानैषा योजना ।

With reference to the first sentence in the above extract, *Ratnaprabha* has the following note :—

प्रकटार्थकारास्तु यद्दवाभ्यां द्व्यणुकाभ्यामारब्धे कार्ये महत्त्वं दृश्यते तस्य हेतुः प्रचयो नाम प्रशिथिलावयव-संयोग इति रावणप्रणीते भाष्ये दृश्यते इति चिरन्तनवैशेषिकदृष्ट्येभेदं भाष्यमित्याहुः ।

\* J. of Oriental Research III. 1929. pp. 1—5.



In the course of his exposition of the Vaisesika doctrine, Samkara relies upon Kanada's sutras and Prasastapada's *Bhasya*. As the author of the *Prakatartha-vivarana* rightly points out, Samkara seems to utilise also the theories of older Vaisesikas like Ravana. The first sentence in the above extract from Samkara's *Bhasya* would present an insuperable difficulty, if one should proceed to interpret it in the light of what Prasastapada has said about the formation of *dyanukas*, *tryanukas* and *caturanukas* from *paramanus*. According to Prasastapada, Udayana, Sridhara and all the later Vaisesikas, two *paramanus* or atoms combine to form a binary product (*dyanuka*) ; three *dyanukas* or *anus* combine to form a ternary product (*tryanuka*) ; and four *tryanukas* or *trutis* combine to form a quaternary product (*Caturanuka*). According to the Vaisesika authorities, it is only in this way that the difference in the *parimanu* or size of a *dyanuka* and a *tryanuka* may be accounted for, though the size in both of these cases is the result of the *sankhya* of the component parts. Samkara, however, says that two *dyanukas* form the component parts of a *caturanuka*. This remark is not consistent with the atomic theory as set forth by Prasastapada and his followers. Vacaspatimisra, in his *Bhamati*, seeks to forcibly dragoon Samkara's text into Prasastapada's mould, by suggesting an emendation to the effect that "यदापि द्वे द्वचणुके" in the text of Samkara quoted above ought to be read as "यदापि द्वे द्वे द्वचणुके". The alternative explanation which Vacaspatimisra suggests in his *Bhamati* on the text of Samkara under consideration is in no sense less strained than the emendation referred to. Vacaspatimisra must have reconciled himself to the idea of doing so much violence to Samkara's text in this connection, either because he was not familiar with the views of earlier Vaisesikas like Ravana or because he deliberately sought to ignore those views perhaps for the reason that he considered them quite untenable. It is difficult to accept the former of these two alternatives, having due regard to the fact that Vacaspatimisra was a polymathic philosopher of encyclopaedic knowledge. What *Ratnaprabha* has said in explaining of the text of Samkara under consideration has been verified by me and found correct, after consulting the manuscript<sup>1</sup> of the *Prakatartha-vivarana*, which was acquired by me several years ago for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, through a peripatetic party working under me. It may be useful to note here that the author of the commentary called *Prakatartha-vivarana* on Samkara's *Brahmasutra-Bhasya*, generally maintains the view of Suresvara and Prakasatman and differs from Mandana and Vacaspatimisra, not hesitating to expose, wherever possible, the weak points in Vacaspati's *Bhamati*. The tradition regarding Ravana's *Bhasya* on the Vaisesika sutras, which the author of the *Prakatartha-vivarana* relies upon, must be fairly earlier than the 13th century A.D., when Anandagiri, who used the *Prakatartha-vivarana* in one of his works, flourished.<sup>2</sup>

An interesting confirmation of the tradition about *Ravana-Bhasya* comes from a rather unexpected quarter. In the latter part of the somewhat lengthy *viskambha* of the fifth act of the *Anargharaghava*, the following passage deserves attention :—

(नेषथ्ये—एकतः)

भो भो लक्ष्मण, वैशेषिक-कटन्दीपण्डितः जगद्विजयमानः पर्यटामि । क्वासौ रामः ? तेन सह विवदिष्ये ।

<sup>1</sup> The passage in the *Prakatartha* runs as follows :—

परिमाणादेरपि तत्तदसाधारण्यात् व्यभिचारप्रदर्शनायैव चिरन्तन-वैशेषिकाणामुदाहरणान्तरमाह—यदा द्वे इति । तथा हि रावणप्रणीते भाष्ये दृश्यते "यद्वाभ्यां द्वचणुकाभ्यामारब्धे कार्ये यन्महत्त्वमुत्पद्यते तस्य प्रचयोऽसमवायिकारणम्" इति ।

p. 278 of the Madras ms. of the *Prakatartha*

<sup>2</sup> Vide page XIV of the late Mr. Tripathi's introduction to Anandagiri's *Tarkasangraha* published as No. III of the Gackward's Oriental series,



(अन्यतः)

भो भोः परिव्राजक, कालसर्पखलीकाररवर्जलता न खलु सुखाकरी वृश्चिकमन्त्रतान्त्रिकस्य । जाम्बवान्--कथं लक्ष्मणपरिव्राजकौ संलपतः । शृणोमि तावत् । ( इत्यवधत्ते ) ( नेपथ्ये पुनरेकतः )

आः लक्ष्मण, सर्वविद्रावणः खल्वहम् ; को मया जनितमानभङ्गो न पराजीयते ।

(*Anargharaghava*, Nirnayasagar Edition, p. 161.)

With reference to the above extract, Rucipatyupadhyaya has the following note :—

नेपथ्ये रावणवचनम् । कटन्दी वैशेषिकशास्त्र-व्याख्याग्रन्थः, कटन्द इति यस्य प्रसिद्धिः । सा च रावणेन कृतेति छलतो ज्ञापयति । 'कन्दली' इति पाठे कन्दली वैशेषिकटीका सापि रावणेनैव कृता ।

It may be inferred from the above extract that the tradition about *Ravana-Bhasya* on the *Vaisesika-sutras* must be much earlier than the *Anargharaghava* and that this *Bhasya* might have been known by the designation of *Katandi* or *Kandali*. If the latter of these two names should be correct, Sridhara's *Kandali*, a commentary on Prasastapada's *Bhasya*, should be taken to have borrowed the name that was given to *Ravana-Bhasya*. It would scarcely be difficult to see that, in the days of Murari, the tradition about *Ravana-Bhasya* must have become sufficiently old to admit of that Vaisesika work being ascribed to the notorious Pratinayaka of the *Ramayana*, in the same mytho-poetic vein that is responsible for the author of the *Nyayasutras* being equated with the saintly husband of Ahalya. From the reference to Murari, the dramatist, in verse 67 of canto 38 of the *Haravijaya* by Ratnakara, a Kashmirian poet belonging to the middle of the 9th century A.D., it may be made out that the author of the *Anargharaghava* should be assigned to a date not later than that of Ratnakara. These evidences might well support the belief that *Ravana-Bhasya* on the *Vaisesika-sutras* might have been earlier than Prasastapada's *Padārtha-dharma-sangraha*. It would be thus quite reasonable to suggest that Prasastapada did not proceed to write a *Bhasya* in the usual style but wrote only an epitomical treatise, perhaps because he felt the pre-existing *Ravana-Bhasya* would render another *Vaisesika-Bhasya* superfluous. Though the fact that there was a *Vaisesika-Bhasya* ascribed to Ravana\* can no longer be doubted, still the name *Katandi* occurring in the *Anargharaghava* requires further confirmation before it could be accepted as the original name which *Ravana-Bhasya* bore.

In this connection, it may not be out of place to invite attention to the manner in which Buddhist tradition connects the name of Ravana, the Lord of Lanka, with one of the oldest texts of the Buddhists, called the *Lankavatara-sutra*. The following quotation is given in the footnote 35 to page 252 of Vol. ii of Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western Countries :—"The second treatise or sutra in the fifth volume of the *Mdo* is entitled in Sanskrit 'Arya-Lankavatara-mahayana-sutra', a venerable sutra of high principles on the visiting of Lanka. This was delivered at the request of the Lord of Lanka by Sakya, when he was in the city of Lanka on the top of the Malay mountain on the seashore, together with many priests and Bodhisattvas." This association, legendary as it may be of Ravana's name with Buddhism and the similar association of the same name with the oldest *Vaisesika-Bhasya*, may be considered together with the way in which Prasastapada's *Bhasya* came to completely supersede the earlier *Ravana-Bhasya*. Such considerations may lend support to the conjecture that the earlier *Ravana-Bhasya* was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhist proclivities, such as might have been quite in keeping with the text of the *Vaisesika-sutras*, and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the *Vaisesika* as *ardha-vainasikas*, while the work of Prasastapada gave the Vaisesika system a theistic turn and presented its doctrines in an anti-Buddhist *Astika* setting.

\* When I was at Lahore in November, 1928, in connection with the Fifth All-India Oriental Conference, I happened to see in the Lalchand Library there a ms. of the Rg-Veda-pada-patha attributed to Ravana. It is not at present possible to connect the author of this Vedic work with the author of *Vaisesika-Bhasya* attributed to Ravana.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT \*

(I)

Friends—I introduce myself as one who happens to be one of the friends of the Hon'ble Founder of this University and I also introduce myself as a humble votary of Indian culture and the Indian science and philosophy of literary criticism in Sanskrit. When I was called upon to undertake the academic duty of delivering a short course of lectures under the auspices of this University, I gladly agreed, mainly for the reason that I expected it would afford me an opportunity to meet almost a family of friends with whom I happen to be intimately connected as former colleague or as former teacher.

From the notification, you must have had some idea of the title which I propose to give to this short course—"Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit". I cannot more appropriately inaugurate this short course than by quoting myself :—

“ परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।  
कविताबुध्योर्योगं नमामि शिवयोर्यथा ॥ ”

“To the *Siva-Parvati synthesis*, to the *mother-father synthesis*, to the *woman-man synthesis*, I pay homage ; just in the same spirit and in the same breath, I do homage to the synthesis of *poesy* and *criticism*, of *charm* and *response*, of *genius* and *taste*, of *poet* and *critic*, of *kavi* and *sahridaya*.”

In this invocation, which I composed and prefixed to my Sanskrit work called *Upalocana* † and which I have introduced at the beginning of this course of lectures, I am not merely following the trodden track of an old-world votary of Indian culture, I am also throwing out some hint in which some of you at least may find the meaning, nature and scope of the theme of the short course of four lectures which I propose to deliver to you. Recently, I happened to mention to one of my friends the title of the course of lectures which I propose to deliver under the auspices of this University ; and as I expected, he remarked it seemed to him an intriguing title. I hope it will not be an intriguing title to you and I hope I shall be able to persuade you to believe that it is not only suggestive but it is also appropriate.

Let me make my ideas somewhat clear by saying a word about the two terms ‘*highways*’ and ‘*bypaths*’ which I use in the title. I am using them in their ordinary sense. By ‘*highway*’ I understand a public way, a well-known way which one might follow in order to reach some definite aim or some fixed goal ; and the word ‘*bypath*’ is used here deliberately in the sense in which it is ordinarily used and you may associate with it all its implications. It refers to something which

---

\* Lectures delivered at the Annamalai Uni. 23rd to 26th Jan. 1931. Later pub. by K.S.R. Institute 1945.

† See the beginning of the *Upalocana*, by Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastri on Abhinavagupta's *Locana*—Part I of the edition of *Dhvanyaloka*, with *Locana*, *Kaumudj* and *Upalocana*, published by the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras.



may be subsidiary, which may be a sort of side-track, which may be a by-road, which may also be in a sense a short route or a secret route—a route that is always subordinate to the highway. By examining the literature in Sanskrit bearing on the principles of literary criticism, you can easily distinguish some important highways and some important byways.

To understand the theories and ways of literary criticism, one should understand its scope, its aim, its chief function. The popular view of the function of literary criticism, more especially literary criticism in Sanskrit, is very defective. You may feel what Sanskrit writers have called literary criticism cannot at best rise above the level of what one might easily characterise as dogmatic criticism. *Alankara* sastra is commonly believed to be a branch of knowledge which deals with figures of speech. Understood in this narrow sense, one might easily say that literary criticism in Sanskrit is at best dogmatic criticism which is tradition-ridden and convention-ridden. It does not help you really to get close to the heart of the work of art which one might desire to reach. That is one way of looking at the matter. But those who are somewhat intimately acquainted with Sanskrit literature know that this is not the correct view. The word *alankara* should be understood in its wider sense. Vamana explains the term *alankara* to mean *sauradarya*, beauty or literary charm in general. In the light of what Vamana has said<sup>1</sup>, we suggest an amended name for this *sastra*, *sauradarya sastra* or even in a more technical fashion, *rasa sastra*. Could this be alright? But this involves certainly another danger. It involves the danger of associating literary criticism with certain metaphysical aspects of Aesthetics; it involves the danger of making you stray away far into metaphysical speculations on art.

Modern students of literary criticism, with special reference to alien literatures, like the English literature, are familiar with certain methods of literary criticism such as historical criticism and biographical criticism; and we know that, recently, at least in some quarters, these ways of literary criticism have not been received well. Historical criticism is felt to be defective in this way, that it takes you away from the work of art and makes you move along an inartistic path, investigating the artist's environment, his age, his race and the poetic school to which he belonged. This method is helpful in certain directions; it is fruitful, it is helpful, as a corrective; but it must be kept within certain limits. What is the position of biographical criticism? That also makes you stray away from the work of art and forces you to work on the biography of the poet; and sometimes, when you have not got satisfactory details, you have to work on unsatisfactory biographies, and in that way, your judgement is likely to become clouded by many irrelevant considerations.

But there is another way of literary criticism recognised by modern critics, that is sometimes described as the neo-criticism. It does not look upon the critic as a judge who is to pronounce judgements but looks upon him as "a sensitive soul detailing his adventures among masterpieces of art". The neo-critics are, in one word, the critics of the impressionistic school. A great writer<sup>2</sup> remarks that impressionism and dogmatism may be described as the two sexes of criticism. I hope they may not turn out to be the two warring sexes of criticism, as the two sexes happen to be in certain spheres, in these days. The neo-critic's way may be described thus in the words of Carlyle: "Criticism has assumed a new form in Germany. It proceeds on other principles and proposes to itself a higher aim. The main question is not now a question concerning the qualities of diction, the coherence of metaphors, the fitness of metaphors, the fitness of sentiments, the general logical truth in a work of art, as it was some half century ago among most critics; neither is it a question mainly of a psychological sort to be answered by discovering and delineating the peculiar nature of the poet

<sup>1</sup> Vamana's *Kavyalankarasutra* 1. i, 2.

<sup>2</sup> J. E. Spingarn. See his "The New Criticism", New York, 1911.



from his poetry, as is usual with the best of our own critics at present ; but it is, not indeed exclusively, but inclusively of its two other questions, properly and ultimately a question of the essence and peculiar life of the poetry itself . . . The problem is not now to determine by what mechanism Addison composed sentences and struck out similitudes, but by what far finer and more mysterious mechanism Shakespeare organised his dramas and gave life and individuality to his Ariel and his Hamlet. Wherein lies that life ; how have they attuned that shape and individuality ? Whence comes that empyrean fire which irradiates their whole being and appears at least in starry gleams ? Are these dramas of his not veri-similar only, but true ; nay, truer than reality itself, since the essence of unmixed reality is bodied forth in them under more expressive similes ? What is this unity of pleasures ; and can our deeper inspection discern it to be indivisible and existing by necessity because each work springs as it were from the general elements of thought and grows up therefrom into form and expansion by its own growth ? Not only who was the poet and how did he compose ; but what and how was the poem, and why was it a poem and not rhymed eloquence, creation and not figured passion ? These are the questions for the critic".<sup>1</sup> This is the neo-critic's way and this is recommended enthusiastically in the twentieth century by certain exponents of neo-criticism and it is recommended particularly with a view to removing the antipathy which has come to be accentuated between the exponents of the creative art and art-criticism.

This adverse attitude towards criticism is mainly due to the divorce which came to be established between the two as a result of certain misapprehensions between the creative side of art and the function of criticism. But there is no real divorce between the creative side of art and criticism and there is no real ground for any such divorce. If we remember what Croce has to say with reference to the fundamental doctrine on which criticism has been based, it is easy for us to realise why it would be unreasonable to recognise any sort of divorce between criticism and creation. "We should dethrone the concept that all art is expression ; we should come to the conclusion that all expression is art".<sup>2</sup> This is the corner stone of neo-criticism ; this is the main doctrine, the main text of the sermons of the neo-critics ; this is the fundamental doctrine on which neo-criticism is based.

Exponents of neo-criticism in the West are described as impressionistic critics, and impressionistic criticism is not without its disadvantages. It may be said against it that a critic of the impressionistic school thrusts *himself*, his own *personality*, his own *ego*, more than necessary upon the view of the readers, and upon the view of those who would like to appreciate the work of art. He seeks to substitute himself in place of the poet, in place of the work of art. But the neo-critic may say that this is better than substituting history of metaphysics or politics or biography. At least it may be said in favour of the neo-critic's position, in favour of his impressionistic school, that he endeavours to re-dream the poet's dream, to re-live his life and it may be said in his favour that he strives to replace one work of art by another. This is the central idea in neo-criticism :—that "*art* can find its *alter-ego* (other self) only in art"<sup>3</sup>. If creation is art, criticism is also art. If creation is one aspect of art, criticism is another aspect or another phase of art. They are different phases of the same, the one being the inner phase, the other, the outer. A misanthropic philosopher, one who had a keen shrewd philosophic insight, I mean the great Schopenhauer, describes criticism as "the feminine aspect of creation". Students of the impressionistic school of criticism will find in this a somewhat distorted view of the science and art of criticism. It would be more correct to say that

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. E. Spingarn in his "The New Criticism."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Spingarn, 'The New Criticism', p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Spingarn, 'The New Criticism', p. 6.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

125

*genius* and *taste* are inseparable phases of the same art ; it may be more correct to say that poetic *genius* and *taste* are related to each other as *woman* and *man*.

In the history of Sanskrit literature, particularly that portion of Sanskrit literature which deals with the principles of criticism—and this goes back to a distant antiquity—one cannot see anything like a pronounced antipathy against critics nor against poets. Taking the general trend of Sanskrit literature at any stage, I believe, one cannot see anything like an attempt to divorce criticism from creation or creation from criticism. Like Plato who banished poetry from his republic, the Mimamsakas and the orthodox Vaidikas might say—“*Kavyalapamsca varjayet*”. These are but aberrations from the normal, even though they are great in other phases of learning. Excepting these very stray cases, our history does not show any divorce, does not show any attempt at divorce between critics and poets.

The oldest phase of literary appreciation may be traced back to the Rgveda. It is not meant to suggest that the Rgvedic bard was conscious of his position as a critic ; yet it is quite possible that the bards were also critics without being conscious of it. In a God-filled or God-intoxicated state of mind, from the pure fountain of their heart, the Rks flowed and some of them suggest certain ideas about critics almost in the same vein. Compare the following Rk-

उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम् ।

उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसन्ने जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः ॥

VIII. ii. 23. 4.

Poesy reveals herself only to him who understands her. It is not the critic that praises the poet here, but the poet that praises the critic. What we may ordinarily expect is that poets, not infrequently, take such an attitude towards their productions, as is very similar to that of parents towards their children. They do not like their works to be criticised and criticised adversely. Ripe poets are ripe critics ; only such writers are not too many. In the Rk quoted above, we have the Vedic bard appreciating the critic.

Now we shall take a leap to the Epics, though the leap is very big. We are told that Valmiki is the Adikavi. Valmiki is regarded as the first genuine poet ; it was he who first indicated to the world the lines on which Indian poesy should proceed and indicated to the world how to appreciate Indian poetry and to understand the fundamentals of Indian poetry. The story describing the origin of the Ramayana is known to all.

पादबद्धोऽक्षरसमः तन्त्रीलयसमन्वितः ।

शोकार्तस्य प्रवृत्तो मे श्लोको भक्तु नान्यथा ॥

Ramayana, I. 2. 18.

Read again the chapter that tells us this story and we shall find that in Valmiki, the creative artist and the art-critic were rolled up and harmoniously blended into one. In a spontaneous way a beautiful poem emanates from the fountain of his pathos-filled heart, and he proceeds to bestow some thought upon the verse and he pauses and appreciates the verse. One would think that the closing part of the chapter is prosaic, but it has a clear lesson to convey to the world. The creative side of his genius did its work side by side with the critical side and he played the role of a critic. The spontaneous emanation of his pathos-filled heart blooms into sweet poetry. Note Soka is itself Sloka. The Soka-Sloka equation has played a very great part in the history of Alankara literature and in the theory of literary criticism in Sanskrit ; it has formed a source of inspiration to the poets



and authors of the Dhvani school of criticism. A fruitful doctrine of literary criticism came to be enunciated as the result of the inspiration derived from this Soka-Sloka equation. It was an equation which attracted the attention of Kalidasa, which he did not choose to ignore.

तामभ्यगच्छद्दुदितानुसारी कविः कुशेध्माहरणाय यातः ।

निषादविद्धाण्डजदर्शनोत्थः श्लोकत्वमापद्यत यस्य शोकः ॥

Raghuvamsa, XIV, 70.

It is clear that the great poet was responsible for advocating a wholesome and harmonious unification of the two phases of art, namely creation and criticism.

Then let us come down to a later stage. Let us see what the prince of Indian poets, what Kalidasa has to say. In a simple way devoid of all embellishment, and in his own characteristically telling manner, in a very appropriate situation, he makes the same observation and lays down the same fundamental position ; says he :

आ परितोषाद्विदुषां न साधु मन्ये प्रयोगविज्ञानम् ।

बलवदपि शिक्षितानामात्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः ॥

Abhijnanasakuntala, Prastavana.

This is a beautiful homage that the greatest artist of India pays to the art-critic. Now by this time, can we not realise that the underlying idea which influenced all these statements was something like this : Art can only find its *alter-ego* in art-criticism. The creative art can only find its other self in the art of criticism, not in the science of criticism.

Let us see what some of the oldest Alankarikas have to say. It is accepted generally that Bhamaha is the oldest Alankarika, the oldest at least among those whose works have come down to us. Says he :

नाकवित्वमधर्माय व्याधये दण्डनाय वा ।

कुक्कवित्वं पुनस्साक्षान्मृतिमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥

Kavyalankara, I. 12.

Not to be a poet certainly is not a sin, nor does it make one fall ill or liable to punishment. But what about being a bad poet or bad artist ? Not to be an artist, not to make poetry is sufficiently bad ; to mar poetry, to injure art, to be a bad artist, it is death itself. As a panacea for *kukavitva*, Bhamaha recommends a careful study of the principles of literary criticism. He himself was not merely a great critic, but was also a great poet. The next great figure in the field is Dandin, probably a younger contemporary of Bhamaha. He also emphasises the same idea in the verse :—

किमन्धस्याधिकारोऽस्ति रूपभेदोपलब्धिषु ।

Kavyadarsa, I. 8.

It is not only the importance and value of criticism, but the underlying unity of the two aspects of the poetic art that he emphasises. The two aspects are but different phases of the same thing. The same attitude is emphasised by Rajasekhara, the great poet and critic, who was characterised by a massive intellect and whose writings reveal its massiveness as well as its perversity. He is perhaps a younger contemporary of Anandavardhana and certainly an elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta. A work of his, *Kavya-mimamsa*, published in the Gackwad's Oriental Series, contains some very interesting matter, more especially in his discussion of the nature and value of *Pratibha*.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

127

Bhavakatva represents literary appreciation. Creation and criticism are naturally dependent ; they form a single unit which has two phases.

सा (प्रतिभा) च द्विधा कारयित्री भावयित्री च ।

कवेरूपकुर्वाणा कारयित्री । . . . .

भावकस्य उपकुर्वाणा भावयित्री । . . . .

कः पुनरनयोर्भेदो यत्कविर्भावयति, भावकश्च कविः इत्याचार्याः । Kavyamimamsa, pp. 12-13.

We are familiar with gold and the touch-stone. When it so happens that both these are of the same substance, it becomes wonderful. The older names of the science are misleading. One may find appropriate names in such terms as Kavyaloka, Kavyadarsa, Kavyadarpana, etc. These terms also suggest that creation and criticism do not represent two distinct things, they are but different phases of the same thing.

I may at once proceed to draw your attention to the glorious way in which a synthesis was actually achieved between these two phases of the poetic art, namely, creation and criticism. It is the crowning glory of Indian poets and critics that they have realised, achieved and established a synthesis between these two phases. What may be regarded as the *ego* and the *alter-ego* of the same art was synthesised in a beautiful way and this synthesis was vividly envisaged both in theory and practice by several Indian poets and critics like Valmiki, Kalidasa, Bhamaha, Dandin, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The last of these eminent authors indicates this beautiful synthesis in the opening verse of his Dhvanyalokalocana :

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकलां

जगद्ग्रावप्रख्यं निजरसभरात्सारयति च ।

क्रमात्प्रख्योपाख्याप्रसरमुभगं भासयति तत्

सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ॥

The secret of poetic genius, its full truth, consists in at once being a *poet* and a *critic*, *kavi* and *sahrdaya*, in the synthesis of the creative art and critical art. Herein lies the great secret.

Who is a *sahrdaya* ? It is not the historical type of critics, nor the biographical type of critics, but the type of neo-critics above referred to, that answers to the *sahrdaya* described in Alankara sastra. *Sahrdayas* are critics whose hearts are attuned to the work of art and this attunement is the result of a certain kind of discipline and this discipline involves constant study and constant appreciation or criticism and constantly moving in an atmosphere favourable for the growth of genuine literature.

येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

Dhvanyalokalocana, p. 77, KSRI. edn.

From what has been said so far, it will be found that Indian poets and critics have achieved a great synthesis between poesy and criticism, a synthesis which forms the key to the proper understanding of the course of Indian poetry and criticism. You may now be able to appreciate the significance of the remark which I made at the outset—

कविताबुधयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोरिव ॥



Now you may proceed to link up this introduction to the main parts of the subject. I propose to persuade you to believe that Sanskrit literature and literary criticism contain very valuable information about what I would not hesitate to characterise as the highway of highways of literary criticism. What more do you require than this, the synthesis that I have referred to between the two aspects of the poetic art under consideration, the creative side and the critical aspect? In this synthesis you can find not only the key to the scheme of my theme, but also the greatest highway of highways of literary criticism. I have not hesitated to characterise it as the *highway of highways of literary criticism*, because it is a synthesis which is coming to be accepted by the modern critics. To say this, in these days, would act as a charm, an important charm. For the exponents of neo-criticism in the West, after so many decades of several thinkers and writers groping in the dark, it was reserved in the twentieth century to emphasise the value of this synthesis, of following the synthetic method of criticism, and of realising the importance of the unity between the two phases of art—namely creation and criticism.

In India and in Indian culture, I may at once tell you that the concept of *synthesis* has always played a very important part. It furnishes you with the key to so many problems relating to Indian poetry, to Indian philosophy, to Indian religion. The glorious achievement of Indian philosophy consists in its synthesis. In recent times all speak of the warring creeds and warring religions in India; particularly politicians of modern times take advantage of a reference to such things. But behind all these apparently warring creeds and religions, one could easily see that Indian culture always stood for synthesis, which formed as it were a fortress in which our culture has been securely enshrined and has always kept itself safe. Even sectarian writers and poets are anxious to emphasise this kind of synthesis everywhere. Take for instance, the great poet Nilakantha Diksita, who has worked up a beautiful synthesis between Saivism and Vaisnavism and Saktism.

यदेतद्वामाङ्गं घनजघनकेशस्तनभरं

कदाचित्तच्छंभोः भवति कमलाकौस्तुभधरम् ।

Nilakanthavijayacampu II. 20.

This synthesis then is our great achievement in the field of religion and philosophy and it is no less such in the realm of art. In pre-historic times, as also in historic times, there was always an endeavour to synthesise the two types of art, Indian and alien, to accommodate them in the same fold and our historical monuments bear ample testimony to this spirit. And it is this Indian spirit in favour of synthesis that is responsible to-day for the tolerant attitude which India is taking in political matters. Indian culture is always in favour of synthesis.

If you study the history of Indian culture, you will always see that its keynote is synthesis, which, in the realm of spiritual knowledge, was so beautifully worked up by Bhagavan Sri Kṛṣṇa in his Bhagavadgita in expounding the Yoga sastra of the Gita. In the sphere of art and art-criticism you can similarly see a glorious synthesis of two important phases of culture, namely, creation and criticism, creative art and art criticism.

## (II)

Yesterday my endeavour was to persuade you to believe the truth that Art could find its *alter-ego* in Art itself and the underlying synthesis between creative art and art criticism, between the two phases of *pratibha* and how it was achieved both in theory and practice in ancient India by her great poets and critics. It was also there indicated that this synthesis—the glorious synthesis between the



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT 129

*kavi* and the *sahrdya*, which was dimly perceived in this land was first definitely achieved by Valmiki and later worked up by succeeding generations of poets and critics and allowed to culminate in the master critic Abhinavagupta. To-day it is my endeavour to carry you further and I propose to persuade you to believe that Sanskrit literary criticism has achieved still another glorious synthesis in the realm of art. If the synthesis I have already described to you is the highway of highways in the field of literary criticism, to-day I shall speak to you about the synthesis of *law* and *liberty*.

I am here tempted to read out a well-known passage from one of the greatest of the modern poets, whose imaginative vision is all-comprehensive and thoroughly Indian—I mean Rabindranath Tagore. “When we come to literature we find that though it conforms to rules of grammar, it is yet a thing of joy, it is freedom itself. The beauty of a poem is bound by strict laws, yet it transcends them. The laws are its wings, they do not keep it weighed down, they carry it to freedom. Its form is in law, but its spirit is in beauty. Law is a first step towards freedom and beauty is the complete liberation which stands and shines on the pedestal of law.”\* The passage referred to is prose-poetry and in a telling and beautiful way, it points out the synthesis between literary law and literary freedom.

How is this synthesis between law and liberty achieved? It is achieved through a particular doctrine of literary criticism; the achievement of this synthesis has been rendered possible by the recognition and acceptance of the principle of *vyanjana*—suggestion, though true it is that the acceptance of this principle has led to a number of wooden classifications in Sanskrit literature. What is this *vyanjana*? In technical language it may be described as an extraordinary significative power which all works of art possess. In its narrow sense, what do we understand by it? Yesterday I referred to the dictum laid down by Benedetto Croce, the replacement of the concept “all art is expression” by the concept “all expression is art”. We have now to remind ourselves of it. In one sense, even from the point of view of the ordinary speaker, even an ordinary sentence has some artistic element in it, and it is the result of the inherent artistic capacity that every intelligent being possesses. This idea is developed by a modern scientific writer Jespersen in a thrilling manner in a recent work of his *The Philosophy of Grammar*. In all speech, he says there are three distinct things—expression, suppression and impression. It is important to note that impression is often produced by suppression also and suggestion, he says, is impression through suppression. Boredom we have when there is only expression, but it is only a question of degree. You cannot come across any human being of average intelligence, being such a hopeless bore as to express everything. One cannot do it. One has always to suppress something and the greatness of great writers and great speakers is said to lie in the larger or greater degree of suppression. This idea could easily be illustrated by a commonplace example. We go to the railway station and standing at the counter say “Please, a second class ticket to Annamalainagar”. Even here there is a large amount of suppression. This helps us to realise the full meaning of the definition given by Jespersen that suggestion is impression through suppression.

*Vyanjana* is suggestion, that is, suggestion in poetry; and it often means more than that. Poetry comes from a principle of suggestion. Even in ordinary sentences the element of suppression cannot be avoided. This truth was long ago recognised in India by the Naiyayikas, who in their anxiety to be absolutely precise by expressing everything have become real bores and everywhere they inflict their hopeless boredom. They are precise, they want to measure thought quantitatively and so use

\* Sadhana, Realisation in Love, pp. 98-9, Macmillan & Co.



the various and varied formulas\* such as *avaccheda*, *avacchinna* etc., and in every sentence of theirs these formulas are used to the best of their ability, so that they might express everything they want, and leave no scope for carrying any impression through suppression. Even they, however, cannot escape from the inevitable nature of language. In spite of their formulas, there is yet a residual element in a sentence which refuses to be expressed—the residual element of artistic sense inherently available in every being. Now let us illustrate this position. Taking an ordinary sentence, let us enquire whether it expresses anything which is not expressed by its constituent elements. That is to say, does the sentence express anything over and above the meaning of the words which compose the sentence? The answer is inevitably 'yes'. The relation between the various words is unexpressed and the question naturally arises, how is this idea conveyed? *Samsarga* they say is *vakyartha*. How is this *samsarga* conveyed? It is mysterious and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In sentences we have a juxtaposition of words and the element of the relation between the words is conveyed, we have to say, by suppression; in other words, the essential part of every judgement is conveyed by suppression. Now the question is, how is this conveyed? The philosophers are not artists and naturally they have strongly differed from the Alankarikas and vehemently criticised their principles. They accept *samsarga* but they say that *samsarga* is not something suggested and would hide their answer by a technical expression '*samsargamaryadaya avabhasate*'; and this element they later describe as the element of suppression in conveying judgement. The life of speech consists in this suppressed element and the greater the life that art has, the greater is the suppressed element in it. Alankarikas have developed the scheme of suppression. From all this we come to understand that *vyanjana* is not the peculiar discovery of critics, and that it is a principle accepted and recognised by every student of philosophy, of logic and of language. It is a principle raised to the rank of a special principle, an important doctrine in the realm of literary appreciation. Poetic art is a superior kind of art and in this art, this principle is employed to a very large extent and the acceptance of this principle renders possible the synthesis between *law* and *liberty*. In the first place, it is easily seen that this establishes a sort of connection between expression and impression, between the speaker and the hearer. On the other side, this principle can be developed in the light of a second equation. On the one side there is the artist's mind, the aesthetic sense of artistic expression and on the other there is the art itself. There is also a third equation, the reader or the *sahrdaya*. And the synthesis may be connected with these three important factors. On the part of the artist, there is much scope for anticipatory imagination, and on the part of the *sahrdaya* there is scope for anticipatory realisation. Now what is the connecting link or relation between the two? It is the poetic expression and this may be described as a bridge which carries the art from the *kavi* to the *sahrdaya* and this bridge is composed of the element of suggestion.

*Law* in the sphere of poetic art reduces itself to the numerous literary rules. In the same sphere, *liberty* is to be understood as the principle which determines the free play of the artist's genius. What harmonises the attitude of the poet and the attitude of the critic is *vyanjana* or suggestion; in the absence of this suggestion either art will groan under the weight of the doctrines of literary appreciation or it will run riot. In this way, the principle of suggestion may be understood to establish a synthesis between *law* and *liberty*.

In this connection we may also profitably consider another matter. This principle has also made it possible to achieve a beautiful synthesis between the two important factors of life, speech and thought, sound and sense. In the ancient poetic literature and in the works of old Alankarikas, one

\* These formed the subject of a course of lectures of Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri—Thought-measuring Devices in Indian Dialectics—delivered under the auspices of the Madras University in 1929.



could easily see the great importance attributed to this synthesis between *sabda* and *artha*. The ancient Indian culture looks upon *sabda* and *artha* as an inseparable pair representing the father and mother of the world. The simple mangala-sloka with which Kalidasa opens his immortal epic, *Raghuvamsa*, is very significant in this direction, very forcible and telling. It is not to be misunderstood, as the verse of a Vaidika introduced without a purpose. It suppresses, conceals behind it a very great truth for artists and critics. Here the greatest literary artist of India pays homage to the symbol of *sabda* and *artha* in the world and seeks to obtain that adequate appreciation of that ample and full synthesis between sound and sense, an appreciation which every genuine artist must possess. The phrase "*vagarthapratipattaye*" does not merely connote the acquisition of the words and their meanings—this is a very small thing which could easily be acquired through *kosas* as in olden days and through dictionaries as in modern days. Here the poet is seeking to equip himself with that important synthesis of sound and sense which every literary artist must have. Without this synthesis, a genuine artist cannot produce a genuine work of art.

Genuine poetry is always looked upon as spontaneous emanation from a *rasa*-filled heart. A beautiful thought clothes itself in a beautiful garb without any conscious effort on the part of the poet. This is the highest test of true poetry. Another writer, Bhavabhuti, remarks :

लौकिकानां हि साधूनामर्थं वागनुवर्तते ।

ऋषीणां पुनराद्यानां वाचमर्थोऽनुधावति ॥

Uttararamacarita, I. 10.

It is an oft-quoted, probably a hackneyed verse, but it embodies a great truth. Consider this verse in the light of the point of view we have been emphasising. The underlying idea is the complete harmony between sound and sense. Sense is always aggressive ; and in the hands of an ordinary man, it shapes its language. But in the case of gifted people, gifted artists, sense follows sound. The term 'rsi' is to be understood in the sense of a gifted artist. Another gifted literary critic who is said to have been a teacher of Abhinavagupta, I mean Bhatta Tauta, remarks that *Kavi* and *rsi* are synonyms. "नानृषिः कविरित्युक्तम्". Prophets and poets are made of the same stuff and their vision is identical. Shelley remarks that painters and poets would not fail to apprehend this vision. How is this effected in poetic expression ? It is, as I have already stated, by the principle of *vyanjana*. The secret is suggestion. Sound and sense cannot be harmonised except through suppression. Mechanically speaking, that is purely from the linguistic point of view, it would mean that the two could not be harmonised. The relation between *sabda* and *artha* has been and is a riddle and the difference becomes accentuated when this great principle is forgotten. Articulation is the result of certain adjustments of the speech mechanism, and sense is quite different from this. Thus organically the two cannot be harmonised. It is the artistic instinct of suppression that serves as the connecting link, bridges over the gulf between the two entirely distinct things, *sabda* and *artha*. Thus in this field also we find that this principle is very important.

This now leads us to a consideration of certain other principles representing certain other highways of literary criticism. We are aware of the fact that literary art or an expression of literary art involves two important aspects—*form* and *content*. Every artist has to pay special attention to literary form and literary content. Now what is literary form, and what is literary content ? This again leads us to the old synthesis of *sabda* and *artha*. What is literary form ? Indian critics have analysed literary form and they have laid down that this consists of *sabda* and *artha*, or *sabda* and certain types of *artha*. Ordinary words grouped in an artistic way with some ideas, that is, *vakyartha*—primary sense—constitute form. This alone, of course, will not do. It must be bright, free from defects etc.




The other elements associated with form are technically referred to as *gunas*, *alankaras*, *ritis* etc.. The term *alankara* stands for *decorative* devices. *Guna* is a term untranslatable. It is not merely quality or merit, but something more ; a new *rudhi* must be established before these words could be accepted. *Riti* cannot again be identified with style merely. This is a very vague term. Does it refer to ways of grouping words or thought ? It is not very clear. In a general way *riti* may be equated with style, for both are vague. I have devised a pedantic phrase which is probably the nearest approximation to the ideas expressed by the term *guna*, ways of collocation ; collocation of ideas or sense and of words approaches *guna*. It must be remembered that it is not merely collocation of words and ideas referred to here but the artistic collocation of artistic *sabda*, *artha*, absence of defects, presence of brightness, *riti*, *guna* and *alankara*, these constitute literary form.

Now what about content ? The sense which is beautiful, the sense that is charming constitutes content. A careful examination of our great works of art and our views and modes of appreciation would reveal this important fact—on one side the various aspects of form synthesise, and on the other the various aspects of content synthesise. And this has been rendered possible by the doctrine of *dhvani* which sums up the synthesis of all conceivable modes of literary appreciation.

औचित्यमनुधावन्ति सर्वे ध्वनिरसोन्नयाः ।

गुणालङ्कृतिरीतीनां नयाश्चानुवाङ्मयाः ॥



(Block lent by Dr. V. Raghavan)

The above-mentioned graph will form a key to the whole position. *Dhvani*, *rasa* and *unnaya*. these three stand for three important schools of thought in Sanskrit literary criticism. *Dhvani* is *vyanjana*. *Rasa* is a highway of criticism not only for Indian literature but also for the study of European literature, a sure and certain method. Emphasising *rasa*, one school accepts *dhvani* or suggestion, while another school accepts *rasa*, emphasising *unnaya*. *Dhvani*, the latter say, is a sort of inference, a quick anticipatory way of inference. These three run after *aucitya*. *Gun*s, *alankaras* and *ritis*, these are emphasised in special ways. Are *ritis* and *gunas* different ? They are recognised as different in *Alankara sastra*. *Anrjuwak* means *vakrokti*. This also runs after *aucitya*.

The graph also represents their historical inter-relation. The bigger circle encloses the bigger triangle which stands for *aucitya* which may be termed as 'adaptation' to be understood in its



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

133

philosophical sense. Adaptation is understood in this sense as standing for the perfect harmony which parts bear to each other and to the whole. *Dhvani*, *rasa* and *unnaya* or *anumana* obviously refer to the literary content, i.e., artistic thought, whereas *gunas*, *alankaras* and *ritis* refer to the literary form.

Now what is *vakrokti*? Some have translated it as eccentric expression. This is a monstrosity. In a simple way, it may be understood as deviation in expression from the commonplace. This deviation may be due to various causes, but when the deviation is effective, it is termed *vakrokti*. On the side of expression, the inner circle refers to *vakrokti* and *gunas*. *Alankaras* and *ritis* are comprised within it. *Aucitya* represents the great synthesis of *rasa*, *dhvani* and *anumana* and what is more, both form and content. *Rasa*, *dhvani* and *anumana*, because they deal with a sphere of content, are bigger, more important, more comprehensive than the sphere of form.

If speech fulfils its purpose, there ought to be some amount of suppression. Hence naturally thought is wider than speech. Philosophically also this is true. If one must be thinking, he must think in language. If this be so, and so far as we know it is so, can it be said that thought and speech are co-extensive? We have seen what the answer should be. And Indian metaphysicists hold that thought is always wider, more comprehensive than speech. If this is so in ordinary parlance, it is expressly and definitely so in the field of literary art. As a fiction, they are taken as co-extensive in one field, that is the field of law, both ancient and modern. The Mimamsakas assume that thought and form are co-extensive. But it remains only an assumption; in actual practice this view is always given up. The assumption is that *vidhi* is straightforward न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः: this is an attitude that is totally inimical to literary criticism. In this field, we accept that thought is always wider than form;\* if not, the world would have been deprived of the pleasure of art; in the field of art, they are never co-extensive. This great synthesis of form and content is the greatest of our achievements in the realm of art and that we have been able to achieve through the doctrine of *vyanjana*.

The graph also helps us to understand the various highways of literary criticism. *Rasapaddhati*; is the oldest and the most permanent; the most imperial highway of literary appreciation, the way of the great critic-artists Valmiki, Kalidasa, the way of the great art-critics, Bharata, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Historically also this is true. For if Valmiki is the father of poetry and criticism, *rasapaddhati* becomes the most ancient highway of literary appreciation. *Dhvani* and *anumana* are placed side by side at the base of the triangle, because one cannot call one older than the other. The leading exponent of the *dhvani* theory presupposes the *anumana* theory and criticises it. It appears therefore possible that these two highways must have existed coevally. Mahimabhatta is not the discoverer of *anumana-paddhati*. In the inner triangle the same historical sequence is observed. Bhamaha, the oldest *Alankarika* available, emphasises *alankara*, while Dandin and Vamana emphasise respectively *guna* and *riti*. These two authors are not far separated in time and therefore they are placed in the foot of the triangle. Further Bhamaha throws out valuable hints regarding *vakrokti*, even though it was reserved for Kuntaka to systematically develop it. According to Bhamaha, literary form and thought consist of *vakrokti*:

सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।

Kavyalankara, II. 85.

Thus it will be found that the *vakrokti*-synthesis which is less important only than the *aucitya*-synthesis is older than the three other literary forms, *guna*, *alankara* and *riti*.

\* This is signified in the graph by the triangle of *rasa-dhvani-unnaya* representing content, enclosing within itself *vakrokti*, *riti*, *guna* and *alankara*, representing form.



## (III)

From my remarks yesterday, you should have easily gathered that we prepared ourselves to move along the highway of *vyanjana*. We also equipped ourselves with a graph towards the end of the last lecture which would enable us as a guide, more or less as a typographical guide, on the highway of *vyanjana* and would enable us not to miss the prominent things and not to miss particularly the links which connect the byroads or the byways with this highway. Tonight I propose to amplify certain remarks I made about the principles of *vyanjana*.

In fact, it may be regarded as the central principle of literary criticism in Sanskrit, it may be regarded as the pivotal doctrine round which the whole scheme of art-criticism in Sanskrit revolves. Now what is the secret of this principle? In a prosaic way, as I told you yesterday, it may be rendered by the term 'suggestion'; and as to what suggestion is, I would like to remind you of the definition given by Jespersen: "Suggestion is impression through suppression." It is the suppressive element that is important in suggestion. We should also remind ourselves in this connection of the general principles laid down by Croce that all expression is art, not only poetical expression but all expression is art. One cannot, however low may be one's civilization or culture, provided one is equipped with some medium of expression, one cannot get away from being an artist in framing sentences. Now the principle of *vyanjana* is suggestion in poetry. Is it that which is not fundamentally different from the principle of suggestion in a sentence, is it merely the suggestion that we see in ordinary sentences? It is not merely that. It represents the centre of charm in poetry, the soul of charm in poetry and so it is not merely the suggestion we find in ordinary sentences. Then what is the secret of the force of *vyanjana* as an artistic principle? I refer to the suppressed element in the case of suggestion. Why should there be a suppressed element at all even in ordinary sentences? We wish to create a minimum degree of interest possibly in the minds of hearers. Without interesting the hearers to some extent at least, we cannot create anything like a desirable impression on the minds of the readers. Even to attract attention, a minimum degree of interest we should provide, and the element of suppression is necessary. Now this element of suppression may be enhanced in its value, this element of suppression may be intensified, may be improved upon in various ways; in poetic expression, it is this element of suppression and the principle of suggestion that rests upon it that prove all-important. In fact it was discovered in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D. by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that this is the centre, the source of poetic charm. Well, what is the secret of this attraction? What is the secret of this force? Some people would say that there is an element of novelty in *vyanjana* or suggestion. The suggested idea is envisaged with a certain degree of novelty. What is suppressed and let out, and what is suppressed and suggested may appear novel, may appear new or may be envisaged with a certain out look of freshness for the time being. Is it this element that is the real source of attraction? I do not think it is the real source of attraction. It is suggested by a Sanskrit writer that there is scope for some sort of intellectual quest in the process of *vyanjana*, quest provided it leads to conquest; and intellectual quest in *vyanjana* certainly leads to some conquest. Now these two things, quest and conquest, are enough to create some interest. Well, is it because of the scope for quest and conquest that we have in *vyanjana* that it proves to be attractive? There is some truth in this explanation but it is not the whole truth. The same idea is expressed in some works on Sanskrit poetics in another way. Something is concealed for the time being; and concealing for a moment and withholding from your view might tend to enhance the degree of charm; like distance, concealing and withholding might lead to enhance its charm: *gudham sat camatkaroti*. Like the charms of an attractive beauty which do not obtrude upon notice in an immodest way, but which are presented through a veil and in



a properly concealed fashion, like the physical charms of a modest beauty then, the suggested element when it is presented, when it is disclosed after some degree of concealment, proves to be attractive. This is also true to some extent. But it is only a poetic way of presenting the other explanation. There is scope for quest and conquest here. But the fact is, as far as I have been able to gather, that *vyanjana* makes it possible for art, for every suggestive art, to re-live its life in itself through a purely artistic process and to find its fulfilment and consummation in a definitely artistic purpose. That is the secret of the force of the whole charm of *vyanjana*.

This requires amplification, and an amplification of this statement may involve a review of the whole literature on Sanskrit poetics from the point of view of *vyanjana*. We may take a long and comprehensive view of the whole literature from this standpoint. Let us take this statement in parts and proceed to consider it. *Vyanjana* is a wholly suggested, a wholly artistic, process. Can we not say that it is an intellectual process? Yes, in the language of the logic-ridden phraseology of the Alankarikas. Or can we not say in the technical sense of the logicians that it has a power attracted towards it? All these technicalities could be introduced in the course of a discussion of the nature of *vyanjana* and of a discussion of its place in art criticism. We have to remember in this connection one important fact. Such a view would enable you to see how to study in detail the learned criticisms in the Alankara sastras and also how to study in detail all the discussions of relevant topics of this principle, namely *vyanjana* in art criticism. Many of you may be familiar with the learned arguments that are adduced to show that *vyanjana* or suggestion is not the ordinary *prima facie* significatory power which words possess. It is not the primary power by virtue of which words or expressions of phrases or sentences convey their *prima facie* meaning. Well, in a majority of instances we are even using expressions in a secondary sense, we are using so many words in a secondary sense. And can we not bring *vyanjana* or suggestion under the category of some secondary significatory power? Secondary significatory power is a sort of fiction which we have introduced in the philosophy of interpretation for purposes of convenience, the result of the superimposition of a certain subjective aspect made intentionally and consciously by the subject upon the expression that is used. You find a certain statement made and some phrases are loosely used, some expressions do not admit of strict interpretation, and consistently with the context, consistently with what you know about the intention of the speaker, and consistently also with the general aim that is kept in view, you interpret and you seek to correctly interpret and to interpret him generously and favourably. Hearers are always supposed to be generous, except probably those who are to consider or interpret law. Other hearers are always supposed to be generous. A certain amount of generosity in interpretation is necessary in all inter-communication of thought. Life will not be worth living, if every hearer should insist upon exact precision and exact accuracy in every statement that you make in ordinary conversation. In writing even, it is possible only with due limitations. Now under such circumstances in order to find out the intention of the speaker, we take some of the phrases loosely used by him in a certain sense which those phrases do not primarily possess. Some hackneyed examples are cited in this connection. Take for instance a hamlet on the Ganges—we interpret it as a hut on the banks of the Ganges. Well, in such cases consistently with the context you reinterpret such phrases in a different way and the interpretation which you put upon them is attributed to some secondary significatory power which the phrase is supposed to possess. Well, can *vyanjana* or suggestion be brought under that? No; the reason is this: you deliberately resort to a certain process of interpretation, because you feel some difficulty in understanding the phrase in its literal sense. The phrase used cannot be construed strictly and your conscious experience of some hitch or difficulty is at the root of the secondary interpretation that is adopted. That is what I mean when I say that it is a sort of fiction which you create for purposes of interpretation. That is not suggestion. Behind that, however, there is another element. Well, fancy for a moment that the speaker who uses such a phrase uses



it in that way with a purpose and in a deliberate manner, not as a result of some lapse. As it is, he deliberately uses the phrase then in a secondary sense. You are not justified in assuming that the speaker is a fool or thinking loose, that he has not got sufficient control over language to make himself intelligible in a direct and straightforward manner. You assume that he is a master of language. Under these circumstances there must be some object, some purpose the speaker must have in view in adopting this secondary mode of expression. He must have something in view, some purpose or *prayajana* in view. What is it he wishes to suggest? He wishes to go a step further on the path of suppression. He wishes to conceal from the point of view for a little while a certain idea and at the same time he wishes that that idea should be understood in an agreeable way. It is in this context you can easily see what the idea might be. As it is, the speaker wishes to suggest that the hut is pure, it is holy because it is situated on the bank of the river Ganga and it is very close to it. As it is, he wishes to emphasise the idea of the proximity to the river and so many other things that may be associated with its close proximity. That element is left to be gathered from the context and that element is left to be suggested; that element is not conveyed for the moment by the expression itself. This is *vyanjana*. This gives rise to a furious controversy in the philosophy of Alankara sastra between the Alankarikas and the logicians. Well, why should not this element be brought under inference? It may be the case of an agreeable type of inference. Call it inference or call it suggestion, you cannot say that it is a regular type of syllogising, you cannot say that it is a regular type of syllogistic inference, you may treat it as a sort of immediate inference. A degree of mediacy is an essential feature of inferential process. Mediacy is the characteristic feature of inference and here in suggestion one feels that the degree of mediacy that is necessarily characteristic of inference is wanting, and we feel that there is a certain degree of immediacy which does not entitle us to bring it under inference. As a result, this process is taken to be a process associated with artistic expression itself but not with an ordinary process; it is taken to be an extreme process and it is described by Alankarikas as *lokottara*. In the course of the technical discussion of the nature of this *vr̥tti*, one is apt to forget the essential characteristic of the process called *vyanjana*. One is likely to be carried away by the glorifying description of the character of *vyanjana*. It is an extraordinary process. Abhinavagupta exalts this process as something extraordinary.\* Why is it *lokottara*? The simple idea behind the phrase *lokottara* is this—it is essentially an artistic process; it is not a *laukika* process, it is not a process of the ordinary life, it is not the inartistic process with which we are familiar in this work-a-day world in our everyday task—it is an essentially artistic process. That is why it is described by the Alankarikas as a *lokottara-vr̥tti* and it is an artistic process for various reasons.

To appreciate adequately why *vyanjana* should be regarded as an essentially artistic process, you have to look at it from various points of view, and I propose to help you in looking at it from certain points of view. It is an essentially artistic process as it involves suppression, not of the everyday type but of the agreeable type. It is an essentially artistic process because it gives us an impression, not the ordinary commonplace impression which sentences give, not the impression of the craftsmanlike or mechanical type but a delicate impression described as artistic thrill. It is an essentially artistic process because it enables you to feel that you have done with certain matters with which students of Alankara sastra are already familiar. It enables you to feel that you have done with the compartmental slicing of Sanskrit literature into literary genera such as epic, lyric, the material, the non-material and so on. It enables you thus to feel that you have done with this sort of compartmental slicing up of literature and it enables you to take the right view of poetic art and view it as an organic

\* See Locana, KSRI. edn. pp. 105-132.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

137

and complete expression and put the right question which you should put to yourself in matters connected with literary production. Well, what is the right question which you should put to yourself? The question to be put is not what is the type under which it should be brought, not whether it conforms to certain time-honoured traditional classifications recognised by the classical school of critics, not whether it conforms to rules deduced from such classification, not whether it conforms to the dead weight of the technique—that is not the right question to put, but the right question to put is what this artistic specimen expresses and how far it expresses it well and artistically? That is the right type of question to put. This point of view was emphasised adequately for the first time by certain Kashmirian critics under the leadership of Anandavardhana, a great exponent of the *dhvani* school. Prior to Anandavardhana critics were carried away by the excesses of classification in Sanskrit literary criticism. Anandavardhana flourished in the latter part of the 9th century. If anybody before Anandavardhana investigated and envisaged the fruitfulness of this principle, namely the principle of suggestion and vividly realised the importance of this principle being raised to the rank of the central principle of literary criticism, it was Valmiki himself, the father of Sanskrit poetry, and Kalidasa who followed Valmiki in so many respects. Among the professional writers on literary criticism in Sanskrit, there is sufficient evidence to show that none clearly realised the importance of this principle before Anandavardhana. This artists realised; the art critics were unconsciously biased in favour of this principle and they unconsciously recognised the importance of this principle but they never intentionally did anything to popularise this principle, to elucidate it and to explain and illustrate it; and we owe this great contribution to the genius of Anandavardhana, that great artist and art critic.

It was he who inaugurated a certain way of classifying specimens of poetic art on the basis of this principle; in fact, it was he that was responsible for the re-classification of poetic expression under three heads. The three heads in Alankara literature are not every suggestive except to those who are familiar with the implications behind the names. The names are *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*. Thus anybody who proceeds to classify, if he wishes to be satisfied with a simple classification, is attracted by the convenience which the three-fold division affords in every branch of knowledge, in Philosophy, in Logic and in other branches of knowledge also—the two extremes and something to represent the middling. Well; that is convenient and it is this convenience that induced Anandavardhana to adopt this tripartite division. You should understand the implications behind this division of art as *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*. That specimen of poetry should be regarded as the best specimen, *uttama*, which allows the suggested element to reign supreme; it never lets itself to be subordinated to anything else—that should be regarded as the *kavya* of the best type. What about *madhyama kavya*? That specimen in which the suggested element is not raised to the supreme rank, is not allowed to reign supreme, and is either co-ordinated with some other element or subordinated to it but is at the same time allowed to preserve its minimum degree of agreeableness and beauty and attractiveness—that is regarded as the *madhyama*. And then there are certain specimens of art which may be described as the result of amusing diversion in which poetic geniuses indulge either at the stage of practice or even after reaching the stage of perfection as a sort of amusement. They are readily described as lifeless *citras* in poetry and such specimens give prominence only to certain attractive features of literary form, and under such attractive features the beautiful suggested element is allowed to lie buried. Well, that is regarded as *adhama*.

Anandavardhana himself suggests that this re-classification is only a tentative device which he has suggested as a challenge to the traditional classification of literature into various genera, to the traditional method of compartmental slicings and cuttings. He indicates how the unity of poetry could be preserved by fixing your attention upon the central principle of *vyanjana*. You



make it the leading principle of art criticism, adopt it as the source of literary charm and you can use it as a magic wand. If you wish to appraise better you can do so, you can do so without giving offence to anybody and you can do so to your own advantage. In that way, in this scheme he proposes to provide the world of readers with a convenient and flexible scheme of classification. It is a scheme which should not be adopted as a rigid scheme of classification by students. Some Commentors and some traditional writers who came after Anandavardhana were labouring under the misapprehension that he intended that this scheme should be adopted as an inflexible or rigid scheme of classification. Sometimes great masters provide the world with certain devices, and these devices are misused. Great artists provide the world with certain devices and with certain materials, and their followers come to attach greater importance to the material than to the purpose itself. In that way, later writers, in the spirit of cavilling critics, proceeded to find fault with Anandavardhana for giving an elastic or unnecessarily flexible scheme of classification which involves a lot of overlapping. It is not for purposes of a strict classification that Anandavardhana provided the world of readers with this scheme. He never intended it to be a logical scheme. His scheme of classification is not intended to satisfy the demands of strict logic. It is more a challenge to the traditional process of slicing and cutting. It is more a challenge to the tradition-ridden critics. In that way, we have to understand; and he himself makes it clear towards the end of his work. He indicates how this scheme could be re-arranged and could be re-exhibited in a slightly different fashion.

Take for instance what is known as the excellent specimen and compare it with what, in a technical sense, may be brought under *madhyama kavya* or a specimen of the middling type. Compare these two, you will find that you are likely to feel that Anandavardhana has done a grave injustice to these two types. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to two specimens.

सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषास्तयः ।

शूरश्च कृतविद्यश्च यश्च जानाति सेवितुम् ॥

This was brought under the first class. The suggestion is allowed to reign supreme here. Three classes of people are able to gather gold, as one would be able to gather flowers wherever they go. They are in prosperity everywhere. That is the suggested idea. Who are these three classes of people? (1) The brave person, the courageous person, one who is endowed with genuine valour, (2) the scholar who has studied well and who has assimilated what he has studied and (3) one who knows how to serve one's master. These three classes of people, wherever they go, thrive well. Now the simple idea that is suggested is that they meet with prosperity everywhere. That is not expressed in a straightforward way. That is certainly a suggested idea. That is allowed to reign supreme and for that reason it is *uttama kavya* and so comes under the first rank. Now place it on one side and compare it for instance with another beautiful specimen which is likely to be brought under the technical *madhyama* type.

अनुरागवती सन्ध्या दिवसस्तत्पुरुस्सरः ।

अहो दैवगतिः कीदृक् तथापि न समागमः ॥

The evening twilight is endowed with *raga*, is endowed with red colour. Her lover, the day, goes before her and quite close to her and love is reciprocated. What a fatality it is that they never come together! They are so anxious to marry each other, they are so anxious to be completely united with each other, but their desire is never allowed to fulfil itself and is never realised. The



obvious meaning here is the relation between the *Sandhya* and *Divasa* and behind it there is a suggested idea. The suggested idea is the relation of two lovers who reciprocate each other's love but who are never allowed to be united with each other. Such a relation is described by the prince of Indian poets, by Kalidasa, as reaching the supreme moment of the most spiritual aspect of love.\* It is that aspect of coming together and separation, of complete reciprocation without fulfilment or consummation, it is this that represents the supreme spiritual moment of love. The supreme spiritual moment of love does not consist in the carnal consummation that follows. And students of *rasa* know that *sringara* or love is essentially spiritual as conceived by Indians and in Indian culture. It is never carnal, it may be exhibited in certain external aspects, it may look like something connected with the carnal aspect. It is yet always spiritual, and the essential feature of love is self-effacement and not self-aggression, not self-aggrandisement. The Indian conception of love is never to possess and is always to efface oneself and to forget oneself. That is why it is raised to the rank of a vehicle which can freely reach to God. Now in this aspect of love one could find something very attractive. Those who are sufficiently responsive to *rasa* cannot miss the central idea in the suggested part of this verse. But still what is the position of that suggested idea? It is assigned a somewhat subordinate rank. It appeals certainly far better and with greater force than the idea on the surface. That is true. But what is the rank that is assigned to it? The intention of the poet is to describe *Sandhya* and *Divasa*; from the context you have to assume that, in describing *Sandhya* and *Divasa*, he has produced a work of art. A work of art, the moment it leaves the artist's hands, is the property of art-critics. We are not at all bound to interpret art in the same manner in which the artist himself intended it to be interpreted. That is the way of every good work of art, but still when we pay some attention to the context and so long as we are alive to the details of the circumstances under which this particular specimen of art was produced, we are hopelessly in the grip of historical criticism; and so long as we are within the grip of historical criticism, we have to realise that the position that is assigned to the suggested element is a subordinate position. Though we know from the circumstances of the case that the artist intends to present the idea beautifully, he seeks to present it by linking it up with some situation, with some spiritual situation, and it is very attractive. In that way he uses more or less as a decorative device the suggested element behind the *prima facie* sense. When we review the above classification, we can legitimately say that some injustice is done to this specimen. Compare it with the first verse. It has got a didactic element in it; it is an ennobling specimen; but ethics no longer regulates the standards of literature; it is the moral standard that regulates literary appreciation here. How to meet objections of this type? How to remove this injustice? Anandavardhana himself indicates how you might remove this apparent injustice.

There is another way of looking at the whole matter, and Anandavardhana himself in this connection was readily understood and interpreted by a learned critic, Panditaraja Jagannatha. He suggests a sort of amendment to this classification. In suggesting an innocent amendment, he does not improve upon this classification but simply brings out what Anandavardhana himself sought to explain towards the end of his work. This division recognises four classes instead of three—*uttamottama*, *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*. Bring it at least under *uttama*; just for the fault which the poet has committed in reducing the suggested element to a subordinate rank, he has to pay some penalty, and instead of calling it *uttamottama*, reduce it to the rank of *uttama*. But we may be excused when we refuse to take into consideration the circumstances under which the poet himself might have produced this specimen from the aesthetic point of view which the art critic has to

\* Malavikagnimitra III. 15, Ananturotkanthitayoh, etc.



adopt. Now when we proceed to review this and when we proceed to re-examine its character, it appeals to us and sometimes it appeals to us with greater force than specimens of the first type. Anandavardhana himself towards the close of his work indicates the reason. The reason which he gives is this : Behind all this, there is an element of *rasa*. On the surface, so long as you are in the grip of historical criticism, you may be able to reach only the suggested element. But behind all this there is an element of *rasa* and it is this path of suggestion which leads you to the inner shrine. When you go there, you forget what you found outside and you lose yourself in it. Then it is not *madhyama*. This idea is again expressed, elucidated and beautifully exemplified by Panditaraja. The beauty consists in its pathetic appeal to the *sahrdaya*. Specimens like this appeal in a pathetic way to responsive minds. What is the cause of this pathetic appeal ? Says he : *dasyam anubhavad rajakalatramiva* (*Rasagangadhara* p. 17). The whole pathos is to be found in the imprisonment of the suggested idea. What is the cause of the pathetic appeal in a queen who is in prison, of a glorious powerful empress who does not deserve to be thrown into prison and who is imprisoned for the moment, who is placed in the wrong place—the whole pathos of the situation, the whole appealing force of the situation, is to be found in that it is a queen that is imprisoned there. It is the suggested idea, it is the suggested element that is imprisoned in the external. The spiritual force of the pathetic appeal of a great person who is thrown into prison can be easily appreciated at this moment, for instance, when we think of the Yerawada Jail. This suggestion or *vyanjana* enables you to see that the right question to put is not what rules does the work of art conform to, but what has the work of art expressed, and how is it expressed.

## (IV)

This will be, friends, the concluding lecture of the short course which I undertook to deliver under the auspices of this University. I would request you to march on, to continue to march on through the highway of *vyanjana* or artistic suggestion. You will have an opportunity to see its full abiding promise, and it will enable you to see many more things. I have to remind you of what I said the other day about the nature of the artistic process called *vyanjana*. *Vyanjana* or artistic suggestion is a process which makes it possible for art to re-live itself in a purely artistic way and to find its fulfilment and consummation in a genuinely artistic purpose, namely *rasa*. We were able to consider certain aspects of this matter yesterday. I would again repeat that *vyanjana* is a superior type of artistic process because it enables you to feel that you have, or can very afford to have, done with the formal distinctions of *gunas*, *alankaras* etc. It enables you to effect a synthesis of all these formal elements in *vakrokti*. In one word, it enables you to synthesise law and liberty. Now you will see how it enables you to synthesise law and liberty. In literature, it is very difficult to unify these two things. One of the greatest modern Indian literary men, the greatest of Indian poets, Rabindranath Tagore, indicates the way in which law and liberty could be synthesised in literature. I quoted an extract from his writings the other day, and I would ask you to remember a bit from that extract. With the true vision of a prophet, with the comprehensive vision, the true insight of a poet, he has indicated the way in which law and liberty could be synthesised ; and Indian Alankarikas, exponents of literary criticism in Sanskrit, have also indicated how law and liberty could be synthesised in literature through the artistic process of *vyanjana*.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

141

In this connection I have to ask you not to be carried away by the glowing tribute which I paid the other day to the exponents of the modern impressionistic school of literary criticism. The exponents of this modern school have, indeed, done a great service ; but it should be remembered that the leading exponents of the school played the rôle of iconoclasts in regard to literary traditions and endeavoured to break all the ideals of classicism. One can easily see that they have committed a mistake in going to one extreme. They have committed the mistake of supposing that complete liberty could be achieved by throwing away all laws, all rules, all conventions and all traditional restrictions. The impressionistic critic fails to realise that laws are the wings of poesy, the wings of artistic liberty or artistic beauty. What will be the fate of a bird which seeks to soar higher and higher with full liberty, with unrestricted liberty but which burns its wings ? That would be the fate of the school of literary criticism which strives to burn away all traditions and seeks to soar higher and higher and run away from all classical or traditional movements. Indian art critics, with the help of all the accumulated wisdom of an age-long artistic culture, endeavoured to synthesise law and liberty and have successfully effected a synthesis through the artistic or aesthetic process of suggestion. They do not treat *guna*, *alankara* and *riti* as so many inhibitions, they do not treat them as so many astrological formulae, they do not treat them—as one follower of the impressionistic school would do—as the prattling of chambermaids, they do not treat them as the dull drone and sing-song of school mistresses. They do not treat them as so many blind alleys, but byways which could be connected and linked up with the highways of literary criticism. In order to appreciate the significance of these remarks, you have necessarily to pay some attention to the conception of *guna* and *riti* and *alankara* in Indian Alankara literature. There is a comprehensive statement regarding *guna* and *riti* given by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* ; and this statement is based upon the *Vyanjana* theory, the theory of suggestion. Allow me to read a small extract.

द्विविधं चारुत्वम्—स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठं, संघटनाश्रितं च । तत्र शब्दानां स्वरूपमात्रकृतं चारुत्वं शब्दालंकारेभ्यः, संघटनाश्रितं तु शब्दगुणेभ्यः । एवमर्थानां चारुत्वं स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठमुपमादिभ्यः, संघटनापर्यवसितं तु अर्थगुणेभ्यः ।

*Gunas* are certain features associated with the *collocation* of ideas and words ; and *alankaras* are allocated to concepts and to words as such, but not to the *collocation* of concepts nor to the *collocation* of words. *Alankaras* contribute to literary charm, *gunas* also contribute to literary charm, but they all contribute to literary charm only on this condition being satisfied, that the artistic process of *Vyanjana* or the artistic suggestion is preserved in tact. *Riti* simply represents a collective and vague name of a group of *gunas*, and the equivalent of *riti* in English is style in its broad and comprehensive sense.

Now then with the help of the graph which I explained the other day, it should be possible for you to see how these aspects of literary form were emphasised in varying degrees by several critics. These may be regarded as constituting the byways of literary criticism, and their existence, or the excuse for their existence, chiefly consists in their being correlated to the suggested sense, or to the suggested element, in an appropriate manner. Thus the process of aesthetic and artistic suggestion known as *vyanjana* connects together all the byways and leads to a synthesis being established between law and liberty. You may consider a few examples, a few specimen from Sanskrit literature, and you may see how in these specimens it is the element of suggested sense or it is the artistic process of suggestion that really represents the vital element of the life of poetry and the law, external law, has much to do with certain rules dealing with *gunas*, *alankaras* and *ritis* ; but if you are asked to say what it is that really serves as the source of charm in these examples you will say that it is not *guna*, *alankara* or *riti* but the vital element or artistic suggestion. Take, for instance, a beautiful verse which I have selected from one of the pious devotional lyrics produced



in India. I am referring to Muka and his Pancasati. One of the well-known verses describing the charm of the goddess Kamakshi of Kanci runs thus :

राकाचन्द्रसमानकान्तिवदना नाकाधिराजस्तुता  
मूकानामपि कुर्वती सुरधुनीनीकाशवाग्वैभवम् ।  
श्रीकाञ्चीनगरीविहाररसिका शोकापहन्त्री सता-  
मेका पुण्यपरम्परा पशुपतेराकारिणी राजते ॥

Stutisataka 11.

Muka must have been in a somewhat playmood when he composed this verse. He uses a good deal of alliteration and you see here some alliterative jingle. But what is the real element of charm? What is it that really constitutes the source of charm? On the surface, in the external form, there is a sort of alliterative jingle, which in lesser hands might have produced a very undesirable effect, namely the repetition of the sound 'Ka' which is introduced here with the greatest possible artistic skill. But what is it that really serves as the vital element in this piece? It is the element of *bhava*, his devotional attitude that is suggested behind and that is embodied in this apparently alliterative form. And here some aspect of the law relating to form is satisfied; but at the same time, through the help of the artistic process, the poet has allowed himself full liberty to soar as high as possible in a certain direction. Or again you will consider another extract from the same work which cleverly uses the figure of speech, turn of expression :

तव त्रस्तं पादात् किसलयमरण्यान्तरमगात्  
परं रेखारूपं कमलममुमेवाश्रितमभूत् ।  
जितानां कामाक्षि द्वितयमपि युक्तं परिभवे  
विदेशे वासो वा शरणगमनं वा निजरिपोः ॥

Mukapancasati, Padaravindasataka 85.

The tender sprouts that are usually famous have certainly become afraid of your tender feet and have taken shelter in the interior of forests. The lotus, on the other hand, which is equally afraid of the charms of your feet, has not run away but has transformed itself into the *padma-rekha* and has taken shelter under your feet. Vanquished people will do well to resort to one or the other of these two devices, either running away to some other place or prostrating themselves before the feet of their victorious enemy. The technique of Alankara sastra would enable you to use some labels in describing the figures of speech that are employed in this verse. But what is the vital element that serves as the source of life, source of charm? It is the attitude of devotion that is suggested by the artistic process of *vyanjana*. Let me give you another instance; it is simpler and it may appeal to all :

धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे  
न चापलमयामहे भवभयान्न दूयामहे ।  
स्थिरां तनुमहेतरां मनसि किञ्च काञ्चीरत-  
स्मरान्तककुटुम्बिनीचरणपल्लवोपासनाम् ॥

Mukapancasati, Stutisataka 85.



It is not merely the attitude of devotion and resultant state of perfect repose, peace and tranquility that is suggested. "We do not take delight in wealth, we do not care to serve wicked people, we do not allow our minds to stray away from the right path, from the path of rectitude, we are not afraid of *samsara*, and we need not run away from our house, from society, from the world; we constantly meditate upon the tender feet of the Mother of the world and live upon the permanent sustenance we derive from our devotion to Her feet." Well, on the surface a suitable form could be seen; it is doubtful whether the idea has clothed itself in the form or the poet intentionally used this form in order to emphasise the idea. In supreme moments of spiritual poetic realisation like this, the poet's devotion-filled heart would have enabled the idea to find a suitable form for itself, without any conscious effort on his part.

And in another place, the same poet soars far high into the region, into the sphere of literary form, but not intentionally. He simply describes a beautiful smile of the Goddess; at one stage, in one supreme moment of realisation, he fancies that he is given the privilege of seeing the smile of his Mother, of the World-Mother, Kamaksi.

आलोके तव पञ्चसायकरिपोरुदामकौतूहल-

प्रेङ्खन्मारुतघट्टनप्रचलितादानन्ददुग्धाम्बुधेः ।

काचिद्वीचिरुदञ्चति प्रतिनवा संवित्प्ररोहात्मिका

तां कामाक्षि कवीश्वराः स्मितमिति व्याकुर्वन्ते सर्वदा ॥

Mukapancasati, Mandasmitasataka 98.

"What is your smile? Poets describe your smile as beautiful; but what is it? At the sight of Siva, a breeze of excitement creates a ripple on the surface of the full ocean of love, bliss and intelligence which you represent, and from that immense ocean of blissful love a small ripple comes out, and that ripple is seen outside as smile. Poets fancy that as your smile." A turn of expression, a figure of speech, is employed here. But it is not wantonly used or intentionally used in a perverse manner to make a beautiful idea groan under it, to suffocate a beautiful idea.

It is the poet's fervour that enables him to find suitable language for his expression; and what is it? It is all the result of the process described as *vyanjana* or suggestion, and it is through the help of this process that poets have been able to lose themselves in the central or vital elements and get at the core of a certain idea and then allow that idea to clothe itself in a suitable garb. Thus one can easily see through examples like this that the artistic, aesthetic process of suggestion called *vyanjana* would enable one to synthesise law and liberty. Take, for instance, one verse from Kalidasa's Kumarasambhava:

तां प्राङ्मुखीं तत्र निवेश्य तन्वीं क्षणं व्यलम्बन्त पुरो निषण्णाः ।

भूतार्थशोभाहियमाणनेत्राः प्रसाधने सन्निहितेऽपि नार्यः ॥

VII. 13.

It is easy and appears to be a simple description of *svabhava*. You can also bring it under some turn of expression. What is the idea that is suggested here? In the simplest fashion possible, the poet employs certain turns of expression, and the form is also perfect, and the artistic feature of ideal beauty called *lavanya* is suggested here. The term *lavanya* in Sanskrit literature is a very significant term. As compared with that term, I cannot help feeling that the term 'beauty' is prosaic. Do not connect the term *lavanya* with *lavana* or salt. It has nothing to do with it. *Lavanya*



here means that whole physical frame and all its parts appear to float as it were on an ocean of brilliant beauty or brilliant charm.

प्लवमानमिवाभाति यदङ्गं कान्तिपाथसि ।

मनःप्रह्लादजननं तल्लावण्यमिति स्मृतम् ॥

It does not require the help of any decorative device, it does not require the help of *alankaras* or embellishments. It is that kind of *lavanya* that is suggested here by the poet Kalidasa in describing the charms or beauty of Uma.

Let us turn our attention for a while to the technical literature dealing with the byways. The other day in the course of my explanation of the graph with which I provided you, I referred to Dandin, Bhamaha and Vamana as the chief exponents of important phases of literary form. Such of you as might have studied the works of Dandin, Bhamaha and Vamana can easily see that the various byways which they have developed in their works are all sought to be linked up with the highway of *vyanyana* or artistic suggestion. I am not going to enter into the technical details discussing these works, but I am going to concentrate my attention upon the simplest elements that could be chosen from these works. Now let us see what Bhamaha does. He lays special emphasis upon *alankara*; certainly he lays particular emphasis upon *alankara* or figure of speech, but at a certain stage he forgets himself. What is it? What is *alankara*? After all, it is a turn of expression. Strictly speaking, all *alankaras* or figures of speech or turns of expression should be brought under what is known as *vakrokti*. Well, when is a turn of expression really beautiful? When it is properly used, when it is used with an eye on propriety in poetry. What is ideal poetry, what is perfect poetry? He gives a very simple definition.

शब्दाथौ सहितौ काव्यम् ।

Kavyalankara I. 16.

Sound and sense put together constitute poetry. This idea is further amplified by a later day exponent of the school of *vakrokti*, Kuntaka. He was himself an eccentric writer, but as a leading exponent of the school of *vakrokti*, he did a great service. What is meant by *sahitya*? Probably the word *sahitya* is based upon this use of the word *sahitau*. The term *sahitya* may be freely rendered by the English word *composition* but it is not all kinds of composition but a particular kind of composition that is referred to here. Kuntaka explains the meaning of the word *sahitya* which consists in sound and sense,—he does not say in perfect harmony with each other,—but he says vying with each other. Sound and sense in genuine poetry vie with each other for suppression. He leaves this idea to be gathered from his work. Though he came forward to write his work as an avowed opponent of the *dhvani* school or the school of suggestion, in an implicit manner in several places in his work, he acknowledges his allegiance to that school; and he gives some instances, in which you can easily see how it is suggestion that is its central idea. If the degree of *sahitya* or harmony of sound and sense vying with each other, that should be maintained at a high level, does not sometimes happen to be maintained, the suggested element suffers on that account. And he cites an instance from Malatimadhava :—

असारं संसारं परिमुषितरत्नं त्रिभुवनं

निरालोकं लोकं मरणशरणं बान्धवजनम् ।

अदर्पं कन्दर्पं जननयननिर्माणमफलं

जगज्जीर्णारण्यं कथमसि विघातुं व्यवसितः ॥



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT 145

The context is that a *Kapalika* seeks to do away with the heroine, and that context shows that it is a moment of supreme excitement, for a great treasure, representing the all-in-all of the hero, is about to be wiped out, and in that connection these phrases are used. "How is it that you have dared to deprive the whole universe of this essence, the three worlds of this most beautiful, most precious gem, the whole world of this life?" And then there is a fall. Is there any consistency? There is bathos, as it were. He has not got up the degree of *sahitya* or the vying with each other or the harmony that is necessary to bring out the suggested idea; and the artistic process itself, to that extent, is detracted, and so the whole phrase is spoiled and some amendement is suggested by the critic. We can easily gather from this that Bhamaha and his followers like Kuntaka, if not explicitly, at least in an implicit manner but in an unmistakable way, seek to link up their methods with the highway of artistic suggestion or *vyanjana*.

Now let us proceed to Dandin, who was one of the younger contemporaries of Bhamaha. He begins with an eloquent tribute to the best specimen of style and to the *gunas* which constitute the vital elements of style. In the course of his exposition of the various *gunas* at one stage he waxes eloquent about a particular *guna*, namely *samadhi*. This *guna* has played a great role in poetic art not only in our country but in other countries as well. What is it, what does it consist in? It is a simple idea. It consists in representing something in the garb of something else, one idea in the garb of another; rather in modern phraseology, it can be taken to stand for what might be described as a sort of verbal heterophemy; but that is not more expressive than the term *samadhi* itself. You can easily find out its nature from an example.

कुमुदानि निमीलन्ति कमलान्युन्मिषन्ति च ।

Kavyadarsa I. 94.

"Blue lotuses go to sleep, close their eyes and red lotuses wake up." Waking up and closing their eyes are features which are usually associated with living beings, not with flowers. We do not usually speak of flowers going to sleep. In language it is an interesting study to see what proportion of our expression consists of metaphors, conscious or unconscious. Modern linguists have made that study and have indicated how metaphors play a very large part in the make-up and development of a language. It is human instinct in composing a sentence to resort to the process of artistic suggestion through the suppressed element; it is equally a human instinct to use this *guna* called *samadhi*. It is not differentiated from metaphor in English books, and, in a loose manner, it may be brought under metaphorical expression. But in Sanskrit literature, you have got a better and nicer classification, and it is brought not under metaphor but under a certain *guna* called *samadhi*. Well, that is why I say that the technical word heterophemy is the closest approach to *samadhi*. We have to introduce some technical terms though they might be somewhat pedantic, to indicate in an accurate manner some of these corresponding ideas. And with reference to this *guna*, what does Dandin say?

तदेतत् काव्यसर्वस्वं समाधिर्नाम यो गुणः ।

कविसार्थः समग्रोऽपि तमेनमनुगच्छति ॥

Kavyadarsa I. 100.

I would even suggest an amendement, it plays a very large part. To the extent to which we are all using this, to that extent at least we are all artists. Dandin lifts this to the highest rank possible among the *gunas*. What is the principle involved in it? He does not explain that. These earlier *Alankarikas* by their silence towards *vyanjana* were able to pay a more eloquent tribute to



the artistic process of suggestion than the later Alankarikas, and the manner in which they emphasised the artistic process is very significant.

कविसार्थः समग्रोऽपि तमेनमनुगच्छति ।

The whole world of poets cannot help making use of this, and not a single poet can avoid using this. If the vital element in the artistic process of suggestion is concealment and withholding for a while to make it possible for you to go through some sort of thrilling exercise of quest and conquest in the sphere of art, this is certainly a feature which involves the artistic principle of *vyanjana*.

And then let us come down to Kuntaka himself and his *vakrokti*. He makes up his mind to take a diverse attitude towards the principle of *vyanjana*. He wishes to develop his byway, the byway of *vakrokti*. What is *vyanjana*? Are you not prepared to recognise the process called suggestion? Yes, we have to recognise it but we can bring it under some other category. He is more frank and in his frankness he writes himself down; to the extent to which he has accepted this attitude and temper against the principle of artistic suggestion or *vyanjana*, to that extent he has written himself down in the history of literary criticism in Sanskrit; and he proposes to bring *vyanjana* or suggestion under *upacara-vakrata*, a sort of secondary turn of expression and this secondary turn of expression is used by him in a very elastic way and in a very comprehensive sense. Figures of speech, like metaphor, simile and such others are capable of suggesting *rasa* through the help of this principle called *upacara-vakrata*, some secondary process;

यन्मूला सरसोल्लेखा रूपकादिरलङ्कृतिः ।

उपचारप्रधानासौ वक्रता काचिदुच्यते ॥

Vakroktijivita II. 14.

He is not prepared to extend his vision a little bit further and see whether there is not behind this secondary something, some artistic process called *vyanjana* or suggestion.

So in this way, if you examine the technical literature dealing with these byways, you will easily see that their writers must all have paid a tribute, if not expressly, in an implicit manner, to the principle of *vyanjana* or suggestion. And the Dhvanikara, the leading exponent of the principle of suggestion, has shown how through the help of this principle, you can gather together all the scattered byways and link them up with the highway of suggestion, provided you recognise the broad principle, another broad principle, called *aucitya* or 'Adaptation'...What is *aucitya*? In the Dhvanikara's view, *aucitya* is not moral propriety. As I explained its meaning the other day, it would be better to tender it by the philosophical equivalent 'Adaptation' which consists in the fitness of parts to each other and to the whole. Not only that; he goes a step further; he would emphasise the idea that *aucitya* or Adaptation consists in the fitness of parts not only to the whole, but to the inner soul, the vital element, also. He is responsible for the oft-quoted dictum in the Alankara sastra :

अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद्रसभङ्गस्य कारणम् ।

प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥

Dhvanyaloka III. P. 145.

And proceeding along these lines, it must be possible for you to realise how law and liberty, traditional rules representing byways of literary criticism, and the artistic suggestion to which I have



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

147

referred as one of the most important highways,—how they could be synthesised ; and so, I hope that this principle, namely *vyanjana*, has made it possible for the students of Indian literature and the students of literary criticism in Sanskrit not to fall into the error of the impressionistic critic and not to throw overboard all laws, all rules, all restrictions. It will not do to cry down laws, rules and restrictions ; we must remember that they all constitute the wings of poetic art. You may refine the wings as far as you can, but you cannot cut away the wings and try to soar high. Any kind of liberty in any sphere which seeks to have a complete abolition of all laws and rules will result in anarchy and will only lead to destruction. That is why the genius of Indian culture is always in favour of equating liberty with law and harmonising liberty with law. Unrestricted liberty. Indian culture is not favour of allowing in any sphere.

There is another direction in which the highway of *vyanjana* would be particularly helpful; and, if you wish to realise how broad it is and how fruitful your effort will be if you take yourself along this highway to some literary goal, you will have to pay some attention to this aspect of the matter also. You know that there is a great controversy in literature and literary criticism regarding the aim of poetic art and the aim of all art. What is the aim of art ? Pleasure-seekers say that pleasure is the aim of art ; moralists say that some moral lesson or moral profit is the aim of art ; and some seek to combine these two things, pleasure and profit and say that both should be regarded as the aim of art. What is the aim of poetic art ? Is it merely to instruct you, to please you, or to do both ? Romantic criticism emphasises the idea that beauty is its own excuse for its being. That is true and that argument must appeal to most of us, students of literature, very strongly. All of us are responsive to the attractions of beauty. We must be prepared to recognise the fact that beauty is its own excuse for its being, and no critic of authority now seriously endeavours to test literature by moral standards, by standards of ethics. It is sometimes stated by some critics that ancient Indian critics did not realise this aspect of literary criticism in an adequate manner. That is not true. What ancient critics have sought to do is this : through the help of the artistic process of the principle called *vyanjana*, they have certainly developed an ideal which is consistent with this attitude, with the attitude just now described, with the attitude of the modern exponents of romantic criticism that beauty is its own excuse for its being. In fact, one of the greatest writers emphasises this idea in a beautiful way. I am referring to Anandavardhana. In the course of his exposition of the principle of *dhvani* at a certain stage, he does not hesitate to condemn Kalidasa in very strong terms for what he considers improper on the moral side. For instance, he condemns Kalidasa in unmistakable terms for the somewhat frank and open way in which he has described the *sambhoga sringara* of the Mother and Father of the world, Parvati and Siva in the eighth canto of the *Kumara-sambhava*. He should have stopped with seven cantos. Consummation of love between Parvati and Siva should have simply been indicated, it should not have been described in detail. He considers that the poet forgot himself and committed an outrage, and considers the poet's behaviour outrageous and in so many terms he condemns no less a poet than Kalidasa himself<sup>1</sup> and his admiration for Kalidasa is very great. In one place, he remarks that he would recognise only three poets, Valmiki, Vyasa and Kalidasa<sup>2</sup> He refuses to recognise any other poet. This is his attitude towards Kalidasa but still he does not hesitate to condemn him. Now when he speaks of the importance of the artistic process of suggestion at the very beginning of his work, he gives a number of instances. The first two or three instances which he has given are of a low moral tone.

<sup>1</sup> See *Dhvanyaloka*, III. pp. 137-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 29.



What is his object ? He wishes to demonstrate the forces of the principle called *vyanjana*. The suggested element may be associated with the greatest depravity, and it may be very bad from the moral point of view ; from the moral point of view it may be very objectionable, still beauty is its own excuse for its being and the beautiful suggested element has its own excuse for its being. You cannot help recognising that. You can condemn it, you need not encourage it in society, you can never recommend it, but still it is its own excuse for its being. You cannot avoid recognising it. That is a fact, physical, physiological, psychological fact ; and that is an aesthetic fact and you cannot help recognising it. And it is the real reason why he opens his work with such objectionable specimens, specimens which would not bear free rendering or free translation in any other language. Well, that is the way in which he emphasises the importance of *vyanjana*. At one stage, he realises a certain type of supreme selflessness, undifferentiated bliss in the form of what he calls *rasa*. Proceed along the path or along the high way of suggestion, artistic suggestion, you will reach a point at which you can unify pleasure and profit, you can synthesise the two aims of art and you may lose yourself in pure unalloyed bliss. In that way through the process called *vyanjana*, a successful endeavour has been made by Anandavardhana himself and also his followers to synthesise the two aims of art.

This question may be looked at from another point of view. Students of Sanskrit literature are familiar with the analogy that is employed in describing the nature of poetic art. Vedic law is compared to a sovereign master who would only give orders to be obeyed immediately, and *puranas* are compared to friends. They also say good things, and they also persuade you to do good things. But what about good poetry or *kavya* ? It confesses its chief aim is merely edification, edification not of an ordinary type. An agreeable edification may, in one word, be described as the aim of *kavya* ; and it is compared to a true loving Hindu wife. She employs only suggestive arts ; she does not behave like Bohemian friends ; she employs her persuasive art to the fullest extent, the artistic process of suggestion, to suggest to you what is good and what is wrong. In that way, there is also another direction in which the highway of *vyanjana* enables you to effect a beautiful synthesis of all the various aims of poetic art.

If you go near the goal of *vyanjana*, you cannot help considering that as a highway of literary criticism in Sanskrit, which opens up fresh and beautiful vistas to poetic or artistic ambition by immensely widening the bounds of artistic resourcefulness. This requires some amplification. The world of poetic art would have been poorer but for this principle of *vyanjana*. As Anandavardhana remarks there would have been only two or three poets in the world ; no good poetry could possibly be produced without in some manner or other using some phrases, some expressions and some beautiful ideas in the works of previous writers. In fact, there is nothing new under the sun. After Valmiki, nobody could have written any Sanskrit *kavya*. However resourceful a poet, it would have been impossible unless he makes use of this principle of suggestion. And this principle of *vyanjana* enables you to express a single idea in a thousand ways and in a thousand agreeable ways. And the Dhvanikara in the fourth chapter of his work waxes eloquent about this aspect of *vyanjana*.

वाचस्पतिसहस्राणां सहस्रैरपि यत्नतः ।

निबद्धापि क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिर्जंगतामिव ॥

Dhvanyaloka IV. 10.

Though thousands and thousands of poets write poetry, the scope of poetic art would in no way be curtailed by that, and the resources of the poet like the resources of mother nature can never be exhausted. Why, what is all this due to ? All this is due to a clever and judicious employment



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT 149

of the artistic process called *vyanjana* or suggestion ; and for this reason I am saying that it opens up fresh and beautiful vistas to poetic or artistic ambition by immensely widening the bounds of artistic resourcefulness.

And above all, through the *aucitya*-synthesis or the synthesis of Adaptation, the process of *vyanjana* leads you on to what might be called the *sanctum sanctorum* of poetic art, the inner shrine of *rasa*. Now the philosophy of *rasa* in Indian poetics is a big topic. However briefly it may be, I should deal with it in the next few minutes. The philosophy of *rasa* is an important branch of art criticism. Some people may fancy that what is known as *rasa* corresponds to what may be described as emotional element in literature. It is not merely that. After a good deal of philosophic speculation and investigation, after several probings and searchings, the exponents of artistic culture in ancient India arrived at a certain well-formulated doctrine of *rasa*, and it was formulated by Anandavardhana. It was in a way hinted at by Valmiki, and adopted by Kalidasa ; and the great poet has also embodied the theory of *rasa* in a beautiful verse in a beautiful situation in his masterpiece, the *Sakuntala*. Let me remind you of the verse :

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्  
पर्युत्सुकीभवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।  
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमवोधपूर्वं  
भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ॥

It is introduced by Kalidasa in a beautiful situation. It is a simple verse. Dusyanta is introduced as the hero who has cruelly forgotten his love. There is nothing to make him unhappy and he does not remember anything unhappy. Still, he feels perturbed, agitated on hearing sweet music. He is not only a king or a sovereign or a lover, but from the point of view of the aesthetic art he is also perfect. That is one of the phases of Dusyanta's character. He is a great moralist and he is a highly virtuous king, both in theory and practice ; he has mastered all the scriptures and he is a strictly righteous king. These represent some features of his character. He is himself a bit of a poet and also a bit of a critic and he is a great painter. He combines in himself all artistic excellences and he makes these remarks. A person is happy to all outward appearances ; still he feels perturbed on hearing some sweet music. What is it due to ? He feels perturbed and agitated ; he falls a victim to some sort of melancholy on seeing objects of beauty. He is not able to recollect anything ; perhaps he recalls to his mind without being conscious of it the abiding impressions of previous attachments, of attachments of previous births ; and in explaining this verse, Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Natya Sastra* indicates how every one of us, with a minimum degree of culture, should be taken to have inherited certain abiding impressions.

जातमात्र एव हि जन्तुरियतीभिः संविद्भिः परीतो भवति । तथा हि 'दुःखसंश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादानादरः' इति न्यायेन सर्वो रिरमया व्याप्ताः, स्वात्मनि उत्कर्षमानितया परमुपहसन्, अभीष्टवियोगसन्तप्तः तद्धेतुषु कोपपरवशः, अशक्नोति च ततो भीकः, किञ्चिदुज्जिगीषुरपि अनुचितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्मकतयाक्रान्तः किञ्चिदनभीष्टतया अभिमन्यमानः तत्तत्स्वपरकर्तव्यदर्शनसमुदितविस्मयः किञ्चिच्च जिहामुरेव जायते । न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवामनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति ।

Abhinavabharati, GOS. I p. 284.

All these instincts are inherited ; all of us are pleasure-seekers in varying degrees and our first impulse is to laugh at our neighbour. One of the German philosophers, Kant, describes this impulse in a somewhat peculiar way. Nobody has got an instinctive liking for another person who is superior



to himself. Every person instinctively dislikes subordination to somebody else. The human soul is instinctive with its love of liberty. It is encaged in a prison ; and we are encaged in our environments, in our own society. There are so many physical, social, political and academical fetters. We cannot allow this soul to give vent to its instinct freely and to have full liberty and, as Kant points out, it dislikes subordination. And what is the proof which he gives ? Well, carefully observe how a man behaves when he sees a certain person slipping down on a rainy day on the road. His first impulse is to laugh. Of course he may be a very good man. He may be able to exercise a good deal of self-control, and he might have developed also scouting spirit to that extent and run up to that man in distress and help him. But what is his first impulse ? Well this is a proof of the fact that nobody likes subordination and so everybody has got an inherited instinct in favour of the comic element. Then the instinct of sorrow is also implanted in you ; the fact of losing something makes you sorry. Well, there is the instinct of disgust. You feel disgusted at the things you do not like. Then there is the instinct of wonder ; when something wonderful is presented to your vision, the instinct of *vismaya* or wonder exhibits itself. There is also the instinct of *santi*, that belongs to the God in man ; that instinct on the one side and the instinct of love on the other side, these two instincts represent the god in man. Love and *santi* or tranquillity, these are also inherited. Well, we are believers in our past existence ; we are also believers in post-mortem existence ; Our existence is not restricted to the existence of the present physical frame, we do not believe that our physical frame is our soul. If we existed before now, we are going to exist for ever ; and it is this belief in the immortality of the personality, in the previous existence and also in the post-mortem existence of the personality—it is this that is responsible for the elimination of the technical tragedy from Indian literature. There is nothing ending with sorrow. Sorrow or grief may be the dominating element, but to end with sorrow is impossible. If your soul really lives for a time in sorrow, it must come out of it in a more energetic way. That is responsible for the elimination of what is known as the technical tragedy from Indian literature. This idea is very well expressed by Valmiki himself, not through precept but through example. Complete pessimism is unknown to Indian culture. Sometimes people, in their mistaken zeal for certain modern ways of alien philosophy, proceed to condemn Indian systems of philosophy as being pessimistic in their tone. *Karuna* is the dominating element in the Ramayana ; Valmiki develops it in various ways.

Now these instincts referred to are the abiding impressions which we have all inherited in varying degrees. Now what does poetic art do ? Through the process of suggestion, you are enabled to realise the development of one or the other of these abiding impressions ; and at a certain stage, these common instincts are associated with the abiding impression called love. But at a certain stage, through the help of the poetic art, it is developed in a certain fashion ; and it comes out envisaged with an artistic garb which comes to be divested of all its worldly associations ; it comes to be divested of all its individualistic connections ; at a certain stage you forget it is either associated with you or with the object of your love, with the hero whose part is represented on the stage or with the heroine. And at that supreme moment, your heart, through the help of the process of *vyanjana* or suggestion, becomes attuned completely to this principle, namely love and you lose yourself in it. You become completely absorbed in it and, at that stage, a certain blissful condition is experienced. Now philosophers and metaphysicians break their heads about this bliss, whether it is positive in its character or negative. But for all ordinary purposes it is enough if you remember that it is a stage of complete blissful absorption.

Now this theory has got important artistic implications. It is the result of Indian artists and art critics proceeding along the highway of *vyanjana*, and it is the goal which they have reached.



## HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT 151

In Indian literature, this has enabled Indian critics to solve an important and difficult riddle : What is the real source of appeal, what is the real cause of appeal in sorrow ? That is not yet fully explained ; various explanations are attempted. At that stage, at that supreme moment, you forget yourself, and some universal element is revealed. That is the real secret of the whole affair. It is not only that. Even in the comic aspect, you forget yourself. Now in the *rasa* theory, you find an explanation for this riddle. It is described as a blissful condition, because at that stage your mind forgets all its ordinary associations. Now through the help of a theory of this kind, it has been possible for Indian art critics to demonstrate all the great possibilities of the highway of *vyanjana*. Now if you follow up a further highway, namely the highway of *rasa*, it will lead you to splendid results. Can it be described as a highway, one may ask. Once on a certain occasion in the course of a private talk, one was tempted to remark that if it was a highway, it might be described as a subterranean highway. That is not a subterranean highway. If you are prepared to indulge in exaggeration, it may be described as the empyrean highway ; but without any exaggeration, I may tell you that *rasa* is not the empyrean highway but an essentially human highway, if you can easily connect it with your own instincts.

In a way, I have come to the end of my task. If synthesis is the watchword of Hindu religion and culture, and if synthesis is the watchword of the Hindu ways of life and ways of thought, and, if it is the watchword of Hindu civilization, I may at once tell you that it is the watchword of Indian art also. As I indicated in my first lecture, it is the synthesis of the artist and the art critic, the synthesis of the poet and the responsive critic, the synthesis of criticism and genius, it is this synthesis that may be regarded as the highway of highways in Indian literary criticism. And I cannot more appropriately conclude this course than by repeating the verse with which I began :

परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।

कविताबुधयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोरिव ॥

“ To the divine synthesis of *Siva* and *Parvati*, to the mother-father synthesis, to the woman-man synthesis, I pay homage, just in the same spirit and in the same breath, I do homage to the synthesis of poesy and criticism, of charm and response, of genius and taste, of poet and critic, of *kavi* and *sahridaya*.”



## VALMIKI-RAMAYANA\*

ऐश्वर्यं पुत्रलाभश्च भविष्यति न संशयः ।

रामायणमिदं कृत्स्नं शृण्वतः पठतः सदा ॥

(रामायणे VI-128-116.)

“To be blessed with a lordly fortune and to be happy in becoming and being the father of a good son—these always surely, accrue to one who hears and reads the whole of this holy text”—the *Ramayana*. VI. 128 116.

This is still the loving belief of many a Hindu, cultured or uncultured, young or old, man or woman, Brahmana or non-Brahmana. Mr. R. Narayanaswami Aiyar, B.A., B.L., the enlightened, large-hearted and pious proprietor of the Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore, is actuated by this happy and healthy belief in making himself mainly responsible for the meritorious act of bringing out this handy, reliable and useful edition of the text of the *Ramayana*.

This edition does not attempt to penetrate into the “Original Ramayana” and reconstruct it, in the manner indicated in writings like *Das Ramayana* by eminent Indologists like Professor Jacobi, after identifying and eliminating what may be regarded as later additions or accretions. The chief purpose kept in view in this edition is to present the whole text of the *Ramayana*, with all the seven Kandas, as generally recognised by Indian tradition since the time of Kalidasa and Asvaghosa to this day, in accordance with certain typical manuscripts of South India and the well-known Bombay recension as embodied in the editions printed in Bombay. The publisher of this edition proposes also to bring out, as early as practicable, a critical edition of the text of the *Ramayana*, together and in accordance with the famous commentary called *Kataka*, by Madhavayogin. Arrangements for the publication of this commentry are in progress. *Kataka* is the clarifying nut which clarifies muddled water; and the commentary called *Kataka* seeks to clarify the muddled stream of the *Ramayana*-text, by separating the spurious from the genuine parts. When the projected edition of the text with the *Kataka* comes to be published, modernists interested in modern methods of textual criticism will find ample opportunities for using the material in the *Kataka* and its text with great advantage.

There are two ways of handling the *Ramayana*. One may be called the *scientific way* and the other the *artistic way*. The former is a long, devious and uneven path, dark except for occasional glimmer and fit only for a certain class of tough-minded workers; and the mentality of one who pursues it must needs be very similar to that of a botanist or anatomist who tears to pieces a beautiful flower or a handsome human form in his quest for the pith or the truth. The scientific way is indeed a great way; but it is not for all and certainly not the way of the tender-minded, not the way of those who would pursue the sweet path of charm and response. And the appropriate way for the tender-minded is the latter way, the artistic way, which is as good as, and certainly sweeter than the other way and which the tough-minded also would like to pursue at least as a pleasant diversion. The present edition of the text of the *Ramayana* is mainly intended for those who pursue the artistic way. It is intended for those who have the well-grounded belief that the bulk of the *Ramayana*, with its present extent and contents, including the Balakanda together with the suggestive episode culminating in the delightful soka-sloka equation, and including at least the main outlines of Uttarakanda, has been recognised as a complete poetic unit since almost the beginning of the Christian era. This class of readers will do well to bear in mind the following considerations:

\* Foreword to M.L.J. Press Ed. 1933.



If the *Mahabharata*, as a work of poetic art, is the oldest artistic monument of ethos with a background of pathos, the *Ramayana* may appropriately be described as the oldest artistic monument of pathos with a back-ground of ethos. It is *adi-kavya* in the sense that it is the oldest work of genuine poetry which spontaneously sprung out of the pathos-filled fountain of Valmiki's heart. In the second canto of the *Balakanda*, it is unmistakably suggested, through the soka-sloka equation and through Valmiki's own observation about his own poetry in 1-2-18, that the true theory of poetry, as conceived in the *Ramayana*, is that genuine poetry is not made but is a beautiful and spontaneous emanation from the fountain of *rasa* and that the life and growth of genuine poetry depend upon a delightful synthesis of the artist and the art-critic, of *kavi* and *sahrdaya*, of charm and response. According to this theory of poetry, *kavya* is not necessarily ornate poetry or court poetry, as some alien Sanskritists would render the term, but it is genuine poetry.

The author of the *Ramayana* blends in a happy way two ideas—that God fulfills himself in the best man, Sri Ramabhadra, and that man, as Dasaratha's son, rises to his full stature by pulling up his Manhood to the level of Brahmanhood. The author of the *Ramayana* would interpret the Upanisadic teaching "पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः" as equivalent to "मनुष्यान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः." This is how *Sahrdayas* of the *advaitic* persuasion are expected to understand and enjoy the teaching and poetry of the *Ramayana*. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to consider the famous verse—

“वेदवेद्ये परे पुंसि जाते दशरथात्मजे ।

वेदः प्राचेतसादासीत् साक्षाद्रामायणात्मना ॥”

This should be punctuated in two ways, with a comma before जाते and with a comma after जाते ; and it should be read in prose in two ways—

‘वेदवेद्ये परे पुंसि दशरथात्मजे जाते and ‘दशरथात्मजे वेदवेद्ये परे पुंसि जाते’

The supreme God of the Veda fulfilled Himself in the highest type of *Manhood* as embodied in *Sri Rama*, Dasaratha's son ; and the latter rose to his full stature of *Manhood* and thus rose to the *Brahmanhood* of the Veda ; then, the ultra-human Veda came to have its delightful fulfilment in the essentially human *Ramayana*, through the *seer-poet* *Praculasa*.

Many a modern *sahrdaya*, under the influence of certain obsessions derived from an alien system of education, may be inclined to describe Valmiki as the Homer of India. He must, however, remember, that Plato refused to give an honoured place to Homer in the ideal scheme of his Republic ; whereas, Valmiki has found, for more than two thousand years, a permanent place of honour and love in the scheme of Indian culture and life, ideal as well as actual. If the German poet Friedrich Rückert finds in Valmiki “Such fantastic grümmen, such formless fermenting verbiage” as Homer has taught the heirs of Hellenic heritage to despise, even this German poet finds in the *Ramayana* “Such lofty thoughts and such deep feeling as the *Iliad* does not show” ; and perhaps, the inadequate linguistic equipment of the German poet is responsible for the beautiful poetic form of the language of the *Ramayana* appearing to him as “formless fermenting verbiage”. The *Ramayana* is one of the grandest world-poems and Valmiki is one of the greatest world-poets. It must be remembered that not only time, but space also is meant by the great God of creation, when He pronounced the divine and prophetic benediction on the first spontaneous emanation of true poetry from the *Rasa*-filled heart of Valmiki, in these terms—

वाक्यं स्यात्स्यन्ति निरयः सरितश्च महीतरे ।

वाक्यान्नामयणकया लोकोषु प्रचरिष्यति ॥

I-2-36 (b) and 37 (b)



## THE PADYACUDAMANI OF BUDDHAGHOSHA \*

The *Padyacudamani* is, according to the colophon, a Mahakavya, and consists of ten sargas of 641 stanzas in various metres. The work is attributed in the colophon to Buddhaghoshacarya and deals with the birth, marriage and other incidents in the life of Buddha. It is a highly artificial poem, and the plan of the work follows the rules of poetics laid down for the composition of Mahakavyas. Dandin's stanzas on this point are—

1	2	3 4	5	6	
नगरार्णवशैलर्तुचन्द्रार्कोदयवर्णनैः ।					
7	8		9	10	
उद्यानसलिलक्रीडामधुपानरतोत्सवैः ॥					
11	12		13		
विप्रलम्भैर्विवाहैश्च कुमारोदयवर्णनैः ।					
14	15	16	17	18	
मन्त्रदूतप्रयाणाजिनायकाभ्युदयरपि ॥					

Among these 18 characteristics, 2, 9, 10, 14, and 15 are not found herein. The omission of 9 and 10 is particularly significant in this Buddhistic Kavya.

**SOURCES OF THE WORK :—**The biographical data regarding Gautama's life in the *Tripitaka* and the *Lalitavistara* and in the *Buddha-carita* of Asvaghosa should have formed the chief sources of the *Padyacudamani*.

**PLOT OF THE POEM—**There ruled at Kapila, a king named Suddhodana of the Sakya race, with his queen Mayadevi. As he had no issue, he performed penance. Meanwhile the Lord of the Tusita world resolved at the instance of the Devas to incarnate in this world for enlightening it and entered the womb of Mayadevi. The birth of the Son, Siddhartha, was attended with supernatural phenomena. After the due performance of the natal ceremonies, arrangements were made for his boyish sports, and for his education. In due time as he grew, he was installed as the heir-apparent, and his marriage was thought of. He was formally married to the daughter of the king of the Koliya country. Then the prince with his wife returned to his own city amidst great rejoicings. The king took particular care to make ample provision for his son's enjoyments in the various seasons of the year. During the autumn the prince practised the use of martial weapons and mastered it in seven days. One day in the spring season when he started for the pleasure garden, he saw on the royal road, as arranged by the Devas, visions of an old man, an afflicted person and a corpse. He was greatly impressed with the sight and questioned the attendants in the Chariot. On learning from the charioteers the nature of the ills to which the human body is liable, he desired to return home. On his way back, he perceived some ascetics, who were reported to have found the means of deliverance from the ills of human existence. He again started for the pleasure garden where he spent the day very agreeable in various pastimes. He returned home, where formal rejoicings were

\* Preface to the Ed. of *Padyacudamani*, Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, 1921. The Sanskrit commentary included in this edition was prepared by the Pandit staff of the Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, under the guidance of its curator, Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri,



conducted. Suddenly he took his resolve to renounce his royal home, travelled 30 Yojanas, crossed the river Anavama, dismissed his attendants and put on the ascetic robe. He practised severe austerities and lived by begging his food in the Bimbisara city. Failing to attain salvation he thought over the means of securing it. During the night he had five dreams, and in the morning after making out the significance of these dreams, he decided on the means of attaining Nirvana. Sitting under a banyan tree, he received Payasa from a woman, proceeded to the Nairanjara river and ate the food. After spending the day in the dense Sala forest, he went to the Bodhi tree in the evening and seated himself there on a miraculously provided seat. The Devas eulogised Buddha ; and Manmatha, learning the news, resolved to conquer him, Manmatha's army first delivered the attack but failed to make any advance. Manmatha then made a personal attack which was repulsed. As a last resort, he sent his women, who performed dexterous dances before Buddha and tried their utmost to captivate and overpower him. Finding their efforts wholly futile, they ran away. Thus came to be firmly established the supreme sovereignty of the great Siddhartha over the empire of salvation.

The story as told in the *Padyacudamani* differs to some extent from that related in the *Lalitavistara* and that adapted in Asvaghosa's *Buddhacarita*, and omits many small connecting and necessary links. In both the works quoted above the sage Asita pays a visit to Suddhodana immediately after the birth of Buddha and predicts, on seeing the child, that he would renounce the life of a householder at an early age to become an ascetic. There is no reference to this in the *Padyacudamani*, and when this is not said, Suddhodana's anxious solicitude to get his son married as soon as he comes of age and to provide for the enjoyment of his son in the palace is not easily accounted for. The King's anxiety to keep his son away from all cares and to prevent him from seeing sights of distress is not mentioned. In the absence of this information, the effect of seeing such a sight on the mind of Siddhartha is not understood. Again without any indication of Siddhartha's mind and inclinations, he is suddenly transported from the palace to the forest. Siddhartha is described elsewhere as having started four times for the garden and seen the three unpleasant sights separately in three excursions and the hermit in the fourth. The gift of Payasa by a woman, who intends it for a sylvan deity and who mistakenly gives it to Buddha, is placed in the *Padyacudamani* before and not after he reaches the Nairanjara river. In the *Buddhacarita* the Lord of the Tusita enters the womb of Mayadevi so that he may be born on earth. But in the *Padyacudamani* he does this after being eulogised by the Devas and requested by them. This is similar to the Gods appealing to Visnu before the birth of Rama.

The authorship of the *Padyacudamani* is attributed in the colophon to Buddhaghoshacarya or simply Buddhaghosha. The author does not speak of himself anywhere within the poem, except as is usual in such Mahakavyas to show his modesty in setting about this work, in stanzas 2 and 3 of the 1st Sarga. Buddhaghosha is a conspicuous name in the Pali literature and is well known among the Southern Buddhists of Burma, Siam and Ceylon. He is rightly said to be the second founder of Ceylonese Buddhism, which, as professed by its most authoritative followers, is virtually the religion of Buddhaghosha. Revd. T. Foulkes in his article on Buddhaghosha in the April 1890 number of the *Indian Antiquary* Vol. XIX, pp. 105-122, after comparing the various legends and historical materials available in regard to Buddhaghosha, summarizes the points of agreement and divergence in them. It is thus made out that he was a Brahman by birth, very learned in Brahminical lore, and an active controversialist against the Buddhists in the early part of his career. He became a convert to Buddhism and a priest of his new religion. He was, according to Burmese authorities, a native of Thaton near Martaban, while some other sources make him a resident of Magadha. He was,



deputed to Ceylon to bring a Pali version of the commentaries on the three *Pitakas* of Buddha for the benefit of Burma according to some accounts and to India according to other accounts. In Ceylon he composed the *Visuddhimagga* and is stated to have copied, translated and commented upon a host of Buddhist works. In his later life he is said to have introduced the written texts and commentaries of the *Pitakas* in Burma. A summary of the dates assigned to Buddhaghosha is given and it is stated that leaving the extreme improbable dates they extend from 386 A.D. to 557 A.D. and group themselves about the reign of the king Mahanama of Ceylon. James Gray in the *Buddhaghoshuppatti* edited and translated by him (1892, Luzac and Co., p. 26) concludes, after considering all the available legends and chronicles regarding Buddhaghosha, that the Talaing records are the most trustworthy and that the main facts according to them are :—

“Buddhaghosha was a Brahman born in Thaton. He was an inmate of the Kelasa monastery, and in A.D. 387 he was deputed to Ceylon by King Thin-li-Gyaung (Dhammapala) in order to bring away a copy of the Buddhist Scriptures. At Bassein, he took ship for Tamalitti, the Indian port, and first went to Gaya by the Gangetic route, to obtain drawings of the principal sacred sites. He returned by the same route and proceeded to Ceylon where he stayed for three years. He composed the *Visuddhimagga* while at Anuradhapura, and, on his return to Thaton, brought a complete copy of the *Pitakas* with their commentaries as well as other works in the Talaing characters.” A list of his works is given in this book of Mr. Gray as well as in the *Indian Antiquary* article referred to above. But the name of the *Padyacudamani* is not found in either list. In an article on “Buddhaghosha and Fa-Hian” in *The Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register* of October 1915 (Vol. I, Part II.) Mr. John M. Senavaratne refutes Mr. Gray’s view regarding Buddhaghosha’s date and maintains that Fa-Hian visited Ceylon in 412 A.D. and Buddhaghosha visited Ceylon in 483 A.D. Mr. Takakusu, in his article on “Paramartha’s Life of Vasubandhu” in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, January 1905, says that the *Samantapasadika* of Buddhaghosha was translated into Chinese by Sanghabhadra in 488 A.D.

From a comparison of the *Padyacudamani* with the *Raghuvamsa* and the *Buddhacarita* with particular reference to the description of similar or same things or situations, one is struck with the profuseness with which Buddhaghosha handles the subject. He gives a large number of details or illustrations to impress the ideas he wants to convey—Vide I, 51, 63 ; III. 33, 46. The procession of the young prince with his newly wedded wife through the streets of his capital town is described in the *Raghuvamsa* VII. 4 to 15, in the *Buddhacarita* III. 13 to 24 and in the *Padyacudamani* IV. 55 to 83. In the *Raghuvamsa*, VII. 5 states that the women assembled after leaving off their usual work on the tops of houses to gaze on the prince, showing thereby their eagerness, which is detailed in stanzas 6 to 10 of the VIIth Sarga. In the *Buddhacarita* stanza III. 13 states that women went to the tops of houses to see the prince ; stanzas 14 to 17 show their eagerness and the desire to avoid disappointment ; stanzas 18 to 22 show the nature of the crowd that assembled ; and stanzas 23 and 24 represent their opinion about the beauty of the prince. In the *Padyacudamani* IV. 55 is almost a paraphrase of VII. 5 of the *Raghuvamsa* and stanzas IV. 56 to 62 give, in a more detailed way, the haste and the eagerness of the women. Both Kalidasa and Buddhaghosa refer to the flower garland not worn by a lady, the incomplete decoration of the eye with the collyrium, the dropping of the waist-belt, etc. Kalidasa’s description is exquisitely refined and beautiful, and places before the mind’s eye a picture of the details desired to be described. Asvaghosa’s description involves a conceit in every stanza describing a detail. Stanza VII-11 of the *Raghuvamsa* and stanza IV. 63 of the *Padyacudamani* describe the thickness of the crowd that assembled to witness the procession of the prince. Again, in VII. 12 of the *Raghuvamsa* the intentness of the women’s gaze is mentioned.



This fact is elaborated with many conceits in stanzas IV. 65 to 68 and is continued up to stanza 77, in the *Padyacudamani*. Further the opinion of the women about the beauty of the prince is told in a clever and telling manner in three stanzas, viz., VII. 13 to 15 in the *Raghuvamsa* and in a simple manner in III. 23, 24 of the *Buddhacarita*. The same thing is told in a highly artificial and embellished style in IV. 78 to 82 of the *Padyacudamani*. Illustrations similar to the above may be worked out in the case of the other descriptions of same or similar things of which a list is given separately.

The peculiarity in the diction of this poem shows that the work was composed at a time later than Kalidasa. A list of the words which are not found either in itself or in its special meaning in the *Namalinganusasana* is given. Almost, all the Alankaras defined in later works are represented by illustrations in this poem.

METRES USED—As in the standard Mahakavyas, the concluding stanzas of Sargas are in different metres from those of the rest in the Sargas. The following metres are used :—

इन्द्रवज्रा, मालिनी, वसन्ततिलक, वियोगिनी, उपजाति, शालिनी, मन्दाक्रान्ता, शार्दूलविक्रीडित ।

The whole of the ninth Sarga is, like the second Sarga of Magha's *Sisupalavadha*, written in the Anustubh metre. Stanzas II. 2 to 7 are composed of only two compound words each.

A careful comparison of the *Padyacudamani* with the *Buddhacarita* and the *Raghuvamsa* on the one hand, and the *Kiratarjuniya* and the *Sisupalavadha* on the other, would lead to the conclusion that while the *Padyacudamani* should have been considerably later than the *Raghuvamsa* and the *Buddhacarita*, it might well be assigned to the period of Sanskrit poetry and poetics to which Bharavi, Dandin and Magha can be assigned, viz., 5th Century to 7th Century A.D. As may be made out from the references given in paragraph 6 *supra*, there is a consensus of opinion in favour of assigning Buddhaghosha to the latter part of the 5th Century A.D. This date for the author of the *Padyacudamani* comes into conflict with Dr. Macdonell's date of Kalidasa, viz., the beginning of the 5th Century A.D. and would appear to strengthen, to some extent, the view maintained by Mr. S. Ray, M.A., in his learned and critical introduction to his edition of the *Sakuntala*—1916, Calcutta, that Kalidasa on the strength of the Bhitamedallion and such other evidences should be placed early in the First Century B.C. between Asvaghosa (79 A.D.) and Asoka (227 B.C.).



## ASCARYACUDAMANI\*

गुणाः प्रमाणं न दिशां विभागः

*Saktibhadra's Ascaryacudamani*, I. 3.

Provenance tells not ; nor does aught else ;  
But sterling worth it is that tells.

With these significant words of the author himself, it would be appropriate to announce the Devanagari edition of Saktibhadra's *Ascaryacudamani*, with a good commentary, which is brought out for the first time in a complete and handy form by the Proprietor of the Sri Balamanorama Press, Mylapore, Madras.

### The Commentary

No definite information is available about the commentary on the *Ascaryacudamani*, except that the commentator describes himself thus in the colophon at the end of p. 237.

भारद्वाजग्रामवासी कुमारिलमतानुगः ।

विप्रः कश्चिच्छक्तिभद्रकृतं व्याकृतं नाटकम् ॥

From the remaining verses of this colophon, it is made out that he is a devout Rama-bhakta and that Sankara is the name of the scribe who transcribed the commentary. It is scholarly and lucid, and elucidates in an able manner several charming passages and situations in the text. There are several quotations in the commentary from great works in Poetics like the *Dhvanyaloka* (p. 44), the *Dasarupaka* (pp. 4 and 62), the *Kavyaprakasa* (pp. 62 and 200) and the *Alankara-sarvasva* (p. 90). The Mimamsaka in the commentator comes out for instance at p. 14, where he uses the maxim पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलीयान्, and at p. 160, where he quotes from Kumarilabhatta's *Slokaarttika*, the verse

उपायानां तु नियमो नावश्यमवतिष्ठते ।

उपादायापि ये हेयास्तानुपायान्प्रचक्षते ॥

That he was conversant with the Yoga and Vedanta systems is clear at pp. 20, 51 to 53 and 237. That he was greatly influenced by *Srimadbhagavata* and perhaps also by the *Narayaniya* of the famous Narayanabhatta of Malabar (A.D. 1590) is evident from the extracts from *Srimadbhagavata* at pp. 134 and 208. There are good reasons to believe that scholars and students alike will find this commentary greatly informing and useful in studying and appreciating the *Ascaryacudamani*.

### Saktibhadra

Though Saktibhadra, the author of the *Ascaryacudamani*, is held in high esteem by the Sanskrit scholars of Malabar, as a well-reputed dramatist of a high order, most of the scholars outside Malabar know very little of him, except perhaps to the extent to which his name happened to be mentioned

\* Introduction to Saktibhadra's *Ascaryacudamani*, Sri Balamanorama Press, Ed. 1926.



in the course of the recent controversy regarding the authenticity of the plays ascribed to Bhasa in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. A popular tradition current in Malabar represents Saktibhadra as a pupil of Sri Sankaracharya (circa A.D. 788-820) ; and if this tradition could be trusted, the great Vedantic teacher saved the *Ascaryacudamani* from complete loss by reciting it from his prodigious memory when the work was accidentally burnt. It is obvious that, according to this tradition, Saktibhadra should be assigned to the end of the eighth or to the beginning of the ninth century A.D. There are no positive evidences which militate against this date. However, no reference to or quotation from the *Ascaryacudamani* is found in any of the well-known treatises in Poetics from Bhamaha down to Panditaraja Jagannatha : and this negative observation applies equally well to many a drama of the Kerala stage, admittedly authentic and otherwise, such as the *Tapatisamvarana* and the *Subhadradhananjaya* of Kulasekhara and most, if not all, of the thirteen plays attributed to Bhasa by the esteemed editor of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. From the accounts of the Kerala stage given by my former pupil—Mr. K. Rama Pisharoti, M.A., and Mr. A. Krishna Pisharoti, in their contribution entitled 'Bhasa's works. Are they genuine?' to the *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental Studies* III.i.pp. 107-117, and also from Mr. A. Krishna Pisharoti's pamphlet (Sridhara Power Press, Trivandrum, 1925) containing a criticism of Bhasa's works, it can be easily gathered that during the reign of Kulasekhara Varman who was the author of the two plays—*Tapatisamvaranam* and *Subhadradhananjayam* and of the *Ascaryamanjarikatha*, two histrionic directories called the *Kramadipika* and the *Attaprakaram* were prepared. In the latter of these two directories fourteen plays are referred to, of which the first five are the *Tapatisamvarana* and the *Subhadradhananjaya* of Kulasekhara Varman, the *Nagananda* of Sri Harsa, the *Ascaryacudamani* of Saktibhadra and the *Kalyanasaugandhika* of Nilakantha, the sixth called *Sri-krsna-carita* being anonymous, and the remaining eight corresponding to eight of the plays ascribed to Bhasa in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. According to the latest investigation of the history of the three Kerala Kulasekharas by Mr. A. S. Ramanatha Aiyer, B.A., M.R.A.S., Trivandrum, (*vide* pp. 109 to 115 in the *Summaries of papers* contributed to the Madras session of the All-India Oriental Conference, 1924, and also Vol. V, Part II of the Travancore Archaeological Series) Kulasekhara Varman, the author of the *Tapatisamvarana* and other works, was different from Kulasekharalvar and might well be assigned to A.D. 935-955. Thus the *Ascaryacudamani* might well have been considerably earlier than the beginning of the tenth century A.D. Perhaps the *Ascaryacudamani* and the other work called *Unmadavasavadatta*, to which Saktibhadra refers in the prologue of the former as one of his writings were some of the oldest plays produced in South India. This accords well with what the Nati exclaims at page 8 of the *Cudamani* :

आर्य, अत्याहितं खल्वेतत्, आकाशं प्रसूते पुष्पम्, सिकतास्तैलमुत्पादयन्ति, यदि दक्षिणस्या दिशः आगतं नाटकनिबन्धनम् ।

The Nati's observation in this strain would be a gross perversion of truth if King Kulasekhara had already produced his two plays—*Tapatisamvarana* and *Subhadradhananjaya*. Some of Saktibhadra's verses remind us of parallels in the works of Kalidasa and Bhattanarayana. For instance, Saktibhadra's verse,

गुणाः प्रमाणं न दिशां विभागः निदर्शनं नन्विदमेव तत्र ।  
स्तनद्वये ते हरिचन्दनं च हारश्च नीहारमरीचिगौरः ॥

*Cudamani*, p. 9

seems to be modelled after Kalidasa's

पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वं न चापि सर्वं नवमित्यवद्यम् ।  
सन्तः परीक्ष्यान्यतरद् भजन्ते मूढः परप्रत्ययनेयबुद्धिः ॥



in the *Malavikagnimitra*. Similarly the verse,

चरणनलिनसाध्यं यानमाहार्यमम्भः  
शयनमवनिपृष्ठं मण्डनं स्नानमात्रम् ।  
तव तरुणि तथापि त्वं श्रिया चक्षुषी मे  
हरसि पुरमयोध्यामावसन्तीव चित्रम् ॥

at p. 57 of the *Cudamani* (II. 4) appears to be closely similar to Kalidasa's

सरसिजमनुविद्धं शैवलेनापि रम्यं  
मलिनमपि हिमांशोर्लक्ष्म लक्ष्मीं तनोति ।  
इयमधिकमनोज्ञा वल्कलेनापि तन्वी  
किमिव हि मधुराणां मण्डनं नाकृतीनाम् ॥

in the *Sakuntala*. The parallelism between the following two verses is striking ;

रक्षोवधाद्विरतकर्म विसृज्य चापं  
गोधाङ्गुलितपदवीषु धृतव्रणेन ।  
रेखातपत्रकलशाङ्कितलेन रामो  
वेणीं करेण तव मोक्षयति देवि देवः ॥

*Cudamani*, VI. 21.

चञ्चद्भुजभ्रमितचण्डगदाभिघात-  
संचूर्णितोरुयुगलस्य सुयोधनस्य ।  
स्त्यानापविद्धघनशोणितशोणपाणि-  
रुत्तंसयिष्यति कचांस्तव देवि भीमः ॥

*Venisamhara*, I-21.

These parallelisms would tend to show that Saktibhadra is later than Kalidasa and Bhattanarayana. Saktibhadra's association with Malabar is unmistakably betrayed in the use of the word 'Sambandha' in its special Malabar sense in Rama's remark at p. 56 (II. 3/4) देवि, तया सह कुमारस्य सम्बन्धः कुतः ? In this connection it may be noted by the way that Dr. Keith in the footnote of p. 371 of the fattest of his works—viz., 'The Sanskrit Drama'—is confounding Saktibhadra's *Ascaryacudamani* with Kulasekharavarman's *Ascaryamanjarikatha*.

### The Chief Merits of the *Ascaryacudamani*

If any excuse were needed for using the Ramayana-theme of perennial interest in the construction of the plot in this play, it might be easily said :

यदि क्षुण्णं पूर्वैरिति जगति रामस्य चरितं  
गुणैरेतावद्भिर्जगति पुनरन्यो जयति कः ।  
स्वमात्मानं तत्तद्गुणगरिमगम्भीरमधुर-  
स्फुरद्वाग्ब्रह्माणः कथमुपकरिष्यन्ति कवयः ॥  
*Anargharaghava*, Act. I.



It may not be an extravagant claim in favour of the *Cudamani* to say that it is the best of the Rama-plays, perhaps barring Bhavabhuti's *Uttararamacarita* in certain respects. As a fine and finished specimen of the Nataka type of dramatic composition, it is refreshingly free from the features that contribute to the heaviness and unstageworthiness of certain well-known Rama-plays like the *Anargharaghava* of Murari and the *Balaramayana* of Rajasekhara. With a very agreeable quickness of action secured by the judicious adoption of the device of *Ankavatara* where appropriate, and the dropping of *Viskambhas*, except where they are necessary and with a well-adjusted time-element, the *Cudamani* would stage best of all the Rama-plays: and this is perhaps the chief reason why it is so popular and esteemed so highly among the professional actors called *Cakyars*. The author begins the play with the Surpanakha-episode which is one of the two pivotal parts of the *Ramayana*, the other being the Kaikeyi-episode.

From the delectationistic view-point of literary appreciation or from the standpoint of *Rasapaddhati*, a careful study of the *Ascaryacudamani* would make it manifest that it represents a special dramatic type in which the *Adbhutarasa* is intended to be treated as the dominating motif. This is indicated by the name itself as suggested by the commentator at p. 7 :

वीरकार्याद्भुतरसभूयिष्ठत्वेन आश्चर्यकराणां चूडामणिरित्याश्चर्य-चूडामणिरिति संज्ञा ।

In order to fully appreciate the force of this remark, one has but to refer to certain significant portions of the play, as I—verse 6, III—pp. 88 to 91 and the concluding portion of Act VII from p. 220 to the end. In the course of the development of the philosophy of Rasa, several attempts were made in the direction of synthesising the various Rasas. The more important results of such attempts were summed up in four kinds of synthesis. Firstly, there is the Karuna-synthesis which originated from Valmiki and found its culmination in Bhavabhuti's एको रसः करुण एव on the practical side, and in Anandavardhana's शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः on the theoretical side. Secondly, there is the Santa-synthesis, which started perhaps from the *Mahabharata*, found its practical fulfilment in works like Asvaghosa's *Sariputraprakarana*, Sri Harsa's *Nagananda* and Krsna-misra's *Prabodha-candrodaya*, and received able advocacy on the theoretical side at the hands of the two greatest Alamkarikas—Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Thirdly, there is the Srngara-synthesis, which firmly rooted in human nature itself since the beginning of creation, reached its acme of spiritual refinement, on the practical side, in the self-effacing ideal of love delineated in an inimitable manner by the creative genius of great poets like Kalidasa and Bana, and, on the theoretical side, in the well-known dictum of the royal polymath, Bhoja :—

रसोऽभिमानोऽहङ्कारः शृङ्गार इति गीयते । And fourthly, there is the adbhuta-synthesis which, on the theoretical side, became crystallized in the views of Narayana and Dharmadatta referred to by Visvanatha in his *Sahitya-darpana* and in the views of Bhanudatta as expressed in his *Rasatarangini* ; and which, on the practical side, led to the production of the wonder-dominated dramatic type represented by the older *Ascaryacudamani* and the later *Adbhuta-darpana* of Mahadeva at the end of the seventeenth century. In the *sthapana*, the *Cudamani* is ushered in as Saktibhadra's wondrous *chef-d'œuvre*. In the Parnasalanka (Act I), adbhuta-rasa sprouts up through the enchanting form assumed by Surpanakha (Verse 6, p. 14). In the Surpanakanka (Act II), a beautiful column of this rasa rises up as may be seen in Rama's rapturous admiration of Sita's charms (verse 4, p. 57). In the Maya-sitanka (Act III), this column assumes a kaleidoscopic form through which one could see several wonderful pictures, now in the wonderment of Rama and Sita at the sight of the wonderful crest-jewel (*Ascarya-cudamani*) and marvellous ring (*Adbhuta-anguliyaka*) shown by Lakshmana as presented by the sages in the forest (p. 89) and now in the golden deer (pp. 91-94) whose irresistible charms brought in their wake untold sufferings to Sita and Rama. In the Jatayuvadhanka



(Act. IV), the adbhuta-motif is not allowed to be completely ignored, but it is kept up by cleverly presenting Sita as discovering Ravana disguised as Rama through the miraculous power of her Ascaryacudamani (pp. 134 and 135). In the Asokavanikanka (Act. V), through Ravana's monstrous *Vipralambha-abhasa* and Sita's gloriously chaste *vipralambha* the dominating adbhuta comes out brilliantly when Mandodari, astounded at Sita's courage, exclaims :

धीरा खल्वेषा, महाराजस्य शीर्षं पङ्कमिव पादेन परिहरति ।  
सत्यमिदानीं कौलीनं पृथिवीसुता सीता पद्मनाभो राम इति ।

—V. 30/31.

In the Anguliyakanka (Act. VI), Hanuman, the very embodiment of all that is wonderful, presents the miraculous ring to Sita along with Rama's message and wonderful crest-jewel ; and Sita herself describes thus the full glory of the Adbhuta-anguliyaka—

इदं लोकाभरणस्याभरणम्, इदं वाणासनगुणपरिखिन्नम्, इदं राक्षसमायापिशुनम्, इदं रजनीपु रत्नदीपः, इदं वदनालङ्कारविकल्पादर्शः ।

(VI. 14/15).

In the beautiful unravelling in the *denouement* of Act VII, the greatest wonder of wonders happens and Sita's purity as the pre-eminent paragon of chastity is wonderfully vindicated by Sita gloriously going through the fire ordeal. That Saktibhadra's poetry rises to a high level and that *Vaidarbhi riti* with *prasada* and *madhurya* in main characterises his composition could be easily maintained by a reference to many a verse in the play. In particular, the following verses would appeal to Sahridayas as charming specimens :—

मार्गे निर्वृतिमार्गमार्गणपरानाराधयन्तो मुनीन्  
स्वैरं सेविततीर्थसिन्धुपयसो दूरं निरस्ताधयः ।

मात्रा लक्ष्मण केकेन्द्रसुतया व्याजेन नीता वयं  
स्वामुत्सृज्य धुरं भुवो मुनिवनं यातव्यमिक्ष्वाकुभिः ॥ (I. 14)

साधारणी नयविदां धरणिः कलत्र-  
मस्त्राणि मित्रमरयः सहजाः सुताश्च ।

पापात्परस्य पतनं नरकेषु लाभः  
द्वे चामरे च सितमातपवारणं च ॥ (I. 17).

अशङ्किता शिथिलय पांसुधूसरं  
स्तनांशुकं शुक्लहरितं शुक्लालपे ।  
विशोषिताधरकमलं विसर्पता  
तरङ्गितं तव मुखगन्धवाहिना ॥ (I. 22).

इन्द्राणीमहमप्सरोभिरनयं कारागृहे गण्यतां  
संहारो जयता दिशो दश मया स्त्रीणां कृतः पुष्पके ।  
कैलासोद्धरणेऽपि वेपथुमतीमद्राक्षमद्रेः सुतां  
दृष्टं तामु न रूपमीदृशमहो चक्षुश्चिरात् सार्थकम् ॥ (III. 20)



अविवेकमनावेक्ष्यमदाक्षिण्यमनूर्जितम् ।

धिगहं जन्म नारीणां यन्मामेवं प्रभापसे ॥ (III. 30).

कनकहरिणः क्वेयं भूमिः क्व चेत्यविचारयन्

अपि निशितधी रामो रामावचः प्रतिपन्नवान् ।

इति कृतधियामासं हास्यः कृतं कृतचिन्तया

प्रभवति कुतोऽनर्थः प्रज्ञा न चेदपथोन्मुखी ॥ (III. 42).

पुष्पायुधप्रतिम पुष्पकनामधेया

सेयं विमानवसतिर्वसते गुणानाम् ।

यां स्वीकृतत्रिभुवनामपि सावकशाम्

आशामिवाहुरपरस्य परिग्रहाय ॥ (VII. 31).

Saktibhadra stands well the test of the poetic touchstone of *gadya* in his beautiful, terse and sententious prose, as may be seen from the following extracts :

न समाधिः स्त्रीषु लोकजः । I. 8/9.

आर्य, किं स्नेहः तुलयति गुणदोषान् । I. 10/11.

कथमौष्ण्यमग्नेश्छाद्यते ? II. 17/18

अयमनिर्वन्धविषयो राशिः । III. 9/10.

समाधी रक्षितं स्त्रीजनं न बाणाः । III. 31/32.

यदेष बालेन बद्धो मुसलेन हन्यते । V. 7/8.

कथं वाल्मीकात् हार उत्पद्यते ? VI. 5/6.

पयो मद्यस्पर्शं परिशङ्क्यते । नामिश्रं हिरण्यं हिरण्यरेतसमर्हति । कथं दीपिकां तमः कलङ्कयति ?

VII. 30/31.

That considerable skill is shown in realistic characterisation is evident from the delineation of Rama's character particularly in Act I, of Ravana's character in Act III and of the characters of Lakshmana and Sita throughout. Where the author deviates from Valmiki's original in the construction of plot, he shows sound judgement as may be made out from the deft change of Valmiki's Cudamani and Anguliyaka into Ascarya-cudamani and Adbhutamguliyaka and from the clever manner in which Sita's abduction is rendered least objectionable by Ravana approaching her under Rama's disguise and misleading her by a false announcement of Bharata's kingdom being in danger.

### The Bearing of the Cudamani on the Bhasa-Controversy

In their contributions referred to, Messrs. A. Krishna Pisharoti and K. Rama Pisharoti mention Saktibhadra's *Ascarya-Cudamani* in the course of the discussion of the authenticity of the thirteen plays ascribed to Bhasa in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. It is interesting to notice that the *Cudamani* exhibits a number of dramaturgic features quite similar to those noted and relied upon



by Mahamahopadhyaya Ganapati Sastriyar in the course of his endeavour to ascribe to Bhasa, the *Svapnavasavdatta* and twelve other plays edited by him. In the *Cudamani* also, the prologue opens with the sentence नान्द्यन्ते ततः प्रविशति सूत्रधारः, the word *Sthapana* is used for Prastavana and the prologue closes with a reference to the character about to enter, after the remark अये, किं नु खलु मयि विज्ञापनव्यग्रे शब्द इव श्रूयते? अङ्ग, पश्यामि which occurs in the same form in nine out of the thirteen plays. It would be very useful to note that the traditional view which distinguishes between *Nandi Sutradhara* and *Sthapaka* or *Katha Sutradhara*, and which is reliably recorded by Visvanatha in the sixth chapter of his *Sahityadarpana*, would throw considerable light upon the problem connected with the special dramaturgic feature that the *Cudamani* and the Bhasa plays of Trivandrum open alike with नान्द्यन्ते ततः प्रविशति सूत्रधारः and would show how the attempt to use this feature in ascribing the Trivandrum plays to Bhasa is futile. There are interesting parallelisms between the *Cudamani* and *Abhisekanataka* in particular. For instance, compare

यमवरुणकुबेरवासवादीनमृतभुजो जितवान्भवानयतः ।

कथमिव शिथिलीकृतः समाधिः कुसुममयैः कुसुमायुधस्य वारणैः ॥

—*Ascaryacudamani* V. 13.

with,

यमवरुणकुबेरवासवाद्यैस्त्रिदशगणैरभिसंवृतो विभाति ।

दशरथवचनात् कृताभिषेकस्त्रिदशपतित्वमवाप्य वृत्रहेव ॥

in the *Abhiseka* (page 74) ; जयतु स्वामी, जयतु महाराजः etc., at p. 177 and जयतु कारणमानुषो रावणान्तकः at p. 224 of the *Cudamani* with the corresponding portions of the *Abhiseka* (p. 73) ; and, अस्याः पतिव्रतायाः छन्दम् अनुतिष्ठ in the *Cudamani* (p. 219) and the preceding sentence with the corresponding sentences in the *Abhiseka* (pp. 69 and 70). It would be interesting to observe here that a characteristic deviation from Bharata's dramaturgic rule forbidding the presentation of death or fight on the stage, is found in the scene of Jatayu's fight with Ravana in the fourth Act of the *Cudamani*, as in the *Abhiseka* and the *Urubhanga*. In an old injured Sritala ms. of Malabar in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, bearing D.C. No. 12492, it would perhaps be of special significance to one familiar with the Cakyar tradition of Kerala that the three works, which show striking similarities, viz., the *Cudamani*, the *Abhiseka* and the *Pratima*, are found comprised. These considerations might easily lead one, adopting a line of argument similar to that adopted by the learned editor of the Trivandrum plays, to say, though without sufficient warrant, the Saktibhadra \* himself was the author of all these three plays. Perhaps a similar line of argument, if stretched a little further might make Saktibhadra responsible for the *Pratijnayau-gandharayana*. Or it may be conjectured that *Unmadavasavadatta* is but another name of the *Pratijnayaugandharayana*, as the former title only refers to Yaugandharayana's ruse of feigned madness for bringing about Vasavadatta's marriage and Vatsaraja's release, which form the chief elements of the plot in the *Pratijna*—Or again, there is the further possibility that the *Unmadavasavadatta* is identical with the ms. in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, described under R. No. 2784, which is an incomplete play breaking off at the beginning of the fourth Act, is similar

\* Obviously Prof. Sastri does not mean to say that they are *actually* plays of Saktibhadra. He only wants to point out the weakness of the arguments in favour of Bhasa's authorship of these plays.—Ed.



in plot, style and spirit to the published *Pratima-nataka* and is tentatively called the *Vinavasavadatta*<sup>1</sup>, though this title does not occur anywhere in the body of the work itself. But in the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to lift up any of these statements above the sphere of a reasonable guess<sup>2</sup>.

In this connection, it must be stated, though it may be looked upon by some as an act of impious heresy, that the arguments so far advanced with reference to the Bhasa-controversy by the learned editor of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series and those who have swallowed some of his views are jejune and inconclusive, and in some places wholly untenable. At the present stage of the discussion relating to the Bhasa-problem, it is hardly necessary to point out that the way in which Mahamahopadhyaya Ganapati Sastriyar would rely upon the use of several un-Paniniyan forms in the Trivandrum plays as evidences of their pre-Paniniyan origin cannot be approved by critical scholars, for the obvious reason that these un-Paniniyan forms might as well have been the solecistic lapses of the professional Cakyars who interfered with or were themselves responsible for, the composition of these plays; and that these Cakyars were prone to such lapses is testified to by the following reference to their inadequate literary equipment at the end of the commentary on Bodhayanakavi's Bhagavadajjuka, recently published by Mr. Anujan Accan of the Paliyam Manuscripts Library, Jayantamangalam, Malabar :

तदपि कृशाशयावशकुशीलव-मात्रहिता ।

यदि तु भविष्यतीयमियता सफलैव कृतिः ॥

Nor would it be difficult to meet the argument that Bhamaha utilised the plot of the *Pratijna-yaugandharayana* in illustrating *Nyaya-virodha* in the fourth chapter of his *Kavyalankara*, by suggesting with better reasons, that Bhamaha was referring probably to some old work like the *Brhatkatha* and was not presupposing the *Pratijnanataka*, precisely on the ground that an attempt is made in the *Pratijna* to remove the chief defect pointed out by Bhamaha, through placing the artificial elephant in a dense forest of *Sala* trees beset with darkness. My esteemed friend—Mahamahopadhyaya Ganapati Sastriyar—is making Kautalya quote in the third chapter of the 10th Adhikarana of the *Arthashastra*, the verse

नवं शरावं सलिलैः सुपूर्णं सुसंस्कृतं दर्भकृतोत्तरीयम् ।

तत्तस्य मा भून्नरकं स गच्छेद् यो भर्तृपिण्डस्य कृते न युध्येत् ॥

etc., from the fourth Act of the *Pratijnayaugandharayana*. But according to a tradition, which is certainly more reliable than the guesses in the published introductions to the Trivandrum plays, and which is recorded in an old commentary on the *Arthashastra* called *Nayacandrika* by Madhavayajvan, this verse नवं शरावं etc. and the previous verse—

यान् यज्ञसङ्घैस्तपसा च विप्राः स्वर्गेषिणः पात्रचयैश्च यान्ति ।

क्षणेन तानप्यतियान्ति शूराः प्राणान् सुयुद्धेषु परित्यजन्तः ॥

were taken from some Purana in which they happened to be put into the mouth of Manu. Attention is invited to the subjoined extract from p. 180 of Volume II of the Punjab Sanskrit Book depot

<sup>1</sup> Acts I-III and VI of this play were published by the K.S.R. Institute, edited by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja as Supplements to J.O.R. Madras. I-V (1927-31) and X (1936). A revised fuller Edn. containing Acts I-VIII was brought out by the Institute in 1962 (Ed. by K.V.Sarma).

<sup>2</sup> The proposed identity of *Unmadavasavadatta* and *Vinavasavadatta* is however not possible. For apart from other reasons, Saktibhadra mentions the *Unmada* as one of his *Kavyas*—Ed.



edition of the *Arthasastra*, which contains a portion of the *Nayacandrika* as found in an incomplete manuscript of that learned commentary belonging to the Government Orinetal Manuscripts Library, Madras.

मनुनी(गी)तावपि मनुगीततया पुराणेऽपीत्यर्थः । यान् यज्ञेत्यादि । ऋतुशतकरणेनापीति भावः । तपसेति, आध्यात्मिकदुःखसहिष्णुत्वेन । पात्रचयैश्चेति, पितृमेध इति भावः । सुयुद्धेनेति, धर्मेणेत्यर्थः ।

नवमित्यादि । सुसंस्कृतमिति, कुलादि(रि)ति शेषः । तत्तस्य मा भूदिति, तदपि तस्मै न देयमित्यर्थः । श्लोकद्वयेन क्रमात् योद्धुः स्वर्गतिः, अयोद्धुर्नरकपातश्च उक्ताविति ग्राह्यम् ।

From this extract it may be made out that the original text of the *Arthasastra* quotes the two verses “यान् यज्ञसङ्घैस्तपसा च विप्राः and नवं शरावं सलिलस्य पूर्णम्” etc., as from a Purana, and that, according to the *Nayacandrika*, the reading in the *Arthasastra* should be मनुगीतावपि श्लोकौ भवतः—यान् यज्ञसङ्घैः etc., and “नवं शरावं etc.”. It is seen from the introduction to the Trivandrum edition of the *Arthasastra* that the learned editor of the Trivandrum plays used the *Nayacandrika* in preparing his commentary on that work. It is indeed disappointing to see that the Trivandrum edition of that work nowhere takes note of this important information about the source of the verse नवं शरावं सलिलस्य पूर्णम् etc., which is furnished in the *Naya-candrika*. That there must have existed before the eleventh century A.D. a *Svapnavasavadatta* which in plot and dramatic structure, was very similar to the *Svapnavasavadatta* published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series is evident from the extracts from Saradatanaya's *Bhavaprakasa* and Bhoja's *Srngara-prakasa* which were brought to the notice of scholars in the J.R.A.S. October issue of 1924. But the variations found in the published *Svapnavasavadatta* as compared with the account of that work in the *Bhavaprakasa* and as compared with the references to a *Svapnavasavadatta*, in the *Natyadarpana* and the *Natakakalasanakosa*, to which Professor Sylvain Lévi drew attention in the *Journal Asiatique* for October-December 1923, are quite enough to convince an unbiassed person of the text of the Trivandrum *Svapnavasavadatta* being different from, though perhaps a stage recension of some old work of that name. Abhinavaguptacarya quotes at p. 152 of his *Locana* (Nirnayasagara Press edition) the following verse as from the drama called *Svapnavasavadatta* :—

सञ्चितपक्ष्मकवाटं नयनद्वारं स्वरूपताडेन ।

उद्धाटय सा प्रविष्टा हृदयगृहं मे नृपतनूजा ॥

This verse does not admittedly find any place anywhere in the *Svapnavasavadatta* of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. The learned editor of that series, undaunted even by the great name of Abhinavaguptacarya, goes to the length of attributing a bad mistake to the great author of the *Locana*, in order to allow the Trivandrum play to claim the much-coveted parentage of Bhasa. This is apt to be felt by some as nothing short of impertinence, particularly when we remember that Abhinavaguptacarya's great authority cannot be impugned without very strong grounds by any scholar, however eminent or sturdy a champion he may be of the authenticity of the *Bhasa-natakakakra* of Trivandrum. It must be remembered that Abhinavagupta is quoting the verse in question from the drama called *Svapnavasavadatta*, in illustration of a defect referred to by Anandavardhana as the following extract would show :

दृश्यन्ते च कवयोऽलङ्कारनिबन्धनैरसा अनपेक्षितरसाः प्रबन्धेषु ।

*Dhvanyaloka*, p. 151. (Nirnayasagara Press editon.)



A great writer like Abhinavagupta cannot be easily taken to have committed an error, particularly when he is quoting a passage for adverse comment. Abhinavagupta is quite familiar with Bhasa as a *Mahakavi*, as the following extract will show.

अधुना रौद्रं लक्षयति—अथ रौद्रो नामेति । आत्म(नाम)-ग्रहणस्यायमाशयः-अन्यायकारिता प्राधान्येन क्रोधस्य विषयः । तादृशि च जने सर्वोऽपि मनोरथैरपि रुधिरपानमपि नाम कुर्यात् । तथा चाह लोकः—यदि लभ्येत, तत्तदीयं रुधिरमपि पीत्वा न तृप्यते । महाकविना भासेनापि स्वप्रबन्धे उक्तः—

त्रैतायुगं (न खलु) तद्धि न मैथिली सा  
रामस्य रागपदवी मृदु चास्य चेतः ।

लब्धा जनस्तु यदि रावणमस्य कायं  
प्रोक्तृत्य तन्न तिलशो न वितृप्तिगामी ॥

Page 255, Vol. I. of the *Abhinavabharati*, Ms. in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library.<sup>1</sup>

Again, while commenting upon the verse,

क्वचिद् धर्मः क्वचित् क्रीडा क्वचिदर्थः क्वचिच्छमः ।  
क्वचिद्धास्यं क्वचिद्युद्धं क्वचित्कामः क्वचिद्धः ॥

*Natyasastra*, I, 74.

Abhinavagupta says in his *Abhinavabharati* :

तथा क्वचिन्नाटके धर्मः प्रधानम्—यथा छलितरामे रामस्य अश्वमेधयागः, क्वचित्क्रीडा यथा स्वप्नवासवदत्तायाम् ।  
एवम् अन्यत्राप्यनुसरणीयम् ।

p. 37, Vol. I. *Abhinavabharati*, Ms. in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.<sup>2</sup>

*Krida* or hilarious merriment is the chief feature of the drama called *Svapnavasavadatta* according to Abhinavagupta. Would not this conclusively establish that the *Svapnavasavadatta* known to Abhinavagupta must be materially different from the Trivandrum play of the same name? It is worthy of notice that the verse त्रैतायुगं तद्धि न मैथिली सा. etc. quoted from Bhasa by Abhinavagupta is not found in any of the published Trivandrum plays. In the article by Mr. C. R. Devadhar on 'the plays attributed to Bhasa, their authenticity and merits' contributed to the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*, Poona. Vol. VII. parts I and II. p. 64, after a careful course of reasoning, the conclusion has been reached and rightly, I believe, that "the *Carudatta* represents a very crude abridgement possibly made for stage performance of that best specimen of the Indian theatre, the *Mrcchakatika*". It would be useful in this connection to note that Mahasena's queen often behaves like an elderly Malayali lady in the *Pratijnayaugandharayana*; that she uses the word *Sambandha* in the peculiar Malayali sense at p. 37 of the Trivandrum Series edition of the play, when she enquires किं सम्बन्धो णिच्चिदो and that Yaugandharayana plays the role of a Malayali when he says at the end of the work (p. 73) एवं सम्बन्धं मन्यते महासेनः ।

<sup>1</sup> G.O.S. Vol. I. 1956 Ed. p. 319.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 38.



तेन ह्यानीयतां भृङ्गारः । It would likewise be of advantage to observe that at p. 20, line 2 of the *Avimaraka* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series), the phrase बहुभिरुपायैर्विचारितम् seems to be used in the peculiar vernacular sense of the Malayalam language and that at p. 108 of this play, the exceptional degree of solicitude and respect for the *matula* shown in the duplicated *abhivadana* which Avimaraka offers to his *matula* at the *nirvahana* stage clearly betrays the influence of the *Marumakkattayam* custom : Considerations such as these must be enough to induce any level-headed scholar to appreciatively welcome the suggestions made by Mr. K. Rama Pisharoti, M.A., in his recent paper on the Bhasa-problem, to rename the *Bhasa-nataka-cakra* as the *Kerala-nataka-cakra*, or to amend the proposed name as the *Cakkar-natakacakra*. The eminent editor of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series has to his credit too great and admirable an output of editorial achievement in several directions other than the Bhasa-plays, for him or any of his admirers to feel solicitous any longer of the *Bhasanataka-cakra* being guarded against any attempt to divest it of the dubious privilege of the highly uncertain parentage of Bhasa. It is hoped that this edition of the *Ascaryacudamani* and a careful consideration of the points noted above, would convey a warning to those who are interested in Indology, against the snares and pitfalls of the *mytho-poetic* muse snugly ensconced behind what, in Baconian parlance, might be described as the Indological idol, which has been erected within the last one decade of this century through the combined efforts of many a well intentioned and well-reputed pro-Bhasa scholar in the shape of the Bhasa-plays of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.



## SRI HARSA'S NAISADHAM\*

Sri Harsa is the author of the *Naisadhiyacarita* which is one of the most important mahakavyas, the study of which is insisted upon, in the traditional method of Sanskrit language and literature. From internal as well as external evidences, it is evident that Sri Harsa flourished in the latter half of the twelfth century A.D. under Vijayacandra and Jayacandra of Kanauj. Of Sri Harsa's metrical compositions, *Naisadha* is the best known and perhaps the biggest also ; and his greatest work, which stands out prominently as at once the most formidable and admirable monument of advaitic polemics, is the *Khandanakhandakhadya*, popularly known as *Khandana*. While it is very easy to assign the highest position to Sri Harsa among Sastraic authors, more especially on the polemical side, it is not so easy to determine his exact position among Sanskrit poets. Tradition regards Sri Harsa as a Mahakavi, or one of the greatest kavirajas, as he does not hesitate to describe himself in the concluding verses of some of the cantos. There is no doubt that he has exhibited in his *Naisadha*, a super-abundance of poetic skill (*sakti*) and erudition (*vyutpatti*)—the two elements which, within appropriate limits, constitute the make-up of a genuine poet. If a *sahrdaya* could appreciate the poetry of nonsense, such as one finds in Sakara's poetry in the *Mrcchakatika*, it is scarcely difficult to see that tough-minded *sahrdayas* can easily find in Sri Harsa's *Naisadha* a masterly specimen of the poetry of erudite oddity. It is in this sense that the *Naisadha* is sometimes described as a *Sastra-kavya*. Here, scholars are likely to be reminded of Bhamaha's unforgettable observation :—

काव्यान्यपि यदीमानि व्याख्यागम्यानि शास्त्रवत् ।  
उन्मवः सुधियामेव हन्त दुर्मधसो हताः ॥

*Kavyalankara* II. 10.

Bhatti, in his famous *Bhatti-kavya*, challenged the above observation by Bhamaha, with a considerable measure of success, and produced what might be characterised as the highest type of the poetry of *satsabdya*, making the following remark at the end of his work :—

व्याख्यागम्यमिदं काव्यमुन्मवः सुधियामलम् ।  
हता दुर्मधसश्चास्मिन् विद्वन्प्रियतया मया ॥

*Bhattikavya* XXII. 34.

Bhatti's remark applies to Sri Harsa's *Naisadha*, not merely from the view-point of *Satsabdya*, but also from that of versatile sastraic erudition. The subjoined extracts from the end of the last canto of the *Naisadha* may, with advantage, be studied in order to know Sri Harsa's own estimate of his poem :—

यथा सूतस्तद्वत्परमरमणीयाणि रमणी  
कुमाराणामन्तःकरणहरणं नैव कुरुते ।  
मदुक्तिश्चेदन्तर्मदयति सुधीभूय सुक्षिप्रः  
किमन्या ताम स्यादरसपुरुषाज्जादरभरैः ॥

\* Foreword to Prof. K. L. W. Sastri's ed. of *Naisadha* with Mallinatha's commentary published by R. S. Vadhyar, 1930.



दिशि दिशि गिरिग्रावाणः स्वां वमन्तु सरस्वती  
 तुलयतु मिथस्तामापातस्फुरद्घुनिडम्बराम् ।  
 स परमपरः क्षीरोदन्वान् यदीयमुदीयते  
 मथितुरमृतं खेदच्छेदि प्रमोदनमोदनम् ॥

From the above extracts, it is evident that, if Sri Harsa himself were to characterise the fruitive mode (*paka*) of his poem, he would call it *amṛta-paka*, obsessed as he is with the puranic association of *amṛta* with a laborious process of churning. But Bhamaha's disciples would like to bring the *paka* of Sri Harsa's poem under *Kapittha-paka* (the wood-apple fruition), which is described thus :—

अहृद्यममुनिर्भेदं रसवत्त्वेऽप्यपेशलम् ।  
 काव्यं कपित्थमामं यत् . . . . . ॥

*Kavyalankara*. V. 62

Some would describe the *paka* of the *Naisadha* as *narikela-paka* (cocoanut fruition) ; but this would necessitate Sri Harsa's poetry being placed, without adequate justice, on a par with Bharavi's poetry. While one might justly describe Bharavi's poetry thus :—

स्फुटता न पदैरपाकृता न च न स्वीकृतमर्थगौरवम् ।

one is greatly tempted to describe Sri Harsa's poetry in these terms :—

स्फुटता कुपदैरपाकृता ह्यपि वा दुर्ग्रहवक्रसूक्तिभिः ।

In fact, it would be appropriate to characterise the *paka* of Sri Harsa's poem as *ausadha-paka*, as the oft-quoted tag "*Naisadham vidvad-ausadham*" indicates, and as the name *Khandana-khandakhadya*—which, in Ayur-veda, denotes a certain medicine-given to his greatest polemical work, may suggest.

It is worthy of note that Sri Harsa belonged to a century, which was dominated by the *vakrokti*-type of poetry and in which poets of the *vakrokti*-school like Mankhaka, the author of the *Srikanthacarita*, flourished. Perhaps, for the reason that Sri Harsa himself was a votary of the *vakrokti*-school, his poem easily won the plaudits of the Kashmirian poets of the 12th century, as may be seen from the following extract from the 16th canto of the *Naisadha* (V. 131) :

काश्मीरैर्महिते चतुर्दशतयीं विद्यां विदद्भिर्महा-  
 काव्ये तद्भुवि नैषधीयचरिते सर्गोऽगमत्वोडशः ॥

In concluding this foreword, I am forcibly reminded of what my sahitya-vidya-guru (my late maternal uncle—Brahmasri Muttappa Sastri, alias Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri) used to remark about the *Naisadha*, in my boyhood, somewhat waggishly as it may seem ; it may be put thus :—if Kalidasa's muse should be described as a *padmini*, if Bharavi's muse should be described as a *sankhini*, if Magha's muse should be described as a *citrini*, Sri Harsa's muse might well be described as a *hastini*, though capable of assuming the other forms also."

Mallinatha's commentary, which is incorporated in this edition and which follows the motto "नामूलं लिख्यते किञ्चित् नानपेक्षितमुच्यते", greatly enhances the value of this edition. This handy volume contains only six cantos. It is hoped that this enterprising publisher of Palghat will, ere long, issue equally cheap and handy volumes of the remaining cantos also of this famous Mahakavya.



## NILAKANTHA-VIJAYA CAMPU\*

“सङ्गः कस्य हि न स्वदेत मनसे माध्वीकमृद्रीकयोः”

The prose-poetry genre of Sanskrit Literature called *Campu* is thus described as a delightful honey-grape mixture by the famous latter-day scholar and poet Sri Venkatadhvarin, himself the author of the *Visvaguṇadarsa*—one of the most popular *Campus*. This description may perhaps be considered particularly felicitous and significant, without the least need for reservation, as applied to the *Nilakantha-vijaya*, among the numerous *Campus* preserved in Sanskrit Literature. Though the Sanskrit scholars of South India are fairly familiar with this brilliant and beautiful *Campu* through an old edition of the work in Grantha script, which has long been out of print, yet for want of a good Devanagari edition the majority of Sanskrit scholars in North India and elsewhere could not find easy access to this work. The proprietor of the Balamanorama Press, has now satisfactorily supplied this long-felt want by bringing out for the first time this Devanagari edition of the *Nilakantha-vijaya*.

From out of the early beginnings of the prose-verse form of composition, prefigured in the Vedic *Akhyanas*, the *Pali Jatakas* and the Sanskrit fables, that the *Campu* should have emerged as a recognised literary kind before the seventh century A.D. is quite obvious from the clear recognition of this type by Dandin in his *Kavyadarsa*—“गद्यपद्यमयी चम्पूः”. However, the earliest of the *Campus*, which have been definitely known so far, are all of them mediocre production of the tenth century A.D. the *Nala Campu* by Trivikrama Bhatta of A.D. 950, the *Yasastilaka* by Somadeva of A.D. 959, and perhaps also the *Jivardharacampu* of Haricandra. Of these, though the last-mentioned work has the greatest claim for intrinsic literary worth, none could be said to rise appreciably above the level of mediocrities and all seem to suffer more or less through the Slesa and Citra obsessions resulting from unavailing and ill-proportioned attempts at securing Bana's inimitable brilliance. If the later *Ramayana-campu* attributed to Bhoja, in spite of its lackadaisical style, and the much later *Bharata-campu* of Ananta Bhatta, in spite of its numerous solecistic lapses and queer conceits, still continue to be popular among Indian Students of Sanskrit Literature, it is rather due to the perennial interest of the happy *motif* and theme of the monumental epics of Valmiki and Vyasa. The latter-day *Visva-guṇadarsa* of Venkatadhvarin is a very interesting, original and remarkable production of the *Campu* type which is sure to be appreciated by its readers as a repository of forcible but heavily riming, ornate but satirical gnomes put into the mouth of a fictitious Swift-like misanthrope called Krsanu, agreeably diversified by the generous though laboured pronouncements of another fictitious character-Visvasu. But the inquisitorial attitude generally assumed by Venkatadhvarin towards the contemporary communities of South India seems to have betrayed him not unoften into an ill-disguised exhibition of a desire to provide in his *Visvaguṇadarsa* something like a literary purgatory to the South Indian souls. The *Nilakantha-vijaya campu*, happily free from these defects, a really delightful honey-grape mixture, was produced by Srīman Nilakantha Dikṣita in A.D. 1637-8, after the lapse of 4738 years in the Kali Era.

अष्टत्रिंशदुपस्कृतसप्तशताधिकचतुस्सहस्रेषु ।

कलिवर्षेषु गतेषु ग्रथितः किल नीलकण्ठविजयोऽयम् ॥ 20 ॥

(नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 12)

\* Preface to Balamanorma Press edn. 1924.



There are luckily available several important particulars concerning the life and age of Sri Nilakantha Diksita. The following extract from the introductory canto of his *Gangavatarana* may be perused here with advantage.

मुनिरस्ति भरद्वाजः ख्यातस्त्रिभुवनेष्वपि ।  
 अन्नैर्यस्य जहौ रामोऽप्यरण्यभ्रमणश्चमम् ॥ 38 ॥  
 तस्यान्वये महत्यासीत् क्षीरोद इव चन्द्रमाः ।  
 श्रीकण्ठचरणासक्तः श्रीमानप्पयदीक्षितः ॥ 39 ॥  
 अमोपणीयैरक्रयैरमूल्यैरमलीमसैः ।  
 यत्प्रबन्धैः शतेनैव भारती परिकर्मिता ॥ 44 ॥  
 यं विद्म इति यद्ग्रन्थानभ्यस्यामोऽखिलानिति ।  
 यस्य शिष्याः स्म इति च श्लाघन्ते स्वं विपश्चितः ॥ 45 ॥  
 नाकेऽपि सति देवानां माहात्म्यकलहे मिथः ।  
 वादः शाम्यति यद्वाचि विन्यस्य निखिलं भरम् ॥ 46 ॥  
 तत्समानप्रभावस्य तदनन्तरजन्मनः ।  
 आसीदाच्चादीक्षितस्य पुत्रो नारायणाध्वरी ॥ 48 ॥  
 जयन्ति तनयास्तस्य पञ्च सौभ्रातृशालिनः ।  
 गर्भदासा महेशस्य कवयश्च विपश्चितः ॥ 49 ॥  
 तेषामहं द्वितीयोऽस्मि भूमिदेवीतनूभुवाम् ।  
 नीलकण्ठ इति ख्यातिं नीतः शम्भोः प्रसादतः ॥ 50 ॥  
 वार्तिकाभरणग्रन्थनिर्माणव्यक्तनैपुणः ।  
 श्रीवेङ्कटेश्वरमखी शिष्ये मय्यनुकम्पते ॥ 51 ॥  
 कुर्वती श्रवणे वाणी कोमलां यस्य साहितीम् ।  
 कर्णपूरशिरीषेऽपि काठिन्यमिव पश्यति ॥ 52 ॥  
 भान्ति शिष्याः पुरो यस्य पाणिर्विन्यस्तपुस्तकाः ।  
 तत्सूक्तिजाह्नवीपूरत्नासेनेव धृतप्लवाः ॥ 53 ॥

(गङ्गावतरण—सर्ग. 1)

It can be made out from these extracts that he was the second of the five sons of Narayana Diksita who was himself the younger brother of Sri Appayya Diksita (A.D. 1553 to 1626), the illustrious South Indian *Acarya* of Saivism and Advaitism, who is appropriately characterised by his admirers as the myriad-minded poly-histor who produced one hundred and four works of great merit in various branches of knowledge and had to his credit incessant ritualistic activities not less numerous or varied, and as one of the greatest champions of the religion and philosophy of Srikantha and Samkara. From reliable records and traditions preserved by the disciples and descendants of Nilakantha it may further be gathered how, as a boy of twelve, Nilakantha became the recipient of Appayya Diksita's heartiest and choicest blessings in his last moments as the lucky substitute for the earthly patrimony which his sons would not allow Nilakantha to get ; how he rapidly throve to become the most prominent scion of Appayya Diksita's family, through his superior statemanship which culminated in his Premiership under King Tirumala Nayaka, the most powerful of the Nayaka Kings of Madura, and through his marvellous genius which exhibited itself in the form of excellent



poetry, thrilling and stirring up his contemporaries and posterity alike ; and how he was otherwise known as Ayya Diksita, and spent the evening of his life in the village called Palamadai, on the left bank of the Tamraparni in the Tinnevely District. Nilakantha was as fortunate in his teacher as in his proteges and disciples. His teacher was Sri Venkatesvara, the reputed author of the *Vartikabharana* and the worthy son of Govinda Diksita of blessed memory, who was the honoured minister of King Raghunatha of Tanjore. His chief proteges and disciples were his younger brother Atiratrayaṅvan, the author of a drama called *Kusakumudavaliya* ; his third son Girvanendra, the author of a *Bhana* called *Srngarakosa* ; the *Vaiyakarana* Cokkanatha Diksita, the well-known author of the *Janaki-parinaya* Nataka. The Sanskrit introduction by Mr. T.S. Kuppuswamy Sastry, in the Srirangam edition of the *Sivalilarnava*, which appeared as No. 18 of the Sri Vani Vilas Sanskrit series, brings together all the available particulars about Nilakantha Diksita, his contemporaries and immediate predecessors.

Nilakantha Diksita is known to be the author of several beautiful minor poems published in 1911 by the Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam. These are seven—the *Kalividambana*, and the *Sabharanjana* of caustic gnomes, the *Santivilasa* and the *Vairagyasataka* of a supreme quietistic thrill, the *Anardasagarastava* and the *Sivotkarsamanjari*—two brilliant devotional lyrics addressed respectively to the Beloved Mother and Father of the universe ; and the *Anyapadesasataka*, a centum of gnomic allegories full of dignified wit and wisdom. His larger works are his two Mahakavyas—the *Sivalilarnava* in twenty-two cantos published by the Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, and the *Gangavatarana* published by the Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, besides the *Nilakantha-vijaya campu*, now published, and two unpublished works—the *Nalacaritanataka*<sup>1</sup> and a commentary on Kaiyata's *Mahabhasyapradipa*.

Nilakantha Diksita is equally great as an art-critic and as an artist, an eminently practical Alamkarika whose literary example is always in delightful unison with the high ideal of poetry revealed in his critical precepts. To realise this, one has but to read the first canto of the *Siva-lilarnava*, and in the light of the canons enunciated therein, to examine the further cantos of that work or his other productions. That he set up a very high standard of poetry would be quite apparent from these extracts :

वक्रोक्तयो यत् विभूषणानि वाक्यार्थबोधः परमप्रकर्षः ।

अर्थेषु बोध्येष्वभिधैव दोषः सा काचिदन्या सरणिः कवीनाम् ॥ 19 ॥

कृते युगे व्यञ्जनयावतीर्णं त्रेतायुगे सैव गुणीवभूव ।

आसीत्तृतीये तु युगेऽर्थचित्तं युगे तुरीये यमकप्रपञ्चः ॥ 38 ॥

दिष्ट्याधिरूढाः कविताधिराज्यं धीरा रमन्ते न हि शब्दचित्ते ।

स्वर्गेऽपि गत्वाऽप्सरसां निवासे काणैव किं कापि गत्रेपणीया ॥ 39 ॥

(शिवलीलार्णव—सर्ग. 2)

देवानामपि दैवतं गुरुमपि प्राचां गुरुणामिह

श्रीमन्तं मदनान्तकं कथमपि स्तोतुं कृतो निश्चयः ।

तेन त्वां त्वरयामि भारति बलात्कृष्टापि दुष्टे पथि

प्रासेनोपहृतापि जातु कुपिता मा स्म प्रसादं त्यजः ॥ 7 ॥

(नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 2)

<sup>1</sup> Since published.



It would also be manifest that, as a literary artist, his greatest achievement lies in effecting a complete synthesis between the *Vakrokti*-aspect of literary form and the *Dhvani*-aspect of literary content, through his masterly *Jeux-de-mots*, both of the lambent and brilliant varieties, being harmonised with richly suggestive collocations of appropriate ideas and expressions. In fact, a foretaste of such a synthesis is given in the very first verse of the *Nilakantha-vijaya* :—

वन्दे वाञ्छितलाभाय कर्म किं तन्न कथ्यते ।  
किं दम्पतिमिति ब्रूयामुताहो दम्पती इति ॥

An all-comprehensive Santa-dominated synthesis may be said to be the happy *molif* which is beautifully delineated through the simple and popular Puranic theme of how the Blue-necked Siva became blue in his neck. The first verse discloses the grand synthesis behind all men and women through the conception of the Ardhanarisvara as the highest God—thus eulogised further on in the verse :—

ओमित्युमेति युवयोरभिधानमेकं  
सृष्ट्यादिसृष्ट्यवधितागुणमात्रभिन्नम् ।  
एकं च तावदभिधेयमपीह रूपं  
वेणी जटेति कचसंहतिभेदभिन्नम् ॥ 24 ॥  
(नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 4)

With the highest type of uni-centric devotion characteristic of a God-filled *Jnanin*, *Ekabhakti* or *Paramaikartin*, the author suggests with sly humour a monotheistic synthesis behind the three chief forms of religion, Saivism, Vaisnavism and Saktism, in these verses :—

दृष्ट्वा कौस्तुभमप्सरोगणमपि प्रकान्तवादा मिथो  
गीर्वाणाः कति वा न सन्ति भुवने भारा दिवः केवलम् ।  
निष्क्रान्ते गरले द्रुते सुरगणे निश्चेष्टिते विष्टपे  
मा भैष्टेति गिराविरास धुरि यो देवस्तमेव स्तुमः ॥ 2 ॥  
चौर्येण प्रणयेन चापहरतः पल्लीपु गव्यान्यपि  
स्त्यायन्ते चरितानि चेत्कविकुलोद्गीतानि गाथाशतैः ।  
तैलोक्योद्धूटकालकूटकबलीकारप्रकारं पुनः  
स्तोतुं के प्रथमैरपि नाम कवयो दूरेऽधिकारस्तु नः ॥ 9 ॥  
(नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 1)

Such a glorious synthesis is further obvious behind the whole plot, which seeks to vindicate the claims of the Blue-necked swallower of the *Halahala* poison for the highest *Saviourship* of all the worlds of morals and immortals. And Sahridayas cannot fail to realise the admirable synthetic appeal through the finishing touches in which the Vaikunthavarnana at the end of the second *Asvasa* culminates, and through the thrilling hymn in the fourth *asvasa* addressed by Visnu to Narayani in worshipful love and the still more thrilling reply vouchsafed by Siva ; and all this must be quite evident from a perusal of the following extracts :

पश्य ज्ञानक्रियेच्छामणिमयमुकुरावद्धमध्यात्मविद्या-  
भास्वद्रत्नप्रदीपप्रकरपरिहृतध्वान्तमन्तस्समन्तात् ।  
गाढाविद्याकवाटं प्रबलशमदमद्वारपालाभिगुप्तं  
भक्तिद्वारं मुरारेरिदमिह शयनागारमोङ्काररूपम् ॥ 34 ॥



क्षन्तारं सकलागसां जडधियां यन्तारमन्तस्तमो-  
 हन्तारं जगतामनुत्तरपराहन्ताङ्कितोरस्थलम् ।  
 उद्यत्कौस्तुभशोभमुत्पलवनीसच्छायमच्छायत-  
 स्तिग्धापाङ्गतरङ्गमैक्षिणि परं ब्रह्माच्युतं शाश्वतम् ॥ 35 ॥  
 जानाम्यहमुमाकान्तं जानासि त्वं च मदिगरा ।  
 जानन्ति किमिमे मूढास्तत्सम्यगनुशिष्यताम् ॥ 47 ॥  
 (नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 2)

यज्जन्मस्थेमभङ्गव्रतमिह जगतां यच्च सर्वान्तरत्वं  
 यत्स्वातन्त्र्यं च मोक्षे श्रुतिषु निगदितं विश्वसाम्राज्यचिह्नम् ।  
 तद्यस्याः साहचर्यात्परिणमति परब्रह्मणि श्रीमहेशे  
 तामाद्यामात्मविद्यामहमिति कलयन् सर्वतो निर्वृतोऽस्मि ॥ 14 ॥  
 यल्लक्ष्मीदयितोऽस्मि यदनुभुवां जेतास्मि यत्कर्मिणां  
 कर्मस्वभ्युदयप्रदोऽस्मि यदपि ध्येयोऽस्मि वा योगिनाम् ।  
 तत्सर्वं त्रिपुरे महेश्वरि महामाये जगद्रूपिणि  
 त्वत्सौभाग्यमहाविभूतिकणिकालेशस्य लेशायते ॥ 15 ॥  
 साधु वत्स जगन्नाथ साधु विष्णो जगन्मय ।  
 पश्य त्वमात्मनाऽत्मानं परमं ज्योतिरैश्वरम् ॥ 18 ॥  
 शिवा घोरा चेति श्रुतिषु विदिते ये मम तनू  
 तयोराद्या मूर्तिः परमरमणीया त्वमसि मे ।  
 त्वमस्यर्धं देहे त्वमसि वदनं दक्षिणमिति  
 त्वयि प्रीये यावत्तव भवति तावच्च विदितम् ॥ 26 ॥  
 (नीलकण्ठविजय—आ. 4)

With his wonderful mastery over all the subtleties of *Rasa*, with superior wit as his *forte*, and with his characteristic *vakrokti* of the crescent, not of the *dogtail* type, Nilakantha in his *Nilakantha-vijaya* works his marvellously beautiful way up to the highest *Rasa*-synthesis of Santa, now through a well-conceived satire on the ludicrous results of a selfish adherence to *karmamarga* by the Yajnika representatives of Vedistic materialism (vide pp. 9, 10, 11 and 12), now through sly mots on the vanity of even celestial wishes (vide pp. 67 to 71 and 115), and now through diplomatic appeals such as we find in Brhaspati's conversation with Sakra and Sukra in the third *asvasa*. And, above all, responsive Sahridayas properly attuned to the many-sided appeals of Nilakantha Diksita's poetry, can never miss the synthesis of varied poetic excellence behind the prose-poetry synthesis on the formal side of the *Nilakantha-vijaya* and are sure to whole-heartedly subscribe to the following estimate :

उपमा कालिदासस्य भारवेरर्थगौरवम् ।  
 दण्डिनः पदलालित्यं माघे सन्ति त्रयो गुणाः ॥  
 भूम्ना भवन्ति यत्रैते गुणाः सर्वे तथापरे ।  
 नीलकण्ठस्य वक्रोक्तिः सा मुग्धेन्दुकलानिभा ॥



## KOSAVAN ACARYAH\*

This is an old library law known to ancient Samskrita culture, not one of the waggish type but one that may well be taken seriously as an aphoristic and suggestive motto of the Library Movement of modern times. Freely rendered, this aphorism means—"To have a library is to be an educator." To an imaginative and responsive mind, it conveys many a good idea connected with the Library Movement, some ideas explicitly and some in an implicit manner. The more important of such ideas will be briefly elucidated here.

*Kosavan* connotes having a library. To have a library may be to have it in one's custody in the sense in which a librarian has it. In this sense, the aphorism under consideration is a sound definition of a true librarian. According to the most up-to-date conception of the meaning of the phrase and as understood by progressive and cultured minds, a true librarian is not a mere caretaker of books, who may be an otherwise good-for-nothing person but can keep a vigilant watch over the books in the library and successfully chain them to their shelves so as to prevent them from straying away, except very occasionally, into readers' hands. But he is a true librarian, who is able to find a suitable reader for every book in his library and a suitable book for every reader who goes there ; who combines judgement and caution with zeal for self-effacement and service, urbane sanity with sane urbanity, firmness with complaisance, confidence with candour, a well-informed mind with a ready wit and disciplined reserve, a certain amount of versatility more especially on the bibliographical side with a cultivated memory and quick receptiveness ; and who, with such an equipment and a high character, can play the role of an unforgettably impressive, but not in the least obtrusive or assertive or offensive, educator or *acarya*.

*Kosavan Acaryah* : To have a library is to be an educator. Looking at this aphorism in another way, one may easily find in it a clear and emphatic indication of the main objects of the modern Library Movement. To have a library may be to have access to it, as adults ; and in this sense, the result would be self-education leading eventually to the education of others ; or to have a library may be to have it in order to make it accessible to others fit to be educated, adults as well as others ; and to have it in this sense and to put it to appropriate use would certainly lead to appropriate results, such as maintaining and advancing literacy or killing illiteracy, as the case may be.

This aphorism again may be considered in another way. It may be taken to imply at once the privileges and responsibilities associated with one who is a *Kosavan*. One great privilege of having a library is to have opportunities for coming into living touch "with the precious life-blood of many a master-spirit embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life." But all those who have such opportunities in the world of books must remember that the responsibility of strictly choosing suitable books rests with them ; and this responsibility comes to be of greater moment, in view of the fact that they have to function as educators of themselves as well as others. They

---

\* *The Library Movement-A Collection of Essays by Diverse Hands*, Madras Library Association 1929. pp. 130-32.



must constantly remind themselves that mere books could not educate any more than "laws constitute virtue" and that "man's business here is to know for the sake of living, not to live for the sake of knowing". In the case of eminent scholars as well as aspiring students, in the case of the semi-literate and illiterate in urban and rural areas, in the case of bourgeois and high-class men and women, it must be remembered by the promoters of the various aspects of the Library Movement that great caution is required in the choice of desirable and suitable books. This is emphasised by the secondary suffix in the word 'Kosavan', in which the 'matup' connotes suitability and desirability. The aphorism that we are considering makes it quite apparent that a judicious arrangement for giving access to books and a wise educating, are reciprocally concomitant factors in any good scheme of cultural service. On the negative side, it also makes it unmistakably clear that "to read, and yet so to read, that we see nothing but a corner of literature, the loose fringe, or flats and wastes of letters, and by reading only deepen our natural belief that this land is the hub of the Universe, this century is the only age worth notice—all this is really to call in the aid of books to thicken and harden our untaught prejudices".

Looked at from the view-point of higher University education, this aphorism suggests that a well-designed literary laboratory, which corresponds to the continental seminars of recent times or to the *pustakakosas* of the ancient residential Universities of Nalanda and Kasi, forms a vital part of all academic schemes of higher research. It clearly suggests also that Acaryas of a higher type ought to be placed in charge of well-designed seminars or literary laboratories, which advanced students may enter, after attending courses of lectures on their respective subjects. As Sir William Ramsay puts it, in his lecture on "The functions of a University", a student who is ripe for research and who enters such a seminar is provided with a library, paper, pens, ink and a subject." "The method of using a library is pointed out to him, and he is told to read books which bear on the particular subject in question; he is made to collate the information which he gains by reading and to elaborate the subject which is given him. Naturally his first efforts must be crude. It probably costs him blame at the hands of his instructor; after a few unsuccessful efforts, however, if he has any talent for the particular investigation to which he has devoted himself, his efforts improve, and at last he produces something respectable enough to merit publication. Thus he is exposed to the criticism of those best competent to judge, and he is launched in what may be a career in historical, literary or economic research." Thus he who functions as *Acarya* ought to be *kosavan* and he who is equipped with a suitable *Kosa* and carefully guided in his work, ripens into an *Acarya*. This important implication of our Sanskrit aphorism is reaffirmed with a modernist ring in Carlyle's famous utterance—"The true University of these days is a collection of books."



## THE LIBRARY MOVEMENT AS VIEWED BY A CLASSICIST\*

I was invited to deliver the inaugural address of the Madras Library Association for the year 1934-1935, by its Council. The two gentlemen, who were chiefly responsible for this invitation.—Mr. K. V. Krishnaswami Iyer and Mr. S. R. Ranganathan—the resourceful and indefatigable President and Secretary of the Association, happened to be friends, whose invitation I had to treat as a behest, which must be carried out, in the best manner possible. In carrying out this behest, I venture to place before you some thoughts on the Library Movement, which come up in my mind, when I view this movement in the way in which a life-long student of the *Ancient classical literature in Sanskrit* would view it. Thus, I happen to be in the happy position of being able to bespeak your Excellency's indulgence and the indulgence of many others, by conveying two negative assurances—that I am not going to create any embarrassing situation for your Excellency by discussing any of the financial problems connected with the library movement or by considering any of the issues connected with the Madras Library Bill and that I do not propose to view the Library Movement with a statistical bent of mind. The financial problems of the library movement and the Madras Library Bill are luckily in safe and competent hands—in the hands of the ever-resourceful President of the Madras Library Association.

The Library Movement is generally recognised to be a recently devised means of national uplift ; and for very good reasons it is widely spoken of as a modern movement. It would not be wrong, however, to say that this movement is not entirely new. An Indian classicist has his feet, certainly, in the *present* but finds his roots in the *past* and has his eyes turned towards the *future*. Following his line of thinking, one may find sufficient reasons to say that the library movement is not entirely new, not merely in the sense that nothing is entirely new, but in the sense that some of its essential features have their parallels in ancient India. To say this should not be misunderstood as arguing a disinclination to appraise justly the value of fresh achievements involved in what we are accustomed to call '*progress*'. It should be remembered that a sound and healthy attitude of progressiveness would never ignore the past or the future ; that the *present*, being itself the evidence of the purposefulness of the past, seeks in the *future* its fulfilment and the evidence of its own purposefulness, and that a consideration of the parallels in the past serves as a source of encouragement and inspiration, and in some respects, as a corrective also. "Never was this world fundamentally unlike what it is in the present, whatever the differences may be in regard to details". "*Na Kadacit Anidrsam Jagat*"—this Sanskrit dictum may be applied to the modern library movement also, with due reservations.

The term '*Library*' stands for a collection of books, intended for effective and beneficial use. The expression "Library movement" connotes two things :—being a movement which seeks to promote, directly as well as indirectly, the establishment, organisation and improvement of libraries and being a movement which, chiefly through its illimitable expansiveness and unrestricted inclusiveness, is helpful in various ways, in the promotion of good activities of an extra-limital character, both in the mental and physical spheres—good activities which are extra-curricular within the four

---

\* Inaugural Address at the Madras Library Association, 1934. Printed in Annual Report of the Madras Library Association. 1935. pp. 51-60.



walls of a school or a college, and which fall outside the prescribed limits in the case of any institution or group. Of these two essential aspects of the *library movement* the latter may be traced back to the remote age of the culture of the *Rg-Veda*, "*Samgacchadhvam, samvadadhvam, sam vo manamsi jaralam*". (R. V.-X). "Meet one another, freely exchange your ideas and understand one another". This exhortation conveyed by one of the seers of the *Rg-Veda* in the concluding hymn of the 10th mandala is very significant. It presupposes the existence of a considerable number of learned people possessing a considerable stock of good ideas which were worthy of circulation. It presupposes, likewise, the existence of a considerable number of people who were fit to receive such ideas. It shows also an adequate appreciation of the value of mutual understanding among such people, which may be said to form the corner-stone of all cultural edifices and the reverse of which has been established by experience to be the chief source of many evils, cultural or otherwise. Indeed, one is tempted to find in this exhortation of the *Rg-Veda* much more than a mere embryonic foreshadowing of one of the most important elements constituting the second of the two phases of the Library movement—*viz.*, the promotion of good activities of an extralimital character. It should be remembered here that all this relates to an age which had not yet provided itself with script and writing, nor with stylus and palm-leaves, nor with ink and paper, nor with the printing press and books and that all this relates to an age in the history of Indian civilization, which deposited its literary treasures in the non-mechanical, mind-moved libraries consisting of the groups of learned persons available in those far-off days.

It is not possible to determine exactly when the art of writing came to be used in India. If the recent Indus Valley discoveries are taken into account, India's knowledge of writing has to be carried back to a very remote period, perhaps earlier than 3000 B.C. Even otherwise, there is good ground to believe that writing must have been known to the makers of early Indian literature, for a long period, before the seventh century B.C., and that it must have been widely used for various purposes, subsequent to the fifth century B.C., during the Buddhistic and post-Buddhistic periods. In the post-Vedic age of writing, wooden tablets, leather, metal, stone, rocks, birch-bark, palm-leaves and paper were employed in India as writing material. There are reliable evidences in Sanskrit literature, which show that written books were already in existence for some centuries before the Christian era. Already, in the early centuries of the Christian era, the production of books was encouraged and the copying and presenting of books were considered meritorious. In all the indigenous schemes of education and cultural training, however, from the earliest times down to the present day, there has been on the one side, a clearly emphatic insistence on the importance of oral tradition and direct contact between the teacher and disciple, between the *acarya* and *sisya*, particularly in respect of the earlier stages of learning in almost every important branch of knowledge; and on the other side, there has been a corresponding insistence on the desirability of refraining from acquisition of knowledge—through books—"from what is usually described as *likhita-patha*". Notwithstanding this attitude towards books, innumerable books were written and widely read in ancient India, by eminent teachers, scholars and students, and several libraries were formed and maintained in monasteries, in royal palaces, in the residences of *kulapatis* or eminent scholars who were heads of residential colleges, in the houses of the wealthy, and in temples.

A careful investigation of the conditions in ancient India with reference to the production and use of books and the formation and use of libraries discloses certain matters which would be of great interest and value to many who are connected with the modern library movement in India especially. From such investigation, it may be made out that two important ideas dominated the sphere of education in ancient India. These two ideas admit of being embodied in two terse and telling formulas, known to the modern world of education. These two formulas are "self-development



in an atmosphere of freedom" and "self-knowledge in an atmosphere of restraint or discipline". They admit of being further synthesised in a third formula, which is equally telling and significant and is not unfamiliar to you. It is "self-expression and self-realisation". In ancient India, as in the modern world, the ultimate object kept in view may be taken to have been "self-expression and self-realisation". To achieve this object, self-development in an atmosphere of freedom is as important as self-knowledge in an atmosphere of restraint or discipline.

In all activities connected with the advancement of culture and national well-being, a due proportion should be maintained between freedom and restraint, as also between a free self-development and a disciplined self-knowledge. In the modern world, it is generally believed that the school makes for self-knowledge in an atmosphere of discipline and that the libraries make for self-development in an atmosphere of freedom. The pupil is endowed with a wonderful but a highly vagarious and dangerous instrument *viz.*, his own mind; and in the school, the teacher is expected to create for the pupil such an atmosphere of discipline as will enable him to understand his own mind, to improve it and to make it fit for self-development leading to self-expression and self-realisation. These are matters clearly understood and recognised by sober and efficient teachers and promoters of the library movement in modern times; and they rightly point out that "the library and the school supplement and complement each other, that the virtue of each is that it is not the other" and that the freedom of the library and the discipline of the school, when inter-changed in an indiscriminate way, would mar the efficient functioning of both. However, in the complexities of modern civilisation, it is becoming increasingly difficult, every moment, to secure and maintain a due adjustment and to avoid the dangers of maladjustment between discipline and freedom, between the school and the library, between activities within prescribed limits and extra-limital activities. The present civilization is mainly a machine-made civilization. The present world has already become "a world criss-crossed with a universal tangle of wires and pipes, and littered, like an American cemetery of discarded and rusting motor-cars, with the hideous debris of the engineer". The present age has become an age of ink and paper, in which it cannot be justly said that there is no justification at all for an outburst like this, ill-balanced as it may be—that "the fetishes of ink and paper have crept between us and the realities of life; the invention of printing, upon which the whole of our modern civilization is based, has created a whole intermediate world of books which stands between us and the great world of living actualities; we have lost the art of dealing directly with life, because direct intercourse with life itself has been, for most part, shut off; and that we permit our memories to run to seed, because we have so many ready make-shifts to do their work for them. Nor can it be said that in the present age of machines and books, there are no risks to be apprehended in the direction of an unhealthy mechanised process of mass-appeal, mass-response and mass-thinking. Now again, can it be said that there is no room, in the present age, for singing the dirge of the *good past*, in these terms—

"Plain living and high thinking are no more :  
The homely beauty of the good old cause  
Is gone : our peace, our fearful innocence  
And pure religion breathing household laws."

The promoters of the modern library movement and the makers of the modern library science have devised effective safeguards against the evils arising from the maladjustment referred to and have introduced certain methods, by which such evils may be prevented or minimised. The most important of such safeguards is to be found in the conception of the *perfect librarian*, developed by some distinguished experts in the library science. The perfect librarian must be competent to form



and conduct successfully any every sort of library ; he must have the requisite technical equipment ; he must be *both born and made* as librarian ; he must have the right kind of mind ; he must have the capacity to get on with people of various natures and temperaments ; and being perfectly competent to be in charge of the intellectual ministry of man, he must be to the intellect what the *perfect* doctor is to the *body* and the *perfect* priest is to the *soul*, and along with the *perfect* doctor and the *perfect* priest, make for the building up of the whole man. This is an ideal picture of the perfect librarian and he may not exist. But a close approximation to this picture is quite possible and has been accomplished by some of the distinguished librarians of the modern world. By the way, I am unable to resist the temptation to observe that our University has been exceedingly fortunate in its librarian, who, by his talent, equipment and unceasing effort is every day coming nearer and nearer to this ideal picture of the perfect librarian. Such a perfect librarian may reasonably be expected to present or minimise all the evils arising from any maladjustment between “self-knowledge in an atmosphere of restraint” and “self-development in an atmosphere of freedom”. Another safeguard of very great importance is to be found in the comprehensive corollaries deduced from the *second* and third of the *five laws* of the Library science. The *second law* is “*Books are for all*” and its comprehensive corollary is “*Every person his or her book.*” The third law is “*Every book its reader*” and its comprehensive corollary is “*No book without its reader*”. It must become easy to understand how these would operate as effective safeguards, if it is noted that “his or her book” means “the book which he or she requires and ought to read” and that “its reader” means “the person who requires the particular book and ought to read it”. A further safeguard devised by the modern library movement is to be found in the catholicity and all-inclusiveness of its scope, which has made it possible for it to extend its wings outside the four walls of a library, over the whole world of humanity, and to make or secure due provision for a wide dissemination of useful and good knowledge through devices other than reading books and through various kinds of extra-bibliological activities.

Here, it would be interesting and suggestive, in several respects, to consider some noteworthy safeguards which happened to be available in the world of education and books in ancient India, against the evils of the maladjustment described at an earlier stage in the course of this address. In ancient India, the value of written books was duly appreciated. The production and circulation of books were sought to be duly encouraged, as may be seen from the old texts commending the gift of books and giving an important place to *pustakadana* in certain phases of the Hindu religious scheme. Ancient Hindu culture considered the symbolism in the worship of the Goddess of learning—*Sarasvati*—incomplete without a book in one of her four hands. As in the modern age, so in ancient India, it was readily recognised that the books, as records of the past, were of great value in enabling us to get beyond the uncomfortable blind alley of the present, by linking it with the past as well as by opening up avenues to the future—that “a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life”, that the glories of the great persist in a wonderful way in their reflections seen in the magic-mirrors of books long after the great themselves had passed away. [*Adirajayasobimbam adarsam prapya vanmayam, Tesam asannidhanepi na svayam pasya nasyati.*] This is what a great poet-critic of the seventh century A.D. says :—“The glories of the great persist in a wonderful way in their reflections seen in the magic-mirrors of books long after the great themselves had passed away”. The educators of the ancient India realised well that books could be used with advantage in several phases of what may be called ‘Renaissance’ at any stage in the history of civilization. If it was the discovery of the literature of Greece and Rome and the printing of what had existed only in a few manuscripts that infused a new spirit into the dead formalism of the middle Ages, opened up fresh avenues of thought in Europe, and created the modern world, it could be said, with equal force, that it was mainly the study of the Buddhistic thought as preserved in Buddhistic books, in correlation with the earlier Upanisadic thought that



made it possible for one of the greatest thinkers of ancient India to rehabilitate the central truths of the Vedic culture in the garb of Advaitic monism and redeem the pure Vedic culture from the grip of certain extreme types of a lifeless ritualism. It is noteworthy that, while the attitude of ancient India towards books and libraries was, on the whole, quite favourable, so as to lead to "Self-development in an atmosphere of freedom", sufficient care was always taken not to make a fetish of books, not to allow books to grow into an inseparable intermediate barrier shutting out students from having real contact with great teachers on the one side and the actualities of life on the other. In this connection, one has simply to remember the insistence in ancient India, on the importance of oral tradition, of direct contact of man with man, of mind with mind, of the student with his teacher and of both with the actualities of life.

It would be highly interesting to see that many important elements in the make-up of the perfect librarian, as described by certain distinguished writers on the modern library movement are embodied in an old library law of ancient India, which, tradition has luckily preserved for us—'Kosavan Acaryah'. Freely rendered, this aphorism means "To have a library of books," made productive, in the language of the library science, "is to be an educator". The whole weight of this aphorism rests upon the secondary suffix in the word 'Kosavan' in which the 'matup' connotes suitability and desirability. This aphorism makes it quite apparent that a judicious arrangement for giving access to books and a wise educating are reciprocally concomitant factors in any good scheme of cultural service. On the negative side, it also makes it unmistakably clear that "to read, and yet so to read, that we see nothing but a corner of literature, the loose fringe, or flats and wastes of letters, and by reading only deepen our natural belief that this land is the hub of the Universe, this century is the only age worth notice—all this is really to call in the aid of books to thicken and harden our untaught prejudices". This aphorism admits of being amplified into a very attractive description of a true librarian in this way :—To quote myself "he is a true librarian, who is able to find a suitable reader for every book in his library and a suitable book for every reader who goes there, who combines judgement and caution with self-effacement and a zeal for service, an urbane sanity with a sane urbanity, firmness with complaisance, confidence with candour, a well-informed mind with a ready wit and disciplined reserve, a certain amount of versatility with a cultivated memory and quick receptiveness ; and who, with such an equipment and a high character, can play the role of an unforgettably impressive, but not in the least obtrusive or assertive or offensive, educator or acarya'. If easy renderableness of the present into the past and the past into the present could be taken as an additional ground for believing in the continuity of India's past and the close parallelism between India's present and her past, I may be permitted to quote here the six Sanskrit aphorisms which I composed soon after the publication of the 'Five Laws of Library Science' by the Madras Library Association in 1931. Of these six aphorisms, the first is identical with the old library law in Sanskrit that we have been considering, and the remaining five are Sanskrit renderings in the sutra-style of the five laws of Professor S. R. Ranganathan. The most noteworthy feature of these six aphorisms is that the first may be regarded as deducible from the first.

These six sutras are :

- "To have a library is to be an educator"—'Kosavan hi Sadacaryah pancasutriparyayah'
- "Books are for use"—'Pustakani pathitum'
- "Books are for all"—'Tani sarvebhyah'
- "Every book its reader"—'Svam Svamapnuyuh pathantam'
- "Save the time of the reader"—'Samayam tasya seset kosah'
- "A library is a growing organism"—'Sadapica vardhamanassa cinmurtih'



With the addition of the words “*pancasutrim vidantvimam*”, all these six sutras can be read together as two anustubh verses.

The promoters of the modern library movement are doing everything possible to extend the benefits of knowledge and culture to the masses and to keep the library movement above the possible censure that it cares more and more for the classes and neglects the masses. Every possible effort is made to solve the difficult problems of rural service, by exploiting many of the modern methods of liquidating illiteracy, such as, for instance, the inauguration and development of schemes of travelling libraries suitable to local conditions. The promoters of the library movement in Madras have yet to tackle successfully numerous problems connected with rural library service, more especially through the medium of the vernaculars. It is known well that there is, in India, still existing, a certain indigenous way of educating the masses through *Pauranikas* and *Kathakas*, and that they propagate, in a very telling manner, great moral and religious truths, with the help of illustrative stories and soul-stirring music. This indigenous way has its roots in the institution of *granthikas* described by Patanjali in his *Mahabhasya* in the second century B.C. (under III-I-26). From the *Mahabhasya* and from the literature connected with it, it may be gathered that the institution of *granthikas* was devised for dissemination of useful and valuable knowledge among the masses, by the educators of ancient India who were interested in the promotion of some movement corresponding to the modern library movement. It behoves us to study and harness the methods behind this old indigenous institution of *granthikas* and to organise, if possible, a large and efficient band of modern *granthikas* from the ranks of educated young men—chiefly from the ranks of unemployed youths—and send them to villages to do various items of work connected with rural library service. We should take care to employ only such of our unemployed graduates as modern *granthikas*, as have not lost their rural instinct and as have sufficient capacity to use spoken vernaculars as their medium. Some may apprehend that the revival of the old indigenous institution of *granthikas* may tend to encourage the use of the background of old-world religion and mythology and the Puranic stories. It is a mistake to suppose that our Puranic stories are only conducive to the development of an unhealthy type of other-worldliness. Most of our Puranic stories are, in fact, intimately connected with the affairs of this world; and if they could be rightly interpreted, they are sure to develop a very healthy *outlook on this world*. One telling instance will suffice here. All are familiar with the old story of Damayanti and Nala. At the *svayamvara* arranged by her mighty father, *Damayanti*, of matchless beauty, chose *Nala*, the perfect man of his age, as her husband, from out of a host of competitors, among whom were the four great Gods themselves—Indra, Agni, Yama and Varuna. What are the lessons to be deduced from this charming Puranic tale? Certainly these are the lessons—that the perfect man is better than the most powerful Gods and that this world is far superior to *Paradise* or *Heaven* or *Svarga*. And why? In the words of one of the greatest philosopher-poets of the 12th century A.D., Damayanti gave these reasons:—“She would prefer to remain in India as Nala’s dutiful wife—India which is as great, noble and interesting as life in a typical Indian family (*garhasthya*); and she would prefer India, where good deeds (*dharma*) can be combined with pleasure (*sarma*), to Heaven, where there is scope only for pleasure.

‘Varsesu yad Bharatam Aryadhuryah stuvanti garhasthyamivasramesu /  
Tatrasmi patyur varivasyayaham sarmormikimmiritadharmalipsuh //  
Svarge satam sarma param na dharma bhavanti bhumaviha tacca te ca”

(Naisadha VI—97 & 98).

It is also worthy of consideration here, how, in some of the basic ideas underlying the ancient Indian scheme of education, there were very effective devices for securing the needed correlation



and adjustment between activities under discipline within a prescribed area and extra-limital activities. Four Sanskrit words sum up in a beautiful way all that has to be said in this connection. *Adhiti* (study under a teacher), *bodha* (understanding and assimilating what is learnt), *acarana* (living what is learnt—not taking leave of what is learnt at the end of the prescribed course in schools and colleges) and *pracarana* (dissemination of what is learnt both by example and precept)—this is the complete educational scheme of ancient India. In this scheme, the teacher and the taught are engaged, throughout their lifetime, in one continual task of acquiring and disseminating knowledge with a view to the betterment of life : they have always access to each other and there can be no danger, as under modern conditions, of the library projecting itself in an undesirable manner into the school or the school into the library.

I propose to devote the concluding part of this address to a statement of some of the more important reasons which should induce all Indians, and all Hindus in particular, to participate in this great modern movement—known as the library movement. India is called *Bharata-Varsa* and the oldest epic counterpart which exactly answers to this Bharata-Varsa and mirrors it completely is Vyasa's Mahabharata. In the Mahabharata we have all the varieties that we see in India and the same underlying spirit of synthesis that we see in India and Hinduism. Hitherto, I was fancying that the sweeping claim put forward in the form of a challenge in the Mahabharata by its great author could be maintained only on behalf of the Mahabharata, and on behalf of Hinduism. For some time past since I came to have some knowledge of the scope of the modern library movement, I have been feeling that there is a third thing on behalf of which this bold claim can be maintained. Perhaps, many of you are already thinking of this verse in the first parvan of the Mahabharata—

“ Dharme carthe ca kame ca mokse ca bharatarsabha |  
Yadihasti tadanyatra yannehasti na tat kvacit.”

In respect of good and meritorious deeds, in respect of wealth, in respect of the satisfaction of longings and desires through the various amenities of life, in respect of the final liberation—in all these respects, what is here is elsewhere, and what is not here is nowhere else”. It is the encyclopaedic character of the Mahabharata that entitles it to put forward this claim. It is the catholicity and the all-embracing elasticity of Hinduism that supports this claim on behalf of it. What makes this claim sustainable on behalf of the library movement is its all-accommodating inclusiveness and unrestricted scope for good work on non-partisan lines.

In the modern library movement, there is great scope for dharma—chiefly for the dharma which relates to the dissemination of knowledge through the creation of facilities for self-development in an atmosphere of freedom. “To carry knowledge to the doors of those that lack it and to educate all to perceive “To carry knowledge to the doors of those that lack of it and to educate all to perceive the right—even to give away the whole earth cannot equal that form of service.” So says Manu ; and quite so, the library movement also says.

On its economic side, this movement affords much scope for *artha*—the second of the *purusarthas* or ends of human pursuits or springs of human activities. On the positive side, there is a great economic value in an increasing number of people becoming able to employ their minds and bodies in a useful manner ; and on the negative side, there is the great economic value of minimising and



## THE LIBRARY MOVEMENT AS VIEWED BY A CLASSICIST

185

eventually eliminating wastage in education especially in the lower stages. As observed recently in his Presidential Address at the Tinnevely District Library Conference, by our Expert and habitually thoughtful Secretary—Mr. S. R. Ranganathan, “the cautious and steady practical, old Britain and young, rash, unsettled and experimenting Russia, which differ from one another as poles as under practically in everything, appear to be completely at one in the appraisal of the economic value of Public Library Service and in exploiting it for the good of their people”.

In the satisfaction of one's legitimate desires through the improvement of the various amenities of life, the library movement can do many good things in urban and rural areas.

It is in the sphere of final liberation that the modern library movement is destined to make the biggest achievement on its democratic side. In the realist view of ancient *Nyaya* and in the idealist view of ancient *Advaita*, final liberation in its perfect form means the liberation of all through knowledge and through self-realisation. This is called *Sarvamukti* in Sanskrit. The methods recommended for this purpose by religion may vary in details. It is scarcely difficult to see that the modern library movement is bent upon carrying on an unceasing campaign against ignorance and for the attainment of *sarvamukti*, liberation for all, through knowledge and self-realisation.

Above all, under the existing conditions in India, the one book which can weld together all classes, castes, creeds, sections, schools and thoughts and fuse them into one complex but lasting and attractive texture, exhibiting a beautiful unity in the midst of harmonious diversities, it may well be said to be the *Mahabharata with the Gita as its pivotal part*: the one philosophy, which can do all this is the *Advaita philosophy* as embodied in Sankara's works; and the one public movement which can achieve all this is the great modern movement called the *Library Movement*.

May I close this address, repeating again with your permission this verse of the *Mahabharata*

“Dharme carthe ca kame ca mokse ca Bharatarsabha |  
Yadihasti tadanyatra yannehasti na tat kvacit” ||

and offering the prayer—

“Vardhatam vardhani citya nityam granthikavartani”

May the Library movement grow for ever and grow for all !



## AUTHORIAL POLYONYMY AND HOMONYMY IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE\*

In Sanskrit literature, there are several instances of two interesting bibliographical phenomena, viz., :

authorial Polyonymy (the same author having different names) ;

and

authorial Homonymy (the same name coming to be given to different authors).

These two phenomena present many an interesting problem to the makers and students of Library Science, in their attempt to formulate the rules of library classification and cataloguing, not to speak of the various difficulties which they cause to the modern historians of Sanskrit literature. Polyonymy comprises not only pseudonyms intentionally assumed by the authors themselves and nicknames waggishly given by others, but also patronymics and matronymics, names of religious lineage (gotra-names), titles of learning, pet-names, abridged names, monachal names (names borne by sannyasins), translated parallels and paraphrastic renderings. Homonymy comprises all the cases where, mainly as a result of the ancient custom of naming persons after their ancestors, gods, goddesses, prophets, saints, distinguished authors, patrons and sometimes rulers, different persons have come to bear the same name. In many of the cases of polyonymy and homonymy, it is impossible to discover exactly all the underlying causes, though, in a few instances, it may be easy to attribute the aliases definitely to joking instinct, mystifying instinct, reverential sentiment, custom, fondling or loving attitude, or parodical tendency. Polyonymous aliases and homonymous parallels are bound to cause even greater trouble and confusion in the sphere of library classification and cataloguing than in the investigation of crimes and settlement of legal claims. Longstanding usage established by reliable evidence is certainly useful to a considerable extent in helping one out of the difficulties in the former as in the latter. In the former, however, when scientific cataloguing leading to the maximum possible benefit with the minimum time and trouble is the chief aim, some special methods of culture to undertake the preparation of a concordance to authorial Polyonymy and Homonymy in Indian literature ; and this would afford ample scope for intelligent, interesting and useful research for a number of scholars, for a number of years.

The following illustrations indicate the nature and complexity of the problems connected with authorial Polyonymy and Homonymy. All the names given below are such as are expected to find a place in the classification of Indian literature.

Vyasa is one of the most famous names in Sanskrit literature. He is the reputed author of the *Mahabharata*. Several Puranas are attributed to him. He is also called Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipayana and this name refers to his colour and to the place of his birth. In some books he is referred to by the patronymic Parasarya and the matronymic Satyavati-Suta. Badarayana, the author of the *Brahma-Sutras*, is equated with him. The famous Bhasya on the *Yoga-Sutras* called *Vyasa-bhasya* is believed

---

\* Classified Catalogue Code by S. R. Ranganathan, Madras Library Association 1934 pp. 111—8.



## AUTHORIAL POLYONYMY AND HOMONYMY IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE 187

to have been written by Vyasa. Some later writers called Vyasaraya and Vyasatirtha bore the name Vyasa. In the last three cases one may find instances of homonymy and in all these names taken together, one may see the various ways in which authorial polyonymy, homonymy, patronymy and matronymy may cross one another.

Valmiki is the author of the *Ramayana*. He is also called Pracetasa and this is his patronymic. In later literature, a Tamil poet and a Prakṛta grammarian came to be called Valmiki. In recent times, Mr. Subba Rao, retired Telugu Pandit of the Presidency College, came to be called Andhra-Valmiki, for his Telugu *Ramayana*.

Kautalya and Kautilya are the names by which the author of the famous treatise on Ancient Indian Polity called *Kautaliya* or *Kautiliya*—is known. The former is his gotra-name and the latter is perhaps his nick-name. This author is equated with Canakya, the famous minister of Candra-gupta.

Kanada, the author of the *Vaisesika-sutras*, is also quoted with the name of Kasyapa in some places and Uluka (owl) in others. Kasyapa is the author's gotra-name and Kanada and Uluka are his nick-names.

Gautama, the author of the *Nyaya-sutras*, is also known by his nick-name—Aksapada. Gautama is his gotra-name. In this connection, it may be remembered that the founder of Buddhism, whose hagiological is Siddhartha, is also known by his gotra-name, Gautama. Cataloguers have also to take into account the name Gautama, borne by the author of an ancient Sutra work of the Dharma-sastra literature (*Gautama-dharma-sutram*).

Panini, the famous Sanskrit grammarian, is in some places referred to by his matronymic—Daksi-putra.

Patanjali, according to the Indian tradition, is quoted under his other name Gonardiya—which is understood as referring to his locality. The belief that he was an incarnation of Adi-Sesa (the thousand-headed Serpent God) is responsible for Patanjali being referred to by the alternative names of Phani and Sesa.

Upavarsa is the author of an ancient *vr̥tti* (commentary) on the *Sutras* of Jaimini and Badarayana. On the authority of Vedāntadesika, he is taken to have borne the gotra-name Bodhayana. In Vedānta literature, he is quoted under both of these names.

The famous Vakya-kara of the Viśiṣṭadwaitins had three names—Brahmanandin, Tanka and Atreya. Perhaps the first was his real name, the second his nick-name, and the third his gotra-name.

Kumarila, the famous author of the *Mimamsa-varttika*, had a curious nick-name-Tutatita. This nick-name was arrived at as a result of the metamorphic instinct venting itself through the dentalisation of the consonants by replacing them by the dental 't'. This may be seen to be not an uncommon practice in ancient India, from the facetious name *Tatatatatam*, which Rajasekhara gives to his drama—*Balaramayana*, in its prologue. Among the disciples of Kumarila, Prabhakara, the leading exponent of the Prabhakara School, came to be otherwise known as—*Guru*; Visvarupa came to have the monachal name Suresvara when he became a sannyasin and disciple of the great Samkara; and Bhattamveka came to have the other name Bhavabhuti, as a dramatist.



Yajñavalkya, the author of a well-known metrical text of the Dharma Sastra, has the alternative name Yogisvara.

In Saiva hagiology, the saint Appar had the alternative names Vagisa and Tirunavukkarasu, which are translated parallels. In Sri Vaisnava hagiology, Nammalvar is known to have had the names Kari-maran, Parankusan and Satha-kopan. The first of these three names of Nammalvar was based upon his grandfather's name Maran and his father's name Kari; the second was a name of honour which his father's master, King Parankusa, allowed to be conferred upon the son (Nammalvar); and the third was a Sanskrit name conferred upon Nammalvar in the Sanskrit literature on Sri Vaisnavism. Yamunacarya, the author of the *Siddhitraya* and other works, is known by his alternative Tamil name Alavantar. Sri Ramanuja, the Bhāṣyakara of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, is known by the other name Lakṣmana-muni and these two names are paraphrastic equivalents. Vedānta-Deśika, otherwise called Vedāntacarya, has another name Venkatanātha, the first two being his names as a religious teacher and the third being his real name, by which he is referred to in his poetical works.

Jayadeva, the author of the drama *Prasannaraghava*, is identical with Pakṣadharamisra, the author of the Nyāya work *Manyaloka*.

Anandagiri, the famous scholiast of Saṃkara's Bhāṣyas, had two alternative names Anandajñāna and Janardana. The first two of these names, he bore as a sannyāsin; and the last was, perhaps, his secular name previous to his sannyāsa. Anandapūrṇa, a sannyāsin, who commented upon the *Khandanakhadya*, is otherwise known as Vidyasāgara.

Jagannātha, the famous poet and critic is generally known by his title Panditarāja. The real name of the author of the *Prataparudrayasobhusana* is Agastya, while he is known generally by his title Vidyānātha. Viśveśvara, a famous Mīmāṃsaka, is known generally by his nick-name Gagabhaṭṭa.

Vaidikasarvabhauma, a famous author of Dharmasastra digests, is better known by his Tamil name Tolappar.

In very recent times, the most famous Sanskrit scholar of South India, Brahṃa Sri Rājū Sastriyār, who wrote some Sanskrit works, adopted his fuller name Tyagarajamakhin, as his authorial name.

In library classification and cataloguing the various problems connected with authorial polyonymy and homonymy should be carefully and successfully tackled. Otherwise, bad errors are likely to vitiate the work of higher research. The following illustrations, in this connection, may not be out of place.

There is an old Advaita treatise called *Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa*, which is one of the most important commentaries on Saṃkara's bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras*. The real name of the author of the *Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa* has not so far been ascertained and he is generally quoted under the name 'Prakāṭārtha-kara' (the author of *Prakāṭārtha*)<sup>1</sup>. In the introduction to the *Dasapadārtha-sastra* published in the Oriental Translation Fund Series, the name of the author of the *Prakāṭārtha* is given as Sri Carana. In this instance, a discerning scholar can easily see a case where an honorific affix is mistaken for the real name. The expression "Sri Carana" is reverentially affixed by Advaita writers to the phrase *Prakāṭārtha-kara*, when referring to the author of the *Prakāṭārtha*. The name

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently Dr. V. Raghavan has established the identity of the *Prakāṭārtha-kara* as Anubhūtiśvarapācārya (A.B.O.R.I. XXIII. 1942. pp. 352-68) —Ed.



## AUTHORIAL POLYONYMY AND HOMONYMY IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE 189

'Prakatarthakara-sricaranah' is on a par with Prakasatma-sricaranah an extended alternative of the name Prakasatman borne by the Sannyasin, who wrote the famous advaita commentary called the *Vivarana* on Padmapada's *Pancapadika*.

The famous author of the *Locana*, a commentary on the *Dhvanyaloka* is described in the colophons of the manuscripts of the *Locana* as "Mahamahesvara-acaryabhinavagupta". This rather gargantuan denomination consists of three parts—'Mahamahesvara', 'Acarya', and 'Abhinavagupta'. The first of these means a great champion of Saivism; the second means a great teacher; and the third part is the real name of the author, the latter half of this part-Gupta-being a patronymic affix. The author of the alamkara work, *Ekavali* also happened to be described in some manuscripts, by the homonymous title 'Mahamahesvara'. The real name of the author of the *Ekavali* is Vidyadhara and this happens to be missed. As a result of this, Burnell's catalogue of the Tanjore Palace Library (p. 54) gives the name of the author of the *Ekavali* as 'Mahamahesvara kavi' and proceeds to equate him with the author of the *Locana* by making the further observation that 'Acarya' and 'Abhinavagupta' are adjuncts added to the name of the author of the *Ekavali*.

Aufrecht, on page 46 of his famous catalogue, confounds Anandatirtha (= Madhvacharya = Purnaprajna) with Anandagiri (= Anandajana). The former is the well-known Acarya of the Dvaita school and the latter is the well-known scholiast of the Advaita school. This is an instance in which a homonymous part of two distinct names of two distinct authors has caused the trouble.

In the new descriptive catalogue of the Tanjore Palace Library, on pp. 1175-6 of Volume II, under Des. No. 1674, Rangaramanuja is described as "a disciple of one Laksmnayogindra". Here is a curious instance of a mistake arising from missing the fact that Laksmnayogindra is a paraphrastic equivalent of Ramanuja, the great Bhashyakara of the Visistadvaita school.

These illustrations will indicate the nature of the snares and pitfalls in the way of librarians who are engaged in library classification and cataloguing. The difficulties arising in this way from authorial polyonymy and homonymy in Sanskrit literature have to be surmounted necessarily with the co-operation of specialistic scholars in Sanskrit, until a reliable concordance becomes available, for ready reference. One golden rule, however, which a librarian, who is concerned with the classification and cataloguing of any considerable collection of Sanskrit books, can easily remember and follow is—"Refuse to be guided by mere names".



## LINGUISTIC NOTES—BHADANTA\*

*Bhadanta*.—This is ordinarily used in Sanskrit and Pali literature as a term of respectful address, when referring to Buddhist mendicants. In a footnote appearing at page 164 of the September, 1926 Number of *the Indian Antiquary*, under the contribution entitled “Two Tamil Hymns for the Margazhi festival”, which contains an English translation of the hymns and for which Mr. A. Butterworth and Prof. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar are jointly responsible, I find the following remarks about the etymology of the word ‘*bhadanta*’ :—“This expression refers to the habitually white teeth of the mendicant celebrates as opposed to other men whose teeth require to be cleaned because of the use of betel, etc. Mendicants are forbidden the use of this. Hence the name *bhadanta* for certain classes of these from this peculiarity.” This etymology is indeed amusing, to say the least, and stands on a level with the explanation of the word *vidhava* as *vigato dhavo yasya sa*. Evidently the ingenious author of this etymology of the word *bhadanta* is thinking of the possibility of resolving it into *bhaniva dantah yasya sah*. To avoid any historical or antiquarian speculation being based on this etymology for the mere reason that it has the imprimatur of an influential Journal of respectable standing, I hasten to suggest what seems to me the correct explanation of this word.

It is derived from the root *bhad*, which is included in Panini’s *dhatupatha* in the sense “to be auspicious or happy.” This root still survives in the form *bhadra*. The same radical element is found in *batis* (Goth), *bet* (A.S.), *better* (Eng.). Curtius suggests that perhaps *bhad* is an expansion of the root *bha*-to shine (See Vol. II. p. 301—Curtius, *Greek Etymology* (English translation, by Wilkins, England). *Bhadant* first arises in Sanskrit *ant*-stem like *kurv-ant*, *bhar-ant* etc., and then becomes thematised into *bhad-anto* in Pali and from *bhad-anto*, a *reformat* arises in Sanskrit. In this connection, it would be interesting to see how, in a similar manner, from *ad-ant*, *ad-anto* should have arisen in Prakrt, and from the last-mentioned form, the word *danta* should have appeared in Sanskrit. In a similar way the Avestic participial formation *bar-anto* arises. It is indeed noteworthy here that this Prakritic habit of thematising Sanskrit *ant*-stems and *vant*-stems is strikingly exhibited in Tamil forms like தனவந்தன், ஹனுமந்தன், பாக்கியவந்தன் from the Sanskrit forms *dhanavant*, *Hanumant*, *bhagyavant*. Compare also the forms referred to in the *Unadi-sutras* 413 to 417.

\* J.O.R.I. 1927. pp. 25-6.



## MADRAS UNIVERSITY CONVOCATION ADDRESS\*

*Mr. Chancellor, Sisters and Brothers of the Madras Academic Fraternity, Ladies and Gentlemen :—*

I am grateful to His Excellency the Chancellor for the honour which he chose to do me by inviting me to deliver the customary address at this Convocation. With a long roll of seventy-eight illustrious predecessors before me, not to be afraid of my address turning out to be platitudinous and vapid would require an uncommon degree of self-importance, of which I am utterly incapable. However, I promptly accepted His Excellency's invitation, overcoming my hesitation by my *Sanskritised* memory, which helped me to take courage from this comforting observation made by our immortal Kalidasa in his *Sakuntala* :—

“ If persons of no consequence acquit themselves with credit in great functions, know that it is all in virtue of the inspiring honour vouchsafed by the privileged powers above. Could the cripple Aruna end the dark and cause the dawn, if the thousand-rayed Sun should not place him in the front and let him harbinger the coming day ? ”

*“ siddhyanti karmasu mahatsvapi yanniyojyah  
sambhavanuramavehi tamisvaranam |  
kim vabhavisyad arurastamasam vibhetta  
tam cet sahasrakirano dhuri nakarisyat ||*

Further, it is a source of special gratification that I have to deliver this address under the aegis of the second Indian and first Hindu Chancellor.

On this important occasion, my thoughts and the thoughts of my academic colleagues and of the numerous students and friends in this hall, turn back gloomily on the great educationist and friend of India, the late Rev. Father Bertram, whose familiar face with its characteristically benevolent smile, it is our misfortune to miss here to-day and it will be our misfortune to miss everywhere and for ever in this world. He came out to India in 1888, graduated from this University in 1896 and became the Principal of the St. Joseph's College, Trichinopoly, in 1909. After working for fifteen years in Trichinopoly, he came to Madras, founded the Loyola College and developed it very rapidly into a splendid constituent college satisfying all the requirements of the new University Act. His students gratefully remember his sympathetic knowledge of their needs and difficulties, his readiness to help them in all possible ways and his abiding interest in their welfare. In his disappearance from this world, his students have lost a good friend and helpful guide ; his friends have lost a reliable, perfectly selfless, sweet and reasonable adviser ; the authorities of this University have lost an indefatigable worker and a shrewd and progressive peace-maker ; and the great educational fraternity of Catholics in this country have lost one of their most valuable brothers, whose sincerity and catholicity easily made him one of the best models of spiritual good manners. May his soul rest in eternal peace and bliss and may his memory be a great source of inspiration to this University !

---

\* Delivered on 29th Aug. 1936.



**Graduates of the year,**

My first duty is to offer you, on behalf of the University, our hearty felicitations on the success which you have achieved in your work and the Degrees, which you have won by right of your attainments. It is a source of great pleasure to me, that, among the recipients of our congratulations this afternoon, there are several graduates who have obtained the higher Degrees, which imply a superior quality of work and an intensive specialization and research in certain subjects. On my own day of graduation, exactly thirty-five years and five months ago, the number of persons who qualified for the Degree of Master of Arts was much smaller than it is to-day and the first lady who qualified for the Master's Degree—Mrs. Saththianathan—happened to figure as the brightest ornament of the convocation of the 29th of March, 1901. On that day, the Honourable Mr. Justice Shephard, in his address, expressed the hope, though with considerable diffidence, that Mrs. Saththianathan's success might lead many others of her sex to follow her example. His hope has been realised happily, within the last thirty-five years, in the large measure of success which the women students of this University have achieved in the sphere of higher education, through the Colleges exclusively intended for them and through men's Colleges. In my department alone—the Sanskrit department—no less than ten ladies have so far qualified themselves for the B.A. (Honours) and M.A. Degree, two of them having distinguished themselves with a *first class*. The number of ladies who have qualified for the Master's Degree in the other departments, is no less encouraging. This indicates, in an unmistakable manner, that the education of women, under the auspices of the Madras University, has been progressing rapidly. That there are, at present, on our rolls, over one thousand three hundred women graduates; that many of them have qualified for the higher Degrees; that nearly fifty per cent of them have qualified for the teaching profession; to crown all this—that this year—1936—has been particularly lucky in claiming to its credit, the two first lady Ph.D.'s—Miss C. Minakshi and Miss V. Paranjoti, who recently distinguished themselves in a noteworthy manner, by their effective and substantial research in Indian History and Indian Philosophy; and that South India continues to maintain, in a creditable manner, her first place in respect of educational progress among Indian women—these are undoubtedly bright features of which all of us interested in education would feel justified in thinking well, with great satisfaction.

Lady graduates are entitled to the warmest felicitations of all friends of India. They symbolise, in ancient Indian culture, the *holy and divin* mother and to them our sweet reverence is due in a full measure. It should be remembered by all the lady graduates that the ideal of Indian womanhood, as typified by Maitreyi in the *Bṛhadaranyaka*, by Sita in the *Ramayana*, by Sukanya in the *Devī-Bhagavata*, by Savitri, Damayanti and Pancali in the *Mahabharata*, can easily be maintained to be always unsurpassable in its purity and loftiness. The first and greatest exhortation which the teacher in the *Taittiriyaopanishad* addresses to a student on the termination of his pupilage in the teacher's residential college (*gurukula*) is, as most of us know, "Venerate thy mother as thy God"—"*Matrdevo bhava*". It is the high privilege and the great responsibility of the lady graduates to cherish untarnished and realise in their life all the noble implications of the Indian ideal of cultured womanhood, as known in the past history of Indian Culture. Their responsibility in this direction is very great; for, any approximation to Ramabhadra or Nala or Yajnavalkya would be comparatively less difficult than an approximation to Sita or Damayanti or Maitreyi. Their education has placed them in a position in which they can claim economic independence and compete with men in all occupations and in the pursuit of the recreations, diversions and forms of social service, which the modern world has learnt to value. They have every right to rebel against the double standard of morals for the two sexes, which some blind customs have allowed to operate in India and other countries. They are quite competent to undertake the duty of emancipating their



## MADRAS UNIVERSITY CONVOCATION ADDRESS

193

uneducated sisters by educating them and lifting them up to a higher level. In doing all this, they have to remember that the task of promoting equality between men and women is exceedingly delicate and complicated in its nature. Equality may, with great advantage to society, be secured by the enlargement of the freedom of women in respect of all good things and by the curtailment of the freedom of men in respect of all bad things. "In respect of all good things strictly", in the former case, and 'in respect of all bad things strictly', in the latter case—these two significant reservations should never be forgotten. They have also to remember that, whatever their public status may be as educated women, the genius of India's ancient civilization and culture requires that they should secure and maintain in an efficient manner, the dominant place which God in His Great Wisdom has reserved for them, in the pivotal institution of Indian civilization—viz., *family*; and this important institution depends entirely for its unsullied cohesiveness and continuity upon the sacred institution called *marriage*. It would be a terrific disaster for Indian civilization and culture, if the new generation of educated men and women should be found incapable of appreciating the beautiful ideals of married and family life, of the household (*grha*) and the Queen of the household (*grhini*), so vividly depicted in India's ancient literature. The educated women who have been admitted to the Degrees of University must necessarily play a very important part in the direction of women's education in India. I would request them all to remember that the education of Indian women—of Hindu women—should not be inextricably linked up with the European ideal and should be designed so as to develop them into a Maitreyi, or Sita or Damayanti or Savitri or Sukanya, so as to turn them into magnanimous wives, noble mothers and wisely alert sisters. To this end, the necessary foundation in the pre-collegiate stages should be laid with wise discrimination and great caution. We may have an excellent idea of what a sound educational scheme for women ought to be in the pre-collegiate stages, by pondering over the precious suggestions which Dr. Besant made in one of her speeches many years ago. That great and wise friend of India said in 1901—"A thorough and literary knowledge of the Vernacular—Hindi, Bengalee, Guzerati, Tamil, Telugu, whatever it may be—including written composition; a knowledge of Sanskrit sufficient to enable a woman to read with pleasure and profit the magnificent literature of the past, its poems, its dramas, its stories; a knowledge of English, because under present conditions such a knowledge is necessary for sympathy with English-educated husband and sons, because it opens the way to a world of thought that may be studied with advantage and enjoyment and because it brings the women into touch with a most potent factor in the modern civilization of India; a knowledge of Hygiene, of the laws which make for health in the house, in personal habits and in domestic arrangements; a knowledge of the elementary physiology and household medicine sufficient to make the mother an intelligent nurse, and in slight ailments physician for her children; a knowledge of some art, music, above all, painting, needle-work, plain and artistic, that she may make the home bright with pure attraction and make it a centre of happy and harmless amusement. Such an education would do nothing to injure the sweet grace of the Indian woman, while it would enlarge her mind, increase her influence and strengthen her character. Needless to add that this education must be accompanied by religious instruction which will purify the heart, enlighten the understanding, stimulate devotional feelings, and satisfy the spirit as it seeks to realise its divinity. Never will the Hindu woman lose her spirituality; but she needs to add to her faith, knowledge, so that she may be a sage as well as a saint, and bring to the service of her great ancestral religion woman's wisdom as well as woman's devotion. So shall she avert from husband and sons the evils of scepticism and apostacy. Hinduism has kept her pure; it must again as in the old days keep her wise". If Hinduism has kept the Indian womanhood pure and it must again, as in the old days, keep it wise, as Dr. Besant said, and wisely effective, let the Indian womanhood draw its inspiration from the *Ardhanarisvara* image, which symbolises, in a beautiful and significant way,



the great synthesis which the Hindu society should always aim at—the synthesis between woman and man, between art and science, between self-effacement and self-realization, between renunciation and possession, between beauty and sublimity, between sweet suggestion and telling expression between speech and thought, between charm and response, between motherhood and fatherhood, and above all, between the *dharma* of a family life and active and skilled service in the wide world of diverse pursuits and purposes. May the great Hindu symbolism of *Ardhanarisvara*, synthesising *Siva* and *Parvathi* protect the glorious purity of Indian womanhood !

### Fellow-Graduates,

The three questions formally put to you on this solemn occasion and to the fulfilment of which you have sincerely and solemnly pledged yourselves are well in their place and are highly significant as formulas which you will do well to remember always and use in your life as your unfailing source of inspiration. These questions should be understood to be so many disguised and implicit imperatives, comprehending within their scope, all your future activities for which your education in schools and colleges have qualified you : and they are the modern counterparts of what the great teachers of Vedic India exhorted their students to do in the world after finishing their educational course in the *gurukula*. When these questions are put to you, students of ancient Indian culture cannot help reminding themselves of the undisguised imperatives in the never-to-be forgotten exhortation by the *Acarya* to his *antevasin* in the eleventh *anuvaka* of the first section of the *Taittiriya-upanisad*. The elements of universal appeal in these Upanisadic exhortations can never be missed. “Speak the truth ; do your duty ; never neglect your duties to your race and family ; never neglect what contributes to well-being and prosperity ; let thy mother be thy God ; let thy father be thy God ; let thy teacher be thy God ; let thy guest who is in need of thy hospitality be thy God ; do good ; never do any evil ; remember and cultivate the virtues which we have practised ; and avoid the wrongs which we may have done”.

“satyam vada ; dharmam cara ; prajatanam ma vyavacchetsih ;  
kusalanna pramaditavyam ; bhutyai na pramaditavyam ;  
matrdevo bhava ; pitrdevo bhava ; acaryadevo bhava ;  
atithidevo bhava ; yananavadyani karmani ; tani sevityani ; no itarani ;  
yanyasmakam sucaritani ; tani tvayopasyani ; no itarani”.

In the questions now put to you and in the old-world Upanisadic scheme of exhortation, there is an unmistakable indication of the fact that your education raises the legitimate expectation that you will in due time play the role of constructive citizens in your life.

Your pledges, all of them, in the first place, impose upon you the duty of adopting and cultivating assiduously the attitude of a *fiduciary* in everything that you may be called upon to do. The fiduciary attitude is one of the essential elements constituting constructive citizenship. If you remember that “the institutions that last longest, that link human beings together in the most abiding and beneficent fellowship, are those that rest upon a *fiduciary basis*, those that embody a tradition of trustworthy service, those that gather to their service a continuous succession of honourable and loyal men, those that gather vitality as they go, becoming not weaker with age, but stronger and more beneficent in contrast with institutions that rest on force or coercion”—if you remember all this, you would hardly find it difficult to appreciate the great value of a fiduciary attitude to the young men going out of a University. This University, like any other University, lives in an atmosphere dominated by the ideas of trust and trusteeship ; and by calling upon you



to conduct yourselves as becomes members of this University, in your daily life, the University reminds you that the knowledge which you have acquired through your colleges could achieve nothing unless you hold it in trust and use it in a proper and wise manner, and that the skill which you have acquired would be of no value in society, unless you make use of your skill in your daily life as a trustee for the common good.

Your deportment in your familiar discourses in daily life is also a matter of great moment ; and this is determined largely by the spirit of trusteeship which you, as educated persons, bring to bear upon your talks. To the extent to which you are able to blend together what is true and what is agreeable in your conversation, without allowing either to detract from the other, to that extent you could realise in practice the ancient Indian ideals of *satya* and *priya* ; and to that extent you could acquit yourselves creditably as educated persons who hold in trust the training which you have received in thinking and speaking.

You should conduct yourselves, as becomes members of this University. You are all sons and daughters of India and this is an Indian University. India's past is great ; and her present as well as future should be also great, if it could be wisely correlated with her past. If, as the worthy Dean Inge (a former Dean of St. Paul's) observed, less than three years ago, the only promise of a better future for his country was to be looked for from those to whom her past was dear, it could be said, with greater appropriateness, to the graduates of all Indian University, that the only promise of a better future for India is to be looked for from those to whom her past is dear. A true Indian has his life certainly in the present, but he finds the roots of his life in the past, and has his eyes turned towards the future. No sensible person would ask you to think that the past is all good and the present is all bad. Many of you may be thinking at this moment of Kalidasa's wise remark that mere antiquity is not a guarantee of goodness and mere novelty is not a mark of badness and that wise men discriminate what is good from what is bad by a careful consideration of intrinsic worth :—

“ puranamityeva na sadhu sarvam  
na capi kavyam navamityavadyam |  
santah pariksyanyataradbhajante  
mudhah parapratyayaneyabuddhih || ”

The Indian expression for *progress* is '*Yogaksema*'. This is a compendious expression signifying all the essential elements making up the meaning of the term *progress*. *Yoga* consists in advancing further and getting what has not already been got ; and *ksema* consists in conserving all the good things already obtained. Ancient Indian culture is equally solicitous about *Yoga* and *ksema*. Any attempt to write on a clean slate and to demolish the past completely and build anew is against the nature of India's genius and such attempts will prove to be dismal failures in India. You are trustees of the future of India and your past must be dear to you. You cannot hope to have an intelligent appreciation of India's past, without acquiring adequate ability to understand and appreciate the Indian literature, which enshrines all the good achievements of ancient India in the spiritual and secular spheres of life. Such ability can be acquired, only if the graduates of our University are adequately conversant with Sanskrit and with at least one of the South Indian languages. That the spirit of ancient Indian culture is primarily embodied in Sanskrit literature, that the distinctive phases of South Indian culture are embodied in the great literatures in Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam, and that these distinctive phases of South Indian culture influenced and were profoundly influenced in very ancient times by, Sanskrit culture and can never be completely disentangled and dissociated from Sanskritic elements—are propositions which no



level-headed person can think of challenging. It would thus be obvious that every graduate of our University should acquire, either in the stage on University education or beyond that stage, an adequate knowledge of Sanskrit and at least one of the South Indian languages—so much knowledge as would enable him to appreciate ancient literature of Universal appeal, like the *Upanishads*, the *Gita*, the *Ramayana*, the *Mahabharata* and the *Sakuntala* in Sanskrit, and as for example the immortal *Kural* and *Kambaramayana* in Tamil. Towards this end, the curricula of studies in schools and Colleges need not be over-burdened, by compelling each student to study English, Sanskrit and a vernacular in his class-room. This object can be best achieved only through schemes of extra-curricular studies, under which Sanskrit under-graduates and Sanskrit graduates would easily persuade themselves to study and enjoy the beauties of a few Tamil classics or classics-in some other South Indian language, and similarly under-graduates and graduates in any of the South Indian languages would easily persuade themselves to study and enjoy a few Sanskrit classics. Whatever might have been the nature of the cleavages that existed in ancient India among the diverse creeds and dogmas, there were absolutely no cultural cleavages or inter-cultural and inter-linguistic jealousies, such as we witness some times in these days, whenever any good measures are being discussed for promoting the study of ancient Indian languages and literatures. You should remember that great makers of South Indian literatures in the past were either themselves Sanskrit scholars or scholars who were able to appreciate readily the good elements of Sanskrit culture, and that great representatives of Sanskrit culture in the past never hesitated to seek and secure the valuable help of the vernaculars in their great work of expounding and propagating great truths. It is only by strenuous work in these directions that the problems involved in the employment of the mother-tongue as the chief educational medium can be solved and that the spirit of ancient Indian culture can be re-captured and effectively brought to bear on the present and future schemes of Indian education. The successful working, on a large scale of extra-curricular and extension schemes, with special reference to the languages and literatures of India, depends largely upon the financial resources available for the purpose. Will any rich philanthropist of South India come forward to help our University with a generous and substantial endowment towards this purpose?

The questions put to you and your solemn pledges clearly imply that you should think mainly *in time* and not so much *in space*. The ascendancy of space-thinking is partly due to a deep-rooted perversity of mine which attaches greater importance to the *eye* than to any other sense. "Space-thinking", as a modern writer puts it, "is insufficient whenever the meaning of human life is in question, because human life, though it displays itself as a spectacle in space, goes on as a conscious experience in time". Time-thinking is a natural mode of thought. It may be called "the historical mind", and all sound history should deal not only with the past, but with the present as growing into the future. Time-thinking is bound up essentially with the idea of *lastingness*. Ancient Indian culture has invariably stressed *lastingness* (*nityatva*) as the essence of the highest conception of reality (*satyatva*), and has thus revealed, in a very telling manner, the significance and value of time-thinking. Some ardent and well-meaning disciples of Karl Marx, who are enthusiastic space-thinkers, may place before you—note the term—a social *scheme*, or *system*, in which all men and forces are *placed*—note the term again—in right relationships to one another. As Indians, you have inherited a great tradition of time-thinking from your past and you should, as time-thinkers, ask—how long will those men and forces stay where you have placed them, how long will that relationship last?

You should ask whether the socialistic space-thinkers are not placing before you "a picture, perhaps a Utopian picture, of human beings caught by the eye at a very happy moment, photographed, so to speak, in the state of social behaviour the space-thinker considers most desirable", say, in a place like the Soviet Russia. The Marxian propaganda may be loud and confident and



a good many of our young men may come to believe that "they see a red dawn rising, full of promise, in Russia, where all the old values and traditions, with every atom of religious faith, are being torn up by the roots". So long as communism and socialism derive their sap from the heritage of Karl Marx of which dogmatic materialism and atheism form part; so long as they are based on class-hatred and dominated by anti-godism, so long as they generate and foster a novel disease of a type of neo-orthodoxy, which seeks to establish a new form of superstition manifesting itself in willingness "to entrust the navigation to people who believe in wrecks as a principle or make a business of piracy"; and so long as the new civilisation of communism and socialism refuses to believe in the past or the future of the soul and thinks exclusively in a spatial and quantitative groove:—you will be safe as the inheritors of a great time-thinking past, only if you stand off from these new experiments. And as inheritors of the all-embracing, all-unifying *advaita* of the Upanisads, as expounded by Sankara, you should strengthen yourselves by the hope, as H. G. Wells puts it, that, out of all the trouble and tragedy of this present time, there will soon emerge in India an *advaitic* revival, "of a simplicity and scope to draw together men of alien races and now discrete traditions into one common and sustained way of living for the world's service"; and by the hope that "religious emotion may presently blow through Indian life again like a great wind bursting the doors and flinging open the shutters of the individual life". May you become worthy of such a revival as trustees of the habit of time-thinking which you have inherited from your past!

Slightly modifying the splendid words of Edmund Burke, it may be said that a University, as well as a nation, "is a partnership and trusteeship in all science and all art and in every virtue and perfection; and as the ends of such a partnership and trusteeship cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership and trusteeship not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born".

You will have a legitimate claim for the privileges of a *partnership* in University life and national life, if you fulfil the three main conditions of constructive citizenship—that you should see that every variety of your valuable occupation is dominated by the fiduciary spirit; that you should aim at the development of skill in every thing that you do; and that you should endeavour to create and perfect certain scientific methods "for harmonizing conflicting claims and for turning human relations, which would otherwise be mutually destructive, into relation of mutual helpfulness". It would do you good to note and remember the manner in which Indian culture used to glorify the fiduciary spirit. Generally, at the end of Royal grants, making endowments for purposes of public good, it is known to all familiar with Indian epigraphy that an *anustubh* line is inscribed in these terms:—

"*danat punyam avapnoti palanad acyutam padam*"—

"One gains spiritual merit by making endowments for good causes; but one gains eternal life through *trusteeship*". This signifies the great importance which ancient Indian culture attaches to the position of a fiduciary.

Your aim in everything that you do should be the perfection of your skill. Skill is an essential ingredient of constructive citizenship. You should not fall under the malign spell of the concept 'happiness,' for 'happiness' is "the one object of human endeavour in regard to which men in general are the worst judges and the readiest to be made fools of". You must choose a vocation that challenges your skill and puts you on your mettle. "Beware of soft jobs and remember the fall of Lucifer". The doctrine of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is a pernicious doctrine. No doubt, all science, all knowledge, fulfils itself in its applications. In a book discussing the applications of science, it is solemnly stated that science is "the mighty instrument which enables



man to conquer Nature and develop her resources for his own advantage". This view is as pernicious in its effect as the doctrine of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". So long as this view prevails among those who have studied 'science' and have acquired scientific knowledge, it would be impossible to reconcile science with religion or morality or humanities. Replace the doctrine of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" by the wholesome doctrine of "the greatest skill of the greatest number". Remember that Science is given to man not to distil the universe into individual advantages, not to be a mere short cut to our ends, not to be a mere labour-saving device, not to be merely "a means of satisfying the desire for happiness with the minimum of effort and personal skill, till man's vocation as a worker becomes a mere affair of pressing buttons and turning switches". In the earlier stages of its history, science tended to destroy art; and if it were to stop with that or persist in that and should it fail to be a powerful ally to man in developing himself by the skilled performance of what he knows and in securing the greatest skill of the greatest number; and if it should help man only in increasing his periods of "untrammelled leisure" without sufficient skill to vitalize his leisure; if that be all, then I for one will say:—"Let the hour stand accursed when science was born into this world". It is indeed highly comforting to think that the God-appointed destiny of science is to become "the founder and the diffuser of art, completing itself in the practised skill of men". Remember that ancient Indian culture brought about, in this way, the reconciliation of science with religion, through the elevation of *skill* to the rank of one of the highest aims of life. When the Lord calls upon Arjuna to do, *whatsoever he does, as an offering to Him* and says:—

*yat karosi yad asnasi yajjuhosi dadasi yat |*

*yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kurusva madarpanam ||*

He requires Arjuna really to secure the highest degree of perfection in all that he does; for, no act would be worthy of being offered to God, which is not done with the highest degree of perfection; and worm-eaten flowers are unfit to be offered to God. It is recorded that a Mohammedan artificer in India, called Hussein Ali, more than a thousand years ago, made a remarkably beautiful astrolabe, an instrument of great ingenuity used in pre-Copernican times for measuring the altitude of the sun and the stars; and in this astrolabe, which happens to be preserved in a collection of ancient instruments, round the edge of the fine brass-work, there is an Arabic inscription which may be rendered as follows:—"This astrolabe is the work of Hussein Ali, mechanic and mathematician and servant of the Most high God. May His name be exalted throughout the Universe". The words "Mechanics and Mathematician" point to the disciplined skill on which the work reposes; and "Servant of the Highest God" to the disinterestedness and perfection with which the work is executed. If all the activities of our educated ladies and gentlemen should be inspired by the ideal of disinterested and disciplined skill suggested in the teaching of the Gita—"Yogah karmasu kaushalam"—"Yoga is skill in all your doings" and in the Arabic inscription of "Hussein Ali", India's civilization, in the future, will be in noble consonance with India's glorious past.

To the utmost of your opportunity and ability and, as far as in you lies, you have pledged yourselves to support and promote the cause of morality and sound learning and to uphold and advance social order and the well-being of your fellow men. You should never imagine that it would do good either to you or to others if you attempt to play the role of the general world-mender. You should cultivate the spirit of constructiveness in any work of reform which you may undertake. You should not begin by concentrating attention on social disorders, social vagaries, social miscarriages, social fevers and social distresses. You should not begin by attempting to play the role of social physicians and by loudly proclaiming your methods of diagnosis and cure. For upholding and



advancing social order and well-being, the right method is certainly not the pathological method, which Matthew Arnold describes :—

“ He took the suffering human race,  
He read each wound, each weakness clear,  
And struck his finger on the place  
And said, Thou aildest here and here ”

A good citizen's vocation is not to be merely analysing his neighbour's ills. The inevitable consequence of the application of the pathological method in the sphere of public and social service would be a wasteful strife between those, on the one hand, who wish to play the part of social doctors and those, on the other, who will stoutly resist rather than allow themselves to be treated as social patients by those whose credentials are, at best, problematic. Much of the disharmony, which arises in these days in Indian society between different groups of India's daughters and sons, in most of the programmes put forward by well-meaning enthusiasts who wish to reform the Indian society in various ways, results from an avowed advocacy of the method of social pathology, the method of diagnosis and cure. In the sphere of politics, more than in the sphere of social reform, the pathological method is unsuitable. The method of diagnosis and cure is most unsuitable, particularly, when India is put on the road to self-government. To adopt the pathological attitude in social service or social reform or in the body politic would logically reduce the democratic principle of self-government to the absurd form of “Government as social patients, by the social patients, for the social patients”. The correct method conducive to constructive citizenship would be to note the healthy centres of the society and vitalize it by energizing those centres. That India's civilization is not rotten to the core and that it has still many healthy centres of life may be easily understood from the fact that it has withstood and outlived many an upheaval and many a vicissitude.

Nothing considerable can be achieved by you unless all your work comes to be informed by faith and courage. In the first place, you must have faith in the immense resourcefulness of man as *man* and you must have the courage to pull you up to your full stature as *man*. You must remember the great Upanisadic thought which you have inherited from the past—“*Purusanna param kimcit*”—“There is nothing higher than the *spirit of man*”; and this has been rendered in Sankara's magnificent exposition of advaita, practically into “*Manusyanna param kimcit*”. You must believe it, as a modern poet puts it, that “the mind (of man) hath many powers beyond name deep wombed within it and can shoot strange vigours”. You must have the courage to realise that life in society means life in the high tensions created in society by the operations of opposite forces—love and hate, pleasure and pain. Even the lowest form of life is pang-born and pang-sustained. “All the great ideals of humanity are pang-born”; and “they are the answers which the heroic spirit of man has given to the challenge of suffering and frustration, to the challenge of pain in one or other of its innumerable forms”. Moral valour is a high virtue and it is inseparably bound up with social valour. “The day of crisis is the birth-day of our virtues”. The hours of suffering are the hours when God incarnates Himself. We can never forget the prayer which *Kunti*, the mother of the Pandavas, chose to address to her God—Sri Krsna :—

“*vipadassantu nah sasvat tatra tatra jagadguro |*  
*bhavato darsanam yat syad apunorbhavadarsanam ||*”

“May we have troubles and risks always and everywhere; for, then, we may see Thee, Master of the world, revealed to us in Your saving grace”. Kant has laid great stress on the “anti-social sociability of mankind”. Human society creates facilities for co-operation and in doing so, creates also occasions for mutual obstruction. This need not be taken to imply individual malice. A man who lives in society and moves on is “like a motor-car in a crowded centre and cannot help getting



in his neighbour's way". If this simple fact be understood, a healthy social tension and social life could be easily ensured by harmoniously maintaining the polarity between the *anti-sociality* and *sociability* of mankind ; and the social tension that arises from this polarity in human nature will call forth a highly constructive type of social valour and social courage. The worst enemy of social valour and social courage is the lower and vulgar kind of prudence, which induces one to run away from risks, to aim at unmixed pleasure, to be a safe man loving only safe ways—safe from all kinds of pain and to be deeply interred in safety, never to be alive to the ennobling virtues of suffering. Ponder over the thrilling words of a modern poet, with reference to such inferior and vulgar kind of prudence ; and these words are put into the Divine stranger's mouth by Lascelles Abercrombie and addressed to Saint Thomas when he is about to be victimised by the lower kind of prudence :—

" Now, Thomas, know thy sin. It was not fear ;  
Easily may a man crouch down for fear,  
And yet rise up on firmer knees, and face  
The hailing storm of the world with graver courage,  
But prudence, prudence is the deadly sin,  
And one that growth deep into a life,  
With hardening roots that clutch about the breast.  
For this refuseth faith in the unknown powers  
Within man's nature ; shrewdly bringeth all  
Their inspiration of strange eagerness  
To a judgment bought by safe experience ;  
Narrows desire into the scope of thought ".

Here, I would point out to you the higher significance of *kama*, which is included in the old " scheme of ends of human endeavours " (*purusarthas*) handed down to us by our seers as part of our cultural heritage. The word *kama* is usually understood in the sense of the " pleasures arising from the satisfaction of our desires " and this way of understanding it is not wrong. There is, however, a higher significance in the inclusion of *kama* in our scheme of *purusarthas* ; and you can appreciate it fully, only when you take the word in its etymological sense of *desire* and understand that lofty desires inspire all noble deeds. Again, ponder over what the Divine stranger says to St. Thomas :—

" It is written in the heart of man  
Thou shalt no larger be than thy desire.  
Thou must not therefore stoop thy spirit's sight  
To pore only within the candle-gleam  
Of conscious wit and reasonable brain ;  
But search into the sacred darkness lying  
Outside thy knowledge of thyself, the vast  
Measureless fate, full of the power of stars,  
The outer noiseless heavens of thy soul.

\* \* \*

Send desire often forth to scan  
The immense night which is thy greater soul ;  
Knowing the possible, see thou try beyond it  
Into impossible things, unlikely ends ;  
And thou shall find thy knowledgeable desire  
Grow large as all the regions of thy soul,  
Whose firmament doth cover the whole of Being,  
And of created purpose reach the ends ".



## MADRAS UNIVERSITY CONVOCATION ADDRESS

201

I do not wish to close this address without dwelling, for a while, upon the present position of our University and its future. Many ideas, which were only pious wishes and hopes in the past, have, since the enactment of the Madras University Act No. VII of 1923, been turned into solid achievements. As early as 1893, the late Sir V. Bashyam Ayyangar, with his characteristic wisdom and foresight, suggested, in his convocation address, the founding and development of a University-Library. He said then :—"One of the several ways, in which a wholesome relationship between the University and its *alumni* may be established, appears to be the founding of a University Library, adequately representing all the departments of Literature, Science and Art, and freely accessible to all its Fellows and Graduates". Our present position in regard to Sir V. Bashyam Ayyangar's suggestion is such as may legitimately compel us to indulge in a warm self-gratulation. Thanks to the generosity of the Crown and the State, we have to-day a splendidly equipped University Library, housed in a well-designed Library building of the University and under the control of a highly efficient Librarian, trained in all the up-to-date methods of the Library Science. The modern conception of a Librarian is 'to be a great educator and function as a great educator mainly through the use of collections of books'. This is also the old-world conception of a Librarian as embodied in an old library law of ancient India :—"Kosavan Acaryah"—"To be a librarian is to be a great educator". The ideal librarian may be described as a cultured person who is able to find a suitable reader for every book in his library, and a suitable book for every one who goes there, who combines judgement and caution with self-effacement and a zeal for service, an urbane sanity with a sane urbanity, firmness with complaisance, confidence with candour, a well-informed mind with a ready wit and disciplined reserve, a certain amount of versatility with a cultivated memory and quick receptiveness ; and who, with such an equipment and a high character, can play the role of an unforgettably impressive, but not in the least obtrusive or assertive or offensive, educator. In recent years, our University has also been co-operating in various ways with the Madras Library Association in promoting the cause of the modern library movement. Our University has done everything that has been found practicable within the last thirteen years for achieving the main object of the Act of 1923—*viz.*, "establishing a teaching and residential University at Madras". Our University has, to its credit, to-day, well-organised departments of Research and teaching in Indian History and Archaeology, Indian Economics, Indian Philosophy, Mathematics, Zoology, Botany, Bio-Chemistry, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kanarese and Islamic languages. The deep interest which our University takes in Indological studies and Oriental research has been amply borne out by the publication of the monumental Tamil Lexicon, by the institution of no less than nineteen teacherships in Indology, including the departments of Indian History and Archaeology, Indian Philosophy and the Oriental Research Institute, by the liberal financial provision of nearly fifty thousand rupees per annum for the Oriental Research Institute and by a liberal grant of twenty-five thousand rupees for preparing and publishing an up-to-date Catalogus Catalogorum of all the Sanskrit manuscripts in the world. All these departments are now housed in the departmental buildings of our University. The scientific departments are provided with well-equipped laboratories. The Indological departments will soon come to be provided with what may be called an Indological laboratory in the form of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, which is one of the richest storehouse of manuscript treasures in the world and which, in its own interest and in the interest of Indological research, ought to become a part of the University Library.

All these developments in the direction of provision for research have made it impossible for anybody to say any longer that our University has not shown sufficient interest in the work of promoting research. A satisfactory achievement of the objects of our institutions intended for research depends largely upon the standard of intellectual honesty prevailing among the University teachers,



upon the extent to which they may be able to vitalize their cultured leisure, upon the unimpaired security of the tenure of University teacherships and upon the spirit of scholarly trusteeship which they bring to bear upon their work. If the motto "Seek quality first and due quantity shall be added unto you" deserves to be adopted and strictly enforced anywhere in our University, it is in our University departments of research.

Our University has been endeavouring to lay special stress upon the promotion of residential discipline in the Colleges within its jurisdiction. In this connection, one important matter to be remembered is that the educators of our students should impress upon them the need for reducing their daily requirements to a minimum and should discourage them strictly from cultivating expensive and wasteful habits of living. The spirit of plain living and high thinking, which dominated the ancient Universities of Takasila, Nalanda and Vikramasila, should be re-captured and established in the hostels of our colleges and in the University union. The residential atmosphere of the Universities of Ancient India made it impossible even for a Prince to develop any consciousness of his financial resources. Even a Prince, in those Universities, must be literally penniless. It is recorded that a Prince of Benares, who was studying at Takasila, happened to break the bowl of a man by chance and that the Prince was not in a position to pay the cost of a meal to that man when he demanded it. In every hostel there should be adequate provision for religious instruction. It was the religious discipline of the Universities in Ancient India that made it possible for them to produce the intellectual and moral giants, to whom we owe all our cultural heritage.

With the grants from the Government and with the funds which it has been possible to find from earlier financial accumulations, our University has made a good beginning in the development of its research side. Much remains to be done in this direction. The existing departments have to be strengthened by the institution of teaching posts of higher grades in some cases and of additional posts in other cases. It is necessary to have a well-devised scheme of long-term fellowships in our research departments. It is necessary to start a number of new departments in subjects which have not so far been represented on the research-side. It is necessary to have an effective and liberal scheme of grants in aid of publications. All these developments depend upon the availability of funds. That, so far, the Senate has not had any member nominated by academical donors, as contemplated in Section 14 clause 10 of the Act, is a regrettable commentary on the paucity of academical benefactors in the Madras University for the last thirteen years. Thus, this University must necessarily get on in the hope that the generosity of the Government in respect of grants to the University would not be curtailed in any manner by the requirements of elementary education. It may be of some use to point out here that, according to the latest periodical report published by the British Committee of University grants, "out of about £ 9,00,000, representing the annual income of the Universities, third is voted by Parliament and 42 per cent of the total number of students in the Universities are assisted".

#### **Fellow-Graduates,**

Now, in the name of the University, I wish you success ; and I request you all to ponder over the last verse in the Gita :—

"Wherever there is Kṛṣṇa, the Lord of Yoga—the embodiment of divine synthesis and wisdom ; and wherever there is Arjuna, the archer—the best example of a disciplined and skilled student ; there will surely be fortune, victory, prosperity and righteousness. Such is my belief". May this be the belief of all—

*yatra yogesvarah kṛṣṇo yatra partho dhanurdharah |  
tatra sriyajo bhūtirdhruva nīmatīrmaṃ ||*



## SRI RAMAKRISHNA AND THE MESSAGE OF HINDUISM\*

In these days of technical civilisation, life is full of stress and strain. A state of indefiniteness and indecision prevails and is patent all through the turmoils of modern life. Only one thing is evident in our activities and that is 'speed.' But when we settle down for a moment to think calmly, we find what we need is Rest, true and quiet Rest—*Santi*. This *Santi*, Rest or Peace, whatever we may call it, is the message of Hinduism, the message of the *Upanishads*, and the message that was preached and practised by Bhagavan Sri Ramakrishna.

It may be rather difficult to reconcile ourselves to this idea of peace in the bewildering conditions of modern times. It may be difficult to conceive that this idea of peace is to help one towards God-Realisation. But in truth it is not so. I would give an example. Suppose a navigator is voyaging on the seas, and in the midst of his voyage he finds himself engulfed by a cyclone. The intelligent navigator that he is, he steers to the centre of the cyclone and discovers Rest and Safety there. In the same way, in the centre of our cyclonic life may be found our Spirit. This is a simple conception to start with. And the Upanishadic message conveyed to us and to the world is embodied in the simple formula '*Matrudevo bhava*'—Respect thy Mother as God.' Sri Ramakrishna realised God through the observance of this formula.

When reversed a little it comes to mean, "Contemplate on God as the Mother." To the unlettered man, to the unsophisticated and illiterate person, the idea of the Mother is simple enough. Indeed, from Mother to God, it is not a far cry. Bhagavan Ramakrishna started with this ideal which is one of the greatest contributions made by Indian culture to the world. There are indeed many ways of conceiving God; but certainly the most appealing among them is this; and more certainly the advantages derived from this concept are many. Even to the child, the values of life, vague as they may seem to be, are to be derived from the mother, and to the childlike heart there is the element of easiest accessibility to the Mother. To the child the nearest and dearest is the Mother—the true embodiment of pure, self-effacing Love. The keynote of Hinduism is the synthesis between *Bhakti*, *Jnana* and *Karma*. The Hindu scriptures proclaim this and our *Siddhas* and practical *Jnanis* realised it. Self-effacing Devotion could be cultivated in the best way possible, if it is associated with the concept of God as the Mother.

There was a parallel to Sri Ramakrishna in South India and that was Muka. He reached the highest state of *Jnana* through the practice of this simple concept of *Bhakti*. He was a Sannyasin and a great *Bhakta* like Bhagavan Sri Ramakrishna. Though he had not much of schooling or systematic instruction, he had great intuition. To him Kamakshi, the Goddess of Kanchi, was the Mother. She was embodiment of all that was True, Good and Beautiful. To Ramakrishna, likewise, Kali was the Mother—the embodiment of all that was Good and True and Beautiful. His was a faith that engendered the highest type of courage and gave the *Bhakta* the type of rest that lifts him above the turmoils of life.

“ धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे  
न चापलमभामहे भवभयान्न दयामहे ”

\* Triveni IX, 10 April 1937.



Muka realised all this through his devotion to the Mother. To men of the present day, all values of life are subordinated to wealth in some form or other. But to *Bhaktas* like Muka or Ramakrishna, moving with courage in a world of higher economic values,—this I shall call by the phrase 'world of spiritual Economics'—the true *Dhana* (wealth) is the Atman, or the Spirit of Man. This Spirit of Man is the highest kind of wealth in spiritual economics. The great poet Vyasa indicated this by calling the 'Atmapaharin' the greatest thief, and Muka suggests this in the verse quoted. When one does not recognise Atman as the greatest *Dhana*, he enters into all sorts of relationship with undesirable people. Both Muka and Ramakrishna realised this truth.

*Bhakti* and *Jnana*, according to the teachings of Hinduism, are the two phases of the same Life. A modern writer remarks : "Love and Knowledge are the twin-sisters, living in the ante-chamber and the inner chamber, allying themselves with each other in striving towards the common goal." The life of Bhagavan Ramakrishna is an illustration of *Bhakti* towards the Mother, which, in its ripe stage, mounts up to the highest state of *Jnana*.

All the *Upanishads*, while they endeavour to give us a glimpse into the nature of Reality and show us the path that leads towards the knowledge of the Absolute, confess that there is no direct means of approach. It is only through a process of negation (*neti neti*—not this, not this), or elimination, that realisation is possible. Ramakrishna, as usual, introduces startling analogies, and in this context, compares a *Jnanin* to a thief in quest of treasure. The thief enters a dark room and lays his hand on various articles, and leaves one article after another with the words 'not this, not this,' till he lays his hands finally on the treasure he has been seeking so far. The search of the *Jnanin* for Atman—Brahman—is likewise. All honour to such thieves ! From the stage of *Matru Bhakti* to that of *Brahma Jnana* rose Sri Ramakrishna, and the end of his quest was in his own words, "At Thy Feet, O Mother !"

Another message of Hinduism as conceived by Ramakrishna is the adaptability or elasticity of religion, one of the strongest points of Hinduism. Hindu religion and Hindu thought may be compared to the *Pushpaka-vimana* which is said to accommodate all. It has given room to Kubera, the mammon God, Ravana, the worshipper of the senses, and Rama, the incarnation of God. Hinduism similarly embraces all religions ideals and creates real harmony between religions. It proclaims, "Paths may be many, but the Goal is the same." The religious unity which Hinduism teaches, is also the message preached and practised by Ramakrishna.

With the aid of the analogy of the chameleon which, though possessing no one particular colour, yet shows different colours, Ramakrishna explained that God, though formless, may yet be assumed to manifest himself in diverse forms.

The idea of the Oneness of God as the Unity of Truth was preached by him. In fact, if one probes into the idea of dependence according to the Dvaita, it will land him in Unity. The world and God form an organic whole, just like the spirit of a man and his human form which constitute an organic whole—so say the Visishtadvaitins ; and here also, unity is the underlying idea. The acme of unity is reached in the *Upanishadic* formula—'Tat Tvam Asi'—(God is Man, Man God) as understood by Advaitins, Bhagavan Sri Ramakrishna draws our attention to this unity.



On the ethical side, the greatest message as set forth in the *Upanishads* and as conceived by Ramakrishna is embodied in the three disguised imperatives 'Damyata', 'Datta' and 'Dayadhvam' \* disguised in the dental rumblings—'da, da, da' of a thunderclap; as the *Brhadaranyaka* says. These are the three cardinal virtues. The whole of the Sermon on the Mount may be brought under these, and the rest will follow. As Sankara said, the three inner urges that impel a man on the wrong side towards hell, are *Kama*, *Lobha* and *Krodha*, and their antidotes are *Dama*, *Dana* and *Daya*. The practice of these virtues leads one towards God-realisation. Sri Ramakrishna proclaims, "Let me be a Christian in Love, a Moslem in Sincerity, and a Hindu in Charity".

---

\* "Restrain yourself", "give generously" and "Have mercy".



## SRI VISNUSAHASRANAMA STOTRA\*

॥ ओं नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॥

शृण्वन् सुभद्राणि रथाङ्गपाणेर्जन्मानि कर्माणि च यानि लोके ।

गीतानि नामानि तदर्थकानि गायन्विलज्जो विचरेदसङ्गः ॥

भक्तिः परेशानुभवो विरक्तिरन्यत्र चैष त्रिक एककालः ।

प्रपद्यमानस्य यथाश्नतः स्युस्तुष्टिः पुष्टिः क्षुदपायोऽनुधासम् ॥

इत्यच्युताङ्घ्रिं भजतोऽनुवृत्त्या भक्तिर्विरक्तिर्भगवत्प्रबोधः ।

भवन्ति वै भागवतस्य राजस्ततः परां शान्तिमुपैति साक्षात् ॥

—*Sri Bhagavata*, XI. 2, 39, 42, 43.

*Sri Visnusahasranama, Stotra* ! After all, a mere string of one thousand names ! By reciting them, can any intelligent person gain any immediate advantage, any advantage which can be definitely ascertained and maintained to be the effects of such recitation ? Thus a rationalistic mind would be disposed to interrogate, when it is invited to apply itself to the perusal of this publication. Even to such sceptical interrogations of a rationalist, a suitable answer is furnished in the second and third of the three verses quoted above from the second chapter of the eleventh skandha of *Sri Bhagavata*. These verses record, for the benefit of mankind, the value of the devotional discipline which a devout worshipper goes through in the course of a worshipful repetition and recitation of the same name and different names of the Supreme Lord. The devotional discipline resulting from *nama-kirtana* consists in the simultaneous effectuation of three precious results *viz.*, blissful love towards the Supreme Lord, realization of His nature and detachment from all other things. It is a matter of common experience that every morsel of food, while eating, produces three results simultaneously—a pleasant sensation, nutrition, and appeasement of hunger ; and similar process is experienced by a *bhakta*, when the Lord's name is repeated. It is the firm conviction of Sri Sankarabhagavatpada and his followers that this devotional discipline is of very high value in reaching the final goal of advaitic thought—the realization of Brahman as the only reality and of the identity of Jiva and Brahman. It is, again, this conviction that prompted Sri Bhagavatpada to write a *bhasya* on the *sahasranama* ; and no intelligent reader is likely to miss in this *bhasya* the synthesis and universality characteristic of Sri Sankara's conception of the advaitic scheme of thought and life.

When studying the *Visnu-sahasranama* with Sri Sankara's *bhasya*, it would be useful to remember that Indian culture believes, as averred by Sri Sankara and other Acaryas, that all the significative units of a language denote ultimately the Supreme Lord. The mystic etymology—false as it may be from the standpoint of modern linguistics—which connects the word *namit* with the

\* Foreword to *Sri visnusahasranama Stotra* with Sankara Bhasya and Tamil translation by Sri V. Narayanan, Published by B. G. Paul and Co., Madras 1942.



effacement of *ahamkara*, as indicated by the negative particle *na* and the pronominal root *ma*, is significant and helpful in appreciating the value of the devotional discipline for which the *Visnu-sahasranama* and other *sahasranamas* are intended. If all the accomplished acts and established facts in the world represent, as a distinguished modernist observes, many a disguised imperative, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that, from the standpoint of Indian culture, names like *Visva* in the *Visnu-sahasranama* are expected, as Sri Sankara hints, to be understood to imply imperatives of the type of—  
सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत to the worshipper and that these names may be viewed also as intended to serve as so many reminders to the Supreme Lord of His divine pledge in the *Gita* :—

अनन्याश्चिन्तयन्तो मां ये जनाः पर्युपासते ।

तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् ॥

A poetic mind often revels in its own beautiful workings through the help of association. An eminent poet comes to have a special partiality for the *calaka* bird ; for it reminds him of clouds, which, in their turn, remind him of the Supreme Brahman, called Krsna. Ponder upon this verse here :

सन्त्येवास्मिन् जगति बहवः पक्षिणो रम्यरूपाः

तेषां मध्ये मम तु महती वासना चातकेषु ।

यैरध्वक्षैरथ निजसखं नीरदं स्मारयद्भिः

स्मृत्यारूढं भवति किमपि ब्रह्म कृष्णाभिधानम् ॥

—Pandita Jagannatha.

Many scholars know well that Sri Sankara is the greatest poet of the Supreme Brahman—  
निर्गुणब्रह्म-महाकविः and the best illustration of this observation can be easily found in the superb prose-poetry of Sri Sankara's *Brahmi-sutra-bhasya*. Often, we find Sri Sankara climbing down from the highest metaphysical peak of *Nirguna Brahman*, to enjoy the delight of playing the role of a great *Bhikta*, through his poetic out-pourings of devotion ; and in this mood, Sri Sankara might well be imagined to have written his *Bhasya* on the *Visnu-sahasranama*. Wherever he does so, he may be imagined to have been prompted by the same spirit which influenced the Supreme Lord to incarnate Himself in human form as Sri Rama or Sri Krishna—the same desire, perhaps, to perfect the wholeness of His Being and establish His title to the rank of *Purusottama*.

Considerations like these would be helpful in a due appreciation of *Visnu-sahasranama* and Sri Sankara's *bhasya* thereon. In the whole range of *Sahasranama*-literature in Sanskrit, the *Visnu-sahasranama*, with Sri Sankara's *bhasya*, may be said rightly to occupy the highest rank for its universal religious appeal both to scholars and laymen, to the classes and the masses, in India.



## SRIMUKAPANCASATI\*

मातृदेवो भव (Taitt-up)

“*Matrilater, be for ever*”

स तस्मिन्नेवाकाशे स्त्रियमाजगाम बहुशोभमानामुमां हैमवतीं तां होवाच किमेतद्यक्षमिति सा ब्रह्मेति होवाच ॥  
—*Kenopanisad*

मूकोऽपि जटिदुर्गतिशोकोऽपि स्मरति यः क्षणं भवतीम् ।

एको भवति स जन्तु-लोकोत्तरकीर्तिरेव कामाक्षि ॥

[*Sri Muka*]

It is believed widely that the theistic cult of *Matrilatry* (mother-worship), as the distinctive feature of Sakta-theism was foreshadowed, more or less clearly, in the Rg-Vedic concepts of Aditi and Dyava-prthivi, and also in the well-known *Taittiriya* exhortation and the *Kenopanisad*-extract, cited above. In the spacious times of the mysticism of ancient India, great Seers, Saints, and Acaryas, like Agastya, Durvasas and Sankara, were chiefly responsible for developing, refining and perfecting an exceedingly charming type of advaitic Saktism, which, while conforming to the Vaidika-marga, would equate the Supreme Mother at once with Reality absolute and the all-embracing, all-generating and all-energising *Maha-maya*, transcending the level of the Divine trinity of Brahma, Visnu and Siva. In the popular religious synthesis of Saivism and Vaisnavism, the mysticism of Mother-worship has culminated in the popular Sakta-phase, which exhibits the Supreme Sakti as Sri Siva's Eternal Spouse and as the adorable Sister of Sri Narayana. The ancient city of Sri Kanchi and the ancient temples of Sri Ekamranatha and Sri Kamaksi, there, came to find a very important place and to play a very prominent part in this old Vaidika variety of the cult of Mother-worship, as developed in South-India, in very early times. Many an advaitin in South India, following Sri Sankara's lead, chose to follow also the path of uni-centric devotion (*eka-bhakti*) to the Mother, as the Supreme Being (Para-Brahman) and also preferred to revel in a delightful type of thinking, in which the well-known *saccidananda* synthesis of advaita would admit of being resolved into *Cit* as the Supreme Essence, *Sat* as the supreme mystic foil and *Ananda* as the supreme, mystic, emergent, nexus. In this connection, all along, the advaitic mysticism of Mother-worship, used as its re-inforcing ally the women-man-synthesis-mother-father-synthesis, suggested, in a very telling manner, by the Sanskrit word *Matr* being taken at once as feminine and masculine. Many such advaitic Eka-bhaktas were great poets also and produced excellent and supremely charming types of devotional lyrics forming a special genre of Sanskrit literature-usually called the stotra-literature. To this class of advaitins, Sri Muka kavi belonged ; and his *Pancasati* is one of the finest specimens of Stotra-literature, motivated by the spiritual fervour of Mother-worship.

No conclusive data are available in support of any biographical account of Sri Muka or his date. South Indian tradition, as preserved in certain records relating to the pontifical Acaryas

\* Foreword to the ed. published by B. G. Paul and Co., Madras 1941.



of Sri Kamakoti Pitha of Sri Kanci and as re-inforced by certain references in Kalhana's *Rajatarangini*, represents Sri Muka to be identical with Sri Mukarbhaka-Sankara, one of the presiding occupants of that pitha and to have been inspired by Sri-Vidya-ghana and to have also been the inspirer of the great author of the *Hayagrivavadha*, Bhartṛmētha. These details preserved in South Indian tradition would bring Sri-Muka-kavi near the latter part of the sixth century A.D. That he had already been recognised as a great religious poet in the sixteenth century A.D. is established by the fact that certain Sanskrit writers of that century presuppose him. The tradition of Sri-Kanci-Kamakoti-pitha further proceeds to describe Sri Muka as a congenital deaf-mute, who subsequently regained his speech by the grace of Sri-Vidya-ghana, his spiritual guru ; and he is also said to have become an inspired poet of inimitable charm by the Divine grace of Sri Kamaksi of Sri Kanci. Careful readers of *Sri-Muka-panca-sati* will not miss the auto-biographical ring of certain verses, with particular reference to Sri Muka's earlier dumbness, later inspiration, Samnyasa and advaitic leanings. In this connection, one has to remind oneself of the verses—*arya*-48, 57; *padaravinda*-24, 71; *mandasmīta*-94, 98 ; *stuti*-18, 21, 28.

It would be helpful in realising the force of the literary appeal of Sri Muka's poetry to remember that he belongs to that class of inspired Sanskrit poets, who were not made poets but who came to be endowed with poetic *pratibha*, through Divine grace, more especially that type of *pratibha* distinctive of the cult of Mother-worship in holy places like Sri Kanci and Sri Jambukesvara, in South India. The *pratibha*, or rapturous poetic imagination of Sri Muka, clothed itself spontaneously in the resplendently gorgeous attire of a highly ornate style, sustained uniformly in all the five hundred verses—an attire in which various decorative devices, such as *gunas* and *alamkaras*, happen to vie with one another, not through any separate effort on the part of the author, अपृथग्यत्ननिर्वर्त्य, in the language of the greatest of literary critics in Sanskrit, Anandavardhana.

The publisher—Sri Balasubramanya Ayyar, as well as the Tamil translator, deserves a special meed of praise. The publisher appropriately dedicates the publication to H.H. Sri Sankaracharya, who adorns, to-day, Sri Kamakotipitha ; and he also incorporates in this volume suitable illustrations. The translator, Sri Balasubramanya Sastri of Tanjore, has to be congratulated on attempting, with considerable success, the well-nigh impossible task of rendering Sri Muka's *Pancasati*. The Madras Law Journal Press has executed its work in a very creditable manner, consistent with its reputation.

This foreword may be permitted to close here with what I consider to be the inspiring message of Sri Muka to the modern world, lost in self-aggrandising aggression and being brought very near the three gates of hell spoken of in the *Gita-kama*, *krodha* and *lobha*.

The great message is this :—

धनेन न रमामहे खलजनान्न सेवामहे  
न चापलमयामहे भवभयान्न दूयामहे ।  
स्थिरां तनुमहेतरां मनसि किं तु काञ्चीरत-  
स्मरान्तककुटुम्बिनीचरणपल्लवोपासनाम् ॥



## पाण्डित्य-विमर्श-अद्वैतम् \*

### SYNTHESIS OF LEARNING AND RESEARCH

अयि मान्या अखिलभारतीयप्राच्यविद्यासभापतयः, मान्याः सोदर्यः महामान्या बहुमानितविपश्चिद्विशेषाः, अस्मिन्नष्ट-  
मेऽखिलभारतीयप्राच्यविद्यासम्मेलने संस्कृत-शाखाध्यक्ष्यं मया ज्ञीकर्तव्यमिति यदाज्ञापितमध्यक्षैस्तच्छिरसि निधीयते मयेदानीम् ।  
अस्मिन्प्राच्यविद्यासम्मेलने विशेषतः संस्कृतशाखायां यदाध्यक्ष्यं मयि स्थापितम् तन्महत्सुकृतफलमिति भावयामि । अयं  
तु समयः संस्कृतभाषासेवां कर्तुं सुकृतवशात् संपन्न इति यथाशक्ति तत्सेवां कर्तुं प्रयते ॥

यत्पूर्वतनसांस्वरिकसंस्कृतशाखाध्यक्षैर्मयि महत्त्वं प्रकटितं तदर्थंवादीत्या प्रस्तुतमिति वक्तुमुत्सुहे । किञ्च यद्यपि  
तादृशं महत्त्वं मयि नास्त्येव तथापि—

सिद्धयन्ति कर्मसु महत्स्वपि यन्नियोज्याः

सम्भावनागुणमवेहि तमीश्वराणाम् ।

किं वाभविष्यदरुणस्तमसां विभेत्ता

तं चेत्सहस्रकिरणो धुरि नाकरिष्यत् ॥

इत्युक्तचतुरोद्घेन यथारुणोऽन्धकारनिष्कासने स्वयमशक्तोऽपि भगवत उष्णरश्मेः प्रभावात् प्रोत्साहाद्गाढान्धकारमपि  
निर्मूलयितुं शक्तो भवति तथैवाहमपि अत्रभवतां विद्वद्वराणां प्रोत्साहनेन यथाशक्ति संस्कृतभाषासेवां कर्तुं प्रभवेयमिति  
सुदृढं विश्वसिमि ।

संस्कृतभाषाया महिमा न केनापि वर्णयितुं शक्यते । महामान्यामनितरसाधारणप्रभाववती संस्कृतभाषां तद-  
भिज्ञानपाण्डित्यवरांश्च सभाजयितुं प्रवृत्ता भवन्त एव—

नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो

मानं जनादविदुषः करुणो वृणीते ।

यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधीत मानं

तच्चात्मने प्रतिमुखस्य यथा मुखश्रीः ॥

इति प्रह्लादकृतस्तोत्राभिप्रायानुसारेण मान्याः पूज्याश्च भविष्यन्तीति संप्रमोदं वदामि ॥

कस्मिंश्चित्द्वारे इदमखिलभारतीयप्राच्यविद्यासम्मेलनं प्रयागक्षेत्रे प्रचलितमभूत् । अहमपि तत्रासम् । वाराणसी-  
विद्वांसश्चासन् । एकस्मिन्दिने सन्ध्याकाले तत्रत्यैः कैश्चित्पण्डितैर्मां दृष्ट्वा साकूतमेवमुपक्षिप्तम् । अखिलभारतीय-  
प्राच्यविद्यासम्मेलनस्यास्य कस्मिंश्चित्कोणे पण्डितशाखेति काचन शाखा स्थापिता दृश्यते । किमितराः शाखा अपण्डि-  
तानाम् ? इममेकैव शाखा पण्डितानाम् ?—इति व्यञ्जनया बोधयितुमियं रीतिः समाद्रियत ? किम् वयमेव पण्डिताः ?  
नान्ये ? वयं सोष्णीषा अतो वयमेव पण्डिताः किम् ? किमर्थमयं विभागः ? 'समबुद्धिर्विशिष्यते' 'यस्य साम्यं  
व्यवस्थितम्'—इति हि खलु भगवदुद्धोषः ? एवं स्थिते किमर्थमयं विभागः ? इति । ब्रह्मश्रीकाशीराजेश्वरशास्त्रिणश्च  
तत्रासन् । तस्योपक्षेपस्योत्तरदाने प्रवृत्तोऽहम् विमर्शकशाखेति काचन शाखा, इत्येवंप्रकारेण बहुधा शाखा वर्तन्त  
इत्यादिकं प्रवक्तुं यदोद्युक्तोऽभूवम् तदा कश्चन तार्किकः "किं नाम पाण्डित्यम् ? किं नाम विमर्शकत्वम् ?"  
इत्येवमन्वयुङ्क्त । तदानीं मयोक्तम् ।

यद्यपि सर्वदेशकालानुगुणेन पण्डितस्य लक्षणं प्रतिपादयितुमसाध्यमेव तथापि पण्डितप्रकाण्डैः पाण्डित्यस्य लक्षणं  
यथा प्रतिपादितं तथा वर्णयितुं शक्यत एव । कालविशेषेण वा देशविशेषेण वा विपर्यासमलब्ध्वा, व्याजान्तरमन-

\* Presidential Address at the 8th A.I.O.C. Mysore. Ptd. in its Proceedings.



## SYNTHESIS OF LEARNING AND RESEARCH

211

वलम्ब्य, परमार्थज्ञानमात्रमवलम्ब्य पण्डितैः पाण्डित्यस्य स्वरूपं प्रकाशितमभूत् । जातिकुलवयोधनादिकमनपेक्ष्यैव परमार्थज्ञानमात्रेण पण्डिता अभवन् । भागवतैरपि—

“न शूद्रा भगवद्भक्ता विप्रा भागवताः स्मृताः ।

इत्यादिना जात्यादिकमनवलम्ब्य भगवद्भक्ता विप्रा इत्युच्यन्ते । ते च पण्डितवीराः वैराग्यप्रधानाः प्रजाधना धीराश्चाभवन् । पाणिनिपतञ्जलिव्यासकालिदासप्रभृतिभिः पण्डितवर्यैर्विषया उल्लिखितास्तानेव विषयान्विमर्शका अपीदानीमवलम्ब्य विचारार्थं प्रवर्तन्ते । तेषां पण्डितवर्याणां ज्ञानमेव बलमभूत् । नैव तेषां गृहारामादिकं वा धनकनकादिकं वा, पुत्रमित्रादिकं वा बलमभूत्—

‘किं तेन न कृतं पापं चोरेणात्मापहारिणा ।

योज्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ॥’

इति वदता भगवता व्यासमहर्षिणाऽध्यात्मज्ञानाभाववतः पापात्मत्वं ज्ञानिनस्त्वर्थात्पुण्यात्मकत्वं च प्रतिपादितम् । तथा च परमार्थज्ञानमेव निरूपचरितम् पाण्डित्यस्य लक्षणमिति सिद्धम् । ब्रह्मचर्यं, नैरपेक्ष्यम्, धैर्यं, ज्ञानैकशरणतेत्यादयो येन पुरुषेणावलम्ब्यन्ते स एव श्रेयोभागी, मान्यो नान्य इति सिद्धम् ।

कस्मिंश्चित्समये कविसार्वभौमो दौत्ये नियोजितः कुन्तलेश्वरं जगाम । तदानीं स कविसार्वभौमो महाराजेन न सभाजितो यथार्हम् । तदा राजसभायां महान्कोलाहलः समजनि । विद्वद्भिः प्रतिबोधितो महाराजः स्वन्यूनतां ज्ञात्वा तस्मै कविसार्वभौमाय देशकालानुगुणं समादरं प्रदर्शयामास यथोचितमासनं च तस्मै प्रायच्छत् । तदानीं स कविसार्वभौमो महाराजसत्कारमप्यविगणय्य पण्डितानां धरणिरेव योग्यमासनमित्युक्त्वा भूमितल एवोपविवेशेति जायते । एवमेव विजयनगराधिपतेः प्रधानात्मात्यैर्विद्यारण्यैस्तत्तागमनार्थं प्रार्थिता वेदान्तदेशिकाचार्या अपि अनितरसाधारणं धैर्यमवलम्ब्य शास्त्रार्थोपदेश एव यत्र कुत्रापि स्थित्वा कर्तव्य इति ज्ञात्वा ‘वयमत्रैव स्थित्वा भगवन्तमेव सेवितुं निश्चिनुमह’ इत्यवदन्निति शृणुमः ।

अस्मदौर्भाग्यवशादिदानीं तादृशधीरा विरक्ता ज्ञानिनः पण्डितप्रवरा विरलाः, प्रायेणाकिञ्चनाश्चाभवन् ।

इदानीं पण्डितशब्दस्तदर्थश्चाकुलीकृतौ दृश्येते । आन्तं तान्तीकृत्य पण्डितशब्दं पण्डित् इति विकृत्य प्रयुञ्जते जनाः । अर्थोऽप्यस्य शब्दस्य बहुधा ह्रस्वीकृत्य व्यवह्रियते । न केवलमस्मत्संस्कृतपण्डितानामेवेदृशं लघुत्वं दृश्यते किन्त्वाक्यालजीत्यादिविषयकपण्डितानामप्येवमेव लघुत्वं दृश्यते ।

वस्तुत इदानीमपि बहुश्रुता गुणज्ञा यशस्विनो ज्ञानिनः पण्डिता वर्तन्त एवेत्यत्र न कोऽपि संशयः ।

विमर्शकत्वं कीदृशमित्यस्योत्तरं देयमिदानीम् । स्वसमानाधिकरणसंस्कृताद्यनिष्णातताकत्वम् तदिति केषाञ्चिदभिप्रायः । परममी विमर्शका विषयान्विचार्य सम्यक् शोधयित्वा वस्तुस्वरूपपरिज्ञानाय प्रयतन्ते अमी विमर्शका नोद्धताः । निर्णीतान्विषयान्सर्वानप्यन्येभ्यः प्रकाशयन्ति । शब्दमर्थञ्च सम्यग्विचार्य निर्णयं कुर्वन्ते । प्रपञ्चस्य स्वरूपं तत्त्वं च विचार्य निर्णयार्थं प्रवर्तन्ते ।

इयं विचारपद्धतिरस्मत्पूर्वजैरप्यादृतासीत् । प्रमाणप्रमेयादिव्यवस्थाविषये विचारः कर्तव्य इत्यक्षपादेनाप्युक्तम् । पाश्चात्यो डेकार्ट् महाशयश्च सर्वत्र संशयः कर्तव्यः, यद्यपि स संशयोऽधिष्ठानावशेषो भवतीत्यभ्यधत् ।

एतावता विचारेण विमर्शनस्य कर्तव्यत्वं प्राप्तम् । तच्च विमर्शनं संशयमात्रपर्यवसितं निष्फलं भवति । निर्णयपर्यवसितं च स्वप्रयोजनं भवति । व्यायामेन शरीरदाढर्यं यथा संपाद्यते तथा विमर्शनेन मानसिकदाढर्यं संपादयितुं शक्यते । तस्माद्विमर्शनाख्यसंस्कार-संस्कृतं मनः परमार्थवस्तुस्वरूपपरिज्ञाने समर्थं भवति । तच्च परिज्ञानम् पाण्डित्येन विना नैव कर्तुं शक्यत इत्यतः पण्डितसरणेविचारसरणिः सहायभूता भवेत् । पण्डितसरणिश्च विमर्शनसरणिप्रधाना भवेत् । एवं सति परस्परं भावयन्तो विमर्शकाः पण्डितवरेण्याः परं श्रेयः साधयेयुरिति दृढं विश्वसिम् ।



## श्रीमदखिलभारतवर्षीयसंस्कृतसाहित्यसम्मेलनस्य कलकत्तानगरे दशमाधिवेशने आध्यक्ष्यवैखरौ \*

ओम् नमो ब्रह्मादिभ्यो ब्रह्मविद्यासंप्रदायकर्तृभ्यः, नमो महद्भ्यः, नमो गुरुभ्यः, नमस्तादृशानां सदसे च ।

परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।

कविताबुधयोर्द्वन्द्वं नमामि शिवयोर्यथा ॥

“आम्नायाभ्यसनान्यरण्यरुदितं कृच्छ्रव्रतान्यन्वहं  
भेदच्छेदपदानि पूर्तविधयः सर्वं हुतं भस्मनि ।

तीर्थानामवगाहनानि च गजस्तानं विना यत्पद-  
द्वन्द्वाभोरुहसंस्तुतिं विजयते देवः स नारायणः ॥”

विष्णुर्मादयितः स यद्गुणभुवां जेतापि यत्कर्मिणां  
कर्मस्वभ्युदयप्रदोऽपि यदपि ध्येयोऽस्ति वा योगिनाम् ।

तत्सर्वं खलु यद्विभूतिकणिकालेशस्य लेशायितं

सा माता जगतां स्ववासभवनीयत्यत्र कालीपुरे ॥

अयि मान्याः पण्डितप्रकाण्डाः, एतादृशेऽत्र प्रदेशे महनीये महनीयाभिभूषिते अद्य समवेता वयमद्वा वर्धामहे ; यद्  
अमृतस्य पुत्रा अमृतवाणीभवताः सादरं भजनीयां तामागमेन स्वाध्यायेन प्रवचनेन च तत्र तत्र बहुधा सम्भाविताम् इदा-  
नीन्तनरीतिमनुरुध्य एवंजातीयकगोष्ठीषु पारस्परिकसंव्यवहारेण च सम्भाव्य कृतार्थयितुं नात्मानं सोत्साहं प्रयतामहे । किंवा  
सेर्यं भगवत्यनादिनिधना अमृतबाष्परसा अस्मादृशानामादरणमभ्यर्हणां वा पुष्पाति ? यदैव बहुमानमावेदयामः, तदात्मानमेव  
मानयामः । के वा वयमस्मन्मातुरुद्धारणे ? तच्चरणनलिनभजनानुगृहीतेनात्मना आत्मानमेवोद्धरेम । अत्रानुसन्धीयतां  
श्रीमद्वैद्यासिकसूक्तिरियम्—

“नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो

मानं जनादविदुषः करुणो वृणीते ।

यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधीत मानं

तच्चात्मने प्रतिमुखस्य यथा मुखश्रीः ॥” इति ।

विश्वविदितः खलु भारतभारत्याः सौभाग्यानुभावप्रथिमा ब्रह्मेवावाङ्मानसगोचरोऽतिवर्तते परिच्छेदपथम् । बाह्यै-  
रप्याद्यसन्दर्भतया परिगणितं सर्वज्ञकल्पं वेदमन्तर्भावयन्ती सुरभारती कालतः परिच्छेदे प्रवृत्तान् सुदूरं धावित्वापि श्रान्तान्  
विमर्शकान् विडम्बयति । ‘प्राची प्राच्येव, प्रतीची प्रतीच्येव, न जातुचिदिमे समवेयाताम्’ इति केषा-  
ञ्चित्प्रवादं वितथयन्तीव सैषा सर्वा अपि दिशः, सर्वमपि जगतीतलम्, द्विषतामेवानवरतं सुरभारतीं चिन्तयतां केषा-  
ञ्चित्समुदायमप्यपरिहाय, व्याप्नुवतां देशतः परिच्छेदं व्यवच्छिनन्ति । स्वरूपतश्चास्याः परिच्छेदोऽसर्वज्ञेन सर्वथा न  
सम्भाव्यते, यस्या वाङ्मये उच्चावचासंख्याप्रबन्धजालं बहुमुखशास्त्रकलादिविविधविषयजातं प्रतिपादयत् तावदुपलभ्यते  
यावता “यन्नेहास्ति न कर्हिचित्” इत्येतस्या आहोपुरुषिकां मुक्तकण्ठं निरावाधं चोद्घोषयितुं प्रभवामः । आ मन्त्रेभ्यः  
आ च ब्राह्मणेभ्यः, आ चोपनिषदितिहासप्रभृतिभ्यः, आ तेभ्यः आ च दर्शनेभ्यः, आ बुद्ध्या आ च शङ्कर-

\* Presidential Speech at the Xth All-India Sanskrit Conference, Calcutta, August 1926. Printed, Samskrita Sahitya Parishad Patrika, Calcutta, IX. 5. Sep. 1926 pp. 185-95.



प्रमुखेभ्य आचार्यपरिवृद्धेभ्यः, आ ब्रह्मणः आ चाप्याद्यत्विकब्राह्मणेभ्यः, मतेषु, अनुष्ठानेषु, सम्प्रदायेषु, देवतास्वरूपेषु, जनिमतामाकृतिषु च, बहुधा समुपलभ्यमानेऽपि भेदे, स्वयमभिन्न एव भारतीयपरिपाकसारोऽत्र भारतीवाङ्मयेऽनुवर्तमानः अस्या भारत्याः समपीपदेवामृतत्वम् ; तथापि 'मृतैषा संस्कृतवाणी' इति व्यपदिशतां भाषातत्त्वविमर्शकानां 'विकृतिर्जीवितमुच्यते बुधैः' इति कालिदाससूक्तिमनुसरतामविपमोऽयं वैज्ञानिकापराधः क्षम्यताम् । कामदुघामेनामस्मन्मातरं सुरभारतीमुपेक्ष्य ये पुनराङ्गलवाणीविलासवञ्चितहृदया भारतीया आङ्गलीमेव सचाटुकारमनुधावन्ति, त इत्थं प्रतिबोधनीयाः—वैदेशिकः कश्चन सपिर-नामा (Sapir) संख्यावान् भाषातत्त्वमधिकृत्य रचिते स्वकीये ग्रन्थे परारिसन्निहिते प्रकाशिते, वदत्येवम्—'पञ्चैव भाषा लोकेऽत्र समुपलभ्यन्ते आभ्यन्तरपरिपाकसारं प्रसारयन्त्योऽनिच्छद्भिरप्यनुविधेयाः—परिनिष्ठिता चीनभाषा, संस्कृतवाणी, अराविक्-ग्रीक्-लाटिन्-भाषाश्च ; किञ्चिदिवास्मानुमनीकरोत्यद्यथावदाङ्गलवाणी आभ्यन्तरपरिपाकसारप्रसारणे सर्वथा अकिञ्चित्करी जायमाना' इति साकूतमिति ।

एवं हि सुप्रतिष्ठिता सुप्रथिता येयं गीर्वाणवाणी, तत्र किं वा कुर्यामि, ये वयमत्र पण्डिताः समवेता भवामः । तद्भक्तानां तद्गुणानुवर्णनं साम्प्रतमेव ; अथापि तावन्मात्रेण नैतावानखिलभारतसंस्कृतसम्मेलनसंरम्भः सफलितः स्यात् । परं ब्रह्मेव स्वे महिम्नि एव प्रतितिष्ठत्येषा भारती, नास्मादृशानां समितौ न राजकीयोपकारधने न वा सङ्घश आघोष्यमाणे गुणपरम्पराधोषणे । अतो नास्नाभिस्तां प्रतिष्ठापयितुं यतमानैः सार्थकं व्यापृतं स्यात् । परन्तु परमोऽयमभ्युपायः सारभूतं भावानां याथात्म्यमधिगम्य लौकिकमलौकिकं चाभ्युदयं निःश्रेयसं चासादयितुमिति निःसंशयं जानीमः, यदेतत् सम्यगार्थभारतीवाङ्मयनिषेवणं नाम । समुचितया रीत्या क्रियमाणमेव भारतीभजनं फलमुपजनयति । अभिमतञ्च फलं तदनुकूलघटन इव प्रतिकूलविघटनेऽप्यायतते । नानाविधानि प्रतिकूलान्यत्र साम्प्रतिकी स्थितिरुपस्थापयति, येषां निरासे उपायाः समाद्रियेरन् । तादृशोपायचिन्तने विनियुज्यमानान्येवंविधानि सम्मेलनानि चरितार्थानि भवेयुः, सद्य एव शक्तिमद्यत्वे पश्यतां प्रत्येकमसमर्थानां पण्डितानाम् । एवं निरसनीयेषु प्रतिबन्धकेषु, इदं तावदुपस्थितिपथमधिरोहति—यद्वैदेशिकविद्यावल्लभाः केचिद्भ्राम्यन्ति, आधुनिकभारतीययोगक्षेमनिर्वाहविषये संस्कृतशिक्षा नोपयुज्यते, अकाले अकाण्डे च लोकान्तराभिमुख्यमैहिकविषयेषु वैमुख्यं च सम्पाद्य द्वितीयपुरुषार्थस्य हानिं लोपं चापादयति इति । अप्रतिभातसाम्पराया वित्तमोहेन संमूढमनसः प्रत्यक्षानुमानपथमतीत्य लेशमात्रेणापि चलितुमसमर्थं एवं भ्राम्यन्तः सम्यक् प्रतिबोधनीयाः । लोकयोगक्षेमनिर्वाहो नार्थ एवायतते ; धर्मेण विनाभूतश्चार्थो न कदाचित् क्वचित् स्थायिने फलाय कल्पते ; स च धर्मः सनातनो भारतीयानां परमो निधिः भारतभारतीपरिज्ञानाञ्जनसंस्कृतलोचनेरैवाविपयसिने ज्ञातुं शक्यते ; स च धर्मः सनातनो भारतीयानां परमो निधिः भारतभारतीपरिज्ञानाञ्जनसंस्कृतलोचनेरैवाविपयसिने ज्ञातुं शक्यते ; प्रत्यक्षानुमानमात्रशरणानां सनातनधर्ममार्गे विनिपात एव भवेत् । अभियुक्ताः खल्वेवं वदन्ति—

“हस्तस्पर्शादिवान्धेन विषमेऽप्यभिधावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥” इति ।

ऐहिकानुबन्धनश्च बहवो विषया अन्यतोऽधिगन्तुमशक्याः संस्कृतवाङ्मयशिक्षणेन सुलभाधिगमा भविष्यन्ति—इति ।

अपरमिदं प्रतिबध्नाति संस्कृतवाङ्मयात् श्रेयसो लाभम्—यदाङ्गलविद्याशिक्षणनिरताः केचन परीक्षोत्तरणमात्रेण कृतकृत्यातां भावयन्तः विरुदकञ्चुकविशेषयोर्लाभमात्रादधिकं भुज्युगं लोचनं च प्रतिलब्धं मन्यमानाः अवजानन्ति संस्कृतनिष्णातान्—किमिमे पण्डिताः कूपमण्डूका जानन्तीति । एवमवजानन्तः, “नाम्नाकं जननी तथोज्ज्वलकुला...तेनास्मि ताताधिकः” इत्येवंरीत्या अहङ्कारेणाभिभूतचेतसः, सद्यं संस्कृते हचिमुत्पाद्य पण्डितकुलेनावज्येरन् । मधुर-रसभरितानां श्रव्याणां दृश्यानां च संस्कृतनिबन्धानां रसप्रवाहस्य समास्वादानेन इतिहासपुराणादिभिः ससीहार्द धर्मावबोधनेन, सर्वलोकसमादरणीयानामुपनिषदीश्वरगीताप्रभृतीनां ग्रन्थरत्नानां निगूढाशयस्य प्रकाशनेन च सुकुमारमतीनामेतादृशानां संस्कृतवाङ्मये हचिरुपादयितुं शक्यते ; अत्र विषये तत्तद्देशीयसांख्यवहारिकभाषा द्राविडी-वङ्गालीप्रभृतयो द्वारतया संस्कृतप्रणयिभिः सर्वैरपि समाद्रियेरन् ।

भागधेयतरुमस्माकं नितरां कम्पयत्येषाऽपरा प्रत्यूहवात्या—यदुताधुनिकतत्त्वविमर्शनरीती पाश्चात्यविद्वद्भिराद्रियमाणायाम् संस्कृतपण्डितैर्वैमुख्यमालम्ब्यते ; नव्यशिक्षितैश्च कैश्चिदपरिपक्वमतिभिरुपरिप्लवमानानापाततो भासमानान् विषयलेशानवलम्ब्य विमर्शप्रवाहेण सुदूरं गम्यते चेति । वैदेशिकैरस्मद्देशीयैश्चाधुनिकैर्विपश्चिद्भिः संस्कृतशिक्षणसरणी



समाद्रियमाणा विमर्शनरीतिः विशेषतो भाषातत्त्वचरिततत्त्वमार्गयोः वृद्धिक्रमपरीक्षां सजातीयविजातीयशोधनं च मुख्योपायतया समाश्रित्य प्रवर्तत इति विदितमेव स्याद्वह्नां पण्डितानाम् । अत्र केचित्पण्डितप्रवरा एवं विभ्यतीव— वृद्धिक्रमपरीक्षा-पूर्वकं चरिततत्त्वदिमर्शकानां सरणिमनुमृत्य संस्कृतवाङ्मयममालोचने क्रियमाणे अपौरुषेयतावज्रकञ्चु-कसुरक्षितस्य सनातनधर्ममूलस्तम्भस्य वेदस्य व्यवस्थितिः शिष्टजनैः समाद्रियमाणा व्याकुप्येत ; एवं गीर्वाण-भाषाया वृद्धिक्रमः सजातीय-विजातीयसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्यपरीक्षापूर्वकं परीक्ष्यमाणा मुनित्रयमतञ्च शिथिलयेदिति । किञ्चिदिवात्र सद्यमाधीयतां मतिः । किं वा न जानन्ति पण्डितोत्तमाः दृष्टिभेदं विषयविशेषानुगुणं पुरस्कृत्य एतादृशान् दोषान् समाधातुम् ? किं वा शारीराणि मर्माणि विषय विषय कर्तव्यं कुर्वन्तपि शस्त्रचिकित्सको दृष्टिभेदेन सर्वाङ्गसुन्दरी काञ्चन पश्यन् तदीयलावण्यामृतस्रोतमोह्यमानमात्मानं नानुमन्यते ? किं वा पशुमारणकर्मदारुणोऽपि दृष्टिभेदमहिम्ना नानुकम्पामृदुरुच्यते कविसार्वभौमेण ? किं वा आब्रह्मस्तम्भपर्यन्तं आश्रुत्यस्मादृशजल्पनपर्यन्तञ्च विश्व-माध्यात्मिकं साधयत् भगवत्पादौ भाष्यं व्यावहारिकदृष्ट्या मात्रामात्रेणापि श्रुतिपथात्प्रच्युतिं न सहत इतीदमस्माभिः नाज्ञायि ? अन्ततो गत्वा अपौरुषेयत्वनिर्वचने तथा शिष्टजनप्रसिद्धिविषयतामेव शरणीकुर्वाणा वयं दृष्टिभेदेन संस्कृत-वाङ्मयस्य वृद्धिक्रमादिपरामर्शेन तात्त्विकान् बहून्शान् यथावदवगत्य आत्मानं अन्यांश्च विज्ञाननुग्रहीतुं सर्वथा निर्भयं प्रवर्तामहे । तथा भाषातत्त्वविचारपथेन गच्छद्भिः प्रकाशयमानास्तत्त्वविशेषाः मुनित्रयपद्धतेरसाधारणीं सुपमामेव परिपोषयेयुः— यत्तामेव मुनित्रयप्रदर्शितां सरणिमालम्ब्य सुदूरं गन्तुं भाषातत्त्वविशेषानवगन्तुं चालङ्करीणा दृश्यते भाषातत्त्वविमर्शन-वैदेशिकानामस्मदीयानाञ्च धिषणा । निश्चप्रचेतत्—एवंजातीयकेषु विषयेषु नात्यन्तायास्मादृशानामज्ञानं शरणं भवितुमर्हति । नव्यशिक्षितैश्च कैश्चिद्विमर्शकम्मन्यैः संस्कृतवाङ्मयस्य विमर्शनेन सहैव प्रथमपरिचयमपि सम्पादयद्भिः— असंस्कृतमेवान्तःकरणमकुण्ठितं प्रसरतीति, शिष्टपरिगृहीतो मार्गः शुभो न भवति स्वतन्त्रेच्छानामिति, नञ्जुल्लेखमधुसम्पृक्त विषमयेष्वपि विषयेषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वारसिकतामात्रेण प्रामाणिकीति ते भाव्यन्ते ; नह्येवं भारतीयचरिते भाषा-शास्त्रसरणौ च कांश्चित् तत्त्वाभासांस्तत्त्विकैरपि विषयैः सङ्कीर्णानि युक्तिसम्बलिततदाभासैरुपपद्यमानां लोकञ्च युगपदुपकारापकाराभ्यां व्याकुलयन्ति । एतादृशानिष्टस्य निवारणे समीचीनोप्यमेवाभ्युपायः—यदञ्जसा तलस्प्रशिनी वैदुषी भवादृशैः महता परिश्रमेण समुपाजिता नव्यविमर्शनमार्गेऽपि यथावद्विनियुज्येत, येषां केषाञ्चिज्जगाहुषी शब्दब्रह्म विरा-जते, अपरेषां काणादगौतमीयोन्मदं साहुषी भासते, पुनरन्येषां मीमांसां पूर्वामुत्तरां वा समुपेयुषी चकास्ति, अथ परेषां सांख्यार्थानखिलं साहित्यमर्म वा विविदुषी विभाति । एवं स्थिते विमर्शनमात्रदुर्ललिता आपातकल्याणसन्तुष्टाः केचिन्न व्यशिक्षिता यावता प्रमादाद्भ्रमसादा तत्त्वविपर्ययसमकरणाय कुर्वन्तः, तावता युष्मदृशा अपि पण्डितप्रवराः स्वौयामविकलां वैदुषीमविनियुञ्जाना नव्यविमर्शनरीतिसमादरणेन निगूढपत्रचरितसारप्रसारणे करणीयमकुर्वन्तः, कथं वा न प्रत्यवेयुः ? संशय्य सर्वथा प्रमाण एव तिष्ठामहे, येऽत्र समवेताः, ते वयं प्रामाणिकं समितेरस्या निर्णयमत्र न नाभ्युपगच्छामः ।

जागर्त्यन्योऽपि श्रेयःपरिपन्थी विषयः, यत्रास्माभिः जागरूकैर्मवितव्यम् । उक्तं सर्वथा साधनीयम्, अन्यथा निग्रहस्थानदर्शनेन निगृहीता भवेमेति भियेव वादपदवीं विहाय जल्पवितण्डयोरकाले समादरणं सहृदयजनान्नितरामुद्वे-जयेदित्यानुभविकमेतत् । बीजप्ररोहरक्षणार्थं कण्टकशाखावरणवत् तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थमेव जल्पवितण्डे व्यधत्तं मुनीनां प्रवरोऽपवादः । कदाचिल्लोकोत्तरधिषणावैभवस्य श्रीहर्षसजातीयस्य तादृशस्य पण्डितवीरस्यानुयोक्तुमेवं शक्तिः स्यात्—

अभीष्टसिद्धावपि खण्डनानामखण्डि राज्ञामिव नैवमाज्ञा ।

तत्तानि कस्मान्न यथाभिलाषं सैद्धान्तिकेष्वध्वनि योजयध्वम् ॥

इति यादृशोऽनुसन्धोयते—

एकं ब्रह्मास्त्रमादाय नात्यं गणयतः क्वचित् ।

आस्ते न धीरवीरस्य भङ्गः सङ्गरकेलिषु ॥ इत्यत्र ।

तथाच तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थायां कथायां प्रवृत्तिः पण्डितानामन्येषां च शोभत एवेति भवन्तु नाम पण्डिता वावदूकाः, परं त्व-काण्डे कालदेशाननुगुणं जल्पाकैः वैतण्डिकैर्वा मा भूयतामेतैः, अन्यथा ते सहृदयलोकेन परिह्रियेरन् ; दवीयस्येव भवत्वे-तेषां रीतिरियं यैवानुवर्ण्यते—

“न भेतव्यं न बोद्धव्यं न श्राव्यं वादिनो वचः ।

अटिति प्रतिवक्तव्यं सभामु विजिगीषुभिः ॥ इति ।



प्राचीनेषु पण्डितेषु अलब्धावकाशोऽपि किञ्चिदेवेदानीं अर्वाचीनेषु लब्धप्रसरोज्यमन्यो विघ्नः प्रतिहन्यादेवास्माकं श्रेयः, यच्चिरेणैव न निराक्रियते। सोऽयं विघ्नः न न विदित ऊहापोहकुशलानाम्—यदेकमुखं पाण्डित्यमसाधारण्येन क्वचिदधिगन्तुं समीहमानैरवश्यविज्ञेयासु शास्त्रान्तरप्रक्रियासु लेशमात्रेणापि दृष्टिः न विधीयते। एतादृशमेकमुखं पाण्डित्यं क्वचित्कोणे कुशाग्रमतेः कस्यचित् फलाय कल्पेत जातुचित् तथापि बहुत्रोपहसनीय एव फले पर्यवस्यति। महामतिरपि नव्यन्यायमात्रनिष्णातोऽपि अभिनवकल्पनाकुशलोऽपि अकुण्ठितप्रतिभाप्रसरोऽपि आवश्यकशास्त्रान्तरविषयेषु समुचितं परिचितमसम्पाद्य क्वचिदुपसत्पदार्थं चरुकुर्वन्, क्वचिल्लेखकविकृतौ सूर्यपदेन कृतोहं 'शूर्पेण जुहोति' इति वाक्यं गगनगतसोमकरणकहोमदृष्टान्तेन व्याकुर्वन्, "अत एव अकुर्वन् विहितं कर्मेतिलक्षणार्थं शता व्याख्यातः" इति गूढार्थदीपिकागते मधुसूदनसरस्वती-वाक्ये 'शता' इति शब्दम् आवन्तं समर्थयन् कथं वा नापहस्तयेदात्मनि बहुमानं स्वपाण्डित्यानुगुणम्। एवमेव नव्यन्यायानभिज्ञान् अवच्छेदकतान्श्रुतिमात्रेण, पिशाचिकेव शिश्नून्, भीषयन्तो शास्त्र-विचारगोष्ठीतः कान्दिशोकान् विद्रावयति। एतेन व्याख्याता विशदीभवति मीमांसयोः व्याकरणे वा एकभक्तिव्रत-मनुतिष्ठतां दुःखस्थितिः। एवं हि क्वचिद्दृश्यमानां न्यूनतामधिकृत्य पुरोभागिनेव मया यदुच्यते, तत् स्तोतुमेव न हि निन्दान्यायेन प्राचां शास्त्रकाराणां महामहिम्नां बहुमुखं सर्वकषं पाण्डित्यमिति सुहृन्मणयो जानीयुः। पुरा खलु भाष्य-कारमहाभाष्यकारप्रभृतयो विशालमतयः परमाचार्याः, तथा पङ्कजदर्शनीवल्लभोऽज्ज्वर्यनामधेयो वाचस्पतिः, परःशतग्रन्थ-रत्ननिर्माणनिपुणाः श्रीमदप्पय्यदीक्षितेन्द्राः, तथाविधाः सर्वतन्त्र-स्वतन्त्र-श्रीवेदान्तदेशिकजयतीर्थप्रभृतयः; कालतो नेदीयां-सोऽपि लोकोत्तरधिषणास्तादृशा एव गङ्गे-रघुनाथशिरोमणि-मधुसूदनसरस्वती-ब्रह्मानन्दसरस्वतीप्रमुखाश्च नानाविध-शास्त्रीयवैदग्धीवैभवस्य परमादर्शभूता येऽत्र समभूवन्, तैः कियदुपाकारि भारतभारत्यां। अधुनातनैश्च कैश्चिदेकशास्त्रां-शमात्राध्ययननिरतैः कियद्वा तस्या उपकर्तुं शक्यते—इति सावधानं निरभिनवेशं समालोचने निःशङ्कं वक्तुं प्रभवामः—यत्सत्यमिदानीन्तनी शास्त्रशिक्षणरीतिस्तथा परिष्कारमपेक्षते, यथेकत्र सुदृढं बहुत्रापेक्षितानंशानवगाहमानं च पाण्डित्यं विद्यार्थिभिः सम्पादयितुं शक्यतेति।

किं चेदमवधेयमभ्युदयप्रत्यूहप्रतिविधानपरैरस्माभिः। परीक्षाविशेषमात्रकृतार्थाः केचित् पण्डितप्रथां प्राप्य तदनुगुणं न चेष्टन्ते केचिदवच्छेदकताकोलाहलमात्रेण चरितार्थाः, परिच्छेद्यान् विपुलान् प्राचीनेषु तत्तच्छास्त्रग्रन्थेषु दृश्यमानान् विषयानुपेक्षमाणाः सस्यसमृद्धश्रेयविक्रयणेन सौवर्णं मानदण्डमुपार्जयतः किम्पचानमतीतनुकुर्वन्ति। प्रतीतिविशेषान् परिष्कारविशेषांश्च नव्यन्यायोपासनासमधिगतेन अवच्छेदकता-मानदण्डेन विपश्चितः परिमान्ति निर्मिते चेति विवेचकानां शास्त्ररसिकानामभिनन्दनीयमेव। तथापि नैतदनुमोदनमर्हति—यदेतादृशोपायव्यापृतैरुपेया उपजीव्याश्च परिष्कर्तव्यानां प्रत्येतव्यानां च विषयाणामाकराः प्राचीनग्रन्थाः सुतरामादरणीया अप्यवज्ञायन्त इति। यथैतादृशी न्यूनता न स्यात्, तथा शास्त्रशिक्षणरीतिः परिष्कृतिमाकाङ्क्षति। द्वितीयनिर्दिष्टस्य दोषस्य समनन्तरप्रतिपादितदोषयोश्च परिहारो यथा भवेत् तथा काचन शास्त्रशिक्षणरीतिर्मद्रमण्डलविश्वविद्यालयेन प्रवर्तिता शिरोमण्यादिपरीक्षानुबन्धिनीषु व्यवस्थामु दरी-दृश्यते, साम्प्रतं बहुषु संस्कृतकलाभवनेषु विशिष्य दक्षिणभारतेऽनुष्ठीयते च; सैषा अखिलभारतसमितेरस्याः कटाक्षदानेनानु-गृह्यताम् येनान्यत्रापि तादृशरीतावुपलभ्यमानानामुपादेयानामुपादानं हेयानामंशानां तत्रापि हानञ्च घटेत।

अन्ततोऽनुगृह्यतां किञ्चिदवधानदानेनेदं प्रतीपद्वयम्, यद्रह्यति बहून् जनान् संस्कृतवाङ्मयाल्लब्धयेन लाभविशेषेण। तत्र तावदेतत् परिहरणीयम्। यद्वर्णाश्रमव्यवस्थायाः सनातनधर्मसेतोर्भङ्गो भवेदिति भयात् केषाञ्चिद्वैज्ञानिकविमर्शकरीति-मनुसृत्य संस्कृतवाङ्मयप्रचारस्य सार्वत्रिकस्य सर्वजनीनस्य चासहनम्। न कोऽप्यास्तिको विप्रतिपद्यते वर्णाश्रमधर्म-सनातनधर्मसेतुविधूत-एवास्मान् रक्षतीत्यत्र। परन्तु संस्कृतवाङ्मयपरिशीलनेन ज्ञानं वर्धयित्वा गुणविशेषानात्म-न्यायाय कृतार्थीबुधैः जनानासदृष्टानुबन्धिनियमविशेषानुष्ठानेऽनधिकृतानामपि मार्गे प्रतिबन्धकान्युद्भावयद्भिः कैश्चित् कथं वा आत्मचोरेन भूयेत? कथमिव चैतेन पत्येतास्य सौरेशस्य वचसो गोचरे—

“किं न तेन कृतं पापं चोरेणात्मापहारिणा।

योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते॥”



एतदप्यत्रावश्यं प्रतिविधातव्यमपरम्—यदद्य तत्तद्देशभाषाणां द्राविडवङ्गालीप्रभृतीनामभिवृद्धिरावश्यकी कुण्ठीभवेत् संस्कृतवाङ्मये श्रद्धाविरोधोत्पादनेनेति मिथ्याभिमानेन सुमहान् कोलाहलः क्रियते कैश्चिद्विश्वविद्यालयसभामेलनेषु विशेषतो मद्रमण्डलप्रान्ते । एवं देशभाषासु स्निह्यन्तः कीदृशाः ? केचन भ्रान्तास्तत्तद्देशभाषाणां संस्कृतवाङ्मयमवलम्ब्य वैदेशिकवाङ्मय-वृद्धिमधिगतानां पारमार्थिकीं स्थितिमजानन्तः ; केचिदन्ये विषयेष्वास्माकीनेषु मर्कटमाध्यस्थ्यमवलम्ब्य वैदेशिकवाङ्मय-मात्रस्य सम्यक् प्रचारणे बद्धादराः । यथैतादृशविमत्या विद्यानुबद्धाः संस्कारा न लुप्येरन्, तथा प्रयत्येत भवादृशैस्तत्तद्देशभाषामपि यावदपेक्षितमभ्यस्य, तद्द्वारा सुनिपुणं संस्कृतवाङ्मयस्य प्रचारणेन देशभाषाणां देशस्य च गुणान् निरूपयद्भिः ।

जानीमो वयम्—“संगच्छध्वं संवदध्वं सं वो मनांसि जानताम्” इत्येवं प्रवृत्तस्य अपौरुषेयवचनस्य भावम्, अन्यथा कथमत्र इयता संरम्भेण सम्मिलेम । प्रमाणशरणा वयं धर्म्यं न्याय्ये च पथि प्रवर्तमाना पण्डितमण्डल्याः, सुरभारत्याश्च योगक्षेमौपयिकानर्थान् विचारयिष्यामोऽप्रमाद्यन्तो निराग्रहाश्च, यतो वयं “महाजनो येन गतः स पन्थाः” इति सूचितया रीत्या पन्थानमभिज्ञानुगुणमञ्जसा द्रष्टुं दर्शयितुं च प्रभविष्यामः । अद्य सभापतिपदे मामधिरोप्य भवादृशानां महतां सङ्गेनात्मानं पावयितुमवसरं मे दत्त्वा सुबहूपकृतवतामेतत्सभानिर्वाहकाणां कृतज्ञतामाविष्कृत्य धन्य-वादान् वदामि सामोदम् । महनीयमतिवैभवानां विपश्चिदपश्चिमानामेतादृशे सदसि सभापतिपदवीं सरोमहर्षमभि-नन्दनार्हमपि, तत्राधिकरोमि न वेति संशयाने सकम्पमभ्युपगच्छति मयि, सभाकृत्यानां निर्वाहार्थमपेक्षितां शक्तिमसंशयं सैव पदव्यादधीतेति विश्वासस्यावकाशो वर्ततेऽस्माकमनुसंधानामिमां भारवेः सूक्तिम्—“सम्भावना ह्यधिकृतस्य तनोति तेजः” इति । अर्थगौरवानुसरण-दुर्ललितेनानेन कविना अत्र प्रायोज्यधिकृतस्येति पदमिति यदि शङ्क्येत, तदापि कुतो विभीयामनुस्मरन्निमां सरसां वैदर्भीवल्लभस्य कविसार्वभौमस्य कालिदासस्य वाणीम्—

सिद्ध्यन्ति कर्मसु महत्स्वपि यन्नियोज्याः

सम्भावनागुणमवेहि तमीश्वराणाम् ।

किं वाऽभविष्यदरुणस्तमसां विभेत्ता

तं चेत्सहस्रकिरणो धुरि नाकरिष्यत् ॥

तत् अनन्तरकरणीयाय प्रवर्तिष्यामहे ।



## PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY IN THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA\*

*Aravanavatikal* (அறவணவடிகளர்) = [Acharya Dharmapala ?]  
in the *Sangam* age.

( I )

*Aravanavatikal* is one of the most prominent characters in the *Manimekalai*, one of the well-known twin epics in Tamil belonging to the *Sangam* age. In the *Manimekalai* he is introduced as a venerable, old, benevolent and learned Buddhist monk who was held in high esteem by all who happened to know him during the period of *Seran Senkuttuvan*. This Buddhist monk is described as vouchsafing light, true insight and final absolution to many a person yearning for knowledge, and to the heroine, *Manimekalai*, who renounced the world in her youth and approached him as an earnest Buddhist disciple seeking to realise the highest truth. Anybody really interested in the reconstruction of the ancient history of South India cannot fail to appreciate duly the value of such reliable data as may happen to be extricated from the tangle and jumble of historical and legendary elements that make up the partly human and partly superhuman, and not seldom anachronic or parachronic, plot of works like the *Manimekalai*. In this belief, a few data of considerable value to students of South Indian history, which are actually found available in the teachings put in the mouth of *Aravanavatikal* in the last two sections (XXIX and XXX), more especially in the penultimate section of the *Manimekalai*, are now proposed to be placed before the world of scholars interested in Indological studies. It is also proposed to make a few suggestions which would be helpful in identifying *Aravanavatikal*, if he could be taken to possess any acceptable degree of historicity. It would hardly be unreasonable to hope that all this would lead to the crux of the problem of the *Sangam* age being tackled more successfully and satisfactorily than hitherto.

A careful perusal of the contents of section XXIX (*Tavattirampantu tarumanketta katai*) of the *Manimekalai* as compared with such particulars as are available about Acarya Dinnaga's works—particularly his *Nyaya-pravesa* and *Pramanasamuccaya*—would tend to establish, to every unbiased reader, beyond any reasonable doubt—(1) that the principles of Buddhist logic, as outlined in this section of the *Manimekalai* are almost entirely based upon Acarya Dinnaga's *Nyaya-pravesa*, and to some extent on his other works also ; most of the definitions, illustrations and even the order of enumeration in several instances answering almost exactly to the corresponding parts of the *Nyaya-pravesa* ; and (2) that, while section XXIX of the *Manimekalai* cannot be assigned to the *pre-Dinnaga* period of Buddhist logic, there are sufficient indications to place it in the *post-Dinnaga* period, close to the transition to certain departures advocated by Dharmakirti by way of improvement. In support of the former of these two propositions, attention may, with advantage, be drawn to certain very striking correspondences between *Aravanavatikal*'s teachings as recorded by *Sittalai Sattanar* and Acarya Dinnaga's *Nyaya-pravesa* and other works.

\* J.O.R. Madras I, 1927 pp. 191-201 ; J.O.R. II, 1928 pp. 79-83,



<i>Manimekalai</i>	<i>Dinnaga</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
(a) ஆதி சினேந்திரன்னவை யிரண்டே. யேதமீல் பிரத்தியங்கருத் தளவென்ன [XXIX-47, 48.]	(a) प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च प्रमाणं हि द्विलक्षणम् । Pramana-samuccaya Chapter I S.C.V.H.I.L.L. <sup>1</sup> page 277 fn.	<i>etamil</i> line 2 of (a) is equivalent to <i>sanyak</i> .
(b) சுட்டுணர்வைப் பிரத்தியக்க மெனச்சொலி, விட்டனர் நாமசாதிசுண க்கிரியைகள். [Ibid—49,50.]	(b) प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्याद्य- संयुतम् ॥ [Pramana-samuccaya Chapter I. S.C.V.H.I.L.L. page 277 foot- note.]	<i>a, b, c, d, e, f</i> in all these cases. It will be seen that what is found in the <i>Manimekalai</i> is a faithful rendering or adaptation of Dinnaga's Sanskrit text.
(c) ஏனையவைகளெல்லாங் கருத்தினி லான முறைமையினனு மானமாம் [Ibid—55,56.]	(c) प्रमेयं तत्र संसिद्धं न प्रमाणान्नरं भवेत् ।  <i>Ibid.</i>	
(d) பக்கமேதுத்திட்டாந்தமுபநய நிகமனமென்னவைந் துள [Ibid—57,58.]	(d) पक्षः, हेतुः, दृष्टान्तः, उपनयः निगमनं चेति पञ्चावयवाः । S. C. V. H. I. L.	
(e) உபநயநிகமனமிரண்டுந் திட்டாந்தத்திலேசென்ற டங்கும் [Ibid—109-110.]	(e) पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तवचनैर्हि प्राशिनकानाम- प्रतीतोऽथः प्रतिपाद्यत इति . . . एतान्येव त्रयोऽवयवा इत्युच्यन्ते । [Nyaya-pravesa p. 1.] <sup>2</sup>	
(f) பக்கப்போலியொன்பது வகைப்படும். பிரத்தியக்கவிருத்த மருமான விருத்த ஸ்வவசனவிருத்த முலோக விருத்த மாகமவிருத்த மப்பிர சித்தவிசேடண மப்பிரசித்த விசேடியமப்பிரசித்தவுபய மப்பிரசித்த சம்பந்தம் மென. [Ibid—147-153.]	(f) पक्षाभासा नव—प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धः, स्ववचनविरुद्धः, आगमविरुद्धः, अप्रसिद्ध- विशेषणः, अप्रसिद्धविशेष्यः, अप्रसिद्धो- भयः, अप्रसिद्धसंबन्धश्च—इति (Nyaya-pravesa). <sup>3</sup>	

1. S. C. V. H. I. L. = Dr. Satiscandra Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic*.

2. This reference is to the page of the edition of the *Nyayapravesa*, which is being published in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda. p. 193.

3. This extract and all the further extracts from the *Nyaya-pravesa* are, unless otherwise specified, based upon the provisional reconstruction of the text of the *Nyaya-pravesa* from the account of the Tibetan version of that work, as given in pages 289 to 293 of Dr. Satiscandra Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic*.



Manimekalai

Dinnaga

Remarks

(g)

ஏதுப்போலியோதின் முன்றருகு  
மசித்த மனநகாந்திகம்  
விருத்தம் மென  
வுபயாசித்தமன்னியதா(தரா)  
சித்தஞ்  
சித்தாசித்தமாசிரயாசித்த  
மெனநான்கசித்தம்

[Ibid—191 to 195.]

(g)

हेत्वाभासास्त्रयः-असिद्धः अनै-  
कान्तिकः(अनिश्चितः), विरुद्धश्चेति ।  
असिद्धश्चतुर्विधः उभयासिद्धः, अन्यतरा-  
सिद्धः, सिद्धासिद्धः, आश्रयासिद्धश्चेति ।

Ibid.

(g)

*anniyatacittam* in line 3  
of the Tamil text is un-  
doubtedly a mistake and  
should be corrected as  
*anniyataracittam*.

(h)

அநைகாந்திகமுஞ்  
சாதாரண மசாதாரணஞ்  
சபக்கைக  
தேசவிருத்தி விபக்கவியாபி  
விபக்கைகதேசவிருத்தி சபக்க  
வியாபி யுபயைகதேச விருத்தி  
விருத்த(ா)வியபிசாரி

யென்றாறு.

[Ibid—211 to 216]

(h)

अनैकान्तिकः षोढा-साधारणः, असा-  
धारणः, सपक्षैक-देशवृत्तिः, विपक्षव्यापी,  
विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः, सपक्षव्यापी, उभयकदेश-  
वृत्तिः, विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी चेति ।

Ibid.

*g, h, i, j*, (See remarks about  
*a to f*).

(*h*) *viruttaviyapicari* in line 5  
of the Tamil text is undoub-  
tedly an error and should be  
corrected as *viruttaviyapicari*.

(i)

விருத்தந்தன்னைத் திருத்த  
கவினம்பிற்  
றன்மச்சொருப விபரீத சாதனந்  
தன்ம விசேடவிபரீதசாதனந்  
தன்மிச்சொருப விபரீத சாதனந்  
தன்மிவிசேடவிபரீதசாதன  
மென்ன நான்குவகைய தாகும்.

[Ibid—276 to 281]

(i)

विरुद्धश्चतुर्विधः—धर्मस्वरूपविपरी-  
तसाधकः, धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधकः, धर्मि-  
स्वरूपविपरीतसाधकः, धर्मविशेषविपरीत-  
साधकश्चेति ।

Ibid.

(j)

சாதன்மியதிருட்டாந்த வாபாச  
மோதிலேந்து வகையுள தாகுஞ்  
சாதனதன் மவிகலமுஞ்சாத்திய  
தன்மவிகலமு முபய தன்ம  
விகலமு மதன்னுவயம்—

விபரீதான்  
னுவயமென்ன, வைதன்

மியதிருட்  
டாந்த வாபாசமுமை வகைய

சாத்தியா வியாவிருத்தி

சாதனவியாவிருத்தி

யுபயாவ்யாவிருத்தி யவ்

வெதிரேகம்

விபரீதவெதிரேக மென்ன.

[Ibid—330 to 340]

(j)

साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभासः पञ्चविधः—  
साधनधर्मविकलः, साध्यधर्मविकलः, उभय-  
धर्मविकलः, अनन्वयः, विपरीतान्वय-  
श्चेति । वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभासः पञ्चविधः—  
साध्याव्यावृत्तिः, साधनाव्यावृत्तिः, उभ-  
याव्यावृत्तिः, अव्यतिरेकः, विपरीतव्यति-  
रेकश्चेति ।

Ibid.



## Manimekalai

## Dinnaga

## Remarks

(k)

விருத்த (ா) வியமிசாரி  
 திருந்தாவேதுவாய்  
 விருத்தவேது விற்குமிடங்  
 கொடுத்தல்  
 சத்தமறித்தஞ் செயலிடைத்  
 தோன்றலி  
 னொத்ததெனினச் செயலிடைத்  
 தோன்றற்குச்  
 சபக்கமாயுள்ள கடாதி நிற்கச்  
 சத்தறித்தங் கேட்கப்படு தலிற்  
 சத்தத்துவம் போலெனச் சாற்  
 றிடுத  
 விரண்டி னுஞ்சங்கயமா  
 யேகாந்தமல்ல.  
 [Ibid - 268-275]

(k)

विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यपि संशयहेतुर्भूतः ।  
 यथाशब्दः अनित्यः प्रयत्ननान्तरीयकत्वात्  
 घटादिवदित्युक्ते, शब्दो नित्यः श्रावण-  
 त्वात्, शब्दत्ववदिति ॥

*Nyaya-pravesa* as reconstructed  
 from the reference by Dhar-  
 makirti in *Nyaya-bindu*-page  
 111, Vidyavilas Press-Benares.

(k)

Dharmakirti drops  
 विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी in his scheme  
 of fallacies, See pages 111  
 and 112 of the *Nyaya-bindu*.

(l)

தன்ம விசேட விபரீத சாதனஞ்  
 சொன்னவேதுச் சாத்தி யதன்  
 மந்  
 தன்னிடை விசேடங்கெடச்  
 சாதித்தல்  
 கண்முதலோர்க்கு மிந்திரியங்க  
 ளெண்ணிற் பரார்த்தத் தொக்கு  
 நிறறவினற்  
 சயனானங்கள் போல வென்  
 ரூற்  
 ரெக்குநிறற்றலினென் கின்ற  
 வேதுச்  
 சயனானத்தின் பரார்த்தம்  
 போலக்  
 கண்முதலிந்தியங்கனையும்  
 பரார்த்தத்திற் சாதித்துச்  
 சயனானவாணைப்போலாகிக்  
 கண்முதலிந்தியத்துக்கும்  
 பரனாய்ச்  
 சாதிக்கிற நிரவயவமாயுள்ள  
 வான்மாவைச்சாவயவமாகச்  
 சாதித்துச் சாத்தியதன்மத்தின்  
 விசேடங்கெடுத்ததின் விபரீதம்  
 [Ibid - 289 to 303]

(l)

तत्र च तृतीयोऽपीष्टविधातकृद्विरुद्धः ।  
 यथा परार्थाश्चक्षुरादयः संघातत्वात्  
 शयनासनाधङ्गवत्-इति । तदिष्टासंहत-  
 पारार्थ्यविषयसाधनाविरुद्धः

*Nyaya-pravesa* as quoted by  
 Dharmakirti in *Nyaya-bindu*  
 p. 103 Ibid.

(l)

Dharmakirti drops this  
 variety of *Virudhha* See pp.  
 103 and 104 of the *Nyaya-bindu*.

A careful consideration of the above extracts and similar passages in section XXIX of the *Manimekalai* would immediately convince any scholar knowing sufficient Sanskrit and Tamil that the principles of Buddhist logic as stated to have been expounded by *Aravanavatikāl* are almost entirely based upon Dinnaga's *Nyaya-pravesa* and the author of the *Manimekalai* has faithfully rendered Dinnaga's definitions and illustrations, besides closely following the order of enumeration found in his Sanskrit text. For obvious reasons, therefore, the philosophical sections of the *Manimekalai*, along with the whole epic, of which these sections form an integral part, and in which the Buddhist motif of the plot would look truncated without them, should be assigned to a period not earlier than



Dinnaga. Further, there are certain unmistakable indications to show that this Tamil epic should be assigned to the period between Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. From the following extract from Vacaspatimisra's *Nyaya-varṭika-talparya-tika*, it may be easily made out that Dinnaga's definition of *Pratyakṣa* "प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं" is defective as pointed out in the *Nyaya-varṭika* by Uddyotakara, in that it is vague and there is no reason why it should be taken to apply to *jñāna* while Dharmakirti's definition shows a distinct improvement.

"न हि यथा सम्यग्ज्ञानमधिकृत्य प्रत्यक्षादिलक्षणं कृतं कीर्तिना तथा दिङ्नागेन, येनाधिकारात् ज्ञाने व्यवतिष्ठेत कल्पनापोढमिति भावः ।" *Talparya-tika*, Vidya Vilas Press, Benares, page 154.

This extract evidently refers to the improvement which Dharmakirti introduces in the sub-joined text of the *Nyaya-bindu* :—

"द्विविधं सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च । तत्र कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षम्" pp. 10 and 11 of the Benares editions.

It is clear that Dinnaga omitted to expressly indicate the topical connection of his definition of *Pratyakṣa* with *Jñāna* or *Samyag-Jñāna*, that this omission made it possible for cavilling critics like Uddyotakara to make adverse comments and that Dharmakirti took care to supply this omission and thus disarm any further opposition on this ground. In this connection, the expression *etamil* (ஏதமில்) in the second line of the Tamil extract (a), at page 3 *supra*, deserves special attention. This Tamil phrase is exactly equivalent to *samyak* (सम्यक्), *etamil* literally meaning *flawless*. It scarcely needs any further explanation to see that, consistently with the spirit of the original Sanskrit texts, *etamil*, in the Tamil extract referred to should be construed with *alavai* and thus this Tamil extract also provides an amendment, which is distinctly *post-Dinnaga* and similar to what we find in the corresponding portion of Dharmakirti's *Nyaya-bindu*. But certain important modification in Dinnaga's classification of fallacies which Dharmakirti introduced in his *Nyaya-bindu*, are not found adopted in section XXIX of the *Manimekalai* and the latter faithfully follows Dinnaga's arrangement and classification. Attention is invited in this connection to the extracts and remarks marked (k) and (l) at page 195 *supra*. It would hardly require any effort to understand from these extracts and remarks that, while Dinnaga would include respectively in the scheme of *anaikantika* and *viruddha* the two varieties *viruddhavyabhicari* and *istavighatakr̥t*, the latter corresponding to *dharmaśiṣa-viparitasadhana*, Dharmakirti would simplify the schemes of *anaikantika* and *viruddha* by eliminating the two additional varieties referred to. From all this, it follows as an irresistible conclusion that, while *Manimekalai* should be later than *Dinnaga*, it should also be earlier than *Dharmakirti*. If Uddyotakara could be taken to be earlier<sup>1</sup> than Dharmakirti, it would be easy to see how, during the transition between the former and the latter, a few amendments like *etamil* in the Tamil extract (a) above referred to, might possibly have been introduced by some of the less combative and more loyal followers of Dinnaga, like *Dharmapala*, who came between Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. There is good evidence to believe that Dinnaga flourished in the earlier part of the fifth century A.D.<sup>2</sup> According to Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World* and Dr. Satis-Candra Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic*<sup>3</sup>

1. See pp. LXXVII to LXXIX in the foreword to the *Tattvasangraha* published in the Geakwad's Oriental Series.

2. See pp. LXXIII to LXXVII Ibid. See also Vidyabhusana's 'History of Indian Logic' p. 270. According to Vidyabhusana, Dinnaga's date is circa 450 to 520 A.D. According to the foreword to the *Tattvasangraha*, Dinnaga's date is circa 345 to 345 A.D.

3. Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic* (pp. 302-303.)



Dharmapala should be assigned to circa 600-635 A.D. Should these data be accepted, I do not see how one could get clear away from the conclusion that the *Manimekalai* should be assigned to the beginning of the seventh century A.D., howsoever this view might clash with current notions about the Sangam age of Tamil literature. In the light of these observations and in view of the fact that the name *Aravanavatikāl* looks much like a Tamil translation or adaptation of the name *Acarya-Dharmapala*, it would not be regarded as far-fetched or fanciful to suggest that perhaps *Aravanavatikāl* was a historical character and was no other than the great *Acarya-Dharmapala* himself, who, according to Beal, was born at Kancipura as the eldest son of a great minister, became a Buddhist *Bhikṣu* and ripened into one of the foremost Buddhist logicians and eventually rose to the high rank of the head of the Nalanda University, shortly before *Tuan Cheung* visited India<sup>1</sup>.

These statements come into direct conflict with most of the current notions regarding the Sangam age, from which, it is widely believed, and perhaps rightly also, that the Tamil epic *Manimekalai* cannot be dissociated. It remains for us now to consider whether any useful hint might be put forward which might be expected, on further investigation, to lead to a satisfactory solution of the problems and puzzles regarding the Sangam age. According to Kanakasabhai,<sup>2</sup> the age of the Sangam is the early part of the second century A.D. Mr. Pandit M. Raghava Aiyangar<sup>3</sup> would assign the Sangam literature to the latter half of the fourth century or the earlier half of the fifth century A.D. Professor S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar<sup>4</sup> and the late Diwan Bahadur L. D. Swamikannu Pillai<sup>5</sup> would respectively assign the Sangam literature to the end of the second century and the middle of the eighth century A.D. After discussing all these theories, in a very able and lucid manner, Mr. T. G. Aravamuthan, in his Sankara-Parvati prize thesis—*The Kaveri, the Maikharis and the Sangam Age*—recently published by the Madras University, arrives at the following provisional conclusion (p. 57). “This process of elimination leads to the conclusion that Karikalan, Imayavaramban and Senguttuvan could not have undertaken their northern invasions—within the upper and lower limits we have adopted—in any period other than the one between 208 and 184 B.C., or that from 148 B.C., down to the early years of the Christian era, or again, in the third century A.D.’ Whatever might be the truth regarding the northern invasions by Tamil kings described in the Sangam literature, we have already seen why the *Manimekalai* should be assigned to the beginning of the seventh century A.D. From the available informations about the history of the Pallavas, it may be surmised that the beginning of the seventh century, which marked the beginning of the reign of Mahendra-Vikrama<sup>6</sup>, was not such as would preclude the possibility of certain Tamil kings undertaking northern invasions or northern pilgrimages incidentally associated with a few martial adventures, more especially before the consolidation of Harsavardhana’s power. Perhaps, one of the Malwa kings, stated in the *Cilappatikaram* to have been present at the consecration of Kannaki’s image, was the Buddhist king of Malwa, identified by Professor Sylvain Levi<sup>7</sup> as *Śiladitya I*, surnamed *Dharmaditya* of the Valabhi-dynasty, who reigned from circa 595 to 610 A.D. During the earlier part of his rule, Mahendravarman might have maintained a very favourable attitude towards Buddhism and Buddhist Bhiksus. Probably, he is the king of *Kanci* referred to in section XXVIII of the *Manimekalai*. The miserable plight of Kanci in the grip of famine and similar troubles, as

1. See Vidyabhusana’s *History of Indian Logic* (pp. 302-303).
2. *The Tamils 1800 years ago* (p. 164.)
3. *Seran Senguttuvan* (p. 177.)
4. *Ancient India* (p. 367.)
5. *An Indian Ephemeris*—I-I-108,468.
6. G. Jouveau Dubreuil—*The Pallavas* (p. 37.)
7. See V. A. Smith’s *Early History of India*, 1914 (pp. 324-325.)



described in this section of the *Manimekalai*, may easily be regarded as quite consistent with the Calukyan troubles in the first decade of Mahendravarman's reign. These suggestions may easily be reinforced by certain particulars furnished by two important Sanskrit mss., which were recently acquired by me for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, through its peripatetic search party working under my official direction and control. One of them contains a considerable portion of a metrical romance called the \**Avantisundarikathasara*<sup>1</sup> and the other a small fragment of a prose romance called the † *Avantisundarikatha*<sup>2</sup>. These particulars are : that<sup>3</sup> *Bharavi*, the famous poet was otherwise known as *Damodara* and was a contemporary of *Durvinita*, a Western Ganga prince and of *Sihmavisnu*, the Pallava king of about 590 A.D. ; that<sup>4</sup> *Dandin* was *Bharavi*'s grandson and in the latter part of his life, was the protege of *Narasimhavarman* (circa 646 A.D.), the Pallava king of Kanchi, who was the son and successor of *Mahendravikrama* ; and that *Dandin*, in his boyhood and youth, perhaps during the early years of *Mahendravikrama*, had to leave Kanchi and wander about for several years, when Kanchi was almost devastated<sup>5</sup> by aggressive sieges laid and pushed by enemies like the Calukyan kings, famine and pestilence. The devastated and famine-stricken condition of Kancipura described in section XXVIII of the *Manimekalai* appears to correspond to the similar plight of that city referred to in the *Avantisundarikatha*<sup>6</sup> and *Avantisundarikathasara*,<sup>7</sup> during *Dandin*'s youth, which synchronises with *Mahendravikrama*'s earlier days. Again in the *Avantisundarikatha*, a *sthapati* called *Mandhata*, who was the immediate or proximate ancestor or teacher of another great architect called *Lalitalaya*, a contemporary of *Dandin* and *Narasimhavarman*, is found described as विस्मापितदुर्जय<sup>8</sup> (who excited the wonder of King *Durjaya*). Probably, this *Durjaya* is identical with *Durjaya*<sup>9</sup>, the king of *Angadesa*, referred to in the *Marimskalai*. The historical data furnished by the two anonymous Sanskrit works *Avantisundarikatha* and *Kathasara* are very reliable and cannot be easily brushed aside ; for, these data are corroborated in several respects by inscriptional and other evidences and seem to rest upon a tradition

1. and 2. These two manuscripts are now deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. In 1924, the Sanskrit text of these two incomplete Mss. was printed and published through the Mangalodayam Press, Trichur, by my friend and former pupil—Mr. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri—who was for several years working under me as a member of the peripatetic party of the Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras. The pages of these works referred to in this paper belong to this printed edition.

3. *Avantisundarikatha* page 6 ; *Kathasara* (p. 3.)

4. *Avantisundarikatha*, page 7 ; *Kathasara* (p. 7.)

5. . . . . परचक्रपीडया पर्याकुलेषु द्रमिलचोळपाण्डये (षु) . . . . (आ) रामपङ्क्तिषु भग्नासु

6. . . . . दुर्भिक्षक्षीणके . . . ms. p. 7 . . .

7. सविक्रिये पुरे तस्मिन् परचक्रोपरोधतः ॥

स चचार शुभाचारस्सर्वामूर्विमुदारधीः ॥ (ms. p. 4)

8. विस्मापितदुर्जयस्य मान्धातुनाम्नः स्थपतेः प्रशस्तवास्तुशास्त्रार्थमार . . . . ललितालयनामा (pp. 7-8).

9. *Manimekalai*. Mahamahopadhyaya V. Swaminatha Aiyar's Edn. (7) 99 ; (10) 54 ; (11) 134 ; (12) 40.

\* This was subsequently published in the Dakshina Bharati Series. The K. S. R. Institute has brought out a revised Edn. of the same serially in the J.O.R. Madras. XVI onwards—Ed.

† Since printed in the Trivandrum Skt. Series 172, based on this single ms. Actually *Damodara* according to this work is a friend of *Bharavi* and the great grand-father of *Dandin*—Ed.



which is earlier than the eleventh century A.D.<sup>1</sup> Having due regard to all these facts and to what is said above about the date of the *Manimekalai*, the view which now holds the field regarding the Sangam age, that it cannot be later than the third century A.D., requires a very careful reconsideration at the hands of all those who are anxious to see that historical truth should never be allowed to surrender to mytho-poetic theories. In order to contribute my mite towards a reconsideration of the problem of the Sangam age, I have, in this paper, placed certain noteworthy facts before scholars ; and I also propose to publish in the future issues of this *Journal of Oriental Research*, a careful English translation of sections XXVII, XXIX and XXX of the *Manimekalai*, with suitable annotations where necessary, explaining obscure portions and drawing attention to the correspondences between the *Manimekalai* and Sanskrit works on Buddhist logic like Dinnaga's *Nyaya-pravesa* and Dharmakirti's *Nyaya-bindu*.

## (II)

In an article entitled "The date of the *Manimekalai*" contributed to the last issue of this Journal (*J.O.R.* Vol. I. pp. 321 to 329), my learned and esteemed colleague of Trivandrum, Mr. K. G. Sesha Aiyer, B.A., B.L., Retired Judge, criticises my views on the date of the *Manimekalai*, set forth in my article contributed to Vol. I. of this Journal (pp. 191 to 201). His criticism may be summed up in these four paragraphs.

(1) Granting that the principles of Buddhist logic, as outlined in section XXIX of the *Manimekalai*, are almost entirely based on the *Nyaya-pravesa*, nothing would be "more probable or natural than to ascribe the authorship of the *Nyaya-pravesa* to the greatest logician of the pre-Dinnagan period, Acarya Nagarjuna ; and on this basis, *Manimekalai* need not be assigned to a period posterior even to the second century A.C."

(2) As "there is nothing violent in assigning Dinnaga to the second century A.C. *Manimekalai* need not be posterior to the close of the 2nd or the beginning of the 3rd century A.C. even if Dinnaga be the author of the *Nyaya-pravesa*."

(3) "ஆதி சினேந்திரனளவையிரண்டே ஏதமில் பிரத்தியங் கருத்தள வென்ன" Hardly convincing is the reasoning at pages 196 and 197, Vol. I, of this Journal, that the expression *etamil* in the Tamil extract given above should be construed with *alavai* and may, thus, be taken

<sup>1</sup> Neither in the fragmentary Ms. of the *Avantisundarikatha* nor in the Ms. of the metrical romance—*Avantisundarikathasara* could we find any reference to the author. So, these two works should, for the present, be taken to be anonymous, if we confine our attention strictly to what is found in the Mss. themselves. But, luckily, Bhoja (1018-1060 A.D.), in his mammoth work on Sanskrit Poetics called the *Srngaraprekasa*, says that a poet called Pancasikha is the author of *Sudrakakatha* and uses the word *ananda* in the last verse of each canto, as the distinctive, emblematic word of his composition [Vide the Ms. of Bhoja's *Srngaraprekasa* deposited in the Government Oriental Mss. Library, Madras—Volume II (p. 437 line 13)]. This is an old habit of great poets like Pravarasena, Bharavi and Magha, who use as their respective emblematic the distinctive mark of the composition. No two Sanskrit poets could ever have used the same word as the distinctive mark of their respective compositions. So it may be safely inferred that a poet called Pancasikha, who was earlier to Bhoja, should have written the *Avantisundarikathasara*. About the authorship of the fragmentary Ms. of the *Avantisundarikatha*, nothing useful could be said in the present state of our knowledge.



to embody the post-Dinnagan improvement referred to by Vacaspati Misra in the Sanskrit extract quoted at page 196 *ibid* ; that certain important modifications in Dinnaga's classification of fallacies, which Dharmakirti introduced in his *Nyaya-bindu* are not found adopted in Section XXXX of the *Manimekalai*, which faithfully follows Dinnaga's arrangement and classification ; and that, therefore, the *Manimekalai* should be assigned to the period of transition between Dinnaga and Dharmakirti.

(4) "If Aravanavatikāl must needs be equated with some well-known name in Sanskrit Buddhism, why could it not be with Dinnaga himself ? The only excuse offered against it is the occurrence of *etamil*, a fanciful objection at the best. In Aravanavatikāl's time, Buddhism was at a low ebb. Buddhism was almost aggressively in the ascendant in Dharmapala's days". *Ergo*, it is difficult to imagine that Dharmapala and Aravanavatikāl might be one and the same person.

I considered these criticisms very carefully and I find that they are all untenable. I proceed to deal with them in the order in which they are set forth *supra*.

(1) Professor Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya holds, on the authority of Sanskrit and Tibetan documents, that Dinnaga is the author of the *Nyaya-pravesa*. In his Introduction to the Tibetan text of the *Nyaya-pravesa* published as Part II of No. XXXIX of the Gackwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, he maintains that the evidence furnished by Dinnaga himself, on the one side, in his own vṛtti on his *Pramana-samuccaya* and by Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramanasamuccaya*—and, on the other side, by Dharmakirti, the best known and most authoritative exponent of post-Dinnagan Buddhist logic, could leave absolutely no doubt, whatever, that the real author of the *Nyaya-pravesa* is Dinnaga. The learned Professor also confesses his inability to explain how eminent Chinese authorities like Kwei-chi, who was a great disciple of Yuan-Chwang and wrote a commentary on the *Nyaya-pravesa*, come to attribute that work to Bodhisattava Sankara-svamin, one of the well-known disciples of Dinnaga. In a recent article contributed to the *J.R.A.S.*—January 1928 (pp. 7 to 13), Professor Giuseppe Tucci tries to prove that the author of the *Nyaya-pravesa* is not Dinnaga, but Sankara-svamin, one of his pupils. Professor Tucci, after drawing attention to the weak points in Professor Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya's arguments, clearly shows how the *Nyaya-pravesa* should not be confounded, as is generally done, with Dinnaga's *Nyaya-mukha* to which Dinnaga was referring in his vṛtti on the opening verse of his *Pramana-samuccaya*. It would be desirable to peruse, in this connection, the subjoined extract from Professor Tucci's article above referred to.

"My friend Vidhusekhara Sastri is opposed to the attribution of the *Nyaya-pravesa* to Sankara-svamin, since Yuan-Chwang does not quote in his travels the name of this author. But I do not think that this is a decisive objection, because not only was the book translated by the great pilgrim himself, under the name of Sankara-svamin, but, as can be seen from many passages of the commentaries by Kwei-chi and Shen-t'ai, these Chinese scholars obtained all their information about the authorship and the history of these logical works from none other than their own master."

On the one side, we have the testimony of the Tibetan translations of the *Nyaya-pravesa* and of Haribhadra in favour of ascribing that work to Dinnaga as pointed out by Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya. On the other side, we have the obviously weightier testimony of the ancient Chinese authorities, Kwei-chi and Shen-t'ai, who were directly associated with Yuan-Chwang himself, in favour of Professor Tucci's view that Sankara-svamin is the real author of the *Nyaya-pravesa*. As against these evidences, would it be reasonable to attach any importance to the entry attributing the *Nyaya-pravesa* to Nagarjuna, in the catalogue prepared at the end of the Nineteenth



century by the Japanese Prof. Bunyiu Nanjio ? Prof. Vidhusckhara Bhattacharya has shown how the Japanese Professor might have made a mistake in rendering the Chinese name of the book 'Yu-Lun'. (Vide p. XII. Introduction to the *Nyaya-pravesa*. Part II G.O.S.). Should my learned critic of Trivandrum decide in favour of B. Nanjio's entry attributing the *Nyaya-pravesa* to Nagarjuna, all the evidences adduced on behalf of Dinnaga and Sankara-svamin notwithstanding, I cannot help feeling that such a procedure would be very similar to decreeing in favour of the witness,—the solitary worthless witness—despite all the weighty arguments adduced on behalf of the two really contending parties.

(2) The considerations which have led scholars like Dr. Vincent Smith (*Early History of India*—Appendix IV to Chapter XII) to conclude that Vasubandhu was a contemporary of Chandragupta I and Samudragupta, are irresistible. According to Yuan-Chwang, Vasubandhu lived 'within 1000 years', not 'within the 900 year's after the Nirvana'—(Watters, i, pp. 211-214). Thus the end of Vasubandhu's life should be brought down to the last quarter of the 4th Century A.C. ; and Dinnaga, Vasubandhu's disciple, should have lived in the beginning of the 5th century A.C. Without doing violence to my standard of measuring time, I am unable to see how I can acquiesce in my learned critic's attempt to assign Dinnaga to the 2nd century A.C. It should also be remembered that Brahmanical and Buddhist works on old logic consistently hold that Dinnaga was posterior to Vatsyayana, the famous author of the *Nyayabhasya*. If Sankara-svamin, who was one of Dinnaga's pupils, should have been the author of the *Nyaya-pravesa*, as Prof. Tucci contends, the *Manimekalai*, which presupposes the *Nyaya-pravesa* and Dinnaga's *Pramana-samuccaya* and which, in the enumeration of Pramanas and definition of Pratyksa, contains certain improvements that are distinctly post-Dinnaga and perhaps later than Sankara-svamin also, cannot be assigned to any date earlier than the 7th century A.C.

(3) In his endeavour to reduce *etamil*, in the Tamil extract quoted against (3) *supra*, to the level of an emphatic, but logically purposeless, expletive, through the device of statistical interpretation with reference to a goodly number of Tamil citations, my esteemed critic forgets that *etamil* in a section on logic bristling with precise definitions, not admitting of even a single useless word, is entirely different from the *etamil* due to metrical or musical or poetic exigencies. A due appreciation of the full significance of the remarks of Vacaspatimisra quoted at p. 196 of this Journal (Vol. I. Part II) and of the observations in the first fifteen lines at page 197 (*ibid*) ought to be sufficient to enable my critic to make out why I consider that the *Manimekalai* should be later than Dinnaga and earlier than Dharmakirti.

(4) Indeed *etamil* has nothing directly to do with the suggested equation of Aravanavatikāl with Acarya Dharmapala. Nor is there anything in my article under reference to make it appear to my critic that I am satisfied as to the identity suggested. Will my critic kindly note again the query mark in the title of my article referred to and consider again the last sentence at Page 197 of Vol. I of this Journal ? If he should choose to concede that the fortunes of Buddhism in Kanci and Nalanda need not have been similar in the same period and that, while it was flourishing in the latter area it might be declining in the former, he would find it easy to imagine that the suggested equation is plausible. Further, when Yuan Chwang visited Nalanda, Silabhadra was presiding over it ; when that Chinese pilgrim visited Kausambi, Dharmapala's monastery there was in ruins, (Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records* Vol. I. p. 237) ; and the account which the pilgrim gives concerning the state of Buddhism in Kanci during his visit to that city shows that there were signs of a recent revival of that faith there—(Beal's *Buddhist Records* Vol. II, pp. 229



and 230). I put it to the advocate of the theory that the Sangam age cannot be later than the 3rd century. A.D., whether it would not be reasonable to assume, in view of the facts explained by me, that Acarya Dharmapala might have returned to Kanci after his retirement from Nalanda in the early part of the 7th century A.D., sufficiently long before Yuan Chwang's visit to allow time for Dharmapala's monastery in Kausambi to fall into ruins, and might have resuscitated Buddhism in Kanci and further south. Having regard to all the facts, may not the equation of Aravanavatikai with Dharmapala be quite plausible ?

It only remains for me to conclude with the hope that historical truth will never be allowed to surrender to *mytho-poetic theories*—the last phrase being advisedly used in the sense recognised in the Oxford Dictionary as well established, and that scholars of the type of my learned critic, with a reputation for a perfect judicial frame of mind, will always be open to conviction and be prepared to reconsider their views regarding the age of Sangam literature.







# श्रीगुरुचरितम्

रचयिता—

प्रो. एम्. रामकृष्ण भट्टः, एम्. ए., विद्वान्.

(विद्याभास्करः, विद्यासागरः, कविताचतुरः)

निवृत्तसंस्कृतविभागाध्यक्षः, हिन्दू महाविद्यालयः, दिल्ली विश्वविद्यालयः







ŚRĪH

## INTRODUCTION

It is said that all works of art including literature are the result of inspiration, which in Sanskrit parlance is termed *Pratibhā* or genius. Śrutis declare that the creator plunged himself into penance, Tapas, before he undertook the work of creation, which became an artistic product and a source of inspiration to later creative geniuses. Could anybody deny that this world of myriad forms and hues, sounds and tastes, movements and stances, is but an ideal work of art? Are not poets, sculptors, painters, musicians and dancers inspired by Nature, the handiwork of the Master Craftsman? Vālmiki, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa were such inspired literary artists working on Vāk and Artha (word and meaning). For, the author of the immortal Ādikāvya was blessed and inspired by no less an agency than the Divine Consort of the Goddess of Learning. Even spiritual inspiration is derived, sometimes, from nature such as a flight of birds against the background of dark clouds, a cataract, a lofty mountain, the dawn, sunset etc. by men of the calibre of the illustrious Paramahansa. In short, there is nothing in the universe that does not act as a source of inspiration to discerning eyes and feeling hearts.

When information was received by this writer about the Birth-Centenary of his revered Guru, Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppaswami Sastri, to be celebrated sometime after December 1980, he thought he could write something to discharge his indebtedness to the eminent scholar and patron of education, especially Sanskrit, that his Guru was to the core of his being. So while sitting in front of his Iṣṭadevatā he prayed for guidance and lo! it came in the form of an inner urge to write a poem on his brilliant life and ideals. His prayer to the Lord was to the effect that the poem should, in every respect, be worthy of that illustrious scholar and saintly person. Inspiration thus flowed urging the poet to depict his Guru's life in the best possible light. When this writer reflected on the magnificence of that life and personality, he was reminded of the great virtues of Śrī Rāmachandra recounted by sage Nārada to Vālmiki. In fact, the Guru was affection and kindness personified to his students, subordinates and others. His pupils found in him an Ajātaśatru, friend of all and enemy to none. This poet has incorporated in this poem many small incidents in the Guru's life, which came to his notice, and which are of no small significance from the point of his spiritual ripeness, sympathy for the poor and the down-trodden, as well as a burning desire to revive and rejuvenate our ancient culture and Sanskrit education. For, Sanskrit in all its branches was his life-breath, as it were. Accordingly, the poet has delineated the great qualities of head and heart of the Professor from his reconstructed natal chart acting as the foundation. The Professor's visit to the holy presence of Bhagavān Ramaṇa Maharṣi, the Sage of Aruṇācala, and his dialogue with his Riksha-puller are some of the points to be remembered as significant



in this connection. From his very birth the hero of this poem showed extra-ordinary powers of memory and devotion and zeal for learning. He was fortunate in being born in an illustrious family of scholars and saintly persons.

This poem contains four cantos in different metres. The first canto, entitled *Gurūdaya*, deals with the birth and parentage of the hero and his all-round development. In the beginning, there is a description of the Kāverī river whose banks were sanctified by the footprints of great saints like Śrī Sadāśiva Brahmendara Sarasvatī, and of the Gaṇapati Agrahāra in Tanjore where the hero's birth took place. The child was originally named Veṅkaṭarāma, but later came to be known as *Kuppusvāmi* prophetically, as he later became an erudite scholar in all Sastras, wherein he attained the depth of knowledge comparable to that of a deep *Kūpa* or well. His maternal grandfather viz. Śrī Veṅgu Śāstrigal, is shown here as considering the magnificent results accruing from the numerous Yogas or planetary configurations at the child's birth. Readers will find that the poet has tried to reconstruct the Guru's horoscope on the basis of his life and achievements and made appropriate delineations in 21 verses. The maternal grandfather's extraordinary interest in the child's future is shown by means of his teaching the little child the *Mūkapañcaśatī* and feeding him one early morning with sanctified milk. His education, both modern and Śāstraic, is described in detail, especially his training in Nyāya, Mimāṃsā, Prasthānatraya etc., under great masters like Śrī Vāsudeva Brahmendra Sarasvatī. He became a *Kalāprabhu* when he graduated and was aptly called Śāstrin by the people for his great erudition in the Śāstras. His temporary employment in the Revenue Board and subsequent resignation are described poetically (verse 85). In his 25th year he became *Sampūrṇa-kalānidhi* (M.A.). Then follow descriptions of his entering upon the second stage of life and of observing its duties. As a true *Gṛhastha* he performed the five daily sacrifices including the recitation of Upaniṣads, Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra etc. His being blessed with issue also is briefly referred to. The first canto ends with the hearty appreciation of the young scholar's evening lectures on Vedāntic topics in Mylapore by learned audiences, especially by Sri V. Krishnaswami Ayyar.

In the second canto, which is entitled *Guruprasāda* (Guru's Grace) we come across the hero being made Captain of the ship of the new Sanskrit College started by Sri V. Krishnaswami Ayyar. As Principal he taught here Śāstras like Mimāṃsā and Vedānta with perfect authority, as he was old in virtues and scholarship, though young in age. Being a man of lofty ideals, he never became vainglorious despite his deep and vast knowledge, and never boastful despite charity. He respected the worshipping, delighted in the company of worthy friends, and being affectionate towards his pupils, treated them as his own children (II-4). In this College he performed thus the Sacrifice of Knowledge resulting in *Apūrya* (also unique) effect for five years. Soon he was honoured by being invited to be the Chairman of the Board of Examiners in Sanskrit in the Madras University. Thereafter the Vāṇivilāsa Press of Śrīraṅgam chose him for editing the complete works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. Then he was invited to study the situation prevailing in the Rajah's Sanskrit College at Tiruvaiyyar and make recommendations



## GURUCARITA—INTRODUCTION

v

for its all-round development. Later he was requested by the Rajah to take up the Principalship of that College. In his 32nd year he was appointed to the prestigious Chair of Sanskrit in the Presidency College, Madras, by the then Government. There he taught the six systems of philosophy and Comparative Philology of Indo-European Languages, in which he was such a great authority that even English professors sought his help in clearing their doubts regarding etymology of rare words etc. Like a powerful monarch who plays the dual role of administering the kingdom and conquering other territories, he shouldered the curatorship of the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library along with his onerous duties of lecturing in the College and outside (II. 19-22). In this manner many a position of authority and honour came to him unasked. Owing to his legal acumen and logical judgements he became an object of respect in the University Councils like the Senate. He was also responsible for starting the Honours and and Śīromaṇi courses in the University. He was not a mere teacher to the pupils, but a friend, guide and philosopher to them indeed. Even those scholars who were jealous at heart of his eminence became submissive to him on account of his uniform kindness and generosity. At this juncture honour sought him from far and near. For, the Benares Hindu University requested him to be a member of its Court. He guided his students to do research and get the Ph. D. degree (*Vidyāvācaspati*). He was at the same time busy giving courses of lectures on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika etc. In this manner this *Gurughana* (lowering cloud or teacher-cloud) poured the showers of knowledge every year, without let or hindrance. Then he started the Journal of Oriental Research in the University. He paid due attention to the development of his students' aptitude for histrionics, music etc. and to foster their interest therein he founded with the help of friends and scholars the Madras Sanskrit Academy, where many festivals were celebrated in honour of Kālidāsa and other poets, along with poetic symposia, music recitals, dramatic performances, lectures on the Bhagavad Gīta etc.

It was at the height of his glory that the Govt. of India honoured this great professor and erudite scholar with the title (rank) of Ācāryaratna (I.E.S.), as a result of which the people truly became *Acāryavān* (possessed of a great Guru) (II. 47-49). He wrote innumerable articles on various topics such as the Prābhākara School of Karma-Mīmāṃsā, Rāvaṇabhāṣya, Bodhāyana and Damaṇḍācārya, Compromises in the History of Vedānta, Sri Ramakrishna and the Message of Hinduism, etc.

At this juncture he heard of the young Sage of Aruṇācala, Śrī Ramaṇa Maharṣi (II. 55-57). Once our Guru happened to visit Tiruvannamalai and prayed to the Lord at the famous temple in enchanting verses (59-67). From the temple he wended his way to the Ramaṇāśrama (Sage's hermitage) and beheld the Sage seated quietly with winkless eyes in *Sahaja Samādhi* (69-73). After making obeisance he sat in meditation in front of the Sage. There he had a wonderful experience of the Ātman, and felt as if he had awoken from a deep sleep, nay, got a new birth, as it were (76-80). The following three verses of adoration express his sense of deep indebtedness to the Sage. The expression “तत्त्वं प्रसीद मायि जन्मनि जन्मनीह,” meaning—“Hence, Thou shouldst be gracious unto me in life after life” is proof of his complete surrender to the Enlightened One. In the next verse our hero affirms that inasmuch as he has secured the



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

worthy *Guru-Kaustubha* (Gem of Master of mighty *Kaustubha*), he has become *Acyuta* (Lord *Nārayaṇa*, or imperishable). He considered himself to be blessed by the Sage's silent but powerful gaze. As a result of this infusion of spiritual power, he became world-famous and powerful like the Sun released from the ring of clouds, or like gold reinforced with fragrance. The last verse of this canto refers to the poet's previous works like the *Mahākāvya* entitled *Śrīśivānandavilāsaḥ* and *Śrīrāmakṛṣṇā-sahasranāmastotram*.

The third canto is interesting also from the point of metrology: It consists of 62 verses, all being in different metres except the first and the last. It employs 51 varieties of the *Vṛtta*, 7 of *Jāti* and three of *Daṇḍaka* type. This canto, named *Guru-vaibhavam*, describes the numerous honours and titles conferred on him by distinguished institutions, saints and sages or *Maṭhādhipatis* such as the *Vidyāvācaspati* by the *Bhāratadharmamahāmaṇḍala*, *Kalānidhi* by H. H. Śaṅkarācārya of Kāncī Maṭha, *Kulapati* by the Jagadguru of Puri Maṭha and last and the greatest viz. *Mahāmahopādhyāya* by the Govt. of India. In this connection there are appropriate descriptions of the Kanchi town and Ācārya. After this, various institutions and organizations noted for research and higher learning in oriental disciplines vied with one another in inviting him to preside over their prestigious conferences: He presided over the Classical Sanskrit and Modern Vernaculars Section of the First All-India Oriental Conference, Poona. Then he chaired the Indian Philosophy Section of the Second A.I.O. Conference, Calcutta. He organised very successfully its next Conference at Madras. The statement that prosperity follows prosperity in quick succession is not false. For, he was invited to preside again over the Indian Philosophy Section of the above Conference at Allahabad. He presided over the 10th All-India Sanskrit Conference at Calcutta. Next he chaired the Indian Philosophy Section of the Tenth All-India Philosophy Congress, held at Waltair, and delivered the Presidential address on "Purnaism in Indian Thought". In the Pandits' Conference held at Mysore he spoke in Sanskrit from the chair on the necessity of adopting the comparative method by traditional Sanskrit scholars. Then there is a description of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, where our hero was given the honour to preside over its annual conference. He was also made a member of that Institute. Our Guru was not merely an expert in Sanskrit and allied subjects, but was deep in his knowledge of Tamil and other languages. As he was comparable in this aspect to Sage Agastya (father of Tamil learning), he was invited to be a member of the Tamil Lexicon Committee.

Though the Professor retired from Govt. service at the age of 55 years, yet he did not refrain from teaching the world of students and scholars all over the country. At this juncture he was honoured by the Madras University by being invited to deliver the Convocation address to the new graduates in the year 1936. Like the veritable *Kulapatis* of ancient *Gurukulas* he advised the graduates, *inter alia*, to stick to the path of truth, honour parents, teachers etc., quoting relevant passages from the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. After this came a request from the Annamalai University to him to be its Hon. Professor of Sanskrit. He accepted this offer, as he was fond of students and dissemination of the ancient learning. Even at this period of time he did not rest on his oars. For, he wrote several books and articles for propagating his



## GURUCARITA—INTRODUCTION

vii

ideas and ideals. Under his expert guidance the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, published more than 60 volumes of Descriptive Catalogues of Mss. on various subjects. These works have been of paramount importance and help for generations of research scholars all over the world. He edited also jointly with Prof. Rangacharya the *Padyacūḍamaṇi*. His scholarly introductions to the editions of the *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇṇayacampū*, *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, *Viṇāvāsavadatta*, *Śaktibhadra's Āscaryacūḍamaṇi*, *Maṇḍanamīśra's Vibhramaviveka* etc., and authorship of "A Primer of Indian Logic" etc. hold the mirror to his vast knowledge and love for his students. He corrected the corrupt readings of the *Dhvanīyāloka* and *Lōcana* and wrote a new commentary entitled the *Upalocana*. His introduction to the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* is acclaimed as both instructive and inspiring. Another mile-stone in his writings is the erudite introduction that he wrote to the English translation of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* by Swami Madhavananda. Another interesting work of his was one on "Library Science as viewed by a Classicist". He also wrote on "*Abrahmajijñāsā*" in the Madras University Journal, analysing the root cause of the tree of worldly existence. He wrote a critical article on the expression *Bhadanta* on the basis of *Bhadraṇi Te*, *Bhānīva Dantāḥ Yasya* etc., as well as on *Sundara Pāṇḍya*. He asserted in an article the truth that a true teacher is one who has a good library—*Kośavān Ācāryaḥ*. He wrote on "Synonyms and Homonyms" in the *Journal of the Madras Library Association*. Thus, there was no Śāstra, nor Kāvya, ancient or modern, where the foremost of the virtuous did not exhibit his mastery. He used to advise Sanskrit scholars to the effect that they should efface the infamy that even great masters of Sanskrit learning stumble on the path of modern comparative methods. For, they should aim at the real *Advaita* or fruitful fusion of these two paths. In this manner, he delivered innumerable lectures and wrote articles. His inspiring, exhaustive and clear lectures on Comparative Philology of Indo-European Languages, have been a source of instruction and delight to generations of students even to this day. One of his pupils later wrote a condensed Sanskrit version of that science. Like another *Patañjali* he wished to enunciate the philosophy of grammar, since that was the dearest abode of the Goddess of Learning. He provided his pupil-sailors with the rafts of critical guidance and instruction on both Pūrva and Uttara Mimāṃsās. Some of his research students analyzed the Soul of Poetry *vis-a-vis* Dhvani and Rasa. Yet others probed the contributions of Bhāsa, Bhoja and others. Some of his sharp-witted disciples investigated the Pāṇinīyan schools of interpretation like the Kāśikā, Prakriyāsarvasya etc., delving into rare manuscripts. Thus our Guru's life was such that nothing was dearer to him than imparting knowledge, which was verily his life-breath, food, shelter, mother, father, nay, the supreme aim of life itself. His words, therefore, were the rays of the rising Sun, as it were, for awakening even slumbering dullards into intelligence and initiative. He, who lived in the sacred precincts of the Kapāliśvara Agrahāra in Mylapore, got up early in the morning and performed his matinal religious duties with *Bhasma-tripuṇḍra* on his forehead, offered the noon-tide worship to the Sun, fed guests and ate his food. Wearing a *Tilaka* and chewing *Tāmbūla*, he came to the Presidency College in his vehicle. The penultimate verse of this canto explains in the *Vipulā* type of *Āryā* that the Guru of extensive fame (*Vipulakīrti*), well-versed in *Vṛtta-vidhi* (rules of conduct, or presody and law), transformed his pupils of varied conduct into men of



ideal character by means of precept and practice. The last stanza refers to the title of this canto and to the previous works of the poet viz. *Kāvyaodyānam*, *Kāvyaamañjarī*, *Arjunah*, *Kañci-jagadgurumahimastotram* and *Gurusaparyā*.

The Fourth and last Canto entitled *Gurubrahmabhūyam* and composed in the Upajāti metre, contains in all 107 verses. In the beginning the disciple asks whether a devout Śiṣya would be content with dwelling on his Guru's glorious achievements, even as a devotee with the singing of the magnificent attributes, of his Iṣṭadevatā, or a love-lorn person separated from his beloved, with reflection on, singing, recounting, lamenting and talking about all her charming qualities, sometimes in dream or in front of her portrait. Being wedded to his religious duties, the Professor would go to the Presidency College generally a bit late. In spite of this, the authorities would keep mum and bow to him, being over-awed by his spiritual effulgence. He travelled mostly in his Riksha through the broad and quiet Beach Road. (*Padavi*) which was horripilated, as it were, by the contact of the wave-arms of the Bay of Bengal. Later on he maintained his own motor car. At College the students used to await anxiously the Professor's arrival. Oh! What a dignified bearing was his! That bright face lit with a smile, that charming and noble dress—all these would melt even an iron heart. His worship-pable and flawless body was an illustration, as it were, for the science of physiognomy, so much so that it reminded one of Śrī Rāmachandra, the Supreme Puruṣa. Here the poet describes in 14 verses his Guru's limbs from head to foot. With the gait of an elephant the Guru entered the lecture-hall as well as the hearts of his pupils. In verse 20 his turbaned head is shown as shining like the firmament with a cluster of autumnal clouds. Next (22) his broad forehead with the Tilaka by the side of the lustrous eyes is described as defeating by its charm the lunar orb with its shining spot, flanked by brilliant stars. The poet feels in the next verse that one would really be overwhelmed with emotion, while bringing back to memory the Guru's smiling face, fore-head bright with sacred ashes, eyes with sparkling pupils and the pair of round spectacles. At this time one of his pupils, a *Kalāsumūrti*<sup>1</sup> (of amiable personality owing to his proficiency in fine arts) painted a fine portrait of the Professor, when he was seated in his house on a chair, having classes from noon till nightfall without feeling tired. He would never stop explaining things repeatedly until the doubt of students were completely cleared. His house was like a hermitage, to which came scholars and friends for their own edification. He had many distinguished persons as his close friends like Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer, Sir P. S. Sivaswami Iyer, V. V. Srinivasa Ayyangar and S. Satyamurthi.

At that time Mylapore, where dwelt respectable Vedic Scholars and advocates, and which is noted for its great temples, was called the *Vārāṇasī* transplanted elsewhere. It is shown here that tourists flock to this city for various purposes but ultimately all worship the Lord Kapali-śvara at Mylapore before returning to their native places. Our Guru resided at that time in house no. 5 of the North Mada Street, which was verily like an abode of gods and held the

<sup>1</sup> It was Śrī Śivārāmamūrti, this poet's close friend and College-mate.



## GURUCARITA—INTRODUCTION

ix

quintessence of the universe. He entertained daily not only guests and his kith and kin, but fed with pleasure a number of poor students. That was not all : Being kind-hearted he gave monetary help to the indigent among his pupils. For, he beheld the Lord Śiva the Penniless, in them (V. 36). He fed sumptuously leading Vaidikas, pupils and others on festive occasions. For example, he gave such a feast to all of them on the occasion of the first birth-day celebration of his grand-daughter. The Professor's son named Śeṣagiri at that time was a graduate having attained proficiency in languages as well as fine arts.

Our Guru always spoke in graceful and simple Sanskrit even on sublime subjects at the meetings of the Madras Sanskrit Academy. On one such occasion he explained beautifully in his presidential speech the different meanings of the Śākuntala verse, “Yad yat sādhu na citre . . .” to the great joy and instruction of the audience. Being firmly established in inner strength, he never uttered, even at home, a single word that was improper or undignified, but observing the queer behaviour of people, he induced his Muse to express his anguish in rhythmic language. Once, it appears, he beheld a lady of a respectable family, not dressed sufficiently decently, standing in a goldsmith's shop intensely engrossed in observing the making of a gold ornament, in her greed for ornaments. By this sight his *Pratibhā* was roused into action and he composed a fine verse beginning with the words, नारीवावलि कविता, whose idea this poet has couched in a slightly different form : This charming house-wife, being devoid of appropriate attire and ornaments, does not at all shine though born in a noble family, even as excellent poetry suggestive of *Rasa*, does not, without natural *Samśkāras* (purity of language and embellishments). In verse 44 the Professor's composition is compared to the Bearer of the Sacred River Gaṅgā (*Gaṅgādhara*) owing to its excellent *Rasa*. Though he observed at home meticulously the rules of his *Varṇa*, yet elsewhere our Guru beheld the same Brahman all around in a dog, *Śvapāka*, cow and Brāhmaṇa.

Here an interesting episode is narrated : Once his Harijan Riksha-puller took leave for a couple of days and went to his village; but returned to duty only after several days' absence. Being questioned by the Master, he spoke with profuse apologies thus : My lord, please listen. I have eaten your salt for years and grown strong. Hence please do not take me for an ungrateful wretch. It is true that my fault is very serious. I beseech you, therefore, to forgive me and my offence, after understanding its reason. When I reached my village, my sister's marriage had been fixed to take place in a few days thence. My family, which was very large formerly, has been unfortunately become depleted at present. For this reason my presence there became all the more necessary for the event.” Being questioned by the curious Master about the cause of his *Kula-śūla* (family crisis), the servant replied, “Svāmin, what can I say about people's queer mental attitude? For, many members of my family renounced their own religion like a piece of cloth, and embracing another, severed all connection with the family and thus brought disgrace to it. Propagandists of that path strive hard to entice others by means of gifts of wealth, clothes, medicines etc., with the aim of increasing their numbers. Now these relatives of mine too felt happy and contented with the money gifted by them, and have forgotten their Gods and kinsmen,”

B



Thereupon the Master observed, "Generally money is dearer than even one's life. For, everybody wants to live happily with the help of wealth. Hence in this ephemeral existence, why did you too not adopt their course, so that your life, cursed with poverty, might have become sweet and happy?" On hearing these words of the learned Master the ignorant, illiterate servant replied, "Sire, all beings in this world carry out willy-nilly the supreme will of *Īśvara*. Having given me birth in this ancient family, would He wish to change it immediately? So, following His will, I am unable to renounce the Dharma that was followed by my ancestors." This reply of the illiterate servant astonished and touched the Master's heart deeply (V. 46-60). Later using this anecdote our Guru explained to his students the difference between culture and civilization.

It is a truism that propriety is the foundation of success in human endeavour. Similarly a poet too attains fame and inner joy by observing *Aucitya* in poetry. The Professor drove home this ideal to the students in a verse wherein the emphasized that all schools of literary criticism like those of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* depend entirely on *Aucitya* for their existence. Once our Guru visited Mangalore on the shore of the southern sea (Arabian sea) and declared open the *Advaitasabhā* building, in a Sanskrit speech sparkling with wit and wisdom for the delectation of the entire audience. The president of that *Sabhā* was Dr. M. V. Śāstri, a famous Āyurvedic physician and Sanskrit scholar. Finding our Professor suffering from bronchial trouble, the physician advised him to take daily a dose of honey for maintaining health. The reader may note the general statements in verses 66 & 67.

At the age of sixty years he retired from the Chair of the Annamalai University also and repaired to his village home like a bird hurrying back to its nest in the evening. In that quiet house he spent his time by observing Dharma and meditation. Gradually his body though strong became enfeebled by old age as well as bronchitis. When he was lying on his sick-bed like the venerable Bhiṣma on the bed of arrows, groups of devout pupils, relatives and others attended upon him, as they were eager to listen to his exposition of the Upaniṣadic truths. He was at that time like the fire about to be extinguished outwardly, but burning still with red hot embers within. Then his son with the assistance of others performed *Graha-Yajña*, *Mṛtyuñjaya Japa*, Vedic recitation etc., for the Professor's speedy recovery. As a result of the merit born of the gift of cows, wealth and corn, health returned to his body even as stolen property does to the owner on account of the powerful monarch. However, when the individual soul reaches the end of the tether, no amount of propitiations or medications can save it. For, neither a Vedic scholar nor a physician has control over destiny. So at the age of 63 years his physical frame was attacked all of a sudden by the powerful disease, just as the fortress of a resident king is by the cruel army of the enemy. In spite of its deadly attack, he was able to withdraw his mind from external objects and repeat the *Mahāvākyas* with a smile on his lips and peace at heart. Being fixed in the Atman, he reflected on the planetary transits as well as the current major and minor periods of the planets and came to the conclusion that the time for the upward flight of the life-bird had arrived. For the ruling



## GURUCARITA—INTRODUCTION

xi

Daśā (major period) was that of Saturn in debilitation, stationed at birth in the 12th house from the Moon, the Bhukti (sub-period) that of Rāhu and Antara (minor period) that of Saturn, since mysterious is the course of Karman. And so he controlled his breath in the heart early in the morning on a Sunday in the jovial year Subhānu, when the Sun was in his own house, Mercury and Jupiter in exaltation and the Moon in sign Libra. The scholars who were seated around him found the Master with his gaze fixed between the brows, and quickly sipped the water and recited the holy names of the Lord Viṣṇu along with the most sacred Upaniṣadic texts. Then lo! the brilliant star-like soul-effulgence came out of the crown of his head and shot fast through the sky towards the Sun. At this people suddenly burst into tears and wailed aloud:—"Alas! Alas!! As misfortune would have it, the Sun that awakens the heart-lotuses and worshipped by all, has suddenly set even in the morning, causing great grief to the world. When could people see once again such a true teacher who was their close friend and benefactor, with a heart over-flowing with the milk of compassion, charming with ideal conduct, and who advised them the path of progress? Now, all on a sudden, the Goddess of Learning and the Vedic tradition, that magnanimity, have all become things of mere memory. So have great erudition in Vedic and Śāstraic learning as well as eloquence in Saṁskṛta speech. No doubt, there are very great scholars in individual disciplines; but there wasn't any, nor would there be hereafter one who was at once a monarch in all Śāstras and virtues. . . ." (81-87). As a result of these lamentations of the people who were shedding torrents of tears the Agrahāra looked as though suddenly covered with untimely clouds. Owing to excessive grief even the morning breeze was not cool, the cuckoo did not warble sweetly, nay, even the temple bells rang with a muffled ring. However, seeing the heart-lotus of the people withered with grief, the Divine Mitra (Sun) was seen immediately rising up into the firmament with His uplifted rays (hands) for consoling it. When the obsequial rites were properly performed by his son, the Guru ascended to the eternal Abode of the Creator and shone there in the company of Brahmaṛṣis verily like the Sun with the Sages known as Vāḷakhilyas.

Thereafter the Guru's pupils and friends put their heads together and founded in his name a Research Institute with a view to furthering His dreams as well as publishing His works and promoting research. Now that the Guru is everywhere in his spiritual form, helping the dissemination of knowledge by inducing from within the lineage of his disciples to do glorious deeds and to produce literary works.

"Oh Master mine, being now merged in the form of my *Iṣṭadevatā* viz. Lord Mahā-gaṇapati, Thou inspirest all to do noble deeds, and drivest them away from evil ones. Hence kindly accept our prostrations. Oh! How many benefactions of indescribable magnitude have been done to this person, the undeserving pupil, by Thee out of supreme compassion, for his future prosperity! Still under the influence of Māyā, O my Lord, Thy commandments were not carried out by him, being forgetful of the dreadful beasts (thoughts) in his greed for the sweet honey in the jungle of mundane existence. May Your Honour, therefore, kindly forgive him all his faults, whether committed by the body or mind, in the waking or other states, just as a



father does his son's offences. O Guru, at present this person's mind is greatly exercised by the worry as to how he could repay adequately that vast debt he owes You even by a hundred lives. However, by utilizing the Guṇa (virtue and string) of the learning imparted by Thee, he has wreathed this pretty garland of poem, with the fragrance of devotion and the tender leaves of imageries, for the grand Birth-Centenary Celebrations." In this manner the poet explains how the assembly of international scholars would pay their due respects to the Guru. Once even this writer was invited to perform vocal penance by delivering an address in Sanskrit on the *Bhagavadgītā* under the auspices of the Sanskrit Academy. The Guru in *Brahmaloka* is besought for leading us, His faltering, wretched children, to the path of eternal bliss. Dwelling in the Author's heart, He inspired him to write this poem. So with pleasure He may accept this as his humble *Gurudakṣiṇā*, and save him. Finally, there is a prayer to the effect that all the mental afflictions of men such as hostility towards Dharma, atheistic policies etc., that are caused by evil spirits, may disappear by the power of His gentleness, nobility and penance, and the Sun of pure knowledge with burnished lustre (or with the lustre of Saṁskṛta) blaze forth in the sky of the human heart filled with light. The penultimate verse reveals that this author feels happy to some extent that it has been possible for him to worship the Lovely Lord Mahāgaṇapati in the form of his Guru by means of this nice poem, as though he had been absolved of his debt only through His gracious side-long glances. After all, whatever is hard to achieve for man in this world when the *Sadguru* is favourably disposed? In the last verse the calendar of the day (II. 8-'80) on which this poem was completed has been detailed.\*

OM TAT SAT

- 
- \* (1) The author is indebted for details in the life of "Mahāhopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri" to a brochure of this title by V. Raghavan, published by the K.S.R. Institute, Madras, in 1971 at its Silver Jubilee.
- (2) An appendix to the poem gives details of the metres employed in canto-III.
- (3) Readers may be interested to know that this writer had a vision of his Guru in a pleasant dream on the night of the 3rd-4th Sept. 1980.



## GURUCARITA—INTRODUCTION

xiii

- (4) For the benefit of readers who are interested in astrology the two charts, of birth and demise, of our Guru are given below :

## CHART I OF BIRTH

He was born on 15th Dec. 1880 at 6-47 A.M., on Wednesday under II Pada of the asterism Rohiṇi in the Gaṇapati Agrahāra or Tanjore. Ascendant=

$\begin{smallmatrix} s & o & / & '' \\ 8 & - & 5 & - & 36 & - & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$ .  $\begin{smallmatrix} s & o & / \\ \text{Moon} & = & 1 & - & 13 & - & 55 \end{smallmatrix}$ .  $\begin{smallmatrix} s & o & / & '' \\ \text{Mandi} & = & 10 & - & 22 & - & 45 & - & 42 \end{smallmatrix}$ .  
Balance of Moon's Daśā at birth=7 yrs. 0 m. 26 d.

*Note:* The figures by the side of the planets give the Navāṃśa Rāsis.

Jupiter 9	Sat. 1	Moon 2	Ketu 8
Mandi 1	I		—
Venus 12			—
Rahu 2 Lag. 2 Sun 1	Mars 8 Merc. 7	—	—

CHART II OF DEMISE: He passed way on Sunday the 5th Sept. 1943 a little after sunrise.

—	—	Mars 2	Sat. 7
—	II		Jup. 10 Rahu 10
Ketu 4			Sun 6 Lag. 9 R. Ven. 6
—	—	Moon 12	Merc. 2







श्रीसिद्धिविनायको विजयते

## गुरुचारितम्

॥ प्रथमः सर्गः ॥

प्रणम्यादौ पुण्यं प्रणवपुषं वेदपुरुषं गुरुणामाद्यं त्वां गुरुतरतनुं वारणमुखम् ।  
गुरोश्चारित्रं तद् दुरितहरमारादुरुकवेर्यतिष्येऽनुप्रज्ञं प्रथितमिह गातुं कुषिणः ॥ १ ॥

उदात्तसत्त्वः कमनीयसद्गुणो विनम्रशीलो हनवद्यविद्यया ।  
विभाति भास्वानिव रश्मिमालया नरोत्तमो योऽस्ति स काव्यनायकः ॥ २ ॥

अगस्त्यतेजस्विनि दक्षिणापथे चकास्ति पुण्येह कवेरकन्यका ।  
निजैः पयोभिर्मधुरैर्भृताखिलावनीजनिर्जीवनपोषिणी सरित् ॥ ३ ॥

प्रगे च सायं वटवः पटुस्वराः सुमन्त्रघोषा ह्यघमर्षणोचिताः ।  
सुगन्धिमन्दानिलसन्तरङ्गिते जलेऽत्र मज्जन्ति धृतव्रताः क्वचित् ॥ ४ ॥

कृषीवला लाङ्गलमुख्यसाधनव्रजैर्निजांसोपहितैस्तरन्ति याम् ।  
क्वचिद्वलीवर्दवरान्पुरोगतान्निनादमाधुर्यद्वतान्नुदन्यपि ॥ ५ ॥

यदीयनीरैरघमार्जनैः पुरा परामुपेत्यान्तरशान्तिमव्ययम् ।  
परात्मतत्त्वं परहंसशब्दिता महर्षयः सञ्जगुरात्मवेदिनः ॥ ६ ॥

परशतास्ते शिवभक्ततल्लजा विलोकयन्तः परमेश्वरं जगुः ।  
समन्ततस्तन्मयतोन्मदिष्णवः स्वदेशवाचा नयनारसंज्ञिताः ॥ ७ ॥

सदाशिवब्रह्मयतीन्द्र इत्ययं महातपस्वी सुगृहीतनामभाक् ।  
सदेहमुक्तः स्म पुनाति यत्तटं ह्यटव्यया भावपथातिगो विभुः ॥ ८ ॥

तटे च यस्या नृपनिर्मिता महोविचित्रशिल्पा सुरसन्नसन्ततिः ।  
महोजतैर्गोपुरशेखरैः पुरन्दरं दरस्मेमुखं तनोत्यलम् ॥ ९ ॥

इहैव तज्ज्ञापुरनाम पत्तनं निकुञ्जपुञ्जद्युतिरञ्जितोर्वरम् ।  
सुधर्मसङ्कीर्तितकीर्तिवैभवं विराजते धार्मिकराजतेजसा ॥ १० ॥



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

समप्रविद्याविभवैर्मनीषिभिर्निषेवितो विप्रगणैरहर्निशम् ।  
 इहामहाराडस्ति गणेशसंज्ञितः श्रुतिस्वनोत्सारितपापसञ्चयः ॥ ११ ॥  
 गणेशपूर्वामरसम्भूषितोऽप्युमासहायस्य च शोणचक्षुषः ।  
 शिरश्शशाङ्कस्य शुभांशुभिर्नृणां विदग्धपापः प्रमदोदयोऽप्ययम् ॥ १२ ॥  
 धरामराणां प्रथमोऽधितिष्ठतां मुदाऽग्रहारं तमिहान्वयः पुरा ।  
 वचोमलोन्मूलनजातसद्यशा व्यरोचतैको मलयालदेशजः ॥ १३ ॥  
 समिद्धतेजा निजमेधयाऽग्र्ययाऽग्रजोऽस्य वंशस्य गुणाम्रणीर्महान् ।  
 शशीव नक्षत्रगणे प्रसन्नभा रराज तज्ज्ञापुरराजपार्षदः ॥ १४ ॥  
 स्वकर्मयोग्यानि फलानि भूतले कुलेऽनुकूले ह्यनुभोक्तुमञ्जसा ।  
 जनिं सदात्मा मुहुरेत्य मानुषीं प्रपद्यते चाभ्युदयं पुमर्थकम् ॥ १५ ॥  
 कदाचिदात्मा जननं स्वगोत्रके प्रयाति तस्मिन्पुनरेव सद्गुणैः ।  
 अलङ्कृताभ्यां दुहितुश्च सन्ततावथो पितृभ्यां व्रतपूतचेतसाम् ॥ १६ ॥  
 ततो जनाग्रेसरतामुपाश्रितस्तदग्रहारे स्वगुणैर्जनादृतैः ।  
 स सेतुरामाय इति द्विजेश्वरो ह्युदारदारैरचरद् गृहिव्रतम् ॥ १७ ॥  
 भुजैश्चतुर्भिः पुरुषोत्तमो यथा प्रजापतिर्वा वदनैस्त्रयीमयैः ।  
 पुमर्थकैर्वा पुरुषो महात्मभिस्तथा सुपुत्रैः शुशुभे स भूसुरः ॥ १८ ॥  
 पिता चतुर्थं सुतमात्मनः प्रियं जुहाव सन् वेङ्कटराम इत्यमुम् ।  
 स कुपुकस्वामिपदं ततः शिशुर्ययौ तु कूपार्थगभीरतास्पदम् ॥ १९ ॥  
 स जातमात्रोऽप्यरुदत्स्वयं शिशुर्ह्यजोऽमरः सोऽहमितीव तद्विदाम् ।  
 निवेदयंस्तं महिमानमात्मनो गुहानिविष्टं गुरुवाक्यबोधितम् ॥ २० ॥  
 प्रियात्मजव्रातयुतोऽप्यसौ पिता चतुर्थपुत्रेण ननन्द चाधिकम् ।  
 पुमर्थपङ्क्तौ चरमे शरीरिणाऽनुभूयते सा परमा हि निर्वृतिः ॥ २१ ॥  
 असुसुव्रतं महिमानमात्मनोऽमनाक् शिशुत्वेऽपि स भाविनं त्विषा ।  
 स सप्तसप्तिः स्वगभस्तिमालया ह्युदीयमानोऽपि दिगन्तमश्नति ॥ २२ ॥  
 बभौ स बालारुणभास्वरोऽर्भकः शशाङ्कसङ्काशमुखो मनोहरः ।  
 सुदीर्घबाहुश्च गभीरनिःस्वनः स्वबन्धुतासेचनकायताक्षियुक् ॥ २३ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xvii

स वेङ्गशास्त्री परदर्शनार्णवप्रमन्थनप्रज्ञ उदारधर्मवित् ।  
 महिम्नि मातामह आस निष्ठितस्तपस्ययैतस्य शुभंयुजन्मनः ॥ २४ ॥  
 चतुर्षु शास्त्रेषु महार्णवेष्विव प्रकृष्टतीक्ष्णा कृतिनो न शेमुषी ।  
 न वेद यस्याप्यतिसूक्ष्ममर्थकं विवेकवैराग्यमुमुक्षुताश्रियः ॥ २५ ॥  
 अनन्तरायं स्वकमान्तरं शिशोः प्रसज्य सदृशनमस्य जातके ।  
 सुमेधसाऽवाप्तजनेर्ग्रहस्थितिर्विचिन्तितान्तश्च फलानुबन्धिनी ॥ २६ ॥  
 “ अयं प्रजातो बत विक्रमाभिधे समेधमानायतिके सुवत्सरे ।  
 अधीतिबोधाचरणैर्जगद्धितैस्त्रिविक्रमस्य क्रममाक्रमिष्यति ” ॥ २७ ॥  
 युगे महेन्द्राधिपतौ सुभिक्षदे ह्यबोधवग्राहहरं विधास्यति ।  
 श्रिये कृशाङ्गोऽप्युदितो मुदान्वितः सुबोधवर्षं नृमनःस्थलीतले ॥ २८ ॥  
 विधुर्बलाढयः पृथुकं दले सिते निजोच्चगः स्वां गृहिणीं च रोहिणीम् ।  
 अनुद्रुतो निर्मलकीर्तिकौमुदीविभासिताशं विबुधं विधास्यति ॥ २९ ॥  
 गणोत्तमेनापि निरीक्षितः शशी कुजेन वर्गोत्तमगोऽपि भूपतिम् ।  
 उदात्तचित्तं सुकलाविलासिनं तनोति जातं मतिवैभवोज्ज्वलम् ॥ ३० ॥  
 प्रभातकाले सुखमन्दशीतलो बहंश्च वातो बत सूचयत्ययम् ।  
 अनेहसाऽऽपण्डितपामरं जनान्वचःप्रवाहेण सुतर्पयेदिति ॥ ३१ ॥  
 धनुर्विलग्ने श्रुतपारगो नरो जितेन्द्रियो विद्वदुपासितो भवेत् ।  
 बृहन्मनोहारिमुखः सुलोचनश्चिरायुरप्यात्ममहा महामनाः ॥ ३२ ॥  
 रवीन्दुभौमामरदैत्यपूजिताः स्ववेश्मतुङ्गाशकभव्यरोचिषः ।  
 धरेश्वराणां धुरि पूजितं श्रुतिप्रमाणमेनं दधते यशस्विनम् ॥ ३३ ॥  
 बलाधिके मूर्तिपतौ च केन्द्रगे कुटुम्बगेहे भृगुजेन मण्डिते ।  
 सुराजयोगेन दिनेशसन्निभो रमेत जातो धरणीन्द्रवन्दितः ॥ ३४ ॥  
 रवौ तनुस्थे सुकृताधिपे निजोन्नतांशके प्राप्तजनुर्धनेश्वरः ।  
 कुलावतंसोऽप्यनवद्यविद्यया यशःप्रभावेण विजेष्यते ध्रुवम् ॥ ३५ ॥  
 नभोऽधिपः शुभ्रहिमांशुनन्दनोऽप्यवेक्षितो वाक्पतिनाऽमृतांशुना ।  
 करोति दीर्घायुषमर्थसेवकैश्चरित्रसौख्योरुगुणाकारं नरम् ॥ ३६ ॥



भृगूद्भवे वाग्भवेनैऽशतुङ्गो कवित्वमथो नृपनीतिनैपुणी ।  
 स्फुरन्मुखत्वं विनयो दया परा नरे विराजन्ति निसर्गसर्गतः ॥ ३७ ॥  
 तनोति मान्दिः सहजालये वसन्पुमांसमुःसन्नभयं ह्यदुःखितम् ।  
 धनाभिमानेन दृढार्थनिर्णयं सदैव देवव्रतपूतमानसम् ॥ ३८ ॥  
 बृहस्पतौ मूर्तिनवांशसंशिते चतुष्टये स्वे भवने तनूपतौ ।  
 स्फुरत्प्रभे नासुखमित्रवाहनक्षितीशपूजागृहधर्मयुग्मभवेत् ॥ ३९ ॥  
 महात्मयोगेन च हंसकेन सन् कृतोदयोऽयं परहंसशंसनम् ।  
 अवाप्स्यति ज्ञानगभस्तिमान्विधुः प्रसन्नमूर्तिस्तपनद्युतिं यथा ॥ ४० ॥  
 सदार्यवन्द्यः सह राजतेजसा सुलक्षणो रम्यवपुर्गुणोत्तमः ।  
 सरःस्विबाधो रमते मरालकः सदस्सु विद्याविभुताप्रभास्वताम् ॥ ४१ ॥  
 मृगाङ्गलग्नाद्रुचकेन सद्रुचा विरोचमानो विपुलाननो धनी ।  
 महाप्रतापः श्रुतसद्गुणो बली भवेज्जितारातिरथाभिमानवान् ॥ ४२ ॥  
 इतीह जाग्रत्सु बहुष्वपि प्रियङ्करस्य योगेषु महत्सु जातके ।  
 वरिष्ठमुख्या विलसन्ति तेऽतुला गजेध्विवाराध्यगुणा गणाधिपाः ॥ ४३ ॥  
 वरिष्ठयोगः कुरुते हिरण्यधीचरित्रविज्ञानपवित्रिताशयम् ।  
 गुरुं नृणां गौरवभाजनं पुनर्विधौतपापव्रजपङ्कसङ्करम् ॥ ४४ ॥  
 सुखी स्वतन्त्रो गुणवित्तविश्रुतः परोपकारी शुभकर्मसम्मतः ।  
 जनिष्यतेऽयं विमलेन सद्गुणयोऽचिराच्च योगेन विसृत्वरक्रमः ॥ ४५ ॥  
 किमुच्यतेऽथास्य महात्मतां प्रति स्वयं महाभाग्यजुषो जितात्मताम् ।  
 सदामिनीचामरशोभनानरसुवासिमुख्योज्ज्वलयोगमालिनः ॥ ४६ ॥  
 दिवास्य जातस्य कुरङ्गलक्षणाऽप्यधिष्ठितादृश्यनभोदलेन च ।  
 अदृष्टमन्यैरनवाप्तमुच्छ्रितप्रबोधयुग्मदृष्टफलं प्रशस्यते ॥ ४७ ॥  
 विचिन्त्य सम्भाविनमेवमात्मनो महान्स दौहित्रवरस्य वेदवित् ।  
 महोदयं स्फारसरोरुहप्रभोस्तुतोष युक्तो विधिनेव मानसे ॥ ४८ ॥  
 प्रशान्तचित्तः स च वेङ्गुपण्डितो विवेकवैराग्यसुभाग्यभाजनम् ।  
 दिने दिने निष्फलतामबुध्यताप्यसारसंसारतरोः सुदुःखदाम् ॥ ४९ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xix

१४

स्वदेहपातं ह्यचिरेण भाविनं विमृश्य विप्रस्तमशिक्षयत्प्रियम् ।  
 स मूकसत्पञ्चशतीं कुमारकं सदात्मनिष्ठो जगदम्बिकास्तुतिम् ॥ ५० ॥  
 कुशाग्रधीरुत्पवयाश्च बालकः स्तवं स्वमातामहपाठितं द्रुतम् ।  
 महोदयोदर्कमगायदादितः स यावदन्तं स्फुटरग्यभाषितः ॥ ५१ ॥  
 अथैकदा प्रावृतदेतदद्भुतं यदेष कालेऽजहिते प्रबोध्य तम् ।  
 त्रिहायनं बालमपाययत्पयः परार्ध्यमन्त्रैरभिमन्त्रितं नवम् ॥ ५२ ॥  
 विशुद्धसत्त्वोऽथ तपःसमाधिनाऽचिरान्मनीषी स चतुर्थमाश्रमम् ।  
 पिशङ्गवर्णांशुकभाग्दिवाकरो विहायसः सायमिवांशमाश्रयत् ॥ ५३ ॥  
 विनष्टशोकाखिलबन्धनो यतिः कृतानुभूतिः स तदात्मनः कृती ।  
 सुसाधनात्सिद्धिमवाप शारदीं विशुद्धिमम्भोघटभूदयादिव ॥ ५४ ॥  
 पुरोहितादिष्टसुवासरे शुभे पिता विनीतं ह्युपनीतमातनोत् ।  
 मुहूर्तके तं विहिते च वत्सरेऽप्युपात्तसावित्रमहाव्रतं सुतम् ॥ ५५ ॥  
 गुरोश्च गायत्र्युपदेशमेत्य स ज्वलन्निव ब्राह्मसुवर्चसा वटुः ।  
 रराज राजोद्गुणस्य दुःसहं रवेरिवासाद्य गभस्तिविस्तरम्<sup>१</sup> ॥ ५६ ॥  
 स संस्कृतान्तःकरणोऽर्भको दिवो गिरःश्रुतेरध्ययनेन सन्ननि ।  
 विवेश पाश्चात्यकलालयं रविर्दिशं पुरस्थोऽपि करैरिवापराम् ॥ ५७ ॥  
 यथा यथा पञ्चनदाङ्गलशालिकाऽप्यमण्डयन्नूतनविद्यया च तम् ।  
 तथा तथा संस्कृतशास्त्रसागरे सुधीः स रेमे गुरुवाकृतरि श्रितः ॥ ५८ ॥  
 मुदा तदास्योदितया बुधाग्रणीर्विभूव मुत्तप्प इति प्रकीर्तितः ।  
 पितृव्यरूपोऽस्य च काव्यकानने विनायको रम्यरसैरलङ्कृते ॥ ५९ ॥  
 अथैष शेषाद्रिकनाथनामभाक् तमप्रजः शास्त्रसमुद्रमन्दरः ।  
 स कृच्छ्रतप्राहिणमञ्जसा गुरुः शशास शास्त्रालिमलङ्क्रियामुखाम् ॥ ६० ॥  
 तृतीयवर्गेऽङ्गलपाठशालगे<sup>२</sup> सुधीर्हर्षाति बत यावदर्भकः ।  
 स तावदास्वादयते स्म गोरसं गुरोश्च गीर्वाणगिरां च गौखम् ॥ ६१ ॥  
 दिशीह मन्त्रारकुटीति पत्तने बृहस्पतिप्रख्यसुमेधसोऽभवन् ।  
 स्फुरद्यशस्यागकराजनायका<sup>३</sup> ह्यनेकसदर्शनकोविदाः पुरा ॥ ६२ ॥

१ विस्तारार्थे विस्तरः प्रयुक्तः, विशिष्टः स्तरः इति समासः ।

२ पाठशाकमिति 'विभाषा सेने'त्यादिना पक्षे नपुंसकम् ।

३ श्रीत्यागराजशास्त्री ।



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

कृती स वाक्ये च पदप्रमाणयोर्विशारदो न्यायसुधांशुशेखरम्<sup>१</sup> ।

निबन्धरत्नान्यपराणि निर्ममे कवीन्द्रसङ्गे सरसीव सारसः ॥ ६३ ॥

सुमेधसा शिष्यगणेन सद्गुरुः प्रयाति मोदं गुणगृह्य आत्मवान् ।

तथा हि राजा<sup>२</sup> स ननन्द शिष्यकद्वयेन रामेण च सुन्दरात्मना ॥ ६४ ॥

सुकीर्तिलक्ष्मीरनघा सरस्वती ह्यभौ च वत्रे गुरुगौरवेण तौ ।

अदृष्टवैशिष्ट्यजुषौ रुषा विना गृहस्थधर्मेऽपि विरक्तिसम्पदौ ॥ ६५ ॥

अधीतितृष्णाव्यथिता भविष्यवः सुबोधसञ्जीवनपानकौतुकाः ।

इमौ च दूरादगमन्मनीषिणः पवित्रविज्ञानमहाह्रदौ विदौ ॥ ६६ ॥

यतीश्वराः केचन दर्शनार्णवे निगूढसत्त्वमणीञ्जिघृक्षवः ।

तदीयशिष्यत्वमुपेत्य सत्वरं सरत्नकण्ठाभरणा विरेजिरे ॥ ६७ ॥

बभूव तेष्वेक उदारधीर्महान्प्रतीक्ष्य संन्यासिपुरोगमोऽनघः ।

शमः शरीरीव हसन्मुखाम्बुजो जनादृतो ब्रह्ममहेन्द्रनामभाक्<sup>३</sup> ॥ ६८ ॥

अनेहसा योगिवरः स गच्छता चकर्ष विद्याव्रतिनोऽस्य मानसम् ।

वटोर्मतस्य प्रतिभानचक्षुषः सतामयस्कात इवाश्मसारकम् ॥ ६९ ॥

प्रयत्नशीलो गुरुभक्तिभूषणोऽवधानदानात्मसमधीतवानयम् ।

महात्मनोऽस्मादखिलागमान्वटुः सपाणिनीयान्विनयेन मेधया ॥ ७० ॥

तपोधनानां धुरि कीर्तितो मुदा तदा स वेदान्तसुतत्वविस्तरम् ।

दुरापमप्राह्यतापि धीमतामिमं वयोन्यूनमथाधिकं विया ॥ ७१ ॥

तदा परिव्राडपरो महायशा दिशीह भाति स्म निजेन तेजसा ।

सुवासुदेवेन्द्र<sup>४</sup> सरस्वतीति सन्नबोधसन्देहतमोविकर्तनः ॥ ७२ ॥

अशादयुवानं रसनाप्रवासिनीं सरस्वतीं साधु दधत्स तं यती ।

विनीतवृत्तं पदवीत्रयं<sup>५</sup> स्वयं विमुक्तिकामेप्सितमाशुबोधनम् ॥ ७३ ॥

निशीतधीः शाङ्करभाष्यसागरे नवः स विद्याविभवोऽधिजग्मिवान् ।

सतर्कमीमांस<sup>६</sup> रहस्यवीचिके कृतावतारोऽपरतीरमश्रमम् ॥ ७४ ॥

१ न्यायेन्दुशेखरम् ।

४ श्रीवासुदेवब्रह्मेन्द्रसरस्वती ।

२ त्यागराजशास्त्री ।

५ प्रस्थानत्रयम् ।

३ श्रीब्रह्मेन्द्रसरस्वती ।

६ सतर्कमीमांसमिति विशेषणम् ।



नदीष्णतां शास्त्रचये गतोऽप्यभूत्सुविश्रुतस्तर्कमुखागमत्रये ।  
 स विश्वतश्चक्षुरपीश्वरो महान्निघेत्र इत्येव जगत्प्रथां गतः ॥ ७५ ॥  
 अथाङ्गलविद्यापरिणाहमातृकां नदीं परीक्षामिव चौघविल्वाम् ।  
 स षोडशे ह्यात्मबलेन हायने ततार तारेशनिभाननः सुखम् ॥ ७६ ॥  
 ततः स तज्ज्ञानगराङ्गलबोधनालयं महान्तं प्रविवेश विद्यया ।  
 उदग्रयाऽर्थी त्वविहाय दर्शनप्रकृष्टसङ्ग्राहमतन्द्रितेन्द्रियः ॥ ७७ ॥  
 चभुर्भिरत्रापि स हायनैर्महाकलालयेऽधीतिपटुः प्रियंवदः ।  
 कलाप्रभुत्वं<sup>१</sup> वरविश्वविद्यसत्पदादवापद्विपदन्तलं कृती ॥ ७८ ॥  
 श्रुतीडितान्तेऽत्र विचक्षणो ह्ययं तमध्यगीष्टाधिकमुच्चविद्यया ।  
 जनप्रशंसा च सभाजनं सतां यतश्च पश्चात्स्वयमेनमागते ॥ ७९ ॥  
 ततोऽमुना व्याकरणं सुदुर्गमं समं महाभाष्यसवाक्यशेखरम्<sup>२</sup> ।  
 सनीलकण्ठाख्यगुरोरलम्भि तन्नवीनतर्कः कविचन्द्रशेखरात् ॥ ८० ॥  
 प्रमाणवाक्यानि च यानि पाठकैरुदाहृतान्यन्यनिबन्धराशितः ।  
 विचित्य सर्वाणि स तानि यत्नवाहिल्लेख जाग्रद्विषणो बहुश्रुतः ॥ ८१ ॥  
 अभुष्य शास्त्रप्रभुतां नवोदितप्रभाकरस्फाररुचश्च वाग्मिताम् ।  
 विलोक्य सद्रत्नपरीक्षका गुणांस्तमाह्वयंश्चास्त्रिमहोदयं मुदा ॥ ८२ ॥  
 तमर्हमालोक्य वयोगुणश्रुतैर्वरीतुमैच्छत्सुदती धरारमा<sup>३</sup> ।  
 यदेष्ट राज्यद्रविणाय संहतौ<sup>४</sup> न्ययुज्यतैव द्रुतमत्र लेखकः ॥ ८३ ॥  
 गदार्दिताया निजमातुरन्तिकं यदानुमेने गमनं न तस्य सा ।  
 तदावधूयाशु जघन्यमानसामिमामघावद्भवनं स भक्तिमान् ॥ ८४ ॥  
 मृगाधिपो ग्रामचरत्वमीहते मतङ्गजः किं निवसेद्रवालये ।  
 करोति वीरो विबलेषु विक्रमं कथं नु विद्वान् निकृतिं सहेत सः ॥ ८५ ॥  
 स्वबन्धुतायाः परिचर्यया प्रसूः प्रयत्नवत्पुत्रविशिष्टदिष्टतः ।  
 जगत्प्रसूसान्द्रकृपाकटाक्षतो विमुक्तरोगा शनकैश्च साऽजनि ॥ ८६ ॥  
 निसर्गमद्रङ्करवातवीजिते समुद्रतीरस्थसुमद्रपत्तने ।  
<sup>५</sup>विधानशास्त्राध्ययनं महाधने स वावदूकत्वकृते<sup>६</sup> प्रचक्रमे ॥ ८७ ॥

१ वि. ए. उपाधिम्

२ सवाक्यं वाक्यपदीयम् ।

३ राज्यशासनम् ।

४ रेवेन्यू बोर्डाख्ये सङ्घटने ।

५ लीगलस्टडीस् इत्याङ्गल्याम् ।

६ लायर्स प्रोफेषन् ।



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

तदेव शास्त्रं च कमप्यनेहसं ह्यनन्तशायीति पुरेऽप्यधीतवान् ।  
 तथापि सदृशनसङ्ग्रहं व्यधाद् व्रजनिवाभ्रेऽप्यशनोच्चयं रवगः ॥ ८८ ॥  
 स्वपञ्चविंशे वयसीह पण्डितप्रकाण्डताया यशसा समं शुचिः ।  
 सुधीः स सम्पूर्णकला<sup>१</sup>निधित्वभाक्प्रशस्तिमापद्यत विश्वबोधनात्<sup>२</sup> ॥ ८९ ॥  
 कुलीनविद्यागुणरूपभूषितां तदोपयेमे सदृशीं सुलक्षणाम् ।  
 स कन्यकां मान्यमतिप्रभो युवा गृहस्थधर्माय गुरूपदेशतः ॥ ९० ॥  
 यथाचरद् ब्राह्मविधिं पुरा वटुः प्रगे च सायं नियमैरतन्द्रितः ।  
 तथा द्वितीयाश्रमधर्ममादरादसेवताद्यानलहोत्रपूर्वकम् ॥ ९१ ॥  
 प्रमादशून्यश्च चचार धर्मवित्स पञ्च यज्ञान्सहधर्मिणीसखः ।  
 सुराश्च येनाखिलभूतसंहतिः सुतपिताः पापचयोऽप्यपाकृतः ॥ ९२ ॥  
 वनीपकः कोऽपि न निर्ययौ गृहादनाप्तकामोऽस्य दयार्द्रचेतसः ।  
 गृहित्वतत्त्वं च विदन्पुरोगमो विदामुपास्तान्वहमञ्जसाऽतिथीन् ॥ ९३ ॥  
 स्वकीयशाखोपनिषज्जपं जितेन्द्रियः स गीतामपि रुद्रमद्भुतम् ।  
 पपाठ सत्पौरुषसूक्तमन्त्रं सहस्रनामस्तवमद्भुतं हरेः ॥ ९४ ॥  
 पुरेऽत्र मद्रे वसता सताऽमुना महर्षिसदृशनमन्तरेण च ।  
 अकारि गोष्ठीषु विपश्चितां मुहुः प्रभाषणं ह्यर्थगुरुत्ववाग्धुरम् ॥ ९५ ॥  
 निश्चम्य यूनोऽस्य मनोहरां गिरां प्रवृत्तिमर्थैरपि सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ।  
 मृदूक्तिहास्यैः स्फुरितां सुमेवसो ननन्दुराशु स्थविराश्च विस्मिताः ॥ ९६ ॥  
 प्रपञ्चितो वेदशिरोऽर्थविस्तरः सशङ्करोदारवचोविजृम्भितः ।  
 सदस्युपन्यासवरोऽस्य सर्वतो यशोवितानं च दिशास्वकल्पयत् ॥ ९७ ॥  
 तदा बुधः प्रीतमना महाधनोऽप्युदारचित्तो महिलापुरस्थले ।  
 उवाच विद्याविशदान्तरात्मवान् स कृष्णसुस्वामिघरामरोत्तमः ॥ ९८ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xxiii

महोदयो जातु जगाम सोऽपि तां सभां च यत्राभिनवेन सूरिणा ।

उदाहृतं शास्त्रिवरेण तेन तत् स्फुटार्थमद्वैतरहस्यमव्ययम् ॥ ९९ ॥

अयं किमन्योऽद्वयतत्त्वदेशिकः स शङ्करार्यो मनसीति विम्विते ।

स साधु साधु स्वयमित्युदागिरद् हृदिन्द्रियाणीरयते हि देहिनाम् ॥ १०० ॥

ऋणद्वयान्मुक्तिमुपागतो ह्ययं स्वयं स्ववेदाध्ययनेन चाध्वरैः ।

क्रमेण सोऽपाकृत तत्तृतीयकं सुपुत्रवक्त्राभ्युजदर्शनोत्सवैः ॥ १०१ ॥

कुले भूदेवानां प्रथितशुचिवृत्ते श्रुतवतां कविः कुण्डुस्वामी जनिमलमताभ्युन्नतिहिताम् ।

तदीयेऽस्मिन्काव्ये गुरुचरितसन्नाम्नि सरसे गुरोः सर्गः पुष्पन्तुदयमयमाद्यो ह्यवसितः ॥ १०२ ॥

॥ प्रथमः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥



## ॥ द्वितीयः सर्गः ॥

धर्माभिरुद्रमवेक्ष्य कलिप्रदुष्टं जीवातुमस्य सुरवाङ्मयबोधनं सः ।

१ स्वामी विचिन्त्य गुरुसंस्कृतपाठशालामस्थापयत्पुरवरेऽत्र तदाऽऽर्यमिश्रः ॥ १ ॥

तं शास्त्रिणं विचितदर्शनसिन्धुरत्नं ह्यर्हत्तमं नववयस्तनुवाक्प्रभावम् ।

विद्यान्धिबोधनतरेरकरोन्महान्तं सत्कर्णधारमरमारचितोपचारम् ॥ २ ॥

मीमांसया सह सहस्रमरीचिरोचिप्रज्ञोऽज्ञतावनकुठार इहात्मविद्याम् ।

अध्यापयत्प्रभुतया च कलालयेऽस्मिंस्तारुण्यके पिपठिषून्गुणबोधवृद्धः ॥ ३ ॥

ज्ञानेऽप्यजायत कदापि स नावलितस्त्यागेऽपि चात्मगुणकथन ऊर्जितात्मा ।

पूज्यांस्त्वपुजदरंस्त सुहृद्भिरुच्चैर्दिशिष्येषु वत्सलतया सुतवच्चचार ॥ ४ ॥

अत्राधिपाठसदनं शरदश्च पञ्च श्रद्धायुगाहरत शिक्षकक्रतिगाढ्यः ।

विज्ञानयज्ञकमपूर्वफलं प्रदिष्टं कृष्णार्यकेण धिषणाध्वरदीक्षितः सः ॥ ५ ॥

विद्यामधीत्य विदुषोऽस्य च संस्कृतान्माऽन्तेवासिनोऽत्र बहवोऽप्यभवन्महान्तः ।

सच्छास्त्रवारिनिधिपारदशः स्वकीर्तिज्योत्स्नावितानरुचिरञ्जितदिग्बधूकाः ॥ ६ ॥

कालेऽत्र मद्रपुरविश्वकलालयस्याध्यक्षः समीक्ष्यः शुचिशास्त्रिणमद्वितीयम् ।

तं संस्कृताध्ययनवीक्षकमण्डलस्याकार्षीद् द्रुतं परिवृढं सुदृढागमज्ञम् ॥ ७ ॥

सर्वाङ्गसुन्दरममुष्य च शास्त्रजाले वैदुष्यमीश्वरकृपास्पदतामवेत्य ।

वाणीविलासमहिता वृणुते स्म शाला तं ग्रन्थमुद्रणरताऽऽगमदीपनाय ॥ ८ ॥

प्रज्ञाऽस्म यत्नबहुला भगवत्पदाद्यश्रीशङ्करार्यकृतिरत्नसरं मनोज्ञम् ।

निर्माति च स्म यमधत्त कनत्प्रकाशं श्रीरङ्गधाम्नि नुतमुद्रणशिल्पशाला ॥ ९ ॥

कार्यक्षमत्वमथ सूक्ष्मविवेकशक्तिं सन्नायकत्वमपि तस्य विदन् नृपालः ।

साहाय्यकं स तमयाचत पाठशालाश्रेयोविधानमधिपञ्चनदं बुधाग्र्यम् ॥ १० ॥

तत्सूचितेन विधिना च विवेकविद्याविद्योतितेन लघु साऽध्ययनोरुशाला ।

आरोहदुन्नतपदं वितताच्छकीत्या देशान्तरोपहृतमाणवकप्रलिङ्ग्या ॥ ११ ॥

पश्चादमुं गुरुवरं गुरुवद् गुणाढ्यं विद्यालयः स महनीयमतिप्रकर्षः ।

अध्यापकैरवृणुत स्वयमाश्रितः सन् विद्याप्रसाधनमना इव ना गुरुद्वम् ॥ १२ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

XXV

मद्रोरुमण्डलमहाध्ययनालये विद्वृन्दारको वयसि राज्यधुरन्धरैः सः ।  
 द्वात्रिंशके त्रिदशवन्द्यमहा महात्माऽध्याचार्यके सुरगिरोऽसुलभे नियुक्तः ॥ १३ ॥  
 तत्रायमार्तकरुणो निजशिष्यसङ्घान् षड्दर्शनैः सह शशास नवीनतन्त्रम् ।  
 भाषानुबन्धि तुलिताखिललोकवाणीध्वानार्थवाक्यरचनाचतुरं ह्युदारम् ॥ १४ ॥  
 सम्पादितं यदतिकौतुककारि कैश्चित् पाश्चात्यसूरिभिरधीतसमानधर्मैः ।  
 भाषासु संस्कृतसरोमकयावनाद्यास्वारब्धविश्वजनसोदरभावबन्धैः ॥ १५ ॥  
 पाश्चात्यसंस्कृतविपश्चिदपश्चिमो यः प्राङ्मोक्षमूलकविराह स संस्कृतं तत् ।  
 सन्दृष्टशान्तिशब्दविधिप्रकर्षं ह्याद्यं सुभाषितमितीह जगज्जनानाम् ॥ १६ ॥  
 अन्यद्यदशी वत वशीकृतशिष्यचेतोराज्यस्य शास्त्रिचतुहरेः प्रभुताऽत्र शास्त्रे ।  
 पाश्चात्यविद्वद्रुपलालितनव्यमार्गे गर्जद्वरेरिव सुदुर्गमकाननेऽद्वा ॥ १७ ॥  
 आङ्गलीमहाप्रवचनप्रचुराश्च तस्मिस्तुङ्गे महाध्ययनसन्निधि पर्यपृच्छन् ।  
 सन्देहसन्ततिममुं ह्युपलभ्य तस्माद् भाषाभिवृद्धिहितमुत्तरमाननन्दुः ॥ १८ ॥  
 अध्यापनेन महतां निगमागमानां ग्रन्थालयस्य १ विभुतार्पितमाधिपत्यम् ।  
 सन्निर्वहञ्छ्रममवोधि मनाङ् न सूरौ राष्ट्रेण भूभृदिव दिग्विजयं सुवीरः ॥ १९ ॥  
 यत्रैव हस्तलिखितानि परस्सहस्राण्यद्यापि सन्त्यखिलभाषितपुस्तकानि ।  
 सन्नहदशेवरचीनलिपिक्रमाणि स्वालेख्यवन्ति विविधार्थमहार्धकाणि ॥ २० ॥  
 ग्रामेषु सज्जनपदेषु विचित्र्य धीरा ग्रन्थोद्धसङ्ग्रमहाध्वरदीक्षितास्ते ।  
 आनिन्युरत्र बहलानि च पुस्तकानि श्रीशास्त्रिणि क्रमविधातरि कार्यदक्षे ॥ २१ ॥  
 विद्याधिराज्यपदवीमधितस्थिवांसं राजन्वतीमिव भुवं तरुणं नृपालम् ।  
 वतुः पतिवरकुलीनकुमारिकास्तं सम्भावनासगुचिताः प्रभुतारमण्यः ॥ २२ ॥  
 तद्विश्वबोधसदने सदनेकविद्यं ह्यव्यायनीतिसमितेः स्थविरोरुगोष्ठ्याः ।  
 सभ्यं तमिभ्यमचिरात्स्वगुणैरकार्षुः पाठये परीक्षणविधौ च सभाधुरीणम् ॥ २३ ॥  
 प्रावीण्यमश्रुतचरं नियमेषु लब्ध्वा नव्येषु दर्शनचये च महर्षिशिष्टे ।  
 सद्भिश्चविद्यभवनैज्यसभासु विद्वान्छीलासमं कृतिमचेष्टत निर्दिशत्सः ॥ २४ ॥



तःसंस्कृताध्ययनके यमुपाधिमग्र्यं स्वोपज्ञमाशुधिषणानिपुणोऽदिशत्सः ।  
 राराजतेऽद्य स शिरोमणिरित्यगाधज्ञानोपलक्ष्य इह दक्षिणदिङ्मुखाङ्कः ॥ २५ ॥  
 द्वीपे नवे नवविचारनिशातबुद्धिन्यायेऽत्यनर्घपथमेत्य रराज यः प्राक् ।  
 तारापथो रघुपतिर्नभसीव सोऽभूद् विद्वच्छिरामणिरधीतिमतिप्रमाणम् ॥ २६ ॥  
 पौरस्त्यसाध्ययनविद्वदमोघविद्याभ्यासक्रमं सुरगिरा बहुमाननीयम्<sup>१</sup> ।  
 आङ्गलप्रबोधमपि भाषितशास्त्रभूषं ह्याचार्य एष समतिष्ठिपदिष्टयज्ञः ॥ २७ ॥  
 राज्योत्तमाध्ययनसन्ननि शास्त्रजातं शास्त्री स्म शास्ति सदलङ्कृतितर्कयोगैः ।  
 वैशेषिकेण पदशास्त्रयुजा स शिष्यान् भाषासुशास्त्रनिगमान्तरहस्यजुष्टम् ॥ २८ ॥  
 आनन्दवर्धनभवं ध्वनिशास्त्रमुच्चैः पातञ्जलाह्निकमखं कुसुमाञ्जलिं च ।  
 सन्यायभाष्यमथ वाक्यपदीयमद्धा सोऽध्यापयन्मुदमगात्सह शिष्यवृद्धया ॥ २९ ॥  
 वृत्ते च वाचि हृदये परिशुद्धिगृध्नुः शास्त्रेऽत्युदारसुमना निजशिष्यदोषान् ।  
 प्रेम्णोपदेशवचनैर्मधुरैरपास्यन् सर्वप्रियः स हृतपण्डितसंशयोऽभात् ॥ ३० ॥  
 ये सन्ति सत्सु मुदितादिगुणा ह्यनर्घाः संस्कारपूतमनसोऽस्य निसर्गजास्ते ।  
 तस्मादसूयकनरास्त्रगृहागतान्सोऽप्यद्वैतदर्शन इहोपचरन्वभासे ॥ ३१ ॥  
 अत्रान्तरेऽखिलविधिज्ञमुपास्य वाचं विद्योतिताशमदधुर्यशसा तमार्यम् ।  
 वाराणसेयनिखिलाध्ययनालयस्याधुतुङ्गशासनसदस्सरसीड्यहंसम् ॥ ३२ ॥  
 स ग्रन्थकोशपतिरत्र विचित्य गेहेष्वानाययद्विरलदुर्लभपुस्तकानि ।  
 सब्रह्मसिद्धि<sup>२</sup>कविभोजरतिप्रकाशान्येवं प्रभाकरमतानुगसन्निबन्धान् ॥ ३३ ॥  
 प्रौढं च शिष्यनिबहं कृतितल्लजानामध्यायमूलपरिशीलनकर्मणीड्यः ।  
<sup>३</sup>वाचस्पतित्वसदुपाधिकृते नियुज्याऽऽचार्योऽकृतोपकृतिमस्य परां प्रधानः ॥ ३४ ॥  
 शास्त्रौघसागरमन्दरशेमुषीकः संख्यावतां परिवृढो ह्यकरोत्सभासु ।  
 तद्विश्ववेद्यनिलये बहुभाषणानि व्याख्याततर्कसविशेषकतत्त्वसारः ॥ ३५ ॥  
 त्रिःसप्तषष्ठकृतसत्रवरेऽपरेऽसावन्दे प्रमाणमधिकृत्य च मेयमार्यः ।  
 वाग्वैखरीहृतममस्तमनीषिचित्तो व्याख्यदुदुरूहगुरुतत्त्वमहार्यसत्त्वः ॥ ३६ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xxvii

प्रत्यब्दमेवमयमध्ययनार्थितृष्णां सन्तर्पयन्नहनि सायमपि प्रजानाम् ।  
 क्षेमाय योगसयुजेऽत्र विना विरामं ज्ञानामृतं गुरुघनश्च ववर्ष हर्षात् ॥ ३७ ॥  
 पौरस्त्यदर्शनगवेषणकर्मनिष्ठं संस्थापितं तदमुनाऽऽस्पदमद्वितीयम् ।  
 विद्वन्मनीषितविवेकसमीरणेष्टं विज्ञानभानुमहसाऽत्र च विश्वतीर्थे<sup>१</sup> ॥ ३८ ॥  
 विद्याप्रपञ्चपरिशीलनलब्धविद्वत्सिद्धान्तसन्ततिमदोबहुधा विचारान् ।  
 लोके प्रकाशयितुमारभतात्र धीरः पौरस्त्यमूर्जितगवेषणपत्रिकोद्धम् ॥ ३९ ॥  
 विद्यार्थिनां च विदुषामभिनेयगेयप्रख्यासु सललितकेलिकलासु चास्थाम् ।  
 प्रोत्साहयन्महति बोधगृहेऽत्र नेता नाट्यान्यकारयदमीभिरुदात्तवृतः ॥ ४० ॥  
 मत्वा स संस्कृतसदध्ययनं धरित्र्यां संसिद्धिसंस्कृतिसुकल्पलतालवालम् ।  
 श्रेयोऽर्थिसज्जनसखः समितिं न्यभान्त्सीत् सेवाविभूतिमनुलायतिमार्गमिश्रः ॥ ४१ ॥  
 तस्मिन्गुरावधिपतौ समितिर्विधात्री प्रोत्साहितचरुणसङ्गसुपर्वतुष्टा ।  
 नानोत्सवानजनयत्कविगोत्रसत्रैः सङ्गीतकाव्यरचनानटनप्रयोगैः ॥ ४२ ॥  
 श्रीकालिदासभवभूतिवचःप्रसूनैर्मालामलङ्कृतिरसोन्मदसूरिभृङ्गाम् ।  
 विद्वद्विभावरचितामुचिताच्छशोभां भक्त्यार्पयत्सहृदयाय कृताञ्जलिः सा ॥ ४३ ॥  
 स्पर्धामकल्पयदधीतिषु नाट्यदाक्ष्ये वाल्मीकिकालिपदयोरुपकल्पिते च ।  
 संलापकेऽन्त्यरुचिराक्षरपद्यपाठे ह्याराध्य संस्कृतगवीप्रसूतप्रसादाम् ॥ ४४ ॥  
 गीतं यदर्जुनविषादनिरासबीजं जन्याजिरे भगवतोपनिषद्रहस्यम् ।  
 गीतागर्वी भगवतीं श्रुतिपारगास्तामाराधयन्ति कृतियोगविवेकवाक्यैः ॥ ४५ ॥  
 राष्ट्राधिपोऽनुपममस्य विलोक्य विद्याचार्यत्वजित्वरयशोविभवं विभान्तम् ।  
 २आचार्यरत्नबिरुदेन महोमहिम्नाऽप्याभूषयत्तमपराजितवाग्विलासम् ॥ ४६ ॥  
 आचार्यवानजनि तेन जनो हि राष्ट्रे शास्त्रेष्वकुण्ठितमतिः शुचिधर्ममार्गे ।  
 अव्याहतप्रगतिराश्रितबान्धवेन व्यापारितः सुकृतलौकिकसङ्ग्रहार्थे ॥ ४७ ॥  
 साहित्यसम्पदुपरञ्चितवेदविद्यस्तत्त्वं विमर्शककवित्वभृतं च वाण्याः ।  
 विश्लेषयन्बुधगुरु रविभाश्च काव्यप्राणादिवस्तुपथजातमभात्सभासु ॥ ४८ ॥



न्यायं च नव्यमुपवर्णय जैमिनीयं व्याख्या हि दर्शनमथोपनिषत्सतत्त्वम् ।  
 प्रब्रूहि निर्गलितसंशयमास्तिकत्वं सत्यं समर्थय स इत्यनिशं शशास ॥ ४९ ॥  
 लेखांश्च कार्यबहुलत्वभरावनम्रः प्रायः प्रभुर्व्यलिखदेष निरन्तरायम् ।  
 प्राभाकरं मतमवेक्ष्य विचक्षणः सन् विद्याघनस्तदनु रावणभाष्यमिष्टम् ॥ ५० ॥  
 अद्वैतमात्मनि विदन्नघो विशिष्टं द्वैतं वगाह्य च गृहीतसतत्त्वरत्नः ।  
 बौधायनद्रमिडदेशिकमार्गमभ्योऽलेखीद् विमृश्य विदुषां प्रमुदे प्रबन्धान् ॥ ५१ ॥  
 केचिद् वदेयुरितिहासविमर्शवीथ्यां मिथ्येति रूढगतयो न तु भारतीयाः ।  
 काष्ठां श्रुतस्य हि परामधिरुह्य मेधा जैत्रध्वजं न्यखनदत्र गुरोः सलीलम् ॥ ५२ ॥  
 यस्माल्लिलेख विमृशन्नितिहासमार्गं प्राचीनसंस्कृतिकथं ततकण्टकार्तम् ।  
 अद्वैतवर्त्मनि च मण्डनसत्पुरेशाचार्यैक्यवाक्यजुषि वैषयिकप्रचारम् ॥ ५३ ॥  
 लीलावतारपुरुषेषु गुरुः प्रजानां सद्भक्तिसूक्तिकुशलो विशदीचकार ।  
 श्रीरामकृष्णपरहंसकृतापदानं विश्वे सनातनमुधमवरप्रदानम् ॥ ५४ ॥  
 अत्रान्तरे जनपदेषु तु किंवदन्तीमाकर्णयत्प्रसूमरां नरकौतुकेन ।  
 चित्रीयमाणद्वयोऽरुणशैलबासं बालं कुमारमिव तं प्रति योगनिष्ठम् ॥ ५५ ॥  
 रूढं वदन्ति मुनयः सहजे समाधावात्मानमात्मनि समाहितमीक्षमाणम् ।  
 द्वाराणि सम्यगपिधाय निरुद्धचित्तं स्वान्तेऽनुभूतपरनिर्वृतिमित्यभूत्सा ॥ ५६ ॥  
 श्रुत्वारुणाचलनितम्बनिवासिनं तं बालारुणप्रभमभीतिकरं नराणाम् ।  
 बालं तपोधनमनाधिमुपात्तमौनं लोकादभूत्स च कुतूहलनुनचित्तः ॥ ५७ ॥  
 जात्वेव शोणगिरिमेत्य गुरुर्गिरीशं वृन्दारकालिपरिषेवितपादपद्मम् ।  
 उत्तुङ्गगोपुरवरव्रजमार्जिताभ्रे शुभ्रे वसन्तमुरुसद्मनि चार्चदाढ्ये ॥ ५८ ॥  
 “कैलासतोऽपि रमणीयतरं परार्थं प्रासादमेतमधितिष्ठसि शैलपादे ।  
 साम्बोभवो भवदवभ्रमणप्रनष्टांस्त्रातुं शिरश्शशिकरामृतधारया नः ॥ ५९ ॥  
 शम्भो महामहिमधाम्नि सुपावनेऽस्मिन् द्वेधा विभासि शिवलिङ्गशिलोच्चयाङ्गः ।  
 एकेश्वरस्तु सुलभः स्थिरभक्तिभाजां तन्मे मनः शिवमयं शिव शश्वदस्तु ॥ ६० ॥



त्वं सन्निधानमसि चाखिलमङ्गलानां देव्या सहामयसुभेषजरूपयाऽद्वा ।  
 विद्ये उभे पशुपते भवदासभावे तन्मे शुचं हर हराशु च मोहमाये ॥ ६१ ॥  
 व्याधो महानपि भवान्भगवान्विधत्ते किं नो मदीयहृदयान्तरकाननेऽस्मिन् ।  
 शूरैः समं च मृगयामगजासहायः क्रोधादिदुष्टमृगभाजि विभो प्रसीद ॥ ६२ ॥  
 शूलप्रियो हरसि शूलमलङ्कारिष्णुलोकं विलोकयसि नेत्ररुचाऽपि भीमः ।  
 सौन्दर्यशेवधिरुदारमतिश्च निःस्वः स्थानुर्नटस्यपि न वेद्मि भवद्रहस्यम् ॥ ६३ ॥  
 त्वामाहुरापदि सुबन्धुमयो गुणाढ्यं षाड्गुण्यके पुरवधे श्रितशौरिवाणम् ।  
 त्यागे श्मशानभवभूतिमपीश कालीदासं कुमारजननेऽज्जिनवाससं च ॥ ६४ ॥  
 ज्योतिस्स्वरूप तव मातुमवर्ण्यतेजः पुञ्जं महत्त्वमुपयुज्य समर्थतां स्वाम् ।  
 भग्नाभिमानसुषमौ हरिवेद्यसौ तौ विश्वेश्वरं सपदि केवलमस्तुतां त्वाम् ॥ ६५ ॥  
 सिद्धिं गताश्च बहवो निजभक्तियोगात् सदाक्षिणात्ययतयस्त्व सन्निधाने ।  
 त्वद्भक्तिकीर्तनमधूनि निपीय मत्तोन्मत्ता न लोकमपुनन्न चिराय धन्याः ॥ ६६ ॥  
 मृत्युञ्जयाय शतधन्वनिषङ्गिणे ते वातान्नवर्षविशिखाय च रोहिताय ।  
 सूताय रुद्रसहमानवनाविषाय क्षेत्रेश्वरस्थपतये च नमः शिवाय ॥ ६७ ॥  
 शोणाचलेशमिति शान्तमुदश्रुनेत्रो मित्रोऽपानलसनेत्रमनाथमित्रम् ।  
 स्तुत्वा प्रसन्नहृदयो रमणं महर्षिं स्मृत्वागमत्तदुदञ्जं स सदागमज्ञः ॥ ६८ ॥  
 नानापतत्रिमृगजुष्टवनोपगूढं भूभृत्पदे विरचितं प्रशमैकसारम् ।  
 खण्डं वतीर्णमवनौ नु विधातुधाम्नो धाराधरावृतमिवैन्द्रवमण्डलं नु ॥ ६९ ॥  
 दूरादपश्यदसमानशमाननोद्यज्ज्योतिर्वृतं स्थिरसुतारकमात्तकायम् ।  
 तं तारकारिमिव दूरदृशं युवानं कौपीनवन्तमुपपन्नतपःसमाधिम् ॥ ७० ॥  
 वाचंयमं च यमिनं प्रशमप्रधानं ह्यात्मारतं प्रमथनाथनिभं निरीहम् ।  
 अल्पे वयस्यपि जरन्निकरैरुपास्यं जुष्टं च वानरमयूरमुजङ्गसङ्घैः ॥ ७१ ॥  
 बाल्येऽनुभूतमरणात्मसनातनत्वं शोणाद्रिनामजनितस्मरणप्रबोधम् ।  
 द्रागाश्रितेशभवान्तरुपात्तयोगं सन्तीर्णसंसृतिसमुद्रमदभ्रमद्रम् ॥ ७२ ॥



श्रीकाव्यकण्ठविदितानलभूवतारं कीटावलीढसुतपोजडजीर्णगात्रम् ।

मत्पात्रयोजितकटाक्षवरप्रसादं सर्वासु भृच्छरणमाभरणं धरण्याः ॥ ७३ ॥

ब्राह्मी स्थितिर्भगवता विवृता पुरा या तां सन्निधौ यतिपतेः स निशाम्य शान्ते ।

नानाकुतूहलिमुमुक्षुजनोपजुष्टे निशब्दसौम्यसुरभौ मुदमापदन्याम् ॥ ७४ ॥

भक्त्या प्रणम्य रमणं तरुणारुणाभं साष्टाङ्गमेनमृषिपुङ्गवमग्रजन्मा ।

तस्य न्यषीददवशं पुरतः प्रसिद्धो ध्यायन्मुहूर्तमुपरुद्धमनोविचारः ॥ ७५ ॥

आत्मानमत्र निरविक्षदपास्तमोहं स्फारयुतावभृतनिर्झरपातशीते ।

आनन्दसागरतले क्लृप्तमानमच्छाऽऽलोकावृतं हततरङ्गचये ह्यनन्ते ॥ ७६ ॥

बाढं स वाङ्मनसयोरपदं महर्षेः सत्सन्निधावनुभवं प्रतिपद्य सद्यः ।

स्वप्नेऽपि दुर्लभमिमं च परं सुषुप्तेः सङ्कल्पनातिशयितं प्रतिबुध्यते स्म ॥ ७७ ॥

स्वप्नः किमेष न हि जागरितोऽस्मि सत्यं मायापघात उत मे मतिविभ्रमः किम् ।

नो यन्मतिर्मम विवेकविचारचुञ्चुश्चित्रीयमाणमनसीति चकार धार्यः ॥ ७८ ॥

एतत्पुनर्भगवतोऽत्यघराशिभूभृद्वज्रायमाणसुकटाक्षवरस्य साक्षात् ।

अत्यद्भुतेन जनितं करुणामहिम्ना पुण्येन पूर्वजनुषामिति निश्चिकाय ॥ ७९ ॥

ध्यानेन तेन परिधौतमनाः प्रशान्तः सुतोत्थितः स किरणैरिव समसप्तेः ।

पद्माकरश्च परिदीपितद्विहाया जन्मान्तरं गत इव प्रमदेन सोऽभूत् ॥ ८० ॥

पश्चाद्यतीन्द्रपदपद्मनिविष्टदृष्टिः शिष्टप्रतीष्टसकलागमसन्नदीष्णः ।

स्तोत्रं मुनेरकृतं चैवमनाथबन्धोरानन्दसान्द्रद्वयो दययाऽधमर्णः ॥ ८१ ॥

“ब्रह्माज्ञं चिद्धन मदीयद्वन्द्वतरस्यं जानासि भावमभवोऽपि भवात्मकस्त्वम् ।

अद्यानुभूतिरजनीह तु सन्निधौ ते या सा दयाजलद शान्तिशक्तिकी ममास्तु ॥ ८२ ॥

नृणां सुदुर्लभमदृष्टविनाकृतानां त्वदर्शनं दुरितसन्तमसार्कतेजः ।

प्राप्तं मयाद्य भगवन्भवभीतिभाजा तत्त्वं प्रसीद मयि जन्मनि जन्मनीह ॥ ८३ ॥

लब्धं चिराच्च गुरुकौस्तुभमर्हणाहं त्वद्रूपमात्मद्वये ननु धारयंस्तम् ।

अप्यच्युतोऽहमधुना भगवन्भूवं तत्त्वं प्रसीद मयि चाच्युतभक्तियुक्ते ” ॥ ८४ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xxxi

तत्सद्गुरोरथ सुपावनदृष्टिपाताद् वाक्याधिकार्यबलतः श्रुतवद्वरेण्यः ।  
मत्वा महर्ष्यनुगृहीतमरं स च स्वं मन्दं ततो निरगमत्तपसो निधानात् ॥ ८५ ॥

विद्यासमग्रगुणसन्मणिमण्डितात्मा पूर्वं महत्सुमहितोऽद्य दिगन्तकीर्तिः ।  
जातो यथा परिधिमुक्ततनुः स भास्वानष्टापदोरुकटकश्च सुगन्धवन्धुः ॥ ८६ ॥

विद्यालयास्तदनु विश्वसुबोधवित्ता आचार्यचक्रपतयः स्वयमेव धन्यम् ।  
सम्माननाभिरभितस्तमनेकशश्च स्वालङ्कृतं विदधिरे विदधीशमार्यम् ॥ ८७ ॥

ज्योतिर्यत्रार्कचन्द्रोडुगणगतमपि स्तोकमाभाति नेहै-

तत्सर्वं यस्य भासा ज्वलति चलति वा चेतनाचेतनाख्यम् ।

आस्तेऽस्मिन्यद्विभूतिर्जगति गुरुलघुश्रीप्रभेदेन शास्त्रा-

चार्ये तस्य प्रसादो व्यजयत मुनिराट् सद्गुरोर्विश्वभूत्यै ॥ ८८ ॥

विरचितमिह पूर्वं यच्छिवानन्दकाव्यं दशशतगुरुनाम्ना रामकृष्णस्तवेन ।  
तदनुजगुरुवृत्ते सद्गुरुप्रसादो व्यरचि रुचिरसर्गोऽयं द्वितीयः सुकाव्ये ॥ ८९ ॥

॥ द्वितीयः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥



## ॥ तृतीयः सर्गः ॥

उद्यन्तं वसुमन्तमर्कमिव सद्गर्मप्रिया ह्यर्धदा विद्वांसं महयाम्भूवुरभयं विद्यासुवाचस्पतिम् ।

श्रेष्ठोपाधिमवाधितप्रसरसत्कीर्तिप्रसादं मुदा दत्त्वा भारतधर्ममण्डलमहाधुर्याः सपर्याविदः ॥ १ ॥

वाचस्पत्यं समर्थं ननु सहजमभूत्तस्य यत्सर्वविद्या-

धौरेयो वाग्मितायाममृतशरवचोन्यासदक्षः प्रतीक्ष्यः ।

आसीत्प्रेक्षायुतानां घनसदसि नवार्थोपपत्त्याऽप्रमत्तो

राकाचन्द्रः सुतारापटलपरिवृतो रोचमानो यथैषः ॥ २ ॥

पुण्यानां सञ्चयः किं न्विति विबुधगणैराश्चर्यचकितै-

र्दृष्टाऽदृष्टेन नृणां कलिमलरहिता काञ्चीति नगरी ।

काञ्चीदाम्नेव नद्याऽप्युपचितसुषमा चापाङ्गगदशा

कामाक्ष्यास्तत्र पूता ककुभि विजयतेऽध्याचार्यतपसा ॥ ३ ॥

तपोराशिः स्वामी जगदुरुगुरुश्चन्द्रचूडेन्द्रनामा

नृणां योगक्षेमं विदधदनिशं कामकोटीमठेशः ।

कदाचित्सूरीणां परिषदमिहासेतुशैलस्थितानां

सदध्यात्मालोकाममृतरसिकेष्टां समापादयत्सः ॥ ४ ॥

महात्मस्वध्यात्मप्रवचननृसिंहेषु सदसि प्रकामं गर्जत्सु श्रुतशरभ आशूचितवचाः ।

वराचार्यः शास्त्री करतलफलीभूतनिगमो विजिग्येऽसावष्टापदपदकतेजस्ततदिशः ॥ ५ ॥

लोकाचार्यस्तदनु गृहिणं देशिकेन्द्रप्रमाणस्तिष्ठन्तं तं नयपदगिरां मार्गशीर्षेऽधिकारैः ।

चक्रे सद्यो यतिपतिरसौ सत्कलाशेवधीन्द्रं सद्योजातप्रतिभमतुलोपाधिना दर्शनाश्रे ॥ ६ ॥

जयति जगतामाचार्योऽन्योऽप्युदारपुरीमठे तपसि निरतः शुद्धो बुद्धः स मद्रपुरं गतः ।

दिगटनपटुर्जातु श्रीमत्सुधीमणिरञ्जितं श्रुतिविशदवाग्योगं श्रुत्वा तमामुमुदे बुधम् ॥ ७ ॥

कविपरिवृढहंसरञ्जिते गुरुवचनसरोजवासिते ।

अतनुत च सदःसरस्यमुं कुलपतिविरुदस्य भाजनम् ॥ ८ ॥

विलोक्य राष्ट्रप्रभुरस्य विद्याप्रभुत्वकीर्तिं जनसङ्ग्रहास्थाम् ।

अनर्घसम्भावनयार्चदेनं महामहाध्यापकसत्प्रशस्तिम् ॥ ९ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

२३३

ततश्च विज्ञानघनं विनीतं शास्त्रार्थसम्बोधनगीष्पतिं तम् ।  
 महासभाः ख्यातमनीषिचर्चाः प्रत्यब्दमाध्यक्ष्यमहाय वव्रुः ॥ १० ॥  
 भरतभुवि प्रथमा महासभा निखिलपुराणगवीप्रिया च या ।  
 तदनघसंस्कृतदेश्यवाक्सदोऽधिपतिरकारि गुरुर्नरोत्तमः ॥ ११ ॥  
 कविसुकृतिनिकेतपुण्यगे तदपि सदो द्रुमकुञ्जरञ्जिते ।  
 विभवमहितमावृतपुरे विमलजलापगयाऽऽवृते नुते ॥ १२ ॥  
 द्वितीयमधिवेशनं प्रथितकालिघट्टे पुरे ससम्भ्रममुपासितं विविधदर्शनाढ्यालिभिः ।  
 प्रसूनमिव सर्वतः प्रवचनस्वनैर्गुञ्जितं ह्यशोभत परं गुरोरधिपतेः प्रवाग्धारया ॥ १३ ॥  
 गुरुवरवृषभे परोपकारक्षमद्वि कार्यपरे पुरेऽत्र मदे ।  
 समजनि महता च तत्तृतीयं सुपरिषदोऽध्यधिवेशनं क्षणेन ॥ १४ ॥  
 सम्पत्तु सम्पत्तिमिहानुरुध्यते मिथ्येति नाप्तोक्तिरयं यदग्रिमः ।  
 प्रेक्षावतां दर्शनसंसदीश्वरोऽप्यायोजितायामभवत्प्रयागके ॥ १५ ॥  
 एवमान्ध्रविषये बुधगोष्ठ्यां बाल<sup>१</sup>तारकपुरेऽखिलतीर्थे ।  
 आधिपत्यभूदयं व्यवृणोच्चाऽऽपूर्णताहृदयमद्वयमेवः ॥ १६ ॥  
 पुनरयं निखिलसंस्कृतगोष्ठ्याः परिवृढो रुचिरकालिकघट्टे ।  
 मधुरया सुरगिराऽखिलसूरीन्प्रमदमेदुरद्वदो व्यधितारात् ॥ १७ ॥  
 सुमण्डिते महिषपुराधिवेशने सुपण्डितैस्तिलकसशीर्षिवेष्टनैः ।  
 सकुण्डलैरसरगिरा परीवृढो विमर्शयुक्सरणिमसावुपादिशत् ॥ १८ ॥  
 पाण्डित्यं दधदमि नूतनं विमर्शं भाण्डार्कारिति वरणीयसंस्कृतान्ध्रम् ।  
 पुण्याख्ये रविरिव रामकृष्णानामा विख्यातो नमसि पुरे द्विजो विजिग्ये ॥ १९ ॥  
 तस्य मनीषितमाशु विदित्वा शिष्यचरा बहवः सुचरित्राः ।  
 सङ्गमिहैकमकारिणो तन्नामयुतं च विमर्शनजीवम् ॥ २० ॥  
 शरदि शरदि तत्रावर्षतेऽप्युत्सवोत्तः परिषदि समवेतस्फारविद्वन्मयी यः ।  
 गुरुर्गमिह वाक्ये सत्ये च प्रमाणे ध्रुव इव निखिलेऽत्रारचितोऽबूभक्तः ॥ २१ ॥



विद्यासत्रे विजितशतमखं तं सम्पूज्याप्यकृषत सदसः ।

कर्माध्यक्षाः कृतिततिपदवीदक्षं सभ्यं प्रवचनचतुरम् ॥ २२ ॥

आचार्योऽसाविध्यमजस्रं पवमानः कर्मासक्तोऽत्रेव जनाश्चासनचुञ्चुः ।

शिष्याञ्छासच्छास्त्रविमर्शं सहमूलं निर्दिश्यालं दीनसखोऽरोचत भूयः ॥ २३ ॥

द्रविडपदपटलविरचनसमितिं श्रुतमहितसुमतिरपि विदितवचाः ।

उपदिशति बहुलपदसमुदयकृद् घटभवमुनिरिव नयविनयनुतः ॥ २४ ॥

विधिना स्थविरो न्यवृत्तद्गुरुगुरुपदान्न पुनर्गुरुकर्मणः ।

जनता यदमुं मुहुर्गामत्तदधिकश्रुतरत्नपरीप्सया ॥ २५ ॥

तदनु स जातु महाश्रुतगेहे सुचरितशिक्षणसद्व्रतिनां च ।

भवननिवृत्तिमहेऽतिमनोज्ञं कुलपतिवत्कृतवानुपदेशम् ॥ २६ ॥

सत्यं ब्रूया धर्ममेवाचर त्वं माता भूयाद्देवता ते पितां च ।

अर्चाचार्यं ह्यातिथेयोऽपि भूयाः शास्ति स्मेत्यं स्नातकांस्तत्र शास्त्री ॥ २७ ॥

अन्तरेऽत्र पुरुषोत्तमं तमो भास्करं तमवृणोद् गुरुत्तमम् ।

संस्कृतस्य कमलाकरो यथाऽण्णामलैर्गुरुकुलं कृताह्वणम् ॥ २८ ॥

कतिपयकालमत्र महितोऽनयद् धिषणयाऽप्यकलुषया वयःश्रमभरात्त्रयीस्फुरितया ।

कलशभवोपदिष्टजनतां भवान्विपतितां स्ववचननौकया करुणयोजयन्विनयभाक् ॥ २९ ॥

सर्वार्थचिन्तितमणिर्गुरुसार्वभौमश्छात्रव्रजस्य च कलौ जनबुद्धिमान्धम् ।

सञ्चिन्तयन्नररचद् बहुलान्प्रभावि-ग्रन्थान्प्रजापतिसमश्चतुराननस्सन् ॥ ३० ॥

राशेर्हि हस्ताङ्कितपुस्तकानां कक्ष्याविभागेन सवर्णनेन ।

संसूचकग्रन्थचयं महान्तं प्राकाशयत्षष्ठ्यधिकं परार्थम् ॥ ३१ ॥

उपकृतिमन्यां प्रौढविमर्शाध्वनि कुरुते स्म प्राग्बुधपङ्क्तेः ।

ननु तनुते सम्प्रत्यपि योऽतःपरमपि धास्यत्यतुलोत्साहम् ॥ ३२ ॥

पूर्वं परिष्कृतमथ सम्प्रकाशितं चूडामणिस्तदिति मनीषिणाऽमुना ।

सद्ग्रन्थरत्नमिह सुपद्यपूर्वको<sup>१</sup> ह्याचार्यरङ्गसहकृतेन सन्मुदे ॥ ३३ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

XXV

बहुचित्रगद्यसखपद्यकृतीः कृतिदीक्षितो ह्यरचयत्त्विह यः ।  
 समपादयत्तदुरुनामनुतं बत नीलकण्ठविजयं विजयी ॥ ३४ ॥  
 विपश्चितामपश्चिमः स भूमिकामरीरचत् ।  
 सुनैषधीयकाव्यगां सविद्वदौषधोत्तमाम् ॥ ३५ ॥  
 प्रथितमपि सुनाम्नाऽदृष्टपूर्वं करलिपिगतवीणावासवाख्यम् ।  
 प्रकटितममुना तद् दत्तकान्त्यं रसिकसुखकृदासीत्काव्यरत्नम् ॥ ३६ ॥  
 प्रथमं वरकेरलसत्कविनाऽप्रजशक्तिकभद्रपदेन कृतम् ।  
 क्षितिजासशिरोमणिनाढ्यमयं प्रकटीकृतवान्सविमर्शमतम् ॥ ३७ ॥  
 मण्डनमिश्रनिर्मितचरोऽद्वयनयहृदयो विभ्रमसद्विवेक उदितः प्रयतसुमनसा ।  
 दीक्षितरामचन्द्रसयुजा प्रकटितविषयोऽभूदयमस्मदीयगुरुणाऽरुणतरुणरुचा ॥ ३८ ॥  
 तर्कसतन्त्रसिन्धुघटभूमतिश्च निरमाद् ग्रन्थमतल्लिकामसदृशीं बुभुत्सुकृपया ।  
 तर्कसुबोधनीं च ललितप्रवेशकपदां यामधुनापि सूरिनिकराः श्रयन्ति तृषिताः ॥ ३९ ॥  
 सदानन्दवर्धिष्णुदिष्टावलोकं महान्तं ध्वनेस्तत्त्ववर्षस्य चार्यः ।  
 विशोध्यपि सल्लोचनं तत्समूलं लिलेखोपनेत्राख्यटीकामुदग्राम् ॥ ४० ॥  
 शुद्धश्रद्धोऽयं प्राज्यसाम्राज्यकल्पं वैदुष्योद्योतं पूज्यरामायणस्य ।  
 मुद्रालोकार्यं निर्ममे लोकवन्धं स्फीतोपोद्घातं सद्विमर्शप्रमाणम् ॥ ४१ ॥  
 भाष्यं चाचार्यकृतं माधवार्यानुव्याहारं बृहदारण्यकस्य ।  
 अद्वैतोदात्तविचारैर्विमृश्योपोद्घातेनालमकार्षीन्मनीषी ॥ ४२ ॥  
 अपि पुस्तककोशकलायां प्रतिपत्तिमधीत्य बुवानाम् ।  
 इतिहासविधेयविमर्शैरलिखन्मधुरं स निबन्धम् ॥ ४३ ॥  
 जिज्ञासामब्रह्मालम्बां निखिलभुवनजनकनिभः परात्मनिबोधनो  
 मद्रोदग्राध्यायागारप्रकटितदलपुटघटितां सपण्डितपामरम् ।  
 सूपन्यास्यच्चावन्ध्योक्तिर्विशकलितसदसदुदयो वदन्नधिकारवाग्  
 बीजं हृदं संसारद्रोर्निजहृदयवदनचरितप्रमुखापराजितः ॥ ४४ ॥



यदथो भदन्तपदमस्ति विबुधगिरि तस्य वाङ्मखः ।

निर्वचनमुचितमेष गुरुः कृतवान्सभद्रशुचिदन्तयुक्तिः ॥ ४५ ॥

सुन्दरपाण्ड्यो राजा चक्रे राजन्वर्ती महान्भूमिम् ।

यस्तस्याप्यपदानं वर्णितवान्सन्मुदे निबन्धे सः ॥ ४६ ॥

पुस्तककोशमहत्त्वं तेनोल्लिखितं च सर्वविदा ।

कोशयुगेवाचार्यः प्रतिपादयतेत्युपन्यासे ॥ ४७ ॥

नानार्थकानि काव्ये पदानि कर्त्रा मुहुः प्रयुक्तानि ।

पर्यायान्विमर्श ग्रन्थालयसङ्घपत्रिकया ॥ ४८ ॥

इत्थं शास्त्रं तन्नो काव्यं वा प्राक्तनं नवीनं नो ।

यत्राप्यदर्शयन्नो प्रभुत्वमार्यः सतां धुर्यः ॥ ४९ ॥

अमरगवीश्वराश्च बहुवः श्रुतिशास्त्रसरिद्धवधयनक्षमा अपि नवोत्थविमर्शपथे ।

स्खलितपदा इतीदमयशः शमयन्तु समे फलति यतोऽद्वयस्थितिरिति ध्रुवमादिदिशे ॥ ५० ॥

ग्रन्थाश्च लेखाश्चोदितास्तेनाऽसंख्या महान्तो रचितास्तथा ।

विदुषां व्याख्यानमालोद्धा उपपत्तिमदर्थपदश्रियः ॥ ५१ ॥

भाषाशास्त्रे नूत्ने ज्ञानं तस्याप्यनर्धरत्ननिधानम् ।

आसीत्पाश्चात्यानां सर्वगिरामीश्वरं विमर्शोन्नाहम् ॥ ५२ ॥

तद्वक्त्रपद्मसृष्टं सुवचःपीयूषमध्ययनपटवः ।

कर्णपुटाकलितरसं सान्त्रयमेवमवलम्बन्ते ॥ ५३ ॥

तस्य शिष्येण सङ्गृह्य प्राज्ञेनैकेन वाक्शास्त्रम् ।

सुप्रवीकितनिबद्धं तत्प्रकाशितमिहावन्ध्यम् ॥ ५४ ॥

रहस्यं चक्रमे धीमान्पतञ्जलिरिवापरः ।

वैयाकरणमाभाष्यं नेदिष्टं धाम वाक्श्रियः ॥ ५५ ॥

मीमांसकशास्त्रवारिधौ पूर्वं चोत्तरकेऽप्यशदसौ ।

प्लवनाभविमर्शनं घनं ह्याचार्यो निजशिष्यधीवरान् ॥ ५६ ॥

केचिद्वनिमस्रसौ च काव्यात्मानं प्रौढधियो विमृष्टवन्तः ।

इतरे तु सभासभोजभङ्गि ह्यार्यादर्शनसंस्कृतात्मसत्त्वाः ॥ ५७ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

११११

तरुणतरणिदीप्तिविद्योतमानस्य चाचार्यवर्यस्य केचिद्बुधाः

सकरुणमसृणेक्षणशालिताः पाणिनीया बह्वृत्प्रक्रियापद्धतीः ।

श्रमबहुलसहा विवेकेन सत्काशिकावृत्तिमुल्याः प्रसिद्धाकृतीः

श्रितकरलिपिपुस्तकाणि परीक्ष्य प्रबन्धैरवापुश्च सिद्धिं पराम् ॥ ५८ ॥

सुचरितनियमस्य सुशिक्षणमास च यस्य गुरोर्वह्नो महनीयगिरो

मनुजजनुपि निःश्वसितं द्यशनं सदनं जननी जनकः परमार्थफलम् ।

अभवदनघतत्त्वयुतं तद्गुदारसुजीवितमत्र सतामनुकार्यगुणं

यद्यमुदयभानुरुचा वचसा परिवर्तयते स्म जडानपि धीचतुरान् ॥ ५९ ॥

प्रतिदिनमुदयाच्च पूर्वमुत्थितः करोति स स्म सान्ध्यकृत्यमातमस्मपुण्ड्रकः स्वशिष्यजीवनं

भवनमधिवसन्पुरःस्थितं शिवालयस्य वेदनादनादिताम्रमहार्गं जपप्रसन्नवीः ।

चरति दिनमणौ नमोऽन्तरेऽर्थमर्पयन्कृतामराचनोऽतिथीनुपास्य योजनं व्यवसृज्य सुजीः

धृतशुभतिलकोऽपि चर्वयंश्च नागपत्रमागमन्महार्हापाठशालमात्मनो रथेन वेगिना ॥ ६० ॥

भूयोवृत्तान्निजशिष्यान्सुश्लोकचरितान्विपुलकीर्तिः ।

विदधे वृत्तविधिज्ञो वाचा धर्मं चरन्कृत्यैः ॥ ६१ ॥

काव्ये मङ्गलचारुमैहिरमहो गायन्गुरोर्वैभवं

काव्योद्यानसुमङ्गलं<sup>१</sup>रीन्द्रसुतं<sup>२</sup>सत्काश्ची<sup>३</sup>सपर्षा<sup>४</sup>नुगे ।

नानावृत्तविजृम्भितो विततसत्कर्मास्थितस्येशितुः

सम्पन्नश्चरिते गुरोः सुमधुरः सर्गस्तृतीयोऽन्यथे ॥ ६२ ॥

॥ तृतीयः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥



## ॥ चतुर्थः सर्गः ॥

कथं नु शिष्यो गुरुगौरवाद्यः संवर्णयन्नस्य गुणांश्च तृप्येत् ।

सङ्कीर्तयन्नीप्सितदेवताया भक्तोऽतिकल्याणगुणानिवाच्यान् ॥ १ ॥

कामातुरो वल्लभया वियुक्तस्तस्याश्च सौभाग्यगुणानशेषान् ।

ध्यायन्प्रगायन्कथयन्परस्मै स्वप्ने च चित्रे विलपल्लपन्वा ॥ २ ॥ (युग्मम्)

नित्यं सदाचारपरः स कृत्यं कृत्वा स्म विद्यालयमेति विद्वान् ।

तदा विलम्बेऽप्यधिकारिणस्तं जोषं तदोजोऽभिहताः प्रणेमुः ॥ ३ ॥

मैलापुरादेष सदा पदव्या विशालशान्तामलया महात्मा ।

पूर्वाब्धिकल्लोलभुजप्रसङ्गाद्रोमाश्चिताङ्गयेव गतो रथस्थः ॥ ४ ॥

पुरा नराकृष्टरथेन शालामदारुणो दारुकृतेन यातः ।

निषादसारथ्ययुजा तु पश्चात्स स्यन्दनेनैव सयन्त्रकेण ॥ ५ ॥

आचार्यमानोरुदयं च शिष्टा ह्युद्दीक्षमाणाः कुतुकेन शिष्याः ।

आनन्दितस्मेरमुखा विधेयास्तमागतं प्राञ्जलयः प्रणेमुः ॥ ६ ॥

अहो नु गाम्भीर्यदृढा गतिम्सा स्मितप्रभातं मुखमुज्ज्वलं तत् ।

रम्यः कुलीनोचित एष वेषस्तान्यश्मसारं हृदयं दृणन्ति ॥ ७ ॥

सामुद्रलक्ष्मीकृतमस्य लोकाराध्यं शरीरं वरलक्षणाढ्यम् ।

निष्कल्मषं स्मारयति स्म नूतं श्रीरामचन्द्रं पुरुषोत्तमं तम् ॥ ८ ॥

छत्रोपमं तस्य शिरो व्यराजतिस्नग्धैश्च कृष्णैर्बहुलैः सुकेशैः ।

उच्चैर्यथा सानुमतश्च शृङ्गं निषण्णसुश्यामलवारिदौघम् ॥ ९ ॥

बालेन्दुसच्छुक्तिविशालशङ्खो रेखात्रयाध्यासितसल्ललाटम् ।

भ्रुवौ विशालोन्नतचापबन्धू रक्तान्तनीलोत्पलमे च नेत्रे ॥ १० ॥

नासा च दार्घा शुकतुण्डकल्पा भ्राजत्पुटा स्निग्धरुचिश्च दृष्टिः ।

ओष्ठौ च बिम्बप्रतिमौ स्मिताभौ वक्त्रं च सौम्यं समसंवृतं तत् ॥ ११ ॥

रक्ता च जिह्वा समदीर्घरूपा स्निग्धा घनाः सद्गदना मनोज्ञाः ।

सुमांसलं तच्चिबुकं च कर्णौ व्यालम्बिनौ तौ विपुलौ समांसौ ॥ १२ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xxxix

गण्डावनिन्नावपि मांसपूर्णौ ते जत्रुणी गूढतरे विशालौ ।  
सुष्ठिष्टपीनावथ चांसदेशौ ग्रीवापि स कम्बुनिभा प्रणद्धा ॥ १३ ॥

कपाटनीकाशमथास्य वक्षोऽत्याजानुबाहू करिहस्तकल्पौ ।  
प्रोत्तानताम्रौ कमलामहस्तौ शङ्खारिमीनाङ्कतलावनिम्रौ ॥ १४ ॥

दृढे निगूढे मणिवन्धने ते तदुत्पिताः शोभनचिह्नरेखाः ।  
मवाङ्कितान्जुष्ठवरौ च दीर्घैः सत्पर्वभिर्ह्यङ्गुलयो नखोद्धैः ॥ १५ ॥

ताश्चापि सूक्ष्मा घनदीर्घरम्याः पृथूनतं तद्भृदयं समांसम् ।  
पार्श्वे मृदू मांसघने च सैही कटिः समो वा जठरो ह्युदारः ॥ १६ ॥

चतुर्वलीभङ्गमथास्य मध्यं ते जानुनी चोपचिते सभे च ।  
वृत्ते च जङ्घे चरणौ च कूर्मान्तौ प्रसक्ताङ्गुलिकोमलौ तौ ॥ १७ ॥

स्निग्धाश्च रोमत्वगनूनवर्णाः स्थूलास्थिता कान्तिमती स्थितिश्च ।  
नृदेवसत्त्वं गतिरार्पणी च च्छाया महीजा करिनिःस्वनोऽपि ॥ १८ ॥

गम्भीरनाभिस्वरसत्त्वयुक्तो विस्तीर्णवक्त्रालिकपूर्णवक्षाः ।  
षडुन्नतो ह्रस्वचतुष्टयोऽसावशोभतार्यो वत सप्तरक्तः ॥ १९ ॥

पाठालयं चैत्यनिजप्रकोष्ठे स्वच्छस्थितिं ग्रन्थचयं समीक्ष्य ।  
मत्तेभगत्या स सभामविक्षत्समं च कौतूहलिशिष्यचित्तम् ॥ २० ॥

उष्णीषपट्टेन सितेन सीतापतिप्रियस्याखिललोकनेतुः ।  
व्यरोचतास्योन्नतमुत्तमाङ्गं सशारदाभ्रौघमिवान्तरिक्षम् ॥ २१ ॥

न्यस्तागुरुस्थासकमस्य भालं विशालमारात्स्फुरदक्षियुग्मात् ।  
पर्यन्तविस्फारसुतारमिन्दोर्विभ्वं लसल्लक्ष्म जिगाय लक्ष्म्या ॥ २२ ॥

स्मेराननं भस्मविशुद्धभालं सुतारके नेत्रयुगे च वृत्तम् ॥ ।  
काचाक्षियुग्मं च गुरोरिमानि स्मरन्नरो नूनमुपैति मोहम् ॥ २३ ॥

मक्रञ्चुकं प्रांशुशरीरमुच्चैर्गतेर्घटीयन्त्रयुतं हि तस्य ।  
संव्यानसंवीतशिरोधि चासीत्पत्रोर्णवासो बहुमानपात्रम् ॥ २४ ॥



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

छात्रो गृहे कोऽपि कलासुमूर्तिर्यष्टिस्मिते हस्तमुखे दधानम् ।  
 भद्रासनासीनगुरोः प्रशस्यं सर्वर्णकालेख्यमकल्पयत्सत् ॥ २५ ॥  
 मध्याह्नतोऽध्यापयति स्म तत्र स्वर्गोहवच्छिष्यगणं क्रमेण ।  
 विश्रान्तिवर्जं परिमार्जितैना यावत्प्रदोषात्ययमस्तदोषम् ॥ २६ ॥  
 यावच्च सन्देहनिरासपूर्वं ह्यशेषशिष्यावलिमानसान्तः ।  
 प्रबोधजानन्दविधुप्रकाशो नोदेति तावद् व्यवृणोत्तमर्थम् ॥ २७ ॥  
 तस्योपदेशसमृह्यालवोऽपि प्रगे च सायं विबुधाः सखायः ।  
 ऋष्याश्रमप्रख्यमुपेत्य गेहं कालं मुदेव क्षणमप्यनैषुः ॥ २८ ॥  
 परश्शताः सत्त्वसुबुद्धिविद्याधर्माधिका मित्रगणेऽप्यभूवन् ।  
 श्रीरामसस्त्रामिशिवाभिधानौ स श्रीनिवासोऽस्य च सत्यमूर्तिः ॥ २९ ॥  
 अन्येऽप्यसङ्ख्याः श्रुतकीर्तियोऽद्वा महात्मनो ज्ञानतपोगुणाल्या ।  
 आकृष्टचित्ता बहुमन्वते स्मानर्घं च सौहार्दममुष्य सन्तः ॥ ३० ॥  
 तदा च मैलापुरमाहुरार्याः पुण्यात्मभिः श्रोत्रियवावदूकैः ।  
 सुरालयैरभ्युषितं बुधोद्भैर्वाणसीक्षेत्रमथान्यदिकस्थम् ॥ ३१ ॥  
 ये प्रौढविद्यां व्यवहारदानं ह्युशन्ति पण्यक्रयणं स्म मर्त्याः ।  
 ग्रन्थाण्डजप्राक्तनवस्तुगोहप्राकारदीपालयदर्शनानि ॥ ३२ ॥  
 ते प्रत्यहं मद्रपुरं समेत्य स्थानानि चित्राणि विलोक्य चान्धिम् ।  
 मैलापुरेऽभ्यर्च्य कपालिशम्भुं यान्ति स्म शान्तिं मनसि प्रहृष्टे ॥ ३३ ॥ (युग्मम्)  
 तत्राग्रहारेऽप्रसरे सुधाम्नामुदङ्मठालौ न्यवसद् गुरुर्नः ।  
 स पञ्चमे सन्ननि सिद्धविद्यः प्रगञ्चसारे सुरसन्नकल्पे ॥ ३४ ॥  
 न केवलं सोऽतिथिदेवपूजां तत्रातनोच्चापि तु बन्धुतायै ।  
 दीनाय विद्यार्थिगणाय नित्यं मिष्टं सदाहारमदान्मुदार्यः ॥ ३५ ॥  
 स निर्धनेभ्यो निजशिष्यवृन्दे साहाय्यकं कारुणिकोऽत्यतानीत् ।  
 वित्तस्य दानेन हि तेष्वपश्यद् विश्वेश्वरं साधुरकिञ्चनं सः ॥ ३६ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xli

अभोजयद्विप्रवरांश्च शिष्यान्सर्वादितः पर्वसु गर्वमुक्तः ।  
 तथा हि पौत्रीजनिवार्षिकोद्यन्महेऽन्नमन्यैः सह चादयत्तैः ॥ ३७ ॥  
 ज्येष्ठः कुमारो हि गुरोस्तदानीमभूद् व्रतस्नात उदात्तवृत्तः ।  
 अशेषसङ्गीतकलानुरक्तो भाषापटुश्शेषगिरिः स नाम्ना ॥ ३८ ॥  
 सदा गुरुः संस्कृतसेविकाया व्याख्यातवान्सत्समितेः सभासु ।  
 स्वरेण नातिद्रुतहारिणाऽसौ गीर्वाणवाण्यैव गभीरमर्थम् ॥ ३९ ॥  
 स जातु शाकुन्तलचित्रवर्णं सभापतिः श्लोकमथो विमृश्य ।  
 व्याख्यन्नवोनेन पथा प्रवक्ता सविस्मयानन्दिषु पार्षदेषु ॥ ४० ॥  
 औचिल्यवर्जं न कदापि वाक्यं प्रायुङ्क्त वेश्मन्यपि धीरसत्त्वः ।  
 दृष्ट्वा विचित्रां जनताप्रवृत्तिं प्रासारयत्प्रातिभमत्र चक्षुः ॥ ४१ ॥  
 रामाऽथ काचिद्विपणौ कुलीना जघन्यवेषाऽऽभरणप्रलोभात् ।  
 दृष्टामुना जातु सुवर्णकारालङ्कारकर्मोच्चितचित्तदृष्टिः ॥ ४२ ॥  
 लावण्ययुक्ता गृहिणीयमद्वा न शोभते भूषणवञ्चिताङ्गी ।  
 तथा रसाढ्या कवितोत्तमा सा निसर्गसंस्कारविहीनभावा ॥ ४३ ॥  
 इत्येवमर्थं गुरुरात्मचित्तेऽवधार्य सद्यः सृजति स्म पद्यम् ।  
 सचेतसां हृद्यमथानवद्यं रसेन गङ्गाधरसन्निकर्षम् ॥ ४४ ॥  
 स वर्णधर्मान्स्वगृहेऽनुतिष्ठन्नन्यत्र चाद्वैतसतत्त्वतां ताम् ।  
 शुनि श्रपाके गवि चाग्रजन्मन्यवैक्षत ब्रह्म समं समन्तात् ॥ ४५ ॥  
 अथैकदा साराधिरन्त्यजन्मा यियासुरन्यत्र गुरोरनुज्ञाम् ।  
 अवाप्य तत्रापि गतो विलम्बं महान्तमाचेष्टत शोचनीयम् ॥ ४६ ॥  
 ततो निवृत्तो गुरुणानुयुक्तो याचन्क्षमामेवमवोचदेवः ।  
 दोषं स्वमाबुध्य “ विभो मदीयं व्याहारमीषच्छ्रवसोः कुरुष्व ॥ ४७ ॥  
 त्वदत्तमन्नं ह्युपभुज्य सम्यक् शरीरमेतन्मम सम्प्रवृद्धम् ।  
 तन्मा जनं विद्धि कृतघ्नमेनं तथापि दोषोऽजनि मन्महात्मन् ॥ ४८ ॥



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

स्वामी क्षमः क्षन्तुमतोऽपराधं विज्ञाय तत्कारणमद्य मत्तः ।

प्राप्ते मयि ग्राममहोभिरल्पैरासीद्विवाहो भविताऽनुजायाः ॥ ४९ ॥

कुलं मदीयं विपुलं यदासीज्जातं त्विदानीं विरलं करालात् ।

विधेस्ततस्तत्र शुभे विवाहेऽत्यावश्यकः सन्निधिरेव मेऽभूत् ॥ ५० ॥

इत्युक्तवन्तं तमपृच्छदार्यः कुतूहली तत्कुलशूलहेतुम् ।

स प्रत्यवादीदथ किं वदानि स्वामिन्विचितां नृमनःप्रवृत्तिम् ॥ ५१ ॥

मद्वंशजाता बहवः स्वधर्मं विहाय धर्मान्तरमम्बराभम् ।

आश्रित्य बान्धव्यगुणस्य बाढं विच्छेदमैच्छन्कुलपांसनास्ते ॥ ५२ ॥

प्रचारकास्त्वन्यपथस्य वस्त्रैर्वित्तेन भैषज्यचयेन मर्त्यान् ।

प्रलोभयन्तश्च विवर्धयन्ते स्वकीयसङ्ख्यां प्रबलाः प्रयत्नैः ॥ ५३ ॥

अतो मदीया अपि बान्धवास्ते तद्वत्तवित्तेन सुमोदमानाः ।

कुलं स्वकीयं सहसा च देवान्विस्मृत्य धन्यां विदुरात्मनीतिम् ॥ ५४ ॥

तदा गुरुः प्राह धनं नराणां प्रायः प्रियं प्राणगणात्परार्थम् ।

वाञ्छन्ति सर्वे तदिदं यतोऽमी यात्रां सुखं साधयितुं क्षमेरन् ॥ ५५ ॥

एवं स्थिते नश्वरजीवितेऽस्मिन्नालम्बिता तत्पदवी त्वया किम् ।

येनात्र दारिद्र्यविगर्हितं ते सज्जीवितं स्यान्मधुरं समर्थम् ॥ ५६ ॥

श्रुत्वा वचः स्वामिन एतदज्ञः प्राज्ञस्य वाचं पुनराददे सः ।

“ सर्वेऽनुतिष्ठन्ति जगत्यवश्यं माहेश्वरीमत्र सतीं सदेच्छाम् ॥ ५७ ॥

अस्मिन्पुराणाभिजने जनिं मे दत्त्वेश्वरो व्यत्ययमिच्छति द्राक् ।

अतस्तदिच्छां बहुमान्य पूर्वोपास्यं न हातुं प्रभुरस्मि धर्मम् ॥ ५८ ॥

दुर्मेधसोऽप्यस्य महार्थयुक्तामाकर्ण्य वाचं चकितः स चेमाम् ।

श्रेयान्स्वधर्मो हरिणेति दिष्टोऽप्यशिक्षितेनावगतोऽयमर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

कथं च संस्कारविभावितात्मा जघन्यजातावपि दृश्यते ना ।

मध्याह्नसूर्याभमतश्च तत्त्वं सनातनं मान्यतमं चकास्ति ॥ ६० ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xliii

द्वितीयमालोच्य गुरुः परस्ताच्छिष्यानवादीदुभयोर्भिदां सः ।  
 संस्कारशिक्षास्पदयोर्हि सन्ति ग्राम्येषु सौहार्दसुबुद्धिमन्तः ॥ ६१ ॥  
 औचित्यसौहित्यचणो हि लोके स्वकर्मणैवानिशमुज्जिहीते ।  
 कविस्तथौचित्यवशेन काव्ये स्वानन्दभाक् स्वच्छयशोमहिम्ना ॥ ६२ ॥  
 औचित्यमेवानुसरन्ति सर्वेऽलङ्काररीतिध्वनिवक्रताद्याः ।  
 इत्येतदर्थं गुरुराह पद्यं काव्यात्मजिज्ञासुकृते विकल्पे ॥ ६३ ॥  
 कदाचिदद्वैतसभानिकेतं सिन्धोस्तटे मङ्गलपत्तनेऽसौ ।  
 सुसंस्कृतव्याहृतिनन्दिलोक विकासयामास शुभे मुहूर्ते ॥ ६४ ॥  
 एतत्सभावल्लभ आसविद्यो वैद्याग्रणीर्वेङ्कटरामशास्त्रो ।  
 दृष्ट्वा कफार्तिं तु गुरोरदिक्षक्षेमाय नित्यं मधु सेवनीयम् ॥ ६५ ॥  
 चिकित्सकादेशमथानु नित्यं प्रवर्तमानः स च कासपीडाम् ।  
 प्रायेण यत्नैरशकद्विजेतुं ह्यसाध्यमस्तीह किमीश्वराणाम् ॥ ६६ ॥  
 वृत्तं तदज्ञातचरं परेषां स वश्यशिष्याय शशंस पूज्यः ।  
 स्नेहेन जात्वात्मजसन्निभाय प्रायः कनीयस्सु सतां ममत्वम् ॥ ६७ ॥  
 षष्ठ्या तदाऽयं शरदां प्रवृद्धो विरम्य चाण्णामलविश्वतीर्थात् ।  
 स्वग्रामगेहे चकमे निवासं विहङ्गमः सायमिवात्मनीडे ॥ ६८ ॥  
 तपोवनप्रख्यतदग्रहारे गणेशगौरीगुरुदृक्पवित्रे ।  
 सदाश्रमश्रीप्रशमे स गेहे ध्यानेन धर्मेण दिनान्यनैषीत् ॥ ६९ ॥  
 जरोत्यवैक्लव्यत्रलेन कासक्लेशेन कायः क्रमशोऽस्य खिन्नः ।  
 मेजे महौजा अपि रुग्णशय्यां सायन्तनोऽस्ताद्रितटीमिवार्कः ॥ ७० ॥  
 भीष्मोपमं रुक्शरशय्यमायं स्फुरत्प्रभामण्डलसंवृतास्यम् ।  
 धर्मप्रिया बान्धवशिष्यसङ्घा ह्युपासतेमं वचनामृतोत्काः ॥ ७१ ॥  
 शाम्यद्भुताशप्रतिकाशमन्तर्ज्वलत्तदिङ्गालशिखाभशक्तिम् ।  
 अश्रौषुरश्रान्तमर्तिं तमेते ब्रह्मैक्यवाक्योपनिषत्प्रवाचम् ॥ ७२ ॥



## KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI BIRTH-CENTENARY VOLUME

ततोऽन्वतिष्ठंश्च गुरोः सुताद्या आयुष्यमारोग्यकरं च होमम् ।

जपं च मृत्युञ्जयमाशुसिद्धिं पारायणं भागवतस्य वेदैः ॥ ७३ ॥

पुण्येन तं गोधनधान्यदानोत्पन्नेन चारोग्यमवापदार्तम् ।

चोरैर्हृतं द्रव्यमित्रात्र राज्ञा प्रभाविणा स्वामिसकाशमाशु ॥ ७४ ॥

यदा हि दिष्टान्तमुपैति जीवस्तदा न कर्माणि तमौषधानि ।

त्रातुं समर्थानि भवन्ति मृत्योर्यदायुषो न प्रभुरार्यवैद्यः ॥ ७५ ॥

त्रिषष्टिमाने त्वथ हायनेऽस्याक्रान्तं शरीरं बलिनाऽऽमयेन ।

हठाद्यथा पौरुषस्य दुर्गं नृशंसकृत्येन बलेन शत्रोः ॥ ७६ ॥

व्याधिप्रदीर्णाव्यग्रोऽपि चित्तं प्रत्याहरिष्यन्विषयावलेः सः ।

वेदान्तवाक्यान्यजपत्प्रशान्तो वक्त्रे च मन्दस्मितमादधानः ॥ ७७ ॥

विचारयन्नो गुरुरात्मनिष्ठश्चरं प्रहाणां च दशाविपाकम् ।

शरीरनीडोड्डयनाय कालं प्राणद्विजस्यागतमन्वबोधि ॥ ७८ ॥

नीचस्थमन्दस्य दशा हि मृत्युप्रदा व्ययस्थस्य शशाङ्गतोऽसौ ।

प्रवर्तमाने तमसोऽपहारेऽन्तरे शनेः कर्मगतिर्हि गूढा ॥ ७९ ॥

सुभानुवर्षे रविवासरेऽथो स्वक्षेत्रोऽर्के गुरुसौम्ययोश्च ।

तुङ्गस्थयोस्तौलिनि वा हिमांशौ प्राणान्प्रभाते हृदयेऽरुणत्सः ८० ॥

भ्रूमध्यसंविष्टदृशं विलोक्याचार्यं बुधास्तं परितो निषण्णाः ।

आचम्य नामान्यजपंश्च विष्णोरीशस्य मन्त्रोपनिषत्प्रपाठैः ॥ ८१ ॥

तदा मुहूर्तेन परं तदात्मज्योतिश्शिरस्तः स्फुरदंशुजालम् ।

निर्गत्य चाकाशपथेन वेगात्प्राधावदर्काभिमुखं विचित्रम् ॥ ८२ ॥

“ हा हन्त हन्तस्तमितोऽधुना हृत्पद्माकरोद्बोधकरः प्रभाते ।

प्रभाकरः सर्वजनप्रतीक्ष्यः शोकाय लोकस्य च दिष्टदोषात् ॥ ८३ ॥

एतादृशं लोकसुबन्धुमासं वात्सल्यकारुण्यसुपूर्णचित्तम् ।

आचारचारुं ह्युपदिष्टदिष्टं कदा पुनर्द्रक्ष्यति सद्गुरुं ना ॥ ८४ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xiv

सरस्वतीवैदिकपद्धती ते महात्मताऽतः स्मरणावशेषः ।  
 जाता ह्यकस्मान्निगमागमानां वैशारदी संस्कृतवाग्मिता च ॥ ८५ ॥  
 सन्तीह विद्वद्वृषभा महान्तोऽप्येकैकतन्त्रे सुधियो विशिष्टाः ।  
 सर्वेषु तन्त्रेषु गुणेषु तद्वन्नाभूद् भविष्यत्यथ सार्वभौमः ॥ ८६ ॥  
 विभूतिमत्येवमुदात्तसत्त्वे यातेऽग्रहारो दिवमस्ततेजाः ।  
 ना नष्टदृष्टिस्त्रिदिवादिवाधो अष्टोऽजनीन्दुस्तमसा च लुप्तः ॥ ८७ ॥  
 उच्चैर्विलपैरिति सज्जनानां सबाष्पधारैरतिदुःखभाजाम् ।  
 अकालजीमूतघटावृतोऽयं मन्येऽग्रहारः सहसा बभूव ॥ ८८ ॥  
 प्रभातवातोऽपि ववौ न शीतः पिकस्तदा नो मधुरं चुकूज ।  
 शोकातिरेकादभवन्नितान्तं प्रासादघण्टाः स्खलितस्वनाश्च ॥ ८९ ॥  
 शोकाभितप्तं हृदयारविन्दं लोकस्य मित्रो भगवानवेक्ष्य ।  
 द्रुतं तदाश्वासयितुं ह्युदग्रैः करैर्वियत्यूर्ध्वमदर्शि गच्छन् ॥ ९० ॥  
 पितृक्रियास्वाचरितासु सम्यक् सुतेन चारूढविरिञ्चिलोकः ।  
 ब्रह्मर्षिभिः साकमशोभतेज्यो भास्वानिवोच्चैर्ब्रतिवालखिल्यैः ॥ ९१ ॥  
 मद्रङ्गरे मद्रपुरेऽर्चनायै शिष्याः सखायश्च समेत्य तस्य ।  
 गुरोः कृतीः ख्यापयितुं विमर्शं तादृक्प्रतिष्ठानमुपाक्रमन्त ॥ ९२ ॥  
 शिष्यप्रशिष्यान्वयहन्निवासः कर्माणि काव्यानि च कारयन्तैः ।  
 विद्याविकासं तनुते गुरुर्नो यशश्शरीरेण विराजमानः ॥ ९३ ॥  
 त्वमद्य मत्प्रेष्ठगणेशरूपो गुरोऽन्तरात्मा नुदसि क्रियायै ।  
 दुष्कर्मजालाजनतां निवार्य प्रेम्णा तदस्मत्प्रणतीः प्रतीच्छ ॥ ९४ ॥  
 त्वया कियन्तो गुरुविघ्नराजा महोपकाराश्चरिता ह्यवर्ण्याः ।  
 ममाप्यनर्हस्य पुरोऽभिवृद्धै वरेण्यकारुण्यभरेण पूर्वम् ॥ ९५ ॥  
 तथापि मायावशवर्तिनाद्धा नानुष्ठिता देव मया त्वदाज्ञाः ।  
 भवाटवीस्वादुमधुप्रलिप्सुस्वान्तेन विस्मृत्य तदुग्रसत्त्वान् ॥ ९६ ॥



सर्वापराधान्क्षमतां भवान्मे तन्वा कृतान्वा मनसा दशासु ।

जाग्रत्प्रधानासु दयाद्रचेताः पितेव पुत्रस्य कविः कवीनाम् ॥ ९७ ॥

निजाधमर्ण्यं विपुलं त्वयीत्यं कथं गुरो जन्मशतेन सम्यक् ।

भवान्यपाकर्तुमहं समर्थश्चिन्ता ममेत्यद्य भिनत्ति चित्तम् ॥ ९८ ॥

त्वद्भक्तविद्यागुणसम्प्रयोगात्सत्काव्यमाल्यं ग्रथितं शताब्दे ।

सभक्तिगन्धं च महोऽर्पये तेऽलङ्कारसत्पल्लवमङ्घ्रिपद्मे ॥ ९९ ॥

समागता विश्वमहानुभावा महोत्सवे जन्मशताब्दहेतौ ।

त्वां पूजयिष्यन्ति च संस्कृताचार्यताः कृतार्था गुरुवारणास्यम् ॥ १०० ॥

पौरस्त्यपाश्चात्यविमर्शकोद्वैस्त्वदीयसेवासमितेः सभासु ।

सारस्वती साधु मुहुर्नमस्याऽनुष्ठीयते शास्त्रविवेकदीपैः ॥ १०१ ॥

मया गुरो पूर्वमथैकदैवं ह्याज्ञापितेनात्र च वाङ्मयं तत् ।

तपो व्यधायि प्रयतेन गीतामुद्दिश्य गीर्वाणगिरां महिम्ना ॥ १०२ ॥

त्वमद्य सद्ब्रह्मपदप्रतिष्ठो ध्वान्तप्रनष्टान्कृपणान्मुदा नः ।

स्खलद्गतीन्स्वान्पृथुकान्नयंश्चापवर्गमार्गं च दयाधनोऽब्ध्याः ॥ १०३ ॥

त्वया हृदन्तर्वसता जनोऽयं सम्प्रेरितः काव्यमिदं ह्यकार्षीत् ।

तत्त्वं प्रसन्नः प्रतिगृह्य पायाः सुदक्षिणारूपमिदं गुरो माम् ॥ १०४ ॥

विश्वात्मस्तव सामसत्त्वतपसां शक्त्या नराणां मनो-

रोगा धर्मविरोधनास्तिकनयप्रख्याश्च दैत्येरिताः ।

नश्यन्तु द्रुतमत्र मर्त्यहृदयाकाशे प्रकाशोऽञ्जले

विज्ञानद्युमणिश्च संस्कृतमहा विद्योततां श्रेयसे ॥ १०५ ॥



## GURUCARITAM

xlvii

गुरुगणपतिमधाराध्य दृढं सुपद्या-

त्मककृतिपथचारी तुष्यतीषद्दृढीत्यम् ।

अनृण इव जनोऽयं प्रेरितस्तत्कटाक्षैः

किमसुलभमिह स्यात्सद्गुरौ नः प्रसन्ने ॥ १०६ ॥

वर्षे रौद्रे च मासो जलधरनिकरासारसम्भूरिताशे

शुक्लेऽर्धे श्रावणस्य प्रतिपदि शशिनो वासरेऽनन्तरायम् ।

याते तज्जन्मतोऽस्मिन्गुरुणि च शतकेऽत्युत्सवैर्वत्सराणां

सर्गैस्तद्ब्रह्मभूयावधि गुरुचरितं पूर्तिमागाच्चतुर्भिः ॥ १०७ ॥

॥ चतुर्थः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥

ॐ तत्सत्





॥ परिशिष्टम् ॥

## तृतीयसर्गस्य च्छन्दोविचितिः

(१) शार्दूलविक्रीडितम् (२) सग्वरा (३) सुवदना (४) सुवृत्ता (५) शिखरिणी (६) मन्दाक्रान्ता  
 (७) वृषभचरितं हरिणी वा. (८) प्रसभम् (९) उपेन्द्रवज्रा (१०) उपजातिः (११) मालती (१२) अपरवक्त्रम्.  
 (१३) विलम्बितगतिः पृथ्वी वा. (१४) पुष्पिताम्रा (१५) इन्द्रवंशा (१६) स्वागता (१७) द्रुतपदम्  
 (१८) रुचिरा. (१९) प्रहर्षणीयम् (२०) दोधकम् (२१) मालिनी. (२२) भ्रमरविलसिता. (२३)  
 मत्तमयूरम्. (२४) मणिगुणनिकरः (२५) हरिणप्लुतम् (२६) ललितपदम्. (२७) शालिनी. (२८)  
 रथोद्धता. (२९) विलासिनी. (३०) वसन्ततिलका (३१) इन्द्रवज्रा (३२) अनवसिता. (३३) लक्ष्मीः  
 (३४) प्रमिताक्षरा. (३५) स्थिरः (३६) पुटा (३७) तोटकम् (३८) वंशपत्रपतितम् (३९) ललिता (४०)  
 भुजङ्गप्रयातम्. (४१) वैश्वदेवी. (४२) ऊर्मिमाला. (४३) वितानम्. (४४) भुजङ्गविजृम्भितम्. (४५)  
 उद्गता (विषमवृत्तं). (४६) गीतिः (४७) उपगीतिः (४८) मुखचपला (४९) जघनचपला. (५०) नकुटकम् -  
 (५१) विलासम् (विषम) (५२) स्कन्धकम्. (५३) पथ्या. (५४) वक्त्रम्. (५५) श्लोकः (५६)  
 वैतालीयम्. (५७) औपच्छन्दसिकम्. (५८) चण्डवृष्टिप्रयातः (दण्डकः) (५९) वर्णकदण्डकः (६०)  
 समुद्रदण्डकः (६१) विपुला (६२) शार्दूलविक्रीडितम्.















